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This thesis aims to explore the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Egypt on both mass and elite 
opinion before, during and after the First World War, with a particular focus on the 1919 
Revolution. 
The research work covers the evolution of Egypt’s nationalist movement – from the quelling of 
the ‘Urabi Revolt by British troops in the late nineteenth century, which resulted in the invasion 
and Occupation of Egypt in 1882, until the wartime formulation of the right to self-determination 
for all colonised peoples and the post-War settlement by victorious world leaders at the Paris 
Peace Conference in January 1919.  
The ‘Urabi Revolt initially began as an effort to restore the rights and standing of native 
Egyptian servicemen in the Army, but this developed into a wider campaign across the country 
that increasingly tackled broader national grievances, including political independence from both 
the British and Ottoman Empires. ‘Urabi presented these issues against the background of his 
country’s Islamic identity, suggesting it was a vital part of Egypt’s status as a strong and 
prosperous nation-state and therefore pledged to protect it. The religious scholars engaged in the 
struggle provided the intellectual thinking that underpinned and justified Egypt’s nationalist 
movement. The ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 – during which the phrase “Egypt for the 
Egyptians” was coined – ultimately involved ordinary men and women who believed themselves 
to be part of a single nation: their aspirations were always framed within both a nationalistic and 
an Islamic context.  
The Occupation, and the particularly reactionary conduct of British soldiers during the Taba 
Crisis and the Dinshawai Incident in the same year of 1906, led to the expression of anti-
Imperialist ire and the rapid politicisation of the country. Egypt’s intellectual elite disseminated 
radical ideas among the entire population, triggering a dynamic that would propel the people 
towards the 1919 Revolution. 
Anti-British resentment intensified under the Protectorate as there was widespread consensus in 
Egypt that the country had been plundered by a colonising power during the First World War. 
This galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before as the British presence had evolved 





The wartime and post-War period saw the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson internationalise the 
rhetoric of self-determination as attempts were made at moulding a new world order. Wilson’s 
words had a great appeal to Egyptian nationalists who viewed these promises as an opportunity 
to break away from British colonial rule. It was in fact Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Russian 
Bolshevik leader, who had spent fourteen years between 1903 and 1917 theorising the concept of 
“self-determination”, before Wilson globalised it as a “legitimising” ideal. The ideological 
rivalry between the two politicians during the war era certainly helped to create an “international 
self-determination moment”– one that would have resounding repercussions for the Egyptian 
nationalist movement.  
A wide range of disaffected groups coalesced around the call for independence by the nationalist 
leader Saʿad Zaghlul during the March 1919 Revolution. Wilson’s Fourteen Points – the 
American President’s heady principles – infused unprecedented expectations into downtrodden 
Egyptian activist circles. But Zaghlul underlined the paradox between discourse at the Paris 
Conference and British actions in the real world. There was a deep irony in the sight of a brutal 
British Army subduing nationalist hopes in Egypt, while these same hopes were being put 
forward in Paris as the very basis of reformed international arrangements. 
The feminist element to this movement was particularly powerful, as women rallied under the 
“Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. But as always, they were used as convenient and efficient 
expedient personnel to attain political goals and not gender equality. Bitterness and 
disillusionment were nonetheless a drive for Egyptian women determined to pursue their cause 
for emancipation. 
Intense turmoil generated panic among those upholding British rule, and showed how ill-
prepared they were to deal with the situation. This culminated in the transformation of Anglo-
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The Arguments of the Thesis and Historiographical Review 
 
Using a few words to encapsulate the importance of a subject which came to dominate his 
distinguished career, the British journalist, diplomat and historian Sir Valentine Chirol (1852 –1929) 
wrote towards the end of his life: “The Egyptian question is bound up with a large part of the 
world’s history for the last hundred years.”1 
That this view was held by a passionate Imperialist committed to the protection and indeed 
expansion of the British Empire in no way undermines its strength. Anyone looking to understand 
and explain world affairs – and particularly Middle Eastern affairs – over the past two centuries 
would certainly do well to centre their studies on Egypt. Factors which have prevailed over the 
country’s history throughout this period have included the fight between foreign powers for strategic 
and economic interests within its borders, and the rise of militant Islam. Such issues are crucial in 
the modern world, with an analysis of their effect on Egypt’s recent history providing universal 
lessons. 
While numerous academic titles have been an inspiration for this research, professional and personal 
contact with Khaled Saʿad Zaghlul, the grandson of the national hero of the 1919 Revolution and 
former reporter for the French edition of the newspaper Al-Ahram, has also been a source of 
motivation. Saʿad Zaghlul was the key figure of the anti-British Revolution. Although much has 
been written about Saʿad Zaghlul this thesis proposes different theoretical, diplomatic and political 
insights.  
A fruitful collaboration with Khaled Saʿad Zaghlul has facilitated access to invaluable, original 
documents held in Egypt on the topic. This allowed for a new perspective on the development of the 
Egyptian nationalist movement and on the colonial relations between the British and the Egyptians 
in an immediate post-war era vastly influenced by America. 
 
1Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem, London, Macmillan and Co., 1920, p.vii. 
The book grew out of a series of articles he contributed to The Times from Egypt between October 1919 and April 1920. 
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This thesis traces the modern origins of nationalism in Egypt to the ‘Urabi Revolt in the late 
nineteenth century. Specifically, it presents a novel historiographical framework that challenges the 
view held by most scholars of Egyptian nationalism that regards the revolt to have been a mere 
“proto-nationalist” expression of an Egyptian national consciousness in its infancy. Not only do we 
highlight the profoundly nationalistic nature of ‘Urabi’s movement – one determined to gain 
political freedom from both the British and Ottoman Empires – but we also demonstrate its 
distinctly Islamic character. This is done by examining the significant contribution of the religious 
scholars to the intellectual articulation of nationalistic thought. Both aspects – nationalistic and 
Islamic – have been greatly underplayed by wider academic theories pertaining to the advancement 
of particular nationalisms in the Muslim world.  
Crucially, this thesis aims at bridging a gap between Western and Oriental history by adding an 
Egyptian dimension to a field which has largely been covered through an Anglo-Saxon or purely 
Egyptian lens. This work is therefore an attempt to provide a thorough and fresh multi-lateral 
approach to this question by uniting and comparing disparate literature from five countries – the 
United Kingdom, Egypt, the United States of America, Russia, and France, where the Paris Peace 
Conference took place after the First World War in 1919. A paramount angle of this examination – 
and a considerable strength – is that it relies on the domestic and diplomatic archives of most of 
these countries.  
Another major theoretical argument of this thesis discusses at length the political application of 
nationalism, which is the principle of self-determination – a concept that seeks to base politics on 
the nation-state as a sovereign entity. During the war, diplomatic language came to encompass 
Wilson’s notion of “self-determination”. The U.S. President imbued this rhetoric with his very 
personal comprehension of morality and what was right for a new world order. Wilson’s 
legitimising utterances had, in fact, appropriated Lenin’s views of “self-determination” and had 
given them a new orientation. Indeed, the idea of “self-determination” that had such an abiding 
influence on the 1919 Egyptian Revolution has its roots in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s political 
discourse during the period 1903 to 1917. The difference was that the Russian had championed self-
determination as liberty and equality for all, including freedom from colonisation and the right to an 
independent state. Lenin conceded that violent revolution could be justified if the ultimate goal was 
freedom as equal rights. In turn, Wilson’s reaction to Lenin’s uncompromising ideology was to 
project “self-determination” as a stabilising standard that would ensure peace globally. Lenin’s 
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terminology thus provided the trigger to Wilson internationalising the phrase in 1918, as the world 
considered the First World War and its aftermath. In this sense, Wilson developed the philosophy of 
“self-determination” from a radical doctrine into a liberal-conservative one. 
Thus it was the pronouncements of both leaders, made in the context of wartime competing stances, 
which contributed to the emergence of an “international self-determination moment”. The much-
vaunted, rhetorical idealism of mainly western statesmen at the post-war Paris Peace Conference in 
1919 certainly stirred a nationalist consciousness in Egypt. However, Egyptians were only too well 
aware that lofty beliefs about self-determination had done nothing to prevent the British from using 
maximum force to crush a popular uprising in their own country. The pragmatic, and far from 
utopian, reality was that the Egyptian Revolution grew directly out of the Peace Conference which 
took place in the French capital in January 1919. 
The immediate post-First World War period was a watershed in the transformation of colonial 
relations vis-à-vis countries like Egypt. Not only was it a time when Egyptian nationalism gathered 
an unstoppable momentum, but it culminated in a genuinely grass-roots insurgency perceived as the 
first modern revolution. This is to say that it saw religious, economic, political, class and even 
gender determinants all converging. In equally contemporary fashion, it also demonstrated the 
power of both elitist and populist opinion. This was manifested in the views of the highbrow, 
intellectual individual Egyptians who eventually made their way to the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, to the comments of the journalists who produced Egypt’s burgeoning popular press at the 
time. Mass wartime mobilisation in the countryside led to nationalist resentment spreading out of the 
cities and towns, across the whole country, as an entire people began to focus their ire on the British 
Empire. 
For the first time in history, upper-class Egyptian women participated in rioting: they openly 
demonstrated for a political purpose and thus showed their solidarity with the nationalist cause. 
Nationalism was an obvious vehicle for feminist demands too. So it was that two dynamic and 
overlapping groups – nationalists and feminists – merged to create a formidable campaigning force 
which would have a compelling effect on the progress of Egyptian society. Radical calls for change 
being made by a pioneering women’s movement strengthened the agenda for self-rule. In turn, 
feminists benefitted from their close association with the nationalists, using their connections to 
build up their own power base. However, we argue that after Egypt won nominal independence in 
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1922, many of the male nationalists who had assisted those fighting for female equality became less 
enthusiastic about the women’s crusade. Feminists learned a crucial lesson from this development – 
they could only really succeed if they established their own independent political organisation. 
In this section we review a number of frameworks to attempt to explain this sense of disillusionment 
experienced by Egyptian feminists in the wake of the 1919 Revolution. We put forward varied 
theories to analyse the changes in the roles and status of women, from the Arab world and beyond, 
following their contribution to revolutionary moments in their own societies. It is through this 
scholarly prism that we assess the Revolution of 1919 as a turning point in the history of Egyptian 
feminism. We conclude that the Egyptian feminist movement was a derivative of western feminism; 
a by-product of the nationalist struggle; and that it only came into being after the nationalist gains 
were achieved. 
All of the above mentioned actors played a decisive part in obtaining Egypt’s nominal 
independence, and forging a spirit of citizenship that would ultimately allow all sections of society 
to engage in the democratic running of their country. 
This thesis adopts both a thematic and chronological approach and we will now, in turn, focus on the 
salient historiographical themes under study in order to provide theoretical and methodological 
guidelines to our research.  
The Theoretical Tension between Islam and Nationalism in the specific context of the 
‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 in Egypt 
The theory and historiography of Islam’s place in the rise of nationalism in the Muslim world has 
developed considerably over recent decades, but there is a marked absence of specific case studies 
related to this field. Our first chapter is therefore an attempt to redress the balance, by focusing on 
empirical evidence displaying the impact the Muslim faith had on nationalist aspirations in Egypt.  
We specifically draw on new theoretical perspectives of nation and nationalism while offering key 
experiences in the history of the country between the years 1879-1882 as an example of how 
important Islam was to the progress of nationalism. Events such as the ‘Urabi Revolt illustrate how 
Egyptians became the first large Muslim group to fight for their own nation within the Ottoman 
Empire.  
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There was of course opposition to the Ottoman Sultan throughout the nineteenth century, in all parts 
of the Empire. But the Egyptian nationalistic revolt came at a time when the Ottoman Empire was 
by no means facing collapse, as it was at the end of the First World War in 1918, when nationalism 
turned into a commanding tool for change.2 
Most of those exploring Egyptian nationalism have analysed Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi’s dissenting 
movement as one composed of indigenous revolutionaries who took on the local elite in Egypt, and 
also European colonial forces who were backing those in power, between 1879 and 1882. But 
scholars have stopped short of acknowledging such a course of action as out-and-out, advanced 
nationalism. Instead, they have portrayed the revolt as being one inspired by a partially formed sense 
of nationalist consciousness that was far removed from the kind which would gain real ground in the 
decades ahead. It was contended that ‘Urabi and his followers were political players merely 
involved in a formative stage of Egyptian nationalism. However, we suggest in Chapter One a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882. 
There have, over the past half a century, been numerous theories about nationalism put forward. 
These can be broken down into the modernist theory, ethno-symbolist theory, primordialist theory, 
and perennialist theory. Modernists view nationalism as beginning predominantly in an 
industrialised Europe. Primordialism focuses on primordial – or fundamental – factors such as 
speaking a specific language, or living in a community based on specific rituals. Ethno-symbolism 
concentrates on the distinctive symbols, values and traditions that bond modern nations. 
Perennialists, meanwhile, argue that nations have existed for as long as people have lived together in 
communities. In spite of an expanding body of theoretical studies about nationalism, there is a 
restricted number of research works covering the link between Islam and nationalism, and 
particularly the influence religion has had on the emergence of nations across the Muslim world. 
This amounts to a notable insufficiency in close probes about nations and nationalism. Chapter One 
will therefore contribute towards explaining the way Islam has played a part in the development of a 
nationalist consciousness.  
As far as definitions of nation and nationalism are concerned, we will use those of sociologist and 
historian Anthony Smith, who acknowledges the significance of history to the nation and views it as 
 
2Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, Tel Aviv, Israel Publishing House, 1953,  p.1. 
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being focused on a pre-existing group sharing common elements, including a culture and economy. 
Smith describes a nation as: 
… a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland 
and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single 
economy; and common rights and duties for all members.3 
We will also employ Smith’s definition of nationalism as: 
... an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of 
its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.4 
Apart from Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and John Armstrong, historians have largely neglected 
historiographical works on specific nationalisms as they apply to the Muslim Middle East.5 It has 
indeed been argued that nationalism is in fact incompatible with Islam because both concepts are 
seemingly defined by contrasting characteristics.  
In the case of nationalism, theories overwhelmingly highlight how communities harness shared 
ground features and prevalent components of identity, while being set within manifest geographical 
boundaries. It is maintained that such boundaries are far less relevant as it pertains to Islam. Instead, 
Islam is based on the Umma (the international community of Muslims) which transcends 
nationhood. The Umma is an historic and universal idea, one that links citizens from potentially very 
different backgrounds according to religious faith: the principles and teachings behind the Umma are 





3Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism, Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 2000, p.3. See also Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin Books, 1991, p.14. 
4Ibid., p.3.  
5The historian Paul Lalor highlights this academic deficit in ‘Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East’, Nations 
and Nationalism, vol. 5, no. 2, 1999, p.303. 
6Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965, p.3. 
The Umma is described by Rosenthal and others as the “universal Islamic community of believers”. This community 
traces its roots back to the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the “original Umma of Medina”. Following the Prophet’s 
death, the Umma was headed by Caliphs who were viewed as “spiritual as well as temporal rulers”. See also pp.ix-xx 
and pp.3-11. 
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As the first chapter of our thesis will demonstrate, however, this notion of Umma does not exclude 
the possibility of Muslims supporting nationalism. Since the birth of Islam, the Umma has covered a 
huge part of the world. It has encompassed varied groups of people from disparate ethnic, cultural, 
and linguistic communities, within separate geographical areas. Islam creates overarching ties based 
on religious belief and practice, and expressed in terms such as “brotherhood”.7  
Thus the objective of Chapter One is to offer a theoretical analysis of Islam’s impact on nationalism, 
using Egypt as a case study. Through investigating the ascendency of nationalism in Egypt in the 
late nineteenth century, we will demonstrate the effect the ‘ulama – or religious scholars – had on 
defining the foundations of the nation. The widely held scholarly thesis that the power and influence 
of the ‘ulama were stifled by modernisation during the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali and rulers that 
came after him in Egypt is also challenged. 
During the nineteenth century, the ‘ulama experienced huge blows to their prestige, and indeed to 
their estates. Reforms led to them losing land and wealth. New educational policies in Egypt, 
combined with a move towards the centralisation of power all counted against the religious scholars. 
Many ‘ulama were extremely conservative, and opposed to any type of reform, and thus not 
obviously approving of such rapid change. Academics noted that the ‘ulama struggled to retain 
positions of authority within an increasingly centralised form of government and bureaucracy. 
Instead they were relegated to the edges of political and administrative processes.  
There are three Egyptian nationalist Muslim scholars of the nineteenth century whose careers and 
works will be considered in Chapter One, as we examine how Islam influenced nationalism in Egypt 
in the nineteenth century. The views of Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and 
Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi are particularly important to theoretical discussions on Islam’s place in 
the transmission of nationalistic thoughts. Analysis shows that many of the distinct attributes of the 
nation state are in fact inherent within the Umma too. Elements such as language, history, geography 
and culture can be as much of a bond within the Umma as they are within a nation. These three 
popular thinkers have also played a crucial part in expanding the debate about nationalism in Egypt 
into a wider one, so emphasizing all-encompassing properties that can be applied to other 
nationalism case studies. They were among the first group of Islamic scholars to underscore how the 
Umma and the nation were not just compatible, but indeed that religious belief and practice were 
 
7Sami Zubaida, ‘Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 10, no. 4, 2004, 
p.407. 
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necessary to those trying to forge a nationalist spirit. They stressed how Egyptians gradually 
acquired a powerful sense of nationhood while they were not just part of the Umma, but also 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. When these three scholars tackled the issue of nationalism they 
were only too aware that they had to appraise it within the context of the Umma and the Ottoman 
Empire, because Egyptians were emotionally and culturally attached to both. These intellectuals saw 
few contradictions between religious faith and practice and national pride. In fact, they were 
convinced that a greater consciousness of Egyptian nationalism would make the Umma stronger. 
In Chapter One we focus on the standing of the Egyptian ‘ulama in the years 1879–1882 and in 
particular the above three Islamic writers as we apply their work to the four principal political areas 
of thought at the time as they related to Islam. They are: firstly, the ascent of nationalist reasoning 
and action during the ‘Urabi Revolt; secondly, dissent aimed at Egypt’s governing Khedive; thirdly, 
Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire; and finally the invasion and subsequent occupation 
of Egypt by the British in September 1882. As they considered such critical matters, the ‘ulama 
offered ideas that were far from conventional. Contrary to common misconception, there was no 
single, uniform ‘ulama view of any of these subjects. Instead, the arguments in Chapter One show 
that there were nuanced religious scholars who were not only in favour of nationalism, but indeed 
played important roles in the Egyptian nationalist movement. They helped to analyse their country’s 
changing status within the Ottoman Empire and the Umma, while also providing new perspectives 
about the nature of communities and reform in a modernising Egypt.  
We suggest in Chapter One that the religious scholars were not as negatively affected by the 
transformation of Egypt as has been made out. Rather, the ‘ulama managed to keep hold of a 
significant portion of their power. Our analysis also points to reforms specifically directed at 
undermining the ‘ulama not being carried out in full, or even in part. The impression that the ‘ulama 
were deeply traditional and had a wholly conservative outlook on society that held back progress 
through rigidly implementing teachings laid out centuries before is certainly one that historians are 
moving away from. Historiographical research reveals that there were both reformist and 
conservative ‘ulama who were prepared to endorse modernisation, and the popular movement 
calling for Egypt to be independent. The scholars deemed that such a state of affairs would be 
entirely befitting the country’s Islamic heritage.  
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As far as methodology is concerned, records of the productions of religious scholars are of course 
key to understanding their relationship with power politics, and particularly Egyptian nationalism. 
The ‘ulama were heavily involved in political affairs in Egypt. The rise of an Egyptian nationalist 
movement at the end of the nineteenth century, and its clashes with the British and Ottoman 
Empires, as well as – locally – with the Khedive and privileged Turco-Circassian Army officers, 
were the primary historical events of the era, and the ‘ulama were engaged in all of them.  
It must be emphasised that the ‘ulama stretched across the Islamic world, and indeed across Egypt 
during the nineteenth century. They had positions within religious institutions, but also in schools 
and universities, as well as in the Egyptian legal and bureaucratic systems, and trade groups and 
numerous other organisations. Thus we decided to concentrate on ‘ulama who, because of their 
intellectual output and reputation, would be regarded as an elite.  
The higher ranking ‘ulama were assisted by juniors who would not generally challenge the views of 
their seniors. Our approach is to consider discourse among these senior and highly respected 
religious scholars as largely reflecting the arguments taking place among all ‘ulama. Scholars who 
were not part of the elite took on the role of spreading messages including the rulings of their 
seniors to Muslim worshippers across Egypt. This system did not tend to depend on the written word 
but instead on devout people committing information to memory, just as they were encouraged to 
memorise the Quran, so as to preserve its purity. The belief is that writing extracts of texts down 
might lead to mistakes, and thus becomes a corruption of what is meant to be communicated.  
However, the elite ‘ulama we focus on also promoted their ideas in books and in newspaper articles, 
often collecting all of their fatawa – the Arabic word for opinions – in volumes of literature. 
Accounts of material elite ‘ulama may have registered in spoken debates is of course limited, and 
much of it is likely to be undiscovered. In these circumstances, particular reliance is placed on the 
known published works of the scholars reviewed here. Our analysis of the ‘ulama’s standpoints on 
Egyptian nationalism as it specifically related to the ‘Urabi Revolt is thus positioned in a far more 
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“War Imperialism” & its Impact on Political Awareness in Egypt  
A nationalist movement cannot operate within a vacuum so, naturally, must be investigated within 
the social, political and economic developments of the country in which it took form and thrived. It 
is, therefore, the purpose of the thesis to examine and discuss the immediate pre- and post-First 
World War contexts which boosted the nationalist campaign in Egypt so significantly, stimulating it 
to success. In particular, the thesis is preoccupied by two major and correlated themes: the impact of 
a global conflict on the political awareness of a colonised people. 
As so often, the War was a huge catalyst of change. The Wafd’s novel brand of nationalism, which 
so surprised the British, was based upon the legacy of Egypt’s extensive participation in the First 
World War – a conflict which exposed the country to a range of previously unheard of hardships, 
and indeed, altered the entire social face of the country. It notably transformed the nationalist 
movement from one mainly involving an educated urban elite into one supported by an extremely 
broad cross-section of socio-economic groups. 
Crucially, British military rule during the War had huge implications on the life of the Egyptians. 
Their country had been a highly strategic operational station for the Empire, with the garrisons 
administering local populations with as much ruthlessness as they fought. Martial law was 
implemented on 2 November 1914, meaning censorship was imposed and public assemblies banned. 
The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had, by the early months of 1915, adopted Egypt as a base. 
Later on in the same year, an Egyptian Expeditionary Force had been raised to fight in the 
Palestinian theatre of war, leading to a vast increase in military logistical demands. Accordingly, 
civilians were called upon to supply “labour, transport and animals and fodder”.8 Conscription was 
effectively instated under the pretext of recruiting volunteers, with entire villages seeing their male 
labour forces disappearing, often almost overnight.9 Light railways in the Sinai were built by an 
Egyptian Labour Corps and a Camel Transport Corps which had drafted no less than 500,000 people 
in total. Animals and crops had to be handed over by peasant communities to the British soldiers 
they were working for. Local cotton and fodder were forcibly purchased at well below market price, 
as British and Commonwealth troops flooded major cities and towns.  
 
8John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956, London, Franck Cass & Co., 1956, p.22. 
9ʿAbd al-Rahman Al-Rafiʿi, Thawrat Sanat 1919: Tarikh Misr al-Qawmi min Sanat 1914 ila Sanat 1921 (The 1919 
Revolution: The National History of Egypt, 1914-1921), Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1955, p.31. 
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Such mandatory collections, combined with other levies, led to growing discontent, not least of all 
in the countryside. 
Egypt was by no means a belligerent country at the time, but it could not escape the social and 
economic repercussions of the War. National morale was acutely negatively affected by the 
presence of British forces on Egyptian soil, with feelings of anger and frustration becoming harder 
and harder to placate. This overwhelming sense of dissatisfaction built up as if in a pressure cooker, 
with nationalists constantly looking for a time and place to vent their emotions. 
An evolution of far-reaching significance following the establishment of the Protectorate was the 
end of de jure suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt’s new legal status ushered in a considerably 
novel phase in its political life, with pan-Islamism no longer an objective. Nationalists could 
concentrate on winning freedom for Egypt rather than championing religious affinities with fellow 
believers in other countries. In summary, what happened was that Egypt’s nationalists won 
numerous supporters from the country’s non-Muslim communities, thus acquiring the necessary 
secular basis to gain power. The new nationalist movement was an explicitly secular one, uniting all 
indigenous Egyptians including the Coptic Christian minority, alongside the Muslim majority. 
There is little doubt that the leaders of the 1919 Revolution perceived no direct connection between 
what they were trying to do and what nationalists in other Arab countries were attempting to 
achieve. This lack of parallel nationalism was evident in both the ideology and the action of the 
Wafdists. As far as their programmatic agenda was concerned, the manifestos and other public 
pronouncements of the Wafdists, Watanists, and other political parties in this revolutionary period 
simply ignored all links with other Arab nationalist movements in Western Asia. An inspection of 
Saʿad Zaghlul’s speeches makes plain that, other than passing references to Egyptians as “the sons 
of Pharaonic civilisation and of Arabic civilisation” or to the involvement of Egyptian Bedouin 
Arabs in the nationalist movement, the pre-eminent leader of the Egyptian Revolution paid no 
attention whatsoever, either to the Arab dimension of Egypt or to a possible tie between Egyptian 
and Arab nationalism.10 
Another important situation which emerged out of the austere war conditions was a growing interest 
in politics. The effendiya (aspirational, middle-class people originally from a modest background) in 
particular began to involve themselves in political matters. The ground was prepared for them by the 
 
10Ibid., p.107. 
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swiftest advancement in education since Muhammad Ali’s reign. Suffering under the British 
Occupation gave the activists ideas about how to galvanise and organise people. Repression by the 
military authorities further enhanced their consciousness. As a result, the politicisation of the masses 
had also become inevitable.11 This widespread phenomenon allowed the Wafd to interact with the 
great part of society, and indeed to mobilise them towards action. 
Awareness of the British stranglehold on the wartime economy had greatly increased as the war 
effort intensified. People could see Imperial influence on almost every sphere of day-to-day life as 
society, and especially the economy, was geared towards victory. In this sense British rule became 
an obvious focus for popular dissent.12 Professionals who were dissatisfied, chiefly lawyers and civil 
servants, were able to transmit Wafdist ideals to towns and villages, as well as to isolated rural 
communities. Workers belonging to social clubs and unions like the Manual Trade Workers Union 
were particularly targeted by these well-informed elites who were trying to get their message to as 
wide an audience as possible.13 Vatikiotis emphasises the importance of the committed educated 
elite as they formed a network between both the privileged aristocratic leadership in Cairo (who had 
always had problems with communicating with often illiterate countryside dwellers) and other 
members of the population.14 
After the War, most relinquished the Watani Party (which had concentrated on traditional 
nationalism, but was blighted by outmoded methods of political action and poor command) to join 
the Wafd Party under the dynamic leadership of Saʿad Zaghlul. There was no possibility of the 
Egyptians being left untouched by the effects of the War. Almost all elements of society came to 
view the British Protectorate as an alien body interfering with, and indeed exploiting, their social, 
economic and cultural life. As the tension built up, the need for a radical response became cardinal, 





11Chirol, op. cit., pp.151-52. 
12Malcolm E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923, London, Longman, 1987, p.297. 
13Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working-
Class, 1882-1954, London, Tauris, 1988, p.88. 
14Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, Indiana, Greenwood Press, 1961, p.23. 
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Additionally, the post-war conditions of the world were distinguished by features which had an 
impact on the nationalist movement in Egypt – notably the American attempt to impose its own 
version of peace internationally.15 
So it was that the grassroots base for a popular revolution was laid down by the strain caused by 
martial law, censorship, and the First World War. When combined with President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points, this pressure became unassailable.16 It was now all a matter of coordination between those 
political circles and the masses. 
An “International Self-Determination Moment” 
Diplomacy in the early twentieth century became focused on “self-determination” as a concept that 
could be used to justify policy and, in particular, the creation of independent nation-states. 
Accordingly, the fourteen years during which Lenin theorised “self-determination” between 1903 
and 1917 were hugely significant to getting the principle on to the global agenda and to 
comprehending its future international references. While mentions on the subject would not 
generally be framed around Lenin’s radical socialist ideology,17 the Russian’s work was still vital as 
regards equating the implementation of self-determination with independent nationhood. The notion 
of self-determination thus sanctioned the formation of these new states.  
Lenin’s “negative” interpretation of liberty was also crucial. His definition of self-determination 
meant freedom from a variety of negatives, ranging from colonial domination and inequality to 
exploitation. The need to break free from oppression was, for example, part of a legitimising 
standard that permitted violence to be used. Thus negatives had positive moral associations. This 
iconoclastic approach to self-determination – one tied up in Lenin’s Marxist view of freedom – was 
to go head-to-head with Wilson’s more liberal-conservative outlook.  
Worldwide debates about “self-determination” were increasingly dominated by Wilson’s liberal-
conservative vision, but Lenin’s more revolutionary stance by no means disappeared. On the 
 
15Salama Musa, Tarbiyat Salama Musa (The Raising of Salama Musa), Cairo, Dar al-Katib al-Misri, 1958, p.123. 
16Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mudhakkirat fi al-Siyyasa al-Misriyya, 2 vols. (Memoirs of Egyptian Politics), Cairo, Dar 
al-Ma’arif, 1977, p.81 and Al-Rafiʿi, op. cit., p.57-60. 
17For a few later suggestions on how to condition statehood on the basis of “self-determination”, see e.g. Wayne 
Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.208-212, and Nicolaus Tideman, ‘Secession as a Human Right’, Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2004.  
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contrary, the Russian’s discourse on “self-determination” had prompted Wilson to internationalise 
the term in the first place. By 1917, Lenin had been grappling with it for fourteen years, and its 
conceptual and political insertion into wartime rivalries on the world stage was down to him. If it 
had not been for Lenin’s work in this respect, Wilson may not have reacted to it altogether, as the 
U.S. president popularised the expression at the end of the War in 1918.  
Wilson’s very personal appreciation of “self-determination” had such influence internationally in 
terms of desirable values such as peace, stability and equality that it was difficult to oppose.18 
Although loosely defined, the Wilsonian interpretation of “self-determination” was so closely 
affiliated with positives that it stood out as a moral norm in itself. Wilson had kept it out of the 
League of Nations Covenant, but it would soon be enshrined in literature relating to the League’s 
Aaland Islands case of 1920-21. Later still, “self-determination” would be integrated in international 
law when it featured in the 1945 UN Charter. With the tenet gaining more traction, it was presented 
as Wilson’s own. It was. Wilson’s views were paramount.19  
As Wilson came to personify “self-determination” across the world, elements of his statements and 
policies that had not even cited it were attached to it. Vague and contentious quotations linked to 
“self-determination” also meant it was construed in varying ways – not all of them ones which 
Wilson would have approved of. Order and peace were the priority after the rhetoric of “self-
determination” was dropped from the League Covenant, only for the terminology to actually be 
applied via the mandate system. Wilson was mainly in favour of stability and mature political 
agency, and he managed to put this set of recommendations into the international debate about “self-
determination”. Interchanging “self-determination” and “consent of the governed”, as Wilson did, 
allowed him to employ the formula without it translating into the necessity to form new, 
independent states. This opened the way for the academic theory of “internal self-determination”, 
which implied that “self-determination” could be implemented within existing states, including 
colonial ones, for the sake of a safe world.  
 
18See, for instance, Frank Füredi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism, London, I. B. 
Tauris, 1994, p.10. 
19For interesting perspectives on Wilson’s legacy in terms of US foreign policy beyond the time frame of this 
thesis, see the statement delivered by Carl Gershman, Counsellor of the US Mission to the United Nations, 
9 October 1981: ‘Self-determination and the Soviet Empire’, World Affairs; 1981/82, 144(3), pp.229-236, at 
pp.230-231; and Anne-Marie Slaughter: ‘Afterword: Making Democracy Safe for the World’, pp.327-335 in John 
Milton Cooper (ed.), Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2008, and the whole of Part IV, pp.253-325 in the same book.  
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Wilson’s legitimising discourse had, in fact, appropriated Lenin’s views of “self-determination” and 
had given them a new orientation. The difference was that the Russian had championed self-
determination as liberty and equality for all, including freedom from colonisation and the right to an 
independent state. Lenin wanted ordinary people to work out their own destinies in specific cases, 
rather than leaving their fate to their leaders. Lenin conceded that violent revolution could be 
justified if the ultimate goal was freedom as equal rights. 
In turn, Wilson’s reaction to Lenin’s theories was to project “self-determination” as a stabilising 
standard that would ensure peace in the world. Peace was always a prime consideration, and it 
therefore warranted self-determination. Besides, unlike Lenin, Wilson’s perspective on equality was 
solely interested in advanced states, within which his controversial conception of self-determination 
could flourish. Wilson’s appraisal of “self-determination as consent of the governed” allowed rulers 
to act without the consent of those ruled, and indeed in direct opposition to their popular will, as 
long as non-interference was the result. Thus Wilson had outlined self-determination as a device that 
abled those in charge to clamp down on forces that threatened their power. In this manner, Wilson 
had diminished the idea of liberty inherent in “self-determination”.  
Beyond the contrasting natures of the Lenin and Wilson stances on “self-determination”, both 
evaluations had a built in “let-out clause”20 which fitted in with both men’s backgrounds and 
ideological positions. Lenin ultimately wanted to establish international socialism, putting the 
emphasis on socialists – and his own leadership, in particular – as to when and where his 
conceptualisation might be enacted. President Wilson, in turn, saw international stability as the 
primary issue, and everything else had to be focused on that aim. In the meantime, the argument was 
that it would be up to moral leaders like Wilson to agree that the right pre-requisites had been 
fulfilled before self-determination was granted.  
Nowadays President Wilson is considered as the “father” of “self-determination”21 and there is no 
doubt that it was him who ensured that the creed was spread around the world. This 
internationalisation led to his ideas becoming more established and authoritative in the post-First 
World War era and beyond. It is likely that the ultimate victory of liberal-conservative values during 
this period meant Wilson’s posture was more widely embraced than Lenin’s in international affairs. 
 
20It is historian John Breuilly who coined this expression. 
21See, for example, Joshua Castellino, International Law and Self-determination, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2000, 
p.13; Gershman, 1981, op. cit. 
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Both world leaders had instilled their own views into their rhetoric about “self-determination”, 
leaving it to the international community and peoples worldwide to work out which they would take 
up. While Wilson’s manifestos were more internationally influential, both notions of self-
determination informed future struggles for liberty.  
There were marked differences between the direct environment in which Wilson and Lenin 
formulated their convictions concerning “self-determination”. Wilson’s were focused on self-
determination petitions during a particularly tumultuous two decades of world history, and they 
were made when Wilson was President of the USA. Thus his declarations were expressed in relation 
to international diplomacy and realpolitik when he was at the height of his power. America itself 
was enjoying increased global prestige, yet Wilson was not constrained by the need to win elections, 
or ensure the approval of his colleagues. 
In contrast, Lenin articulated his thoughts far more theoretically, setting them within the wider 
subject of Marxist revolution. He concentrated on the doctrinal “correctness” of self-determination 
as it might apply to reality. At the time, Lenin was fighting for power within his party, and all of his 
views were advanced within the framework of Marxist ideology, and the passionate in-house 
debates that characterised socialist party politics. Both Lenin and Wilson wanted to succeed in the 
propaganda battle during the war, and in the post-war period, so as to enhance their moral 
ascendancy and, subsequently, increase their appeal to audiences worldwide. Numerous diplomatic 
historians have analysed President Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in great detail, and it is by no 
means our intention to do so in this work, but rather to give prominence to its significance. It is 
particularly noteworthy that Wilson spoke a week after being given an English language edition of a 
document in which the Bolsheviks asked the Allies to explain their ambitions for the First World 
War, in the context of “self-determination”. The Fourteen Points suggested specific cases of land 
arrangement agreements for Europe and indeed the Ottoman Empire, including for its Arab subjects, 
that would be linked to Wilson’s understanding on self-determination. Such practical plans certainly 
emboldened Egyptian nationalists and convinced them that they should strive for complete self-
determination for themselves. 
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“On Revolution”  
It would be easy to rely on a solely rational, scientific approach in an enquiry into nationalism in 
Egypt in the build up to the country’s 1919 Revolution. Verifiable evidence is readily available to 
back up theories about a concerted move towards independence – one supported by Egyptians of all 
backgrounds. However, there is no reason why more subjective accounts of this dynamic movement 
should be discarded. National history is often written in proud, triumphalist language, and in Egypt, 
records of nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul’s life are, for example, often given a reverential 
treatment which might be considered inappropriate. 
In fact, the generally florid and overblown language of the patriotic historian can provide an 
interpretation of reality which greatly adds to the history of a defined period. The Revolution of 
1919 was first and foremost a nationalistic one, and expressions of nationalist pride provide very 
useful experiences about the mood of the time, and indeed the thought processes and circumstances 
which brought about such radical change. 
Many of the men and women behind the development of Egyptian nationalism in the immediate pre- 
and post-First World War period admired western philosophy and culture, but still had to struggle 
against its colonial manifestation. Having rejected the West through their revolution, many 
historians in countries such as Egypt concentrated on producing narratives which have been written 
off as propaganda and polemic. 
While politicians invariably use their country’s history as a tool to influence public opinion, and 
indeed to win them over to supporting both policy and strategy, scientific methods are expected of 
the historian. But this does not preclude considering the patriotic, idealised, and sometimes 
politically motivated bias in writing history in tandem with the more thorough, sober inclination. 
As an example, our descriptions of the events of the 1919 Revolution in Chapter Five are by no 
means over-reliant on a Report drawn up by the Egyptian Delegation which offers a detailed 
chronicle of the clashes between demonstrators and Empire troops. In fact, we deliberately quote 
extensively from it to give the Egyptians “a say”. That does not suggest a lack of critical distance or 
indeed naivety, especially so as the brutal repressions they recount through eye-witness testimonies 
are something that the British authorities have also kept archives of. 
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What is crucial, however, is that reflection on the more subjective expositions of Egypt’s recent 
history should be viewed against the background of decolonisation and nation-building in the pre- 
and post-revolutionary period, and the degree to which Egyptian historians have responded to 
official guidelines. Rather than dismissing certain versions, all should be welcomed as contributing 
to the historiography of the time. 
Following the above discussion about the writing of the national history, this historiographical 
review will focus on the varied perspectives on the independence struggle of 1919 held by different 
writers. In this respect, the thesis is principally concerned with three aspects which illustrate the 
wide range of interpretations on specific developments. A fundamental facet of the thesis is that it 
highlights the historiographical division between “Western” and Egyptian sources, as the 
terminology used is crucial to placing the actions into a certain historical context. The thesis is also 
set to engage in a debate within Arabic literature itself on the Revolution, and on the part played by 
Saʿad Zaghlul in particular. Another major dimension of the revolution is that it brought to the fore a 
new brand of Egyptian nationalism – that is to say a true combination of the aspirations of an 
educated elite and the wishes of the popular classes. In order to understand how the two spheres 
came to coalesce, the thesis embarks on a thorough study of both the press and religion and their 
role in the dissemination of nationalist ideas.  
There is a clear distinction between the Egyptian and Western lexicon pertaining to the radical 
events of 1919. Egyptian literature unanimously refers to the forceful protests as a “Revolution”. 
Western historiography, however, tends to resort to a whole array of qualifications relating to the 
scale of the dissent. Thus, alternative words are often used in Anglo-Saxon writings to describe the 
bloody confrontation between British soldiers and the Egyptian population in the spring of 1919. 
These include terms such as “unrest”, “trouble”, “crisis”, “events”, “protests”, “riots”, “uprising”, 
“insurrection”, “rebellion” or – at the most extreme – “revolt”. Sometimes the clashes do not even 
get a mention. The chasm in the usage of vocabulary is far from being just superficial. Instead it 
reflects a profound divergence of perceptions. For the Egyptian historiography, what happened in 
March 1919 was a key historical moment – hence the widespread reference to “Thawra” – 
Revolution – in Egyptian sources.22 Descriptions of the Revolution in Egyptian history books insist 
on the sudden and powerful way the Egyptian population as a whole rose up against British rule. In 
 
22See for example Al-Rafi’i, op. cit. and ‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan, Thawrat 1919 fi Daw’ Mudhakkirat Saʿad Zaghlul, 
(The 1919  Revolution in Light of Saʿad Zaghlul’s Memoirs), Cairo, Al-Hay’ah al-Misriyya al-‘Amma lil-Kitab, 2002. 
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contrast, the terminology adopted in British history in general depreciates the nature and indeed the 
extent of this watershed in modern Egyptian history. The revolution is thus at times reduced to a 
mere “agitation”, “disturbance” or “disorder”. At other times, it is perceived as a significant 
occurrence, a critical and unstable time, or a localised act of popular defiance to attempt to 
overthrow the established authority.  
Interestingly enough, John Darwin makes a contradictory analysis of the revolution as he first tries 
to minimise it and then recognises its singularity. Darwin begins by depicting the Revolution as a 
“classic” colonial revolt.23 He praises Lord Milner for his efforts in attempting to find a peaceful co-
existence (“modus vivendi”) with the nationalists. In this sense, Darwin harks back to the Cromerian 
period. But Darwin also concedes that the Wafd represented a genuine and sweeping form of mass 
mobilisation, rather than a straightforward form of routine “Pasha politics”. Darwin plays down the 
importance of the Revolution, instead concentrating on the impact the First World War had on the 
day-to-day running of the British Empire. More generally he looks at the war’s effect on Britain’s 
entire Imperial position in the world. Darwin poses the theory that the war may well have been the 
catalyst of a worldwide nationalist spirit which ultimately heralded the end of Empire. Inevitably, 
Darwin contends, the war did not have such cataclysmic repercussions. He minutely reviews the 
policy statements and policy execution of British leaders including Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner, 
Churchill and Montagu. Darwin also analyses the domestic and international policies of the 
Coalition government. Darwin’s conclusion is that there was “no absolute reduction in British power 
and influence” at this time. Instead Darwin suggests that the British retreated from what he calls 
“War Imperialism”, returning “to the methods and constraints which had characterised policy before 
1914”. Darwin explains that: 
It was the gradual and selective casting off of temporary additions to 
Imperial power in a world which had grown less dangerous and more 
parsimonious, not a nerveless collapse in the face of insurgent nationalism, 
which best describes the spirit of the Lloyd George coalition's Imperial 
policy after 1918.24  
Although there is a consensus in Egyptian historiography on the phrasing of the popular 
mobilisation of 1919, perspectives on the revolution and the part played by its leader Saʿad Zaghlul 
 
23John Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922, London, 
Macmillan, 1981, p.74. 
24Darwin, op. cit., p.275. 
Introduction: The Arguments of the Thesis and Historiographical Review 
 
27 
in particular can differ. These differences are clearly revealed if one considers the most prominent 
works in Egyptian history. For instance, Lahsin focuses on the figure of Saʿad Zaghlul and his role 
in Egyptian politics.25 He makes a number of understatements, most notably in denying Zaghlul his 
leadership of the nationalist movement. As for Mohammed Ghorbal, in his book entitled Tarikh al-
Mufawadat al-Misriyya al-Britaniyya,26 he looks at the bilateral relations between Egypt and 
Britain. He reproduces the texts of the proposals set out before negotiations and presents them in a 
literal fashion. Unfortunately, his book does not explain the documents and the conditions under 
which they were put forward in terms of the political developments in Egypt at the time. 
The prolific historian ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i witnessed the Revolution of 1919 as a young man of 
thirty and then chronicled it in his Thawrat 1919,27 in two volumes. His Thawrat 1919 serves as one 
of the most detailed accounts of the revolution and draws on archival material, newspaper articles as 
well as his personal memories and links with political figures. Together with Fi A’qab al-Thawra al-
Misriyya,28 vol.1, which deals with the aftermath of the revolution, they constitute a compilation of 
events arranged in a chronological sequence. Before the War, al-Rafi’i was a member of the Watani 
Party and afterwards served as a member of the lower and upper houses of Parliament. In spite of his 
political views, al-Rafi’i emphasises Zaghlul’s leadership in the Egyptian revolution. He also 
expresses his own nationalist feeling in his books when assessing the revolution and the nationalist 
movement.  
As for ‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan, in Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya Fi Misr Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 
1936,29 he overstates the role of Zaghlul, and believes the 1919 Revolution to have been an essential 
part of his character. This amplification of Zaghlul’s position lessens the importance of the people 
throughout these events. The study is written in a journalistic style, and the author only uses 
secondary sources. What appears to be certain is that such works do give a strong idea of the 
disparity of views in Egyptian literature about this chaotic period. 
 
 
25‘Abd al-Khaliq Lashin, Saʿad Zaghlul wa-Dawruhu fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya (Saʿad Zaghlul and His Role in the 
Politics of Egypt), Cairo, Maktabat Madbuli, 1975. 
26Mohammed S. Ghorbal, Histoire des négociations égypto-britanniques 1882-1936, vol. 1 (History of Anglo-Egyptian 
Negotiations, vol. 1), Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahda, 1952.  
27Al-Rafi’i, op. cit. 
28‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Fi A’qab al-Thawra al-Misriyya (The Aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution), Cairo, 
Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1959. 
29‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya Fi Misr Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 1936 (The Rise of the 
Nationalist Movement in Egypt, 1918-1936), Cairo, Maktabat Madbuli, 1983. 
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At the end of the War, the transformation of nationalism from a dynamic but limited movement 
driven by an educated elite to a full-scale popular movement was quite incredible.30 Indeed, the ill-
conceived arrest and deportation of the Wafd leaders to Malta prompted strikes and mass 
demonstrations by students, government officials, doctors, lawyers and other professionals, transport 
workers and women. The truism that economic power invariably lay behind political power and 
social advancement was also realised by a majority of the population. There is no doubt that the 
Wafd membership had been dominated by senior professionals including lawyers, landowners, 
bankers, civil servants and medics. They formed the nucleus of a burgeoning middle-class who had 
an economic stake in the desire for political independence. It was this group which was able to 
undermine rival Egyptian groups which traditionally supported the British administration, because 
they had gained so much from it.31 This politicisation of society meant that the Wafd could 
communicate with the great mass of people, and indeed to galvanise them to action. Chirol reaches 
the same conclusion when he writes that during the War: 
We had done nothing to gain the confidence of the educated classes, whose 
impatience at the maintenance of even a veiled Protectorate had been 
steadily increasing even before the war, and we had for the first time 
profoundly estranged the agricultural masses that form the vast majority of 
the population.32  
As a result, he notes that the politicisation of the masses had become inevitable: 
To the Egyptian masses political theories and arguments had meant nothing 
before the war. But in Egypt, as in every other country, all the conditions of 
life, and especially the enormous rise in prices, had produced a wave of 
social unrest which took many different forms.33  
Professionals who were dissatisfied with British rule, especially lawyers and civil servants, were 
able to transmit Wafdist ideals to towns and villages, as well as to isolated rural communities. 
Workers belonging to social clubs and unions like the Manual Trade Workers Union were 
particularly targeted by these well-informed elites who were trying to get their message to as wide 
an audience as possible.34 Vatikiotis emphasises the importance of the committed educated elite as 
they formed links with both the privileged aristocratic leadership in Cairo (who had always had 
 
30Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.209. 
31Ibid., p.209. 
32Chirol, op. cit., p.141. 
33Chirol, op. cit., pp.151-152. 
34Beinin & Lockman, op. cit., p.88. 
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problems interacting with often illiterate countryside dwellers) and other members of the 
population.35 
One fascinating development of the revolution was the appearance of Egyptian women on the 
barricades. In correspondence with General Sir Edmund Allenby, the newly appointed High 
Commissioner of Egypt, Saʿad Zaghlul comments upon the extraordinary social change, noting how 
“the most distinguished women in Egyptian society were not able, on their side, to see their fellow- 
country-men treated in this way and keep silent about it”.36 He adds that: 
[T]he curtain that ordinarily separates our women of the upper classes from 
the outside world did not prevent them from expressing their sentiments. In 
fact, nearly three hundred women of the most important families of Cairo 
organised on March 20th a simple and dignified manifestation, after they had 
read in the morning newspapers that permission had been granted them.37 
With the deportation of the Wafd’s figureheads, Egyptian women took over on the political 
playground. Thus, Safiyya Zaghlul and Huda Sha’arawi – the wives of the imprisoned Wafd leaders 
– led upper-class veiled women and staged a demonstration against British Occupation. In the 
countryside, even the fellahat (women farmers) disrupted railway and telegraph lines and damaged 
infrastructure.38 It is also important to note that Saʿad Zaghlul’s observations illustrate the 
relationship between nationalism, Islam and feminist commitments among Egyptian women from 
the upper-classes.  
Margot Badran’s Feminists, Islam and Nation,39 also reflects the intricate link between gender 
issues, politics and religion in the making of modern Egypt. She has a broader understanding of the 
nature of feminism in Egypt at that stage as she points out that it involved not only women from 
different classes (essentially upper- and middle-class), but also male intellectuals, nationalists and 
Islamic modernists. The writings of Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid also give particular importance to the 
growing connection between these different groups whose nationalist-feminist activism was best 
illustrated during the struggle for independence of 1919-1922. Hourani comments on Lutfi al-
Sayyid’s thoughts in these terms: 
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For Lutfi al-Sayyid and his generation, feminism was an essential part of 
true nationalism, and it was no coincidence that when, a decade later, 
Egyptian women began to throw off the veil and claim the right to take part 
in the common life of society, it was as a by-product of the struggle for 
independence in the early days of the Wafd.40  
Although Beth Baron recognises the significance of the 1919 Revolution in relation to the rise of 
Egyptian feminism, she stresses emphatically women’s involvement in political and feminist affairs 
in the 19th century, in the context of the birth of the modern state under Mohammed ‘Ali. She thus 
writes: 
In the case of modern Egypt, historians have highlighted the role of women 
in the 1919 revolution. Prior to that, women are generally seen as uninvolved 
in the national struggle. [...] The 1919 revolution is also seen as the pivotal 
point in the shift from nationalist to feminist activities. Yet this stress has 
caused scholars to overlook antecedents for women’s nationalist and 
feminist endeavours as well as bypass non-feminist women and groups in the 
preceding decades.41 
This quick overview of the association between feminism, nationalism, politics and Islam provides a 
template for these themes to be discussed in a section of our dissertation. 
The educated urban intelligentsia and nationalist elite were not the only ones to have a decisive role 
in the mobilisation of the masses. The part played by the popular press is often underestimated. 
Chirol insists that with the revival of Egyptian nationalism, it was the more extreme school of 
journalism that came to have the strongest influence on popular opinion. Thus he provides the 
following comment: 
Journalism was not regarded at first as a profession of much account. It 
attracted chiefly the failures of the Europeanised schools and colleges, 
whose hopes of employment in the public services had been disappointed, 
and who were proportionately embittered. The ordinary Egyptian who has a 
small difference of opinion with his neighbour at once shrieks at the top of 
his voice, cursing his antagonist’s forebears to the third or fourth generation, 
whilst the other neighbours gather round to enjoy the ferocious repartees that 
are bandied about. The newspapers caught that unfortunate habit, and it 
 
40Hourani, op. cit., p.182. 
41Beth Baron, ‘Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism in Pre-1919 Egypt’ in Rashid Khalidi et al. (eds.), The Origins of 
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evidently was to the taste of their readers, for violence was invariably 
rewarded with an increasing circulation.42 
It is widely accepted among scholars that the Wafd’s new type of nationalism cast the pan-Islamic 
and pro-Ottoman beliefs of its pre-war predecessors as it displayed an ideology rooted in the 
philosophy of liberal democracy.43 Chirol, however, argues that there was a close link between 
Islamic extremism and nationalism, writing at the time: 
Nationalism is deeply tinged with Mahomedan fanaticism. There had always 
been reason to suspect, and for months past it had been very noticeable that 
almost all the turbulent demonstrations, usually ending in violence, 
originated in popular gatherings held inside the mosques, where the most 
fiery speeches could be made with impunity.44  
Chirol uses the Introduction of his book to describe Egyptian Nationalism as a blend of enlightened 
political philosophy and extreme religious zeal: 
As elsewhere it [British Occupation and intervention] has set in motion 
forces, in part progressive and in part reactionary, which in Egypt, under the 
particular impulse given to them by the war, have found expression in a 
skilfully organised political campaign against the maintenance of the British 
Protectorate as well as in an explosive outburst of emotional patriotism, 
never entirely free, in an Oriental and Mahomedan people, from racial and 
religious passion.45 
He makes the same point in his conclusion when he asks: 
Should we really promote the evolution of the Egyptian people towards 
nationhood by handing them over to a party which is appealing more and 
more openly to the reactionary forces of the Islamic world?46  
These are thus three main angles to the 1919 Revolution which will be covered in the thesis. They 
are firstly, the importance of phraseology in Western and Egyptian literature in the way it invariably 
reveals a different political agenda in both cases; secondly, the widely disparate interpretations 
within Egyptian literature itself. And, thirdly, the essential involvement of the elites, the popular  
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press and religion to gather anti-British support at the grassroots. All three dimensions are crucial as 
regards grasping an all-encompassing view of mass mobilisation at the time. 
Theories on Egyptian Feminism 
Many theories have been published about the feminist movement in Egypt. One popular way of 
looking at these ideas is to consider Arab feminist movements as by-products of Western ones.  
Feminism as a by-product of the Western model:  
Western influence could be found in all fields of Egyptian life: economic, political, and social 
change brought about by exposure to European powers had led to a new manner of thinking. Novel 
thought processes and perspectives being imported from the West resulted in the role of women 
changing significantly.47 These theories are based on the view that female status in any community 
is centred on both local outlooks and foreign ones.48  
As part of the primary phase of feminism in Egypt, educated groups of women were exposed to 
intellectual concepts from abroad, and acted on them. This discourse would have gradually attracted 
women from other tiers of society. This was the first stage in the development of feminism in Egypt. 
A hindrance to feminist ideals filtering down from the upper-classes to lower ones was the 
conservative nature of some sections of society. In certain circles there was a strong suspicion of 
western values because people were convinced that they threatened their traditional lifestyles, and 
indeed their beliefs.  
Feminism as a by-product of nationalism:  
Beyond the penetration of Western propositions stimulating feminism in areas such as the Middle 
East, political action by women could also be a direct result of nationalism. In the case of Egypt, 
women wanted to liberate their country from British rule, and considered their contribution as 
women to be essential to the struggle.  
 
47Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, New York, Greenwood Press, 1964. 
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This idea stems from the view that nationalism should be to the advantage of all sections of society, 
and not just men. Women who were politically active in Egypt between 1919 and 1924 not only 
displayed their nationalist credentials, but showed how they could be just as effective as men.  
While women from the upper-classes dominated the early Egyptian women’s movement, some came 
from other backgrounds. Some of those joining in street demonstrations were killed by British 
soldiers, and were thus elevated to the status of national heroes, and indeed martyrs.  
The Wafd political party accepted women members, and allowed them to take part in these popular 
demonstrations. They were also involved in other activities against the British Empire, including 
boycotting British goods. In terms of nationalist success, women certainly contributed to Egypt 
nominally achieving independence from Britain in 1922.  
However, the fact was that this political activism had no immediate influence on attaining 
emancipation for women. Instead, after the revolution, those who had joined the Wafd and 
campaigned so effectively were expected to return to their traditional roles in life. There was no 
attempt at introducing women’s suffrage in the 1923 Egyptian Constitution. The kind of exclusion 
that women had experienced following other monumental revolutions around the world was 
replicated. Thus we can highlight the contrast between revolutionary activity among women and 
their lack of progress in the post-revolution period, just as we can in places such as Algeria, the 
Soviet Union, China, Cuba and America.  
Feminism as a derivative of the post-revolutionary period: 
It can also be argued that feminist movements become effective in the post-revolutionary period. 
Once nationalist movements have gained what they set out to achieve, there is a moment of 
settlement when women think about what they have been involved in, and what is possible in the 
future.  
Women have experienced the limited freedom to participate in political action over a specific time 
span, and want this freedom to be permanent. In this sense, even bitterness, resentment, and the 
sense of betrayal that directly follows a revolution can be a significant impetus for change, and 
especially towards creating a more enduring feminist movement.  
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Egypt’s feminists worked to undermine British rule, but were not formalised as the Egyptian 
Feminist Union (EFU) until 1923. Even then, the Union did not start up properly until women 
realised they had been excluded from the electoral rules laid out in the new 1923 Constitution. From 
1923 onwards, members of the EFU lobbied furiously to be introduced to the electoral process, and 
called for numerous other rights. They wanted to see the Personal Status Law changed, and 
encouraged all women in society to fight for the right to have a definite political role in their 
country.  
Riots and other displays of public anger have always been commonplace in Egyptian society. When 
there is a widespread perception of injustice, or corruption, or a general need for change, then people 
take to the streets. Those who have chronicled such demonstrations over the centuries have reported 
that women from all kinds of backgrounds partook.  
The years when Muhammad ‘Ali was in power, between 1805 and 1848, were renowned for such 
popular protest. As Egypt got into grave economic problems, women were among those who 
attacked the forces of law and order to oppose rising prices and taxes. Many were from the rural and 
city lower classes. The women may technically have been demanding better conditions and a fairer 
economic deal for men at this time, but they were still engaged in political action for their country, 
and for all of its citizens.49  
The 1919 Revolution in Egypt saw a particularly marked movement towards women dissenting, and 
not just those from the working classes who had traditionally campaigned for improved socio-
economic standings. The uprising of 1919 was the first time that women from the upper ranges of 
Egyptian society joined in the marches demanding independence from the British.  
Such women could be seen in Cairo, following up on at least two decades of discourse about 
freedom by participating in direct political action. The women were often in black abayas and were 
invariably veiled, and their determination to take a public stance in what they viewed as reactionary, 
unjust British rule was extremely efficient. Even when the rioting stopped, and crowds moved off 
the streets, such women kept up their opposition for another five years.  
There was no question of these women solely taking passive, peaceful roles during their country’s 
struggle. They instead wanted to emulate male activists – to present themselves as heroic and well 
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organised figures who could stand up to British rule in a manner that was not just symbolic.50 What 
is striking, however, is the manner in which these women were inclined to dispose of traditional 
stereotypes during the protests, and then revert to them after the revolutionary moment had passed.  
Frantz Fanon recounts in A Dying Colonisation (1967), how women in Algeria took to the streets 
during their country’s War of Independence from France between 1954 and 1962. They had a hand 
in violent operations in a way that would revolutionise their position within society. It was through 
popular dissent, and indeed the use of weapons against a common enemy, that they brought about 
emancipation. Fanon describes how men supported the liberation of women in greater numbers, to 
the extent that the conflict against the French not only freed the country, but also its female 
citizens.51  
In fact, Fanon’s view had several problems. He underestimated how Algerian women were given 
minor functions in the resistance movement against the French. They were never allowed to take the 
initiative during attacks, for example, and never issued orders.52  
Instead, as the French became more combative and ruthless, and men started to go into hiding, or 
were killed, or invalided, or put in prison, women had to take on male duties. A shortage of males 
was the main reason they fought. Women were able to use their veils as a disguise, and their 
femininity to get through French check points, and to evade military patrols. Algeria’s National 
Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) were able to send the women to place bombs 
in barracks and other targets using these overtly feminine disguises.  
Women who were killed or imprisoned and tortured were viewed as national heroes, and indeed as 
martyrs, but ultimately they were replacements for men’s roles as a matter of military expediency. 
While groups of women were used on the frontline, many others remained in their traditional 
positions as wives and mothers, providing for children and other family members, including 
menfolk. Their employment as soldiers masqueraded as ordinary women was a temporary, 
emergency measure deemed necessary for the FLN to win the war.  
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Similarly, Fanon did not acknowledge that the FLN’s primary and overriding aim was victory, and 
not female emancipation. Their plans for the post-war period were unspecified, and they certainly 
had no stated objective concerning women’s rights. On the contrary, the FLN was largely interested 
in reverting to the customary Islamic way of life that colonisation by the French had challenged. The 
kind of liberal approach to feminism from Europe was something the FLN wanted to resist. In short, 
ideas about the liberation of women were being imported from France and the FLN was fighting the 
French so as to eject them from Algeria.53  
In such circumstances, the future for Algerian women, including those taking part in field 
operations, was a life in a free country, but also a traditional one. When the war ended, and 
independence was gained, all women were expected to go back to the conventional roles that 
Algerian society expected of them. There is a great difference between the heroic perception of 
women’s actions in revolutions undertaken during the period of conflict, and the reality of post-
revolutionary life for women.  
Women were also heavily involved in the French Revolution of 1789. However, as in Algeria, 
female participants did not achieve the kind of progress for women that many would have 
envisaged. There was no emancipation for women afterwards, with the Napoleonic era instead 
mainly concentrating on advancing the stations and professional careers of men from the upper 
echelons of society. There is in fact plenty of evidence that women’s rights suffered a setback within 
a France regulated by the Napoleonic Code: “old wines were presented in new bottles”.54 
The situation was very similar after the American Revolution of 1765 to 1783. After the war, white 
women returned to patriarchal lifestyles focused on the kitchen and the nursery.55 There is very little 
proof that conditions in the lot of women in the Soviet Union, Cuba and China were improved by 
their revolutions either.   
Radical events leading to sudden changes in the balance of power do not necessarily cause 
revolutions in every sphere. In the three latter nations, the gap between revolutionary beliefs and 
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actually putting such beliefs into practice narrowed during the revolution itself, but widened 
considerably afterwards.56  
All of the five revolutions mentioned above had different objectives, but beyond this there were 
many similarities. They were fought against a single reactionary enemy; they aimed at reorganising 
society along nationalistic and egalitarian lines; and they all involved women joining mass 
revolutionary movements.57  
The revolutions also all tell a story of politically active women being denied emancipation in their 
post-revolutionary communities. Instead, their efforts ended up mainly helping the male 
revolutionaries they had fought alongside. These men were happy to see patriarchal values 
suspended during a time of struggle, but were equally content to see them re-imposed once the 
ideology behind their revolution could be applied to their respective societies.  
Thus women’s involvement in extraordinary historical developments such as revolutions can be 
viewed as exceptional measures.58 They are by no means intended to redefine women’s places in the 
societies that emerge after revolution.  
Women’s engagement in revolution is also different to men’s because women are supposed to 
participate in line with their roles as providers: as wives and mothers whose job it is to look after 
their menfolk.59 Essential provisions such as food are in short supply, but women are required to 
cope. Then men are in short supply (because of death, and wounding, and imprisonment) and 
women have to fill in. Women thus inevitably become politicised, but at the volition of men, who 
guide them on the battlefield and in other crisis zones. Women do not lead the revolution, and still 
have to continue with their traditional status.  
After the crisis has gone, patriarchal roles within society are resumed, but – at the very least – 
attitudes have changed, especially among women. They have had an experience of freedom, and see 
no reason why they should not have others. Women have learnt how to deal with a struggle, and in 
peacetime consider themselves capable of sharing participation in electoral processes with men.  
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All of this illustrates the manner in which the fiercely nationalistic women who took part in the 
Egyptian Revolution of 1919 to 1924 operated. At a critical time, they responded to the emergency 
within their country, taking on a repressive foe. This historiographical review thus shows how such 
women shared a sense of common purpose with all other members of society. Traditional female 
tasks, as well as factors such as segregation and enforced seclusion, were ignored along with social 
norms that relegated women to secondary posts within society. The national good was the primary 
motivation for all political action, and overrode any sense of injustice based on sex.  
In light of post-revolutionary developments in Egypt, women felt disillusioned. Chapter Six evokes 
this sense of resentment, but concludes that it was galvanised and used to create a nationalistic 
female consciousness that was later channelled towards creating Egypt’s first feminist movement.  
All the significant themes highlighted above are examined in our thesis. The methodology proposed 
here supports the key events and experiences discussed in our core work.  
Structure of the Thesis 
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The Emergence of an Islamic Nationalist Movement in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century 
This chapter explores the theoretical tension between Islam and nationalism in the specific context 
of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882. We argue that ‘Urabi’s movement was not only the first 
manifestation of modern Egyptian nationalism, but that it was also imbued with a distinct Islamic 
character. What started as a protest against an elite class of Turco-Circassian officers within the 
Army, expanded to take on far greater nationalistic objectives, while preserving the country’s 
Islamic identity. The role of the religious scholars – or ‘ulama – is studied at length as they assisted 
greatly in that process.  
Chapter Two: 
Anti-Imperialist Ire & the Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century 
The turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century saw British Imperial repression on full display 
during events that came to be known as the Taba Dispute and the Denshawai Incident of 1906. One 
was a border dispute which pitted the British and Ottoman Empires in a strategic regional power 
game, while the other saw Britain’s harshest form of summary justice used to maintain its grip on 
Egypt. Both outrages consolidated nationalist ambitions and led to the setting up of formal political 
parties providing means of expression for the population at large. 
Chapter Three: 
Prelude to the 1919 Revolution: How Britain’s “Informal Imperialism” was replaced by the 
“War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict 
The focus of this chapter is the consensus among all strands of indigenous Egyptians that their 
country had been plundered by a colonising power during the First World War. Wartime 
mobilisation of Egypt’s resources led to wide-scale resentment of the British occupiers, with many 
Egyptian peasants coming into contact with direct British rule for the first time ever. This realisation 
galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before. 
The Rise of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement: 
The Case of the 1919 Revolution 




A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment”  
and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists 
The political implementation of nationalism evokes “self-determination”. It was the American 
President Woodrow Wilson who internationalised the language of self-determination as attempts 
were made at setting up a new world order after the First World War. This emboldened the Egyptian 
nationalists to strive for complete independence for themselves. But as will be made clear, it instead 
led to a “tragedy of disappointment”. 
Chapter Five: 
The Egyptian Nationalist Revolution of 1919 and the British Response to the “Egyptian Problem” 
Chapter Five assesses the nature of the Egyptian nationalist movement and its radical shift from an 
elitist protest to a popular revolution in which all social classes participated. It considers the 
methods deployed by Britain to contain the Revolution. It also highlights the serious miscalculation 
by Empire troops as they underestimated the extent of the revolutionary movement, and failed to put 
an end to the agitation. 
Chapter Six: 
Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution: From Political Awakening to Nationalist Feminism 
Chapter Six retraces the evolution of Egyptian feminism, from the formation of a political 
consciousness at the start of the 19th century, which ran in parallel with the country’s rapid 
development as a modern state, to the powerful role women played in the nationalist Revolution as 
they rallied under the “Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. This chapter also analyses the intricate 
connection between feminism, nationalism, and Islam.  
Transliteration 
For the transliteration of Arabic terms, the author referred to the guidelines suggested by the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Most of the Arabic terms have been 
transliterated including most of the names of persons. Terms that have become of common use have 
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The profound influence of nationalism on the development of the modern world is covered in a vast 
body of historiographical literature dealing with peoples’ aspirations to create “nation-states”. The 
formation of distinct geographical entities over time has produced increased numbers of historical 
and sociological enquiries focusing on dynamic movements forcing change. This empirical evidence 
on the emergence of nations and nationalism supports four major theoretical approaches that can be 
listed as “ethno-symbolist”, “modernist”, “perennialist” and “primordialist”. 
Such theoretical examinations have, however, been noticeably dismissed as regards the rise of 
nationalism in the Arab and Muslim World. Paul Lalor points the limited number of empirical case 
studies of regional nationalisms in theoretical works, saying “the new writing on nationalism has 
largely ignored the Arab Middle East”1 and that “scholars working on Arab nationalism have been 
slow to make use of the new [theoretical] material”.2 
Furthermore, nineteenth century Egypt stands out in scholarly perspectives which predominantly 
investigate the progression of nationalism in the Middle East in the context of the Ottoman Empire 
defeat at the end of the First World War. The ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 thus puts Egypt in a 
unique position as far as the timing of the expression of nationalism in the Muslim world is 
concerned. Indeed, Egypt was still nominally governed by the Ottoman Sultan, while seeking to 
break away from him as the de facto head of the Islamic Umma (the worldwide community of 
Muslims) during his rule and not in the aftermath of the fall of his Empire.3 
This chapter addresses this situation in Egypt, which is the principle subject of this thesis. In 
particular, scholars of Egyptian nationalism have neglected building historiographical and empirical 
work on the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879 to 1882 that goes beyond the “proto-nationalistic” approach, 
instead considering it as a mere localised rebellion against the contending political forces of the 
Khedive, Turco-Circassian elites, European control, and indeed British Occupation. Not only have 
the core nationalistic ambitions of the movement been considerably overlooked by most academics, 
but they have mainly regarded it as an embryonic precursor to the “full-blown” nationalism of the 
early twentieth century in Egypt. 
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Similarly, although Egypt scholars have highlighted – to varying degrees – the importance of the 
Muslim faith, including the influence of Islamic thinkers,4 to Egyptian nationalism in the nineteenth 
century and early years of the twentieth century, wider theories of nationalism have not integrated 
this work. Instead they have suggested that Islam is at odds with traditional nationalism. 
Nationalism as a force for social change emphasises the diverse cultural, ethnic, historical, and 
linguistic traditions that bond people to a particular territory, they argue, but Islam seems to override 
such distinctions, as common faith and the Umma, become the most prevalent features in the 
identity of the entire Muslim community. There are many scholars who agree that Islam and 
nationalism cannot be reconciled and they thus set forth divergent conceptions of community. In this 
regard, Sami Zubaida notes that to “some western commentators, including Ernest Gellner, the 
Islamic idea of the community as the political unit is incompatible with the territorial nation-state”.5 
In this chapter, we will present an opposing argument by examining the sense of shared interests that 
underpin both Islam and the concept of the nation-state. 
Thus, we will primarily draw attention to the gaps in the growing theoretical analysis and empirical 
findings on Egyptian nationalism, especially as they relate to the dynamic between Islam and the 
desire for nationhood. While there have been attempts by Arab Middle East scholars to set the 
‘Urabi Revolt within the context of the emergence of nationalism in both the entire Arab and 
Muslim world, and Egypt more specifically, the amount of such historiographical enquiries is 
remarkably restricted. Against such a deficient theoretical background, the nationalistic expression 
of the ‘Urabi Revolt – albeit a failed one – remains largely disregarded. 
Historiographical literature has included the role of Islam on the development of nationalism in 
Egypt, but studies tend to begin at the start of the twentieth century, and not with the ‘Urabi Revolt 
two decades earlier. The contribution of the Islamic religious scholars – the ‘ulama – to the ‘Urabi 
Revolt has been underplayed due to the widely held view amongst academics that the influence of 
the ‘ulama in Egypt declined in the nineteenth century because of state reforms. However, we will 
argue that in the emerging nationalism of the years 1879 to 1882 – which culminated in the quashing 
 
4Hourani, op. cit.; Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (History of the 
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of the ‘Urabi Revolt and the British invasion and subsequent Occupation of Egypt – the ‘ulama in 
fact retained much of their social status and played a significant part in the intellectual formulation 
of nationalistic thought. Accordingly, they imbued Egyptian nationalism with a distinct Islamic 
character. 
This chapter therefore aims at challenging the prevailing scholarly consensus by exploring the 
theoretical tension between Islam and nationalism in the context of the ‘Urabi Revolt. To this effect, 
we will first of all analyse the historiographical literature covering the rise of nationalism in 
nineteenth century Egypt and stress its limitations. This chapter will also take into account new 
research asserting the nationalism of the ‘Urabi Revolt, as well as establishing its specific Islamic 
nature. We will then concentrate on the traditional role of the ‘ulama and consider their status in an 
increasingly modernised Egyptian society, while showing that they played a crucial part as agents 
embracing change supported by a sense of nationalistic pride. Eventually, we will focus on the 
theoretical study of the intellectual contribution of reformist Islamic clerics and thinkers in defining 
Egypt as a modern Nation during that time. All of those major protagonists provided convincing 
arguments about the way in which Islam was indeed compatible with the clamour for nationalism. 
How Nationalism Developed in Egypt during the Nineteenth Century 
Academic studies of the Constitutional movement and the ‘Urabi Revolt fall into a number of 
categories. These can be summarised as one involving a considerable amount of literature that 
concentrates on broad Egyptian history of the nineteenth century, and a narrow one made up of an 
output of writings that looks notably at the three year uprising using documents in Arabic, English, 
French and Turkish.6 Finally, there are commentaries and memoirs produced by those who 
witnessed or contributed to the build up as well as the ‘Urabi revolt itself. Egyptians in this group 
include the religious scholar Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh and Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi himself, the 
Egyptian Army officer and nationalist at the head of the uprising. British officials living in Egypt 
and others visiting from other parts of Europe at the time of the revolt, and leading up to it, have 
 
6See Alexander Schölch, Egypt for the Egyptians! The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882, London, Ithaca Press, 
1981; Juan Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi 
Movement, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993; Jacques Berque, Egypt, Imperialism and Revolution 
(translated by Jean Stewart), London, Faber & Faber, 1972; Abd al-Rahman Al-Rafiʿi, Al-Thawra al-ʿUrabiyya wa al-
Ihtilal al-Inglizi (The ‘Urabi Revolt and English Occupation), Cairo, Al-Dar al-Qawmiyya lil- Tibaʿa wa al-Nashr, 1966. 
See also Robert L. Tignor, ‘Some Materials for a History of the ʿArabi Revolution’, Middle East Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, 
1962, pp.239–248. 
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also provided records, among them a seminal one by W. S. Blunt.7 Research for this chapter has 
used material from many of these texts as well as drawn on Egyptian archival sources. The 
assessment and limitations of such accounts will be underlined during our examination. 
During the 1870s, the reign of Khedive Ismail (r.1863–1879) saw Turco-Circassian statesman 
Muhammad Sharif Pasha (1826–1887) lead calls for greater constitutional protection against 
Ottoman rule. His movement wanted a written Constitution and elected parliament of Egyptians to 
curtail Khedival power, and to allow Egyptians more self-rule. This movement emerged at a time of 
great economic instability, when Khedive Ismail was imposing ever higher taxes. The Dual Control 
set up by Britain and France in 1876 was meant to manage Egypt’s bankrupt economy and pay off 
the country’s debts amassed during a period of modernisation and redevelopment. Muhammad 
Sharif Pasha’s movement was dominated by Turco-Circassians. They were seen as nobility who was 
foreign and out of touch, so they were never able to appeal to the Egyptian masses. The 
Constitutionalists also largely failed to deal adequately with the country’s dire economic problems, 
nor to overcome the feeling that the majority of ordinary Egyptians were alienated from the political 
process. They did enjoy limited success, however, and – crucially – showed that it was possible to 
pursue a system of checks and balances between the ruler and Parliament. In this sense the 
Constitutionalists provided an essential step for those seeking an alternative power base to the 
Khedive.8 
In contrast, the movement led by Egyptian army officer Ahmed ‘Urabi was far more successful. 
‘Urabi was first of all opposing the manner in which the Khedive granted privileges to Turco-
Circassian army officers in comparison with their Egyptian counterparts. As the protest intensified, 
other more nationalistic objectives were introduced by the ‘Urabi movement.9 Meanwhile, the Dual 
Control and increasing European penetration continued to cause economic and social problems. 
Egyptians felt put-upon and humiliated, all the while blaming Khedive Isma’il for their subjugation 
 
7Wilfred Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events, 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1907. The accuracy and therefore usefulness of this record is reliant on how close the author 
was to power brokers of the period. Blunt was certainly well-connected to senior politicians including British premier 
William Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary Lord Granville. Blunt was also close to ‘Urabi, and supported the 
Nationalists and their calls for independence. 
8Landau, op. cit. 
9Schölch, op. cit., p.153. 
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by foreign powers. After his forced abdication, his successor and son Khedive Tawfiq was quickly 
viewed as a puppet of the British and French.10 
‘Urabi established himself as a powerful leader between 1879 and 1881, as he was involved in a 
series of confrontations with Khedive Tawfiq. ‘Urabi’s movement became wider in scope and more 
influential, as it made more social, economic and political demands. The concerns of ordinary 
people from different walks of life were articulated. These included workers in the countryside, city 
trades people, and others such as “medium and lower-level clerks, middle management in state and 
provincial bureaucracies, the graduates of the modern civil schools, the officer corps and cadets, 
journalists, and the Muslim and Coptic clergy”.11 
Whatever people’s background, there was a unified front against the Turco-Circassian elite, as well 
as expansionist European powers such as Britain and France. Nationalists believed that Egypt “was 
under Turkish and European domination and not ruled by Egyptians themselves and the country’s 
wealth was being disposed in debt payments to Europe”.12 A newly educated class had emerged out 
of the heightened modernisation of Egypt. There were burgeoning bureaucracies centrally and 
locally, and an equally expanding printed press. People had greater opportunities to interact and take 
part in political debates. Social mobility was on the increase thanks to improvements in the 
education system, while the Turco-Circassians and Europeans became more unpopular. They were 
seen as holding the nation and Egyptians back, and indeed threatening their futures.  
There were other groups attracted to ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement who had lost out because of 
Egypt’s modernisation. Islamic scholars had, for example, seen much of their wealth taken away, 
and their influence was also in decline. Over the course of the nineteenth century, they gradually saw 
their land and property confiscated, as well as their role managing the Awqaf (charitable 
endowments). Meanwhile, Egyptians in the countryside were heftily taxed so as to pay back debt to 
European governments. By the years 1880-81, all of these segments of society were “unified by a 
sense of ethnic solidarity involving an (Arabic) linguistic revivalism, Egyptian regional patriotism 
and Islamic nationalism”.13 
 
10Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture, 1870–1919, Cairo, American 
University Press, 2011, pp.20–25. 
11Cole, op. cit., p.22. 
12Schölch, op. cit., p.172. 
13Cole, op. cit., p.271. 
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Nationalist demands for greater sovereignty and against the Khedive, the British, and ultimately the 
Ottoman Empire, intensified. The Khedive used British support to try and appease ‘Urabi, initially 
granting concessions. The ‘Urabists were allowed their own government in September 1881, for 
example, but such measures only made ‘Urabi and his followers more popular, while undermining 
the Khedive’s authority further. Thus the Ottoman Sultan strengthened his power in Egypt by 
bolstering both the Khedive and ‘Urabi, without publicly backing one over the other. The Ottoman 
Sultan then disowned ‘Urabi at the behest of the British. When ‘Urabi refused to resign, the British 
launched a seaborne invasion, sailing the Royal Navy to Alexandria. The British military then 
prepared to invade, so upholding Khedive power, and also protecting the financial debt it was owed, 
as well as vital interests around the Suez Canal.14 
Beyond the 1860s, an intelligentsia flourished in Egypt thanks to educational reforms. It was 
particularly drawn to nationalist thought and action, especially as the Egyptian economy came under 
greater strain. Debt was mounting, and there was growing concern about both the European and 
Ottoman influence in Egypt. Between 1879 and 1882 the native nationalist movement in Egypt 
knew such issues had to be dealt with, along with the increased influence of the Turco-Circassian 
nobility. The nationalists wanted to call a halt to British Imperialism, while also ending the 
supremacy of the Khedive and curbing the de facto Ottoman control over Egypt. 
During this intense period of nationalist expression, local dissent flourished in the movement led by 
Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi. It challenged local rulers, as well as European powers. Regardless of this, 
scholars have not recorded this as a period of “full-blown” nationalism. Instead they class it as being 
in its infancy. 
Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski are among scholars who in fact see Egyptian nationalism as 
dating from the start of the twentieth century, underplaying the effect of the ‘Urabi Revolt. Despite 
this, both writers concede that “the first significant speculation over the issue of national identity in 
modern Egypt occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”15 Gershoni and 
Jankowski acknowledge the importance of the new intelligentsia, the development of Egypt’s 
printing press, and the country’s involvement in the developing world economy as being pivotal. 
 
14Schölch, op. cit. These events are covered extensively in Schölch’s book and it serves as one of the most authoritative 
accounts of the ‘Urabi Revolt and its antecedents. See also Cole, op. cit. and account by Al-Rafiʿi, op. cit., al-Thawra al-
ʿUrabi. 
15Hourani, op. cit., p.4. 
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Changes in the 1860s and 1870s led to far more public discourse on the country’s political affiliation 
and religious identity among all segments of society as well. 
Nevertheless, Gershoni and Jankowski argue that ‘Urabi’s political movement that developed 
between 1879 and 1882 was never able to disassociate itself from the Ottoman Empire and the 
Sultan, and was accordingly weakened because of this. They contend that Egypt’s religious ties with 
the Ottoman Sultan as part of the Umma, is the reason why the ‘Urabists failed to seek full 
independence from the Caliph. They describe how the movement’s leaders “repeatedly expressed 
their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan… and declared their struggle as being one of maintaining Islamic 
unity in the face of the threat of European domination.”16 Thus, crucially, Gershoni and Jankowski 
view the ‘Urabi Revolt as increasing a sense of national consciousness and generating debates about 
Egypt’s national identity, but not as “full-blown” nationalism in pursuit of independence. Instead, 
they consider that there was always an underlying expectation for the ‘Urabists that Egypt would 
retain political and religious links with the Ottoman Empire, and indeed the Islamic Umma. 
Albert Hourani highlights the same perceived conundrum between Islam and nationalism. For 
Hourani, Islam did indeed play a role in Egyptian nationalism as it progressed in the nineteenth 
century, but, according to him “the idea of the Egyptian nation, entitled to a separate political 
existence, involved not only the denial of a single Islamic political community, but also the assertion 
that there could be a virtuous community based on something other than a common religion and a 
revealed law.”17 Many Muslims undoubtedly saw the very notion of an independent nation state as 
being a danger to Egypt’s more important role within the worldwide Muslim community. In spite of 
the greater power being granted to Egyptians within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth 
century,18 Egyptians supported the Ottoman Sultan for the primary reason that he was the head of 
the Umma. 
However, we will use in this chapter new theoretical studies to show that nationalists succeeded in 
keeping Islamic loyalty to the Umma and the Sultan compatible with their desire for political 




18Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.3. Jankowski and Gershoni also state on this topic that Ottoman rule over the 
course of the nineteenth century led “educated Egyptians to reconsider the subject of Egyptian political allegiance and 
affiliation”. 
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in this process. Nationalists wanted to remove themselves from Ottoman control, and establish their 
own political system. While doing this they also sought to maintain, and indeed solidify religious 
ties with the Umma, and with the Ottoman Sultan as its head. The nationalists deemed that this 
would ensure that the Sultan back them in their struggle against Khedive Tawfiq (1879-1892), and 
remove the popular misconception that religious connections with the Umma would be undermined 
by nationalism. The nationalists also considered that close links with the Ottoman Sultan were vital 
if the threat of a British invasion was to be overcome. 
As Gershoni and Jankowski, another Egypt scholar who overlooked the influence of the ‘Urabi 
Revolt of 1879-1882 was P.J. Vatikiotis. In his historical book on Egypt from Muhammad ‘Ali to 
Sadat,19 Vatikiotis instead concentrates on other periods such as Muhammad ‘Ali’s political 
ascension. In his observations on the social, economic and political changes at the time, Vatikiotis 
writes that: 
political developments in the period 1866–82 cannot […] be fully 
appreciated outside the context of the educational and cultural advances of 
the same period, or outside the context of the financial difficulties which 
brought European control over the Khedival government.20 
Vatikiotis is thus primarily interested in the sudden and profound reforms in Egypt that started when 
Muhammad ‘Ali came to power (r.1805–1848). The Ottoman commander was not just the self-
declared Khedive of Egypt and Sudan, but he also ruled Levantine regions outside Egypt’s borders. 
The Ottoman Empire’s control over Egypt lessened during the nineteenth century, as the country 
was transforming considerably. During the 1860s, Arabic replaced Turkish as the official language 
of Egypt, for example.21 This was also a time when Egypt began to gravitate towards European 
countries, developing trade and fiscal associations with these countries. The Egyptian state 
modernised across numerous other spheres, including education. Characteristically, a civil school 
system coordinated from Cairo introduced non-religious subjects. Although Ernest Gellner argues in 
his work that industrialisation22 and its consequences on nationalism did not happen in Egypt until 
 
19See Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, London, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1991. 
20Ibid., p.127. 
21On the importance of the Arabic language in nationalist aspiration, see Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and 
National Identity: A Study in Ideology, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2003. Specifically see the chapter on 
Egyptian nationalism. 
22Gabriel Baer, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt, Chicago and London, Chicago University Press, 1969, 
p.212. 
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well into the mid-20th century, the substantial socio-economic mutations of the nineteenth century 
did have a significant effect politically. Vatikiotis describes how these changes “for the first time 
produced a local opposition to the Khedive”23 and indeed directly led to the formation of the ‘Urabi 
movement between 1879 and 1882. 
The account of events during the reign of Khedive Isma’il (r.1863–1879) is virtually the same 
contained in various scholarly works. Vatikiotis, in fact outlines, as many historians do, how the 
political turbulence was generated by numerous strains, including the European penetration of Egypt 
and its fiscal grip over the country, as well as a feeling of anger aimed at the local elitist Turco-
Circassian class. Protesters joined the Constitutional movement, which expressed dissent against the 
Khedive via the new Consultative Assembly, the Majlis al-Shura al-Nuwwab in 1866.24 
The economic pressures brought about by the debt crisis in Egypt had a deep impact on the people – 
fellahin (peasants) and modest city dwellers alike – as they were heftily taxed to pay off the 
country’s debts to European nations who had financed Egyptian renewal projects throughout the 
1860s and afterwards.25 By the turn of the nineteenth century, such social groups had been through 
decades of financial hardship, as they slowly won back autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, 
as the eighteenth century drew to a close, the taxes they had to pay to the Sublime Porte to retain 
Egypt’s degree of independence and as a mark of respect to the Ottoman Sultan, had risen 
significantly.26 Vatikiotis claims that the Constitutional movement was mainly made up of the 
Turco-Circassian elites, who held the highest positions in Egyptian society. He contends that these 
constitutional concessions – namely the new Constitution and Parliament – meant Khedive Isma’il 
“opened a Pandora’s Box from which emerged the first Egyptian rebels”.27 
Notwithstanding, Egypt’s new Constitutional movement was not particularly successful. Ahmad 
Shafiq suggests in his diaries that the Majlis al-Shura al-Nuwwab was in fact a token body created 
so Khedive Isma’il might persuade supporters in Europe that he was a “constitutional monarch, 
permitting some public participation in power, to avoid the charge of absolutism”.28 Many historians 
 
23Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, pp.127-28. 
24Landau, op. cit., pp.8-9. 
25John C.B. Richmond, Egypt, 1798–1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity, London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1977, 
pp.118–19; and Al-Waqa‘i’ al-Misriyyah, Egypt, No. 12, 19 January 1880. 
26‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad ‘Ali, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984; 
see also Michael Winter, Egypt Under Ottoman Rule, 1517–1798, London, Routledge, 1992. 
27Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, p.129. 
28Ahmed Shafiq, Mudhakkirati fi nisf qarn (My memoirs over half a century), 2 vols., Cairo, Matba’at Misr, 1–36, 
vol. II, p.29. This same quote is also mentioned in Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, p.130. For a more 
minute study of Egyptian constitutional politics in the second half of the nineteenth century see Landau, op. cit. 
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specialising in Egypt’s history have indeed cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Constitutional 
activists, with some placing a large question mark over the allegedly overwhelming Turco-
Circassian nature of their movement. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod argues that the Constitutional movement 
was buoyed by its initial accomplishments, but soon faced up to the reality of where real power lay: 
by 1879 they [the constitutionalists] appeared to have achieved a good 
measure of success in their endeavour, but the emptiness of their victory 
became apparent immediately after their triumph when they were confronted 
with the nascent power of the alien European elite.29 
An assessment of the Constitutional movement’s record in government also shows its blatant 
shortcomings. As Prime Minister, Constitutionalists’ leader Muhammad Sharif Pasha, who was a 
Turco-Circassian nobleman, could only hold two administrations together for less than five months 
each, prior to Britain’s invading of Egypt in 1882.30 
The intrinsic inadequacies of the Constitutionalists were two-fold. One that was noted by most 
scholars was the privileged nature of the Turco-Circassian nobility who dominated the movement. 
They succeeded in obtaining a range of constitutional changes before Isma’il was forced to abdicate 
in 1879, and indeed became the main check on Khedival governance.31 But when Isma’il’s son, 
Tawfiq, took the throne, ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement became far more influential than the 
Constitutionalists. By the time of Tawfiq’s ascension to power, they were viewed as an elite Turco-
Circassian group solely concerned with strengthening their political power so as to, in turn, bolster 
their own economic stake in the country, rather than work for the greater interests of the Egyptian 
people. The second inadequacy was the ethnic identity of the Turco-Circassians, who were seen as 
having little in common with native Egyptians. Khedive Isma’il’s favouritism towards the Turco-
Circassian class was tacitly supported by Ottoman Empire officials, who agreed to them being 
promoted over autochtonous Egyptians within institutions including the civil service and the Army. 
Thus the elitism and ethnicity of the Turco-Circassians helped to perpetuate the view that they were 
part of the Ottoman and Khedival power nexus. Such an impression prevented the Constitutionalists 
from winning mass popular support from the majority of the Egyptian people. 
 
29Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ‘The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite: Prelude to the ‘Urabi Revolt’, Middle East Journal, 
1967, vol. 21, no. 3, p.326.  
30Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s first term as Prime Minister was from April to August 1879. His second, prompted by 
Ahmad ‘Urabi after the ‘Abdin Palace incident, and following ‘Urabi’s demands, was from September 1881 to February 
1882. His third lasted from August 1882 to January 1884. 
31Landau, op. cit., pp.16–27. 
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This common perception of Turco-Circassian ethnic elitism is, however, disputed by Abu-Lughod’s 
work on the changes in the makeup of Egypt’s power brokers during the nineteenth century. Abu-
Lughod maintains that the fundamental nature of the Turco-Circassians, including their ethnic 
character, had changed considerably over the course of the nineteenth century, and that they were in 
fact “identical with the indigenous population except in prestige”.32 Abu-Lughod suggests that 
Muhammad ‘Ali wanted to use his power to lessen the clout of specific social groups, and 
particularly the elite Turco-Circassians who exercised control over social, economic and political 
life.33 Muhammad ‘Ali was keen to weaken any group that challenged his own grip on power, and 
accordingly wanted the Turco-Circassians to move away from Cairo. He encouraged them to go 
back to their estates in the countryside, so as to “renounce their old occupations and begin to build a 
new pattern of life”.34 This movement of the Turco-Circassian noblemen led to them assimilating 
within rural communities, and indeed having an influence on them. Religious ties overcame ethnic 
differences, especially as there were marriages with native Egyptians. As a result of these family 
bonds, Turco-Circassians dispensed characteristics unique to their identity. They stopped speaking 
Turkish, for example, and communicated in Arabic. This caused, argues Abu-Lughod, the Turco-
Circassian ethnic identity becoming so diluted that, by the 1870s, it “had lost its meaning”.35 While 
the idea of Turco-Circassian identity disappearing might be considered hyperbole, it certainly 
changed over the course of the nineteenth century. The native Egyptian view of the Turco-
Circassians also altered during that time, to the extent that their noble status as the landed elite was 
no longer acceptable by the rest of society. 
While there is a consensus among most scholars that ‘Urabi’s nationalists surpassed the 
Constitutional movement in popularity from 1879, they have made no suggestion that the mainly 
secular nature of the movement was to blame for its weakness. Indeed, Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s 
Constitutional organisation had no religious affiliation and although it was “nationalist”, it never 
sought to use Islam or other aspects of its Egyptian identity to advance its patriotic rhetoric. 
Vatikiotis wrote that he doubted “whether Sharif could have attracted the ‘ulama, landowners and 
other elements in the Assembly […] to his camp away from the Orabists”.36 In fact, he did not 
attract them and, crucially, there was almost no undertaking to secure such support. The 
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Constitutional movement not only never tried to incorporate religious groups, but its extremely 
limited “nationalist” ambitions centred in priority on increasing the power of the new Assembly at 
the expense of the Khedive’s, and working to repay debts to European lenders.37 Such objectives 
resonated with the elites, but not Egypt’s masses. Instead, it was the ‘Urabi movement – one for 
Egyptians and led by Egyptians – that captured the imagination of the public at large. 
The ‘Urabi movement started as a group protesting against Turco-Circassian army officers receiving 
privileges over their Egyptian counterparts.38 While the dissent has been analysed as being caused 
by ethnic tensions between Turco-Circassians and Egyptians39 this view does not acknowledge that 
‘Urabi himself wanted Muhammad Sharif Pasha – a Turco-Circassian – to become Prime Minister 
and lead a new government following the first confrontation between the ‘Urabi nationalist 
movement and Khedive Tawfiq in September 1881. ‘Urabi and his fellow officers were in fact from 
modest rural backgrounds which many Egyptians could identify with.40 ‘Urabi’s populist appeal 
involved not just grass roots national pride, but also a pledge that he wanted a return to Egypt 
asserting its Islamic identity and legacy. A long period of interference by European powers had 
caused huge economic difficulties for the Egyptian people, along with a feeling that their religious 
belief, and indeed entire culture, was being challenged. ‘Urabi, who was a native Egyptian acutely 
sensitive to his country’s Islamic identity, undertook to deal with such injustices.41 
There has been a tendency to underplay, or indeed bypass completely, the part the religious scholars 
played in the ‘Urabi Revolt and in the emergence of nationalism in Egypt in general. It is this 
analytical deficiency that this chapter will seek to cover. The Egyptian ‘ulama were the 
acknowledged protectors of their faith and the most important authorities in Islam. By paying little 
attention to their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt, historians of the uprising have thus overlooked its hugely 




37Schölch, op. cit. 
38Berque, op. cit., p.113; see also Schölch, op. cit., pp.136-37 and p.153. 
39Berque, op. cit.  
40Ahmed ‘Urabi, Mudhakkirat al-Za’im Ahmed ‘Urabi: Kashf al-Setar ‘An Ser al-Asrar fi al-Nahda al-Misriyya  
al-Mashhora bil-Thawra al-‘Urabiyya (The Diaries of the Leader Ahmed Urabi: Unveiling the Secret of all Secrets on 
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al-Gami’i, 3 vols., Cairo, Dar al-Kutub, 2005, vol. 1, pp.90–94. 
41Ibid., p.295. 
Chapter One: The Emergence of an Islamic Nationalist Movement in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century 
 
54 
The ‘Urabi revolt initially began as an effort to restore the rights and standing of native Egyptian 
servicemen in the Army, but this developed into a wider campaign across the country that tackled 
broader national grievances. ‘Urabi presented these issues in the context of his country’s Islamic 
identity, suggesting it was a vital part of Egypt’s status as a strong and prosperous nation-state and 
therefore pledged to protect it. 
‘Urabi’s most natural and valuable allies in the promotion and indeed preservation of this Islamic 
identity were the religious scholars in Egypt, although at the time there was some disagreement 
among the ‘ulama. While some gave their backing to the Khedive, so opposing ‘Urabi and the 
increasing challenge he posed to the rule of both the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan, others did in 
fact support his nationalist rebellion and calls for independence. There are scholars who concur with 
this account of a split among the ‘ulama,42 but to date no research into the ‘Urabi Revolt examines 
the ‘ulama as a group and their intricate positions in relation to the emerging nationalist movement, 
and indeed their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt.43 Islam was a central component of Egyptian national 
identity in the nineteenth century, and so were the ‘ulama who provided religious and moral 
guidance to society at large. Thus the lack of analysis of the part Islam and the ‘ulama played in 
radical politics can be viewed as a major academic flaw. 
The Nationalist and Islamic Character of the ‘Urabi Revolt, 1879-1882  
We will here incorporate new theoretical works demonstrating that Egyptians imbued with a sense 
of being part of a nation led the overwhelming nationalist ‘Urabi Revolt between 1879 and 1882. 
Their objectives were varied, and included retaining loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, while achieving 
independence from his Empire.44 Beyond this principal aim, the nationalists sought to reduce the 
power of the Khedive. As the revolt intensified, they wanted the Khedive removed from power 
altogether, arguing that he was too close to the British.45 A third purpose of the nationalists was to 
attempt to secure the help of the British in reducing Khedival authority. While they tried to achieve 
this, the nationalists guaranteed all European powers, and the Dual Control, that they would pay 
 
42Cole, op. cit.; Schölch, op. cit.; Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., al-Thawra al-‘Urabi. 
43Recent research by the academic Dr Ahmed Mansoor Mirza is probably the latest work which attempts to look at the 
role of the ‘ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt and in relation to the emergence of nationalism in Egypt in his doctorate thesis 
entitled: Between Ummah, Empire and Nation: The Role of the ‘ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt and the Emergence of 
Egyptian Nationalism, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014. 
44Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., al-Thawra al-‘Urabi, p.70. 
45Ibid., p.119. 
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back all their debts. When such complicated diplomacy became unstuck, and the British moved to 
maintain Khedive Tawfiq’s position, the nationalists chose to resist growing British influence. 
We will endeavour to use fresh references to show that all of these three objectives were offered as 
ones that would amalgamate Islam and nationalism. We will also demonstrate the limitations of the 
existing scholarly literature in that respect. Egyptian nationalism played on a desire to defend the 
country from foreign meddling, and from a ruler who was being used by overseas invaders. The 
Khedive had abandoned his own people, and Egyptians with a legacy stretching back to ancient 
history needed to stand up to him. Egypt was a distinct geographical entity, with its own tongue – 
Egyptian Arabic – and a successful past. Beyond the greatness of the Pharaohs, Egypt had played a 
key role in Islamic civilisation. As far as Islam was concerned, the nationalists saw the need to 
safeguard Egypt’s religious identity, especially when it was coming under the hold of non-Muslim 
countries, such as Britain.46 When the Khedive forged an alliance with “infidel” Britain just before 
the British invasion in 1882, then the urge to preserve Islamic Egypt became particularly important 
and was indeed considered as an Islamic imperative. 
Beyond the treatment of the ‘Urabi Revolt in the broad historical literature which covers nineteenth 
century Egypt, two highly authoritative books by Juan Cole47 and Alexander Schölch,48 have long 
been appraised the most notable published works about the ‘Urabi Revolt. Both investigate the 
uprising in more detail, focusing on its nature and principal causes. But there are marked differences 
in approach: Schölch’s is a thorough political analysis of the sequence of events between the 
specific years 1879 and 1882, while Cole concentrates more on the social and cultural history of the 
period and the conditions which gave rise to the rebellion. Cole’s angle is an effort to provide a 
sociological enquiry, which also incorporates a more theoretical examination of revolution and 
actual circumstances – the kind prevalent in Theda Skocpol’s valuable writings on the French, 
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Other publications on al-Thawra al-‘Urabi (Arabic for the ‘Urabi Revolt) are by writers such as 
Latifa Salim50 and the prolific ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i.51 These Arabic language contributions are 
regarded by some to be overly descriptive, and too concerned with class struggle,52 but they still 
offer researchers considerable background on the subject of the ‘Urabi Revolt prior to negotiating 
the Egyptian archives that are notoriously difficult to access and utilise.53 
Alexander Schölch’s study is mainly interested in elites. For example, he describes how the pro-
Khedival military and government hierarchy in Egypt were associated with new elites, both within 
the revolutionary ‘Urabi movement, and the Constitutionalist camp of Muhammad Sharif Pasha, 
which took a more long term view of change. Cole in fact writes that “the social dimensions of the 
Revolution escape Schölch”.54 Cole goes on to discard analysis based on elites, looking instead at 
the influence of wider social forces, such as peasants, organisations and societies centred on trade, 
and thinkers. Cole explores the social make-ups of these groups as they relate to class, and looks at 
how they fitted into a rapidly transforming Egyptian society. Cole suggests that “economic and 
demographic change and the growth of state power created new interests among the three strata that 
most participated later in the Revolution”.55 
Although the texts under discussion are examples of greatly different methods of scrutiny, the 
authors draw similar conclusions. Cole and Schölch both acknowledge that the ‘Urabi Revolt saw 
separate forces with very definite points of contention uniting against the Khedive and his 
government. Schölch refers to them as “autochthonous social groups,”56 which included military 
personnel, as well as ‘ulama and local journalists who “stood in the forefront of this struggle”.57 
Cole concurred on the influence of the groups cited all taking part in the uprising, but he also 
highlights the involvement of “the rural population, the urban guilds and the intelligentsia … [who] 
were united by reference to a common enemy”.58 Both historians considered that the main fight was 
 
50Latifa Salim, al-Quwa al-Ijtimaa’iyya fi al-Thawra al-‘Urabiyya (The Social Forces in the ‘Urabi Revolt), Cairo,  
al-Hay’ah al-Misriyya, 1981. 
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against the Khedive Isma’il and then, after Isma’il’s abdication in 1879, his successor, Khedive 
Tawfiq. Triggers for political action included excessive taxation of the peasantry and guild workers. 
Disquiet about the treatment of Egyptian soldiers as second class servicemen in comparison to 
Turco-Circassians also caused grievances. 
As regards the standing of Islamic religious scholars in Egypt, Schölch suggests that “as a social 
group, the ‘ulama had not recovered from Muhammad ‘Ali’s blows economically and politically”.59 
In turn, Cole evokes the influence of “economic and social change in the 1860s and 1870s on the 
peasants, guilds and intellectuals”.60 The two academics stick to the familiar pattern of argument of 
the ‘ulama becoming far less influential while not investigating the validity of such a view. 
Consequently, both authors largely fail to grasp the full scope of and the intricacies underlying the 
‘ulama’s part in the ‘Urabi Revolt as well as the Islamic nature of the uprising. 
Cole and Schölch accept that Islam was a dynamic for social change, but only in a very limited 
manner. Schölch sees the ‘ulama as representing the obvious Islamic aspect to the uprising. The 
historian said that in the period just before the Revolution, authoritative ‘ulama such as “Sheikh  
al-Bakri and Sheikh al-Idwi were won over” to the nationalist cause. He points out that Sheikh  
al-Idwi used his sermons to rally against Riyadh Pasha,61 the ethnic Circassian politician who served 
as Egypt’s Prime Minister three times between 1879 and 1894, and colonial European powers.62 The 
La’iha Wataniyya, or National Declaration by the National Party on 2 April 1879 – which laid out a 
set of nationalist demands –63 is emphasised by both Cole and Schölch. The latter argues this was 
supported by religious scholars such as Sheikh al-Bakri, Sheikh al-Idwi and Sheikh Khalfawi.64 
Cole takes a different view, however, and contends that the “religious and military branches of the 
intelligentsia supplied nearly half of the signatures”.65 Cole adds that “many of the Muslim high 
clergy or ‘ulama, though ‘ulama did form one branch of the revolutionary intelligentsia”.66 Cole and 
Schölch are united in the opinion that the burgeoning nationalist ‘Urabi revolt meant members of the 
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‘ulama were forced to reflect on their relationship with the Khedive, the Ottoman Sultan and indeed 
Egypt itself, as it pertained to its place within the Umma.67 But there is no deep analysis of the 
‘ulama’s exact position within this nationalist movement, and indeed among those who opposed it. 
Instead, the ‘ulama are merely treated as one of many groups caught up in revolutionary 
developments. Cole and Schölch place these Islamic scholars and thinkers in an oversimplified 
posture that only depends on the extent of their loyalties to the Ottoman Sultan, through his 
representative, the Khedive.68 
In fact, as they reacted to the rise of ‘Urabi, and the growing nationalistic spirit in the country 
between 1879 and 1882, the ‘ulama had a far more significant and indeed nuanced attitude towards 
the unfolding events. Important new research by more contemporary scholars such as Indira Falk 
Gesink and Meir Hatina that examines the work of the ‘ulama in Egypt during the nineteenth 
century, illustrates that the more conservative Islamic scholars were – in contrast to the established 
and predominant theories in ‘ulama studies – pro-nationalist, and indeed were very close and vocal 
supporters of ‘Urabi and the revolutionary movement he led.69 
The ‘Urabi uprising, Egypt’s first manifestation of nationalism, took place at a time when Egypt 
remained part of the Ottoman Empire – a period when the Sultan himself was head of the Islamic 
Umma.70 Despite this, there are no specific investigations on the influence of Islam and the ‘ulama 
on the ‘Urabi revolution. While Cole and Schölch’s books provide broad and beneficial material on 
the relationship between the ‘ulama and the nationalists, they by no means cover it in detail. By 
contrast, Meir Hatina offers a clear examination of the ‘Urabi uprising, and the role of the ‘ulama, 
but the precise links between Islam and Egyptian nationalism are not the primary subjects of his 
work and are similarly played down. 
Gesink’s study of the corps of religious scholars is a valuable addition to the existing literature. She 
argues that most of the scholarly production on the ‘ulama has put too much emphasis on modernist 
Islamic scholars, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, meaning that the more conservative ‘ulama have 
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been viewed as “opponents of reform and enemies of progress”.71 Gesink covers al-Azhar’s reforms 
in Egypt and, how the ‘ulama played an essential role in debates about education reform in the 
nineteenth century. Gesink also describes how, even on the political front, both traditional and more 
reformist ‘ulama remained engaged and expressed complex ideas, relating to the most important 
political issues of the day.72 
Indeed, the influence of Islamic scholars has been ignored in much of the historiography of the 
‘Urabi Revolt. Academic literature has failed to acknowledge that the ‘ulama led discourse on 
nationalism, and discussed its implications for Egypt’s place within the Umma, and indeed its 
allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan. Many ‘ulama supported nationalism between 1879 and 1882. 
They recognised that nationalism and Egypt’s vital position in the Umma could be reconciled. There 
were also powerful religious scholars who were vehemently opposed to such views. The ‘ulama had 
a key role in the political fray, having an impact on all sides in the struggle. The confrontation 
extended to a battle over control of al-Azhar itself: Egypt’s most renowned mosque-seminary.  
There were two particularly important confrontations involving al-Azhar, which came to symbolise 
Islamic legitimacy.73 One saw ‘Urabi’s movement attempt to get rid of the allegedly anti-nationalist 
Sheikh al-Azhar, and then replace him with a supporter. The second incident saw ‘Urabi, endorsed 
by pro-nationalist ‘ulama, secure a religious legal ruling, or fatwa, questioning the integrity of the 
Khedive in relation to his status as a Muslim. The fatwa portrayed Khedive Tawfiq as a British 
pawn, determined to advance the interests of the non-Muslim British Empire in Egypt. ‘Urabi’s 
nationalists accused Tawfiq of apostasy, as the fatwa called for his rule to end. Both incidents 
clearly highlight the involvement of the ‘ulama in the nationalist struggle. 
While concurring with this opinion, Hatina re-analyses the ‘ulama’s stance. In line with this, our 
argument challenges the prevailing view of the ‘ulama losing their historic power during the 
nineteenth century and re-evaluates their authority during that time. Hatina acknowledges that the 
early to mid-decades of the 19th century saw the ‘ulama’s political and economic leverage receding, 
but he argues that “Muhammad ‘Ali’s reformist program […] failed to weaken [the ‘ulama’s] status 
as the country’s intellectual elite and the attractiveness of al-Azhar as an institution of religious 
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learning”.74 Hatina’s latter observation is a valid one, but we intend to rely on the writings and 
contributions of some of the most prominent religious scholars at the time to later demonstrate that 
the ‘ulama not only kept hold of much of their social standing, along with their authority in religious 
and moral matters, but they also retained intellectual dominance as well as political clout. This all 
enabled the ‘ulama to participate in expressions of Egyptian nationalism. In this sense, the ‘ulama 
not only provided spiritual, intellectual and moral legitimacy to the movement, but were a central 
political force in its ultimate popularity. 
Thus both Hatina and Gesink have put forward an important re-appraisal of the principal and 
generally accepted body of work on the ‘ulama, and the way they dealt with state reforms and 
modernisation in nineteenth century Egypt. Such works include those by the scholars ‘Afaf Lutfi  
al-Sayyid-Marsot and Daniel Crecelius produced in the 1960s and 1970s and in which they stick to 
modernisation theory, and do not fully explore secularisation processes, and their repercussions on 
Islam and the Muslim world. Hatina remarks that secularisation per se did not take place in Egypt: 
in the sense of the separation of religion and state. Rather, it took the form of 
the penetration of the state into areas that traditionally had been under the 
control of the religious establishment such as the Waqf (charitable 
endowment), the educational system and the judiciary.75 
As far as such questions are concerned, more research work is certainly required to establish how far 
the state did in fact spread its control on spheres of life including education and the judiciary. In line 
with Hatina and Gesink’s argument, we will proceed to show how the ‘ulama grappled with Egypt’s 
swift modernisation process in the nineteenth century. To that effect, we will offer an alternative 
theoretical approach about the manner in which the ‘ulama responded to reforms, while analysing 
how such reforms did not in fact present a significant challenge to their traditional roles. The way 
the ‘ulama were able to remain popular among huge segments of society, while resisting state 
influence will also be considered. It was through preserving their political and moral standing during 
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Islam & Modernisation: The Status of the ‘Ulama in Nineteenth Century Egypt 
The modernisation of Egypt during the nineteenth century was inextricably linked to a sense of 
national pride and the emergence of nationalism. It was an era when the country modernised in all 
areas of public life. The way the economy was organised was altered, along with the political 
system, and civil service. More specifically, the military and the education system were subject to 
change, as were Egyptian relations with the Ottoman Empire, and indeed other regional and 
international partners.76 This period of reform in Egypt was presided over by Muhammad ‘Ali, the 
Ottoman General in Egypt. After the French left in 1801, ‘Ali became Egyptian Vali (Governor) 
thanks in part to political demands by the country’s religious scholars. 
Much of the modernisation process in Egypt can be traced back to burgeoning links with Europe 
which started with the invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of the 18th century. Muhammad 
‘Ali’s reign, and those that came afterwards, saw Egypt moving away from the Ottoman Empire, as 
Europeans exerted greater influence. The creation of the Suez Canal77 strengthened bonds with 
Europe, as did increased visits by Egyptian students to countries such as Britain and France. Beyond 
these educational ties, European professionals arrived to work on prestige projects such as the Suez 
Canal, and also in aiding to renew other elements of Egyptian infrastructure. Architects and 
technocrats helped improve Egyptian cities, and they were supported by medics, lawyers and a host 
of other professionals from Europe.78 Egypt became increasingly reliant on Europe. Financially, 
much of Egypt’s modernisation derived from the sale of cotton to Britain.79 
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Change from the start of the Muhammad ‘Ali’s era continued up until the reign of Isma’il’s (r.1863–
1879). To begin with, the Egyptian military was strengthened, in the hope that it could resist greater 
encroachment from Britain or France, or indeed from the Ottoman Empire. Land in Egypt was 
handed over to the state to support the growth of all these transformations. In the meantime, 
educational reforms saw a technical school system set up. The missions of Egyptian students to 
Europe were meant to assist recruitment to the army and the civil service, producing a better quality 
of candidates. Reform and modernisation affected every sphere.80 
The reign of Khedive Isma’il was also a period of modernisation, following a break under Abbas I 
(r.1848–1854) and Said I (r.1854–1863). The latter wanted to slow down reform, or else reject it 
altogether.81 Education improved considerably under Isma’il. Efforts were made to assist trade links, 
and cities were rebuilt to resemble those in Europe. Meanwhile, political institutions were reformed. 
Parliamentary government grew out of Isma’il’s reign, with the foundation of the Majlis Shura  
al-Nuwwab in 1866.82 
Thus advancements aimed at centralising and modernising key institutions inhibited the influence of 
the ‘ulama in the political field, and also curtailed their economic privileges, and indeed 
increasingly challenged their overall traditional standing. These specialists in fiqh – Islamic 
jurisprudence – were sidelined as they were forced to retreat and exert their knowledge and authority 
in areas that were left relatively untouched by the encroaching new state. ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-
Marsot and Daniel Crecelius outline the declining power of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century.83 
They follow a popular view among historians that sees the start of Muhammad ‘Ali reign, and 
especially the period after 1809, as being detrimental to the fortunes of the religious scholars.  
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Al-Sayyid emphasises how the ‘ulama were stripped of economic strength and other forms of 
power, saying all of this was due to “the introduction of westernising influences”,84 that, it is argued, 
were personified by advisors who rearranged “his administration on Western lines, introduce[d] a 
Western-style system of education, [and developed] an efficient army modelled on European 
lines”.85 Al-Sayyid contends that these brought about so much progress that “the traditional social 
pattern of groups having a cohesive force and an internal organisation of their own that was 
independent of a central authority”86 was broken down, and new social elites took over. 
Crecelius, in contrast, focuses on the manner in which ‘ulama dealt with rapid transformations in 
society. He said that the way in which they reacted to modernisation was at first “instinctively 
defensive, [and] characterised by a strong desire for self-preservation”.87 Taking an opposing stance 
to al-Sayyid, Crecelius said the ‘ulama actively opposed change, and were “able to obstruct, delay 
or undermine new programs”.88 It was only later, when such obstructions failed and the state 
reforms grew stronger, that the ‘ulama altered their position, effectively withdrawing from the wider 
world, and concentrating on the areas where they still had authority. As Crecelius puts it, they 
retreated “in an effort to preserve them from contamination through contact with the modernising 
elements in society”.89 
Crecelius and al-Sayyid accordingly concur on how advances in Egypt undermined the ‘ulama: 
modernisation led to them losing economic and political clout. But, in contrast to Crecelius,  
al-Sayyid blames a new elite imbued with European values “that was eventually to displace the 
‘ulama as the intellectual elite of the land”.90 Crecelius was more inclined to attribute the self-
imposed marginalisation of the religious scholars for their decline. Crecelius argued that 
modernisation was not meant “to destroy the institutions of the old order but rather to create a new 
order alongside the old”.91 The ‘ulama were unable to prevent reform, let alone influence it, and so 
grew increasingly isolated.  
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Crecelius suggests that the ‘ulama’s traditional areas of leverage were able to avoid forced change 
because Muhammad ‘Ali was “unwilling to offend the religious prejudices of the ‘ulama and the 
overwhelming majority of tradition-bound Egyptians or to tamper with a sacred revealed law”.92  
Al-Sayyid maintains that a burgeoning modern civil service had replaced the religious scholars as 
the “men of the pen”. This altered the nature of Islamic Egypt, but, Al-Sayyid claims that, 
Muhammad ‘Ali “could not totally ignore tradition, for after all he was a Muslim ruler”93. 
Despite the reforms carried out by Muhammad ‘Ali, and those who ruled after him during the 
nineteenth century, Islam remained hugely important to the lives of ordinary Egyptians. Rather than 
destroying the power of the ‘ulama, reform actually strengthened their connection to the lives of 
devout Muslims. Modernisation increased the authority of the ‘ulama among huge groups of people 
seeking moral guidance.94 Fast social change within a society with a long Islamic history meant that 
people looked for stability and certainty in religion. It is in this sense that the traditional approach of 
a diminished class of ‘ulama has been questioned and there is a view that “the loss of its monopoly 
over educational and intellectual life did not result in marginality.”95 
Much of Muhammad ‘Ali’s reform led to the ‘ulama’s close relationship with the centre of power in 
Egypt being challenged. In the words of Crecelius: “having eliminated the interference of the ‘ulama 
in his government, Muhammad ‘Ali left them virtually alone, to teach, think, write, or practice 
whatever they wanted so long as they did not undermine his programs within the sphere of 
government”.96 Even if the influence of the ‘ulama was indeed limited to basic interaction with the 
political realm, there can be no question of the religious scholars losing all standing. On the 
contrary, an important role of the ‘ulama had, for centuries, been to offer ethical guidance to people, 
and there was no sense of this role disappearing. The religious scholars acted among other things as 
teachers, and legal experts, and such positions were as relevant to the mass of the population as ever, 
as new research indicates. Muhammad ‘Ali’s reforms ejected the conservative ‘ulama from 
government because they were sceptical of change, but this did not prevent the religious scholars 
from carrying out their wider work in society. Egyptians revered Islamic practice, and relied upon 
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By looking at the key effect Islam had on Egypt, and the way religious scholars provided legitimacy 
to government, novel theoretical studies suggest that ‘Urabi and his movement had solid ground to 
bring the ‘ulama back into the centre of political life. In more recent scholarly work, Hatina notes 
that “bending to the authority of the state did not mean the total submission of the religious 
establishment”.97 Similar new interpretations to the work of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century 
include that of Indira Falk Gesink who notes that both reactionary religious scholars, as well as 
“modernist” ones, backed ‘Urabi. Such work illustrates how important it is to further discuss the 
contribution of the religious scholars to Egyptian nationalism in the nineteenth century. 
Over time, the state reforms gradually pressed the religious scholars to engage with issues linked to 
modernisation and wholesale societal changes in Egypt. This, in turn, left the ‘ulama working out 
how they might in fact adapt their work in a variety of spheres to new ideas being imported from 
other parts of the world, and especially Europe. Thus, the ‘ulama became increasingly involved in a 
wide-ranging debate about the relevance of these new ideas and how they should relate to their 
country. 
Here, we will therefore examine the impact the religious scholars had on reform, and on the kind of 
thinking that underpinned Egypt’s nationalist movement. Islamic reform became a priority for an 
initially restricted group of ‘ulama as sectors of the state including education and scientific research 
were modernised. These more progressive ‘ulama believed that the development of knowledge was 
compatible with their faith. Other more conservative ‘ulama were more inclined to reject the new 
ideas, and called for continued emphasis on the core values of Islam they viewed as sacred. We will 
specifically concentrate on three highly influential religious scholars from the nineteenth century: 
Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi. We will thus 
demonstrate how all three men promoted reform, but also provided an intellectual justification for 
Egyptian nationalism. 
Before we consider the writings and roles of those three distinct Islamic thinkers, however, it is 
important to first of all define the historical functions of the ‘ulama in Muslim countries and, in 
particular, look at their spheres of authority in Egyptian society in the nineteenth century. The word 
‘ulama comes from the Arabic verbal root (ain laam meem).98 This root is the three-letter verb “to 
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know”. As a noun, ‘ulama means “the ones possessed with knowledge” or those possessed with 
knowledge. Such “possessors of knowledge” have played hugely important parts in Islamic societies 
since the 8th century. Beyond teaching, preaching and interpreting texts, they acted as moral guides. 
Their ‘ilm (Islamic knowledge) was crucial, to the extent that political leaders in Egypt tried to use 
the work of the ‘ulama for political purposes. This was the reason so many leaders traditionally kept 
the ‘ulama at the centre of power. 
Egypt’s education system, in turn, was kept separate from the political arena, but the ‘ulama were by 
definition able to continue with their educative function. Their principal scholarly, legal and moral 
duties ensured that the ‘ulama remained extremely well respected. There was a top-to-bottom feel to 
this: in the countryside, ‘ulama took on key positions in villages, while in the cities senior ‘ulama 
were part of the inner circle of power brokers. They were part of the Caliph’s imperial Court, and 
attached to those leading tribes. 
Beyond their obvious religious and teaching responsibilities, the ‘ulama’s close links with political 
players meant they were relied upon to sanction policy. They offered legal justification for decisions 
concerning every sphere of life, from taxation and law to war. This power brokering was weighed in 
favour of the rulers, with the ‘ulama by no means remaining independent.99However, by “1500 the 
religious scholars had already turned into a highly respected group which could with considerable 
sources of personal and corporate wealth and a large influence in the shaping of Muslim 
societies”.100 
Meir Hatina portrays the traditional ‘ulama as scholars “who acquired their formal religious training 
and credentials in established madrasas [schools: sing. madrassa; pl. madaaris] and religious 
colleges [and act as] teachers, preachers, judges and administrators in the state religious system”.101 
Meir Hatina said some ‘ulama were affiliated to the state but others “were unaffiliated scholars who 
adopted a more critical and activist stance and often clashed with official ‘ulama and the political 
authorities over religious and socio-political issues”.102 
 
 
99Keddie, op. cit., ‘Introduction’, Scholars, Saints and Sufis, pp.1-3. 
100Ibid., p.2. 
101Meir Hatina, ‘Introduction’ in Meir Hatina (ed.), Guardians of the Faith in Modern Times: ‘Ulama in the Middle 
East, Leiden, Brill, 2009, p.1.  
102Ibid., p.2. 
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Meir Hatina’s sketch of the ‘ulama needs expanding. To begin with, it needs to be pointed out that 
the religious scholars worked across a variety of professions, and indeed many of them mixed with 
the intellectual elite across society. Many ‘ulama, including Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rifa’a Rafi’  
al-Tahtawi, whose careers are both considered in this chapter, became influential journalists and 
writers, as they took advantage of the power of the new printing presses in Egypt. As we shall 
reference later, ‘Abduh and Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi spent time as part of the “formal” ‘ulama corps. 
Tahtawi, was a brilliant religious scholar who was close to Muhammad ‘Ali, while ‘Abduh became 
Grand Mufti, the highest Islamic legal position in the country. 
It should also be noted that Meir Hatina stresses the way the ‘ulama were an integral component of 
the state religious system. They did not just legitimise political decisions, but actually took part in 
making them. Meir Hatina also discusses how all ‘ulama were respected, whether affiliated to the 
state or not. This was because of their numerous roles across all sections of society. Thus the ‘ulama 
sanctioned decisions taken by rulers, and also acted as informal guides to the masses, thanks to their 
diverse and highly influential capacity in society.  
The Role of the Reformist ‘Ulama in Defining Egypt as a Modern Islamic Nation 
Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873)103 started his academic career at the al-Azhar Mosque-
University in Cairo in 1817. Sheikh Hasan al-Attar (d. 1834),104 the leading Islamic scholar who was 
to become the Grand Imam of al-Azhar for four years up until 1834, taught al-Tahtawi. The son of 
an apothecary originally from North Africa, al-Attar was first influenced by the conquering French 
during the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt but he was forced to leave when they started persecuting 
the shuyukh (pl. of sheikh) and ‘ulama. A long period of exiles saw the polymath Hasan al-Attar 
travel and teach extensively in Albania, Syria and Turkey between1803 and 1813, all the while 
honing his knowledge of subjects such as medicine and history. When he returned home to Cairo he 
made it clear that he was a supporter of Muhammad ‘Ali’s radical education policies, earning 
himself the position of Rector of al-Azhar University, the then principal global centre of Islamic 
learning. Al-Attar lectured at al-Azhar at a time when Egypt’s education system was becoming 
 
103Details of al-Tahtawi’s life are in Jamal al-Din Amal-Shayyal, Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Cairo, np, 1958. 
104Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1979, pp.76–91. See 
also ‘Ali Mubarak, al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya al-Jadida li Misr al-Qahira wa Muduniha wa Biladiha al-Shahira (Tawfiq’s 
Topography of Victorious Egypt, its Cities and Famous Regions), Cairo, Bulaq Press, 1886–89, vol. 4, pp.38–49. 
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increasingly archaic and limited in scope, and so recommended its transformation. Writing about the 
classical work Jam’al-Jawami’,105 a book on the fundamentals of Islamic theology and legal theory, 
Hasan al-Attar critiqued what he considered to be the paucity of education at al-Azhar:  
We have limited ourselves to the study of narrow, derivative books 
composed by recent authors, which we repeat throughout life, and we do not 
permit ourselves to study anything else, as if true knowledge is contained 
within them. When we receive a question on theology that is not found 
within them, we dispose of it [by saying] that it is of the philosophers’ 
debate […] or a literary point from among the topics that have been 
disproved.106 
Hasan al-Attar’s reforming spirit was condoned by Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, 
but al-Attar still became unpopular with the more reactionary al-Azhar ‘ulama who dominated the 
religious corps at the time.107 His close links with Muhammad ‘Ali ensured al-Tahtawi was sent to 
France to further his education in 1826. Al-Tahtawi stayed in France between 1826 and 1831. As 
well as continuing with his religious duties as an imam as part of the educational mission, he spent a 
great deal of time learning about the “French language and reading books on ancient history, Greek 
philosophy and most importantly eighteenth century French Enlightenment thought, especially the 
works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu”.108 Al-Tahtawi’s period of study of the 
Enlightenment in France came just nearly four decades after the French Revolution of 1789, 
meaning France was awash with new radical ideas. Thus France was, according to Albert Hourani, 
of great importance to the young Egyptian’s intellectual development. In turn, as far as nationalism 
was concerned, this period of study “left a permanent mark on the Egyptian mind”.109 
Beyond the ideas of writers such as Voltaire, al-Tahtawi realised that the implementation of these 
philosophical thoughts could have a profound effect on society as a whole. While remaining 
sceptical about some aspects of French life, the way France had evolved and was organised 
following Revolution and other momentous changes impressed al-Tahtawi greatly: he was taken by 
 
105Imam Ibn As-Subki, Jam’ al-Jawami’ fi Usul al-Fiqh, published by Dar Al-Kutub Al-‘Ilmiyyah. It is a collection of 
seven law books finished in 760 A.H. at Nairab near Damascus. It is the most well-known of Ibn As-Subki’s books, and 
remains one of the most important authorities on Shafi’ite law.  
106‘Abd al-Muta‘al al-Sa‘idi, Tarikh al-Islah fi al-Azhar (History of Reform in al-Azhar), Cairo, Matba’at al-Itimad, 
1943, p.20. See also Gesink, op. cit., Islamic Reform, p.24. 
107Gran, op. cit., p.88; Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., ‘The Beginnings of Modernization’, p.274. 
108Hourani, op. cit., p.69; see also Alain Silvera, ‘The First Student Mission to France under Muhammad ‘Ali’ in Elie 
Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society, London, Frank Cass, 1980, p.9. 
109Hourani, op. cit., p.69. 
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the emphasis on the “prolonged education of children”,110 and by the French “intellectual curiosity 
and above all their social morality”.111 It was through adopting the philosophy and values of the 
Enlightenment that France had succeeded in so many spheres, al-Tahtawi believed. What 
particularly appealed to al-Tahtawi was Montesquieu’s description of the state as a geographical 
entity bound by “national spirit”, with love of country guaranteeing political virtue.112 It was this 
view of France as a nation that al-Tahtawi wanted to extend to Egypt, so he spent increasing 
amounts of time studying his own country’s distinctive ancient history and considering the way its 
geographical boundaries had practically not altered over time.113 When al-Tahtawi got back to 
Egypt, he held a number of positions, including school inspector and head of the new School of 
Languages, and as editor of the state-sponsored newspaper, al-Waqa‘i’ al-Misriyya (Egyptian 
Events).114 The paper was an overtly pro-establishment one at the time,115 but working there gave al-
Tahtawi great experience in articulating his views to a wider audience.  
Al-Tahtawi’s considerable contribution to the field of education was primarily aimed at getting 
young people into the growing number of professional schools necessary to provide staff for the 
Khedive’s expanding bureaucracy. Also, as a means of stepping up the on-going process of 
modernisation of Egyptian industry, and of the country’s military, Muhammad ‘Ali encouraged 
subjects which were mainly being taught according to French texts on topics ranging from sociology 
and history to military technology. Al-Tahtawi’s most remarkable achievement was his hugely 
significant role in translating such French works into Arabic, including the writings of his favoured 
French philosophers, while also commissioning and supervising colleagues towards the completion 
of the translations of other writers, so allowing Egyptians to read them, and indeed to discuss 
them.116 Al-Tahtawi and his pupils translated some two thousand works into Arabic in all.117 This 





113Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, 
Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1972, p.123. Wendell notes that Egypt’s territorial boundaries are 
“determinable with unusual ease and little or no dispute”. 
114Hourani, op. cit., p.71. Al-Tahtawi’s biography and political thought is also outlined in Wendell, op. cit. 
115Al-Waqa‘i’ al-Misriyyaa newspaper initially published in both Arabic and Turkish, first appeared in Egypt in 1828. 
Ordered by Muhammad ‘Ali, it was the first newspaper of its kind in the Middle East.  
116These works are listed in Hourani, op. cit., p.71.  
117Jamal Muhammad Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, London, Oxford University Press, 1960, 
p.10. 
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effect as far as the creation of a new generation of Egyptian intellectuals was concerned.118 It was  
al-Tahtawi’s view that Egyptian education had been held back by the orthodoxy of the ‘ulama. 
Rather than taking up Enlightenment ideas, and indeed embracing the new technology that was 
transforming Europe, Egypt’s outdated education system was failing to cope. Al-Tahtawi thus 
counselled that the conservative Islamic institutions should incorporate the “sciences created by 
human reason”,119 adding that “if the ‘ulama are to interpret the Shari’a [Islamic Law] in the light of 
modern needs, they must know what the modern world is”.120 
Al-Tahtawi’s French-Arabic translations were of great historical importance to the development of 
Egypt’s nationalist spirit, and so too were his own original writings and political pamphlets which 
were widely distributed. Al-Tahtawi was, in Hourani’s opinion, the first Egyptian scholar to 
“articulate the idea of the Egyptian nation… [and to] justify it in terms of Islamic thought”.121 
Hourani further describes al-Tahtawi’s work as follows: 
[His] ideas about society and the state are neither a mere restatement of a 
traditional view nor a simple reflection of the ideas he had learnt in Paris. 
The way in which his ideas are formulated is on the whole traditional: at 
every point he makes appeal to the example of the Prophet and his 
Companions, and his conceptions of political authority are within the 
tradition of Islamic thought. But at points he gives them a new and 
significant development.122 
Al-Tahtawi published his first significant piece of writing when he got back to Egypt from France – 
an account of his time in Paris full of day-to-day anecdotes and considerations.123 It provided 
insights into what it was like to be an Egyptian in the French capital in the mid- nineteenth century, 
but also highlighted al-Tahtawi’s developing political thinking. The influence of the Enlightenment 
ran throughout his work: al-Tahtawi saw Enlightenment thought as being the dynamic of France’s 
successful domestic reform, and indeed its strength and effect on the world stage. Muhammad ‘Ali 
himself commissioned a special edition of the diary al-Tahtawi kept in Paris and ordered it to be 
 
118Hourani, op. cit., p.71. In 1841 Tahtawi took control of a new School of Languages, writes Hourani. Al-Tahtawi 
personally translated “twenty works including histories of the ancient world, the Middle Ages, Voltaire’s Lives of Peter 
the Great and Charles XII of Sweden, a book on Greek philosophers and Montesquieu’s Considérations sur les causes 





123Rifa’a Rafi’ Al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Baris (Paris Diary), Cairo, Bulaq Press, 1834. 
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distributed to key civil servants in Egypt as part of their compulsory education.124 A subsequent text 
concentrated on Egypt,125 and saw al-Tahtawi showing great appreciation about the record of his 
countrymen’s forebears, the ancient Egyptians. Accordingly, and in contrast to fellow ‘ulama of the 
time, al-Tahtawi advocated in his book that the modern Egyptians should work to emulate the 
colossal achievements of their ancestors. 
So it was that beyond calls to take up the rational values of the Enlightenment, al-Tahtawi combined 
this with the expression of greater pride in Egypt’s distinguished history and Islamic traditions in the 
country’s modern political life. Montesquieu’s separation of powers was a principle that al-Tahtawi 
wanted to adapt to Egypt’s culture of governance. Al-Tahtawi contended that his country was 
organised around four separate “estates”. These were the ruler, the ‘ulama, the military, and those 
involved in trade and other industries.126 If each of these “estates” were functioning properly, all 
would improve the circumstances of everyone in society, he argued. Al-Tahtawi discarded France’s 
model of nationalism based on a secular civil society, which promoted the idea of the people 
governing themselves, rather than allowing an autocratic leader to be in charge. This was mainly 
because al-Tahtawi was always conscious of the debt he owed to the Khedive. The success of  
al-Tahtawi’s ongoing career certainly relied on favours from the Ottoman representative. 
Consequently, al-Tahtawi did not advocate the scrapping of the Khedive’s position altogether. 
Instead, al-Tahtawi supported the more conventional Islamic form of government, which placed the 
‘ulama within a hierarchy of power headed by the Khedive, with the ‘ulama serving the best 
interests of Egyptian Muslims. Thus al-Tahtawi did not consider that such a conventional type of 
Islamic authority should be changed, but argued that Montesquieu’s separation of “estates” would in 
fact act as an effective check on a ruler’s absolute power, while not creating the need to get rid of 




124It was in 1822 that the Bulaq Printing Press had first been created allowing a wide range of books to be published in 
Arabic and Turkish and distributed among the kind of numbers which in the past would have been impossible. The 
establishment of new prints was to have a huge impact on the spread of ideas, and the number of people formulating 
them, and indeed acting upon them. 
125Rifa’a Rafi’ Al-Tahtawi, Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-‘Asriyya (The Roads of Egyptian Hearts 
in the Joys of the Contemporary Arts), Cairo, Bulaq Press, 1869. 
126Ibid., p.348. 
127Hourani, op. cit., p.75. 
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Despite backing rule that involved Islamic traditionalists, al-Tahtawi was nonetheless critical of both 
the ‘ulama, and indeed the manner in which students were being taught at al-Azhar in Cairo.  
Al-Tahtawi (a Shafi’i by legal rite)128 was well schooled in Islamic law but considered that Egypt’s 
failure to advance as quickly as many European countries was partly due to the ‘ulama and al-
Azhar’s rejection of an education system that focused on non-Islamic subjects, and accepted 
modern, enlightened theories about the rapidly changing world.129 A reluctance to teach the 
rationality of science, for example, held back Egypt’s progress, al-Tahtawi argued. Progress was 
essential for al-Tahtawi, and especially moves towards two main objectives: the modernisation and 
prosperity of Egypt as a nation. 
Indeed, al-Tahtawi firstly believed that modern Egyptians needed to emulate the achievements of 
their illustrious ancestors. This romantic view of ancient Egypt evoked the distinctive nature of 
modern Egyptians, who followed in their esteemed line. Al-Tahtawi argued that “the physical 
constitution of the people of these times is exactly that of the peoples of times past, and their 
disposition is one and the same”.130 By underlining the unique and highly impressive qualities of the 
Egyptian people in this manner, al-Tahtawi was setting the tone for a nationalistic argument. 
Al-Tahtawi also saw less romantic, and more pragmatic, social reasons for Egypt’s progress as a 
nation. The advancement of Egypt would improve economic conditions for the vast majority of the 
Egyptian people, he contended, and engaging with Europe was an essential part of this process. 
Modernisation would ensure they understood “European laws of trade, commerce and credit”.131 
Moral rulers were responsible for creating an efficient economic system and social welfare for all 
Egyptians, was al-Tahtawi’s position. He saw checks and balances to any government as being 
fundamental – a scrutinising role that was most commonly taken on by the ‘ulama. Influential, 
upright religious scholars were indeed considered as being paramount to the just and fair functioning 
of government – one that would result in a just and fair society that would increase prosperity for the 
community as a whole. 
 
 
128The Shafi‘i madhhab was founded in the 9th century by the Arab scholar Abu ʿAbdullah Muhammad ibn Idris  
al-Shafiʿi (767 — 820 CE) and is one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. The others are Hanafi, 
Maliki and Hanbali. Further discussion on Sunni Islamic law can be found in Hallaq, Wael B. (2009), An Introduction to 
Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press. 
129J. M. Ahmed, op. cit., p.14. 
130Quoted in Hourani, op. cit., p.79. See also Al-Tahtawi, op. cit., Manahij al-Albab, p.187. 
131J.M. Ahmed, op. cit., p.14. 
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In spite of this reasoning, al-Tahtawi was concerned at the ‘ulama’s inability to embrace non-
Islamic education. He said that “teaching must be linked with the nature and problems of society”,132 
but the ‘ulama’s traditional teaching, and their rigorous focus on religion, held Egypt back. The 
religious scholars’ own influence on Egypt’s rulers was also disadvantaged by their conservatism, 
especially in the field of education. Al-Tahtawi appreciated that “the ruler should respect and honour 
the ‘ulama [and] treat them as his helpers in the task of government”,133 but he nevertheless 
conceded that the ‘ulama’s leverage had declined as their failure to modernise created differences 
with the Khedive. Muhammad ‘Ali was among Egyptian rulers who reduced the ‘ulama’s role as 
crucial cogs in the process of governance. It was the ‘ulama’s stagnating teaching practices that 
were seen as preventing Egypt’s chance to modernise and prosper as a nation. 
Al-Tahtawi’s disposition towards European political thought, and especially that of the 
Enlightenment, was a principal reason for his criticisms of traditional Islamic education. Al-Tahtawi 
invariably championed a specific type of Egyptian patriotism in all his work, which saw him call for 
a reformed education system – one that promoted the notion of a community based on Egyptian 
identity. Specifically, a main and recurrent topic in al-Tahtawi’s work was the distinction between 
communities centred on religious and nationalistic values. The ‘ulama’s emphasis was on nurturing 
a community underpinned by religious faith and practice, but al-Tahtawi’s understanding was “a 
national brotherhood over and above the brotherhood in religion”.134 
The concept of the Egyptian nation was also crucial to al-Tahtawi’s work. For al-Tahtawi, the love 
of country (hubb al-watan) was the “main motive, which leads men to try to build up a civilised 
community”.135 Such distinctive qualities were separate from the sense of unity which came from 
the Islamic Umma, and religion in general. Such an expression of the bond of nationhood 
(wataniyya) – and Egyptian nationhood in particular – was unique. Thus a glorious past, the 
continuing history of the Egyptian people, and clear geographical boundaries were all factors that 




132Hourani, op. cit., p.77. 
133Ibid., p.75.  
134Al-Tahtawi, op. cit., Manahij al-Albab, p.99, quoted in Hourani, op. cit., p.77. 
135Hourani, op. cit., p.78. 
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Though the nation was all-important to al-Tahtawi, he saw how vital different types of ties, 
including religion, were to the progress of any distinct community. Al-Tahtawi believed modern 
Egyptians were part of a legacy stretching back to the heyday of ancient Egypt, but for him the 
Revelation and other key dates in the history of Islam from its foundation in the seventh century 
were more significant.136 Modernity pervades al-Tahtawi’s writings and was a key component of his 
political thought, along with the reform of education, so as to become part of the modern world. All 
of this, however, was ultimately grounded in and legitimised by the Islamic tradition, and the deeds 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. With his emphasis on such religious antecedents, 
al-Tahtawi was one of the first Islamic scholars to show how Islam could be reconciled with the new 
nationalist spirit pervading Egypt, but also modernising trends being popularised in the West, and 
increasingly penetrating countries such as Egypt.   
Al-Tahtawi’s central role in the development of Egyptian nationalism came at a time when the 
influence of the ‘ulama was in relative decline. Al-Tahtawi died in 1873, before the nationalist 
‘Urabi Revolt started in 1879, but his life achievements, as an authoritative translator and as a 
scholar, signified the start of the emergence of Enlightenment thought in nineteenth century Egypt, 
as it transformed the country. His work was greatly assisted by his close links to both the ‘ulama and 
to Muhammad ‘Ali and his descendants,137 thus making al-Tahtawi an intellectual lynchpin in the 
historic changes which took place in his country. Ultimately, al-Tahtawi wanted to create a modern, 
advanced, European-style Egypt, but one that also still held on to a sense of Egypt’s past, and to 
Islam. 
A study of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s (1849 – 1905) work and his calls for the reform of Islam are 
crucial to understanding the developments towards modernisation that went on in Egypt during the 
nineteenth century. The future scholar was born in 1849 in the Nile Delta village of Mahallat Nasr, 
Lower Egypt, to ‘Abduh ibn Hasan Khayrallah, his Turkish father who was part of the devout Umad 
land owning elite. ‘Abduh was born in the year of the death of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, also known 
by his Albanian name Mehmet ‘Ali. Mehmet ‘Ali was the Albanian soldier who rebelled against the 
Ottoman Empire, and caused great harm to Egyptian farmers during the period when he appointed 
himself ruler of the Ottoman province of Egypt between 1805 and 1848.‘Abduh ibn Hasan 
 
136Ibid., p.80. 
137Al-Tahtawi was initially close to Muhammad ‘Ali, but became less popular with the Khedive. When al-Tahtawi was 
despatched to Khartoum, he compared the experience to being exiled (Hourani, op. cit., p.73). 
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Khayrallah, benefitted from newly introduced irrigation systems and an improvement in rural 
security under Mehmet ‘Ali, but he, like many other farmers of the time, fled their villages to avoid 
conscription. The situation was much quieter after Mehmet ‘Ali’s death, and ‘Abduh had a relatively 
secure upbringing in Mahallat Nasr. ‘Abduh ibn Hasan Khayrallah could not be classed as 
particularly wealthy, but he was well connected enough to hire a private Quran teacher for his son. 
Early lessons, up to the age of 12, involved learning religious texts by heart.138 
‘Abduh went to a private school in the city of Tanta, north of Cairo, where he showed exceptional 
academic abilities from an early age. Then – as a young teenager – ‘Abduh was sent to be educated 
at the Ahmadi Mosque. He subsequently joined al-Azhar in 1869 and finished studying there in 
1877, when he was twenty-eight.139 Muhammad ‘Abduh’s early career was not entirely spent within 
the formal ‘ulama corps, and involved lecturing at al-Azhar and Dar al-‘Ulum, the institution 
founded in 1871 to give students both an Islamic and a more modern secondary education.140 
‘Abduh also had a great deal of experience beyond the ivory towers of educational institutions as he 
started working as a journalist and writer soon after he graduated. His time at school and then at  
al-Azhar University had already convinced him that the scope of the Egyptian education system was 
too limited and traditional, with its insistence on religious instruction. ‘Abduh was particularly 
unimpressed by the “pre-modern” ideas and practices of Islamic scholars emphasising committing 
religious texts to memory. ‘Abduh was thus constantly seeking to expand his academic horizon 
outside such rigid systems, to the extent that Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish, the eminent conservative 
cleric and one of his tutors, once admonished him.141 
 
 
138For more biographical details about Muhammad ‘Abduh see Mark Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh, Oxford, Oneworld 
Publications, 2009. 
139Rida, op. cit., vol. 1, part 1, pp.1-24 for background. See also Adams, op. cit.; Kerr, op. cit.; Kedourie, op. cit.; 
J.M. Ahmed, op. cit.; Hourani, op. cit.. ‘Abduh became a ‘alim on graduation in 1877, but rather than join the ‘ulama 
immediately, worked as a writer and lecturer at al-Azhar. He was regarded as an esteemed and high-ranking Islamic 
scholar. 
140For an account of the foundation and influence of Dar al-‘Ulum, see Lois A. Aroian, The Nationalization of Arabic 
and Islamic Education in Egypt: Dar al-Ulum and al-Azhar, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 6, monograph 4, Cairo, 
American University in Cairo Press, 1983; see also Chris A. Eccel, Egypt, Islam and Social Change: al-Azhar in 
Conflict and Accommodation, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984. 
141Muhammad ‘Ammara (ed.), Al-A’mal al-Kamila al-Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (The Complete Works of the Sheikh 
Muhammad ‘Abduh), Cairo, Dar al-Sharouk, 1993, A Conversation with Sheikh ‘Illaish, vol. III, p.210. The 
disagreement between ‘Abduh and Sheikh ‘Illaish is well documented by a number of authors. We concentrate on 
‘Abduh’s own recollections, in which he recounts his study of the Nasafi faith and dares ‘Illaish to “leav[e] everyone’s 
tradition [he means theological schools] aside and using his own logic to explain faith”. 
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Later on, ‘Abduh became part of the inner circle of modernising Afghan philosopher, Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani. It was to be the prominent Islamic scholar who had the greatest influence on ‘Abduh’s 
political thought.142 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was one of the fiercest detractors of the European 
powers’ domination and interference in the Muslim world.143 Arriving in Egypt in 1871, he first of 
all taught at al-Azhar, but then there were arguments with notable ‘ulama, which resulted in  
al-Afghani being barred from teaching there. So instead, he tutored informal classes in coffee shops 
and at his home in the Khan al-Khalili district of Cairo, neighbouring the al-Azhar mosque.144 After 
leaving his lecturing position at al-Azhar, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani remained on good terms with 
Khedive Ismail and continued to draw a salary.145 Al-Afghani used his privileged status to shape 
many of those who would play such a leading role in the Egyptian nationalist movement between 
1879 and 1882. Others who attended al-Afghani’s discussion groups included Khedive Ismail’s son, 
Tawfiq, who would himself later become Khedive. Tawfiq was also persuaded by al-Afghani’s 
urging for internal Islamic reform. 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was careful to suggest that reform indeed needed to come from within 
Muslim communities, and that it should not be forced from outside. He particularly objected to the 
uncritical mimicry of western values, arguing that it would have a devastating effect on all walks of 
life – from economic to social – and indeed on Egyptians’ sense of moral worth. Al-Afghani advised 
that the way to protect Islam as an ethical force was for Muslims to themselves adapt to a changing 
world, abandoning their narrow and highly traditional view of education – one that mainly 
concentrated on a rote learning approach to religion which had constrained rational scrutiny and 
diligence. A far broader education, which included new subjects, would give Muslims the chance to 
not only advance in the modern world, but also to build a new role for their religion within it.146 
Islam’s inability to modernise and its failure to keep up with western countries were at the heart of 
al-Afghani’s teaching. This, he believed, had resulted in European powers, and particularly Britain 
and France, controlling vast swathes of Muslim countries, either directly or indirectly. Thus, as far 
 
142Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din  
‘al-Afghani’, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1983. See also Rida, op. cit., vol. 1, part 1, p.25; Hourani, 
op. cit. 
143Rida, op. cit., vol. 1, part 1, pp.73, 79, 82. 
144Jamal al-Din’s teaching methods saw him being forced out of al-Azhar. He failed to follow the traditional, 
conservative curriculum, instead choosing more enlightened topics and scholars for study: see Hourani, op. cit., in 
particular the chapter on al-Afghani. 
145See Schölch, op. cit., and Hourani, op. cit. 
146See J. M. Ahmed, op. cit., and Wendell, op. cit. 
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as al-Afghani’s political activism was concerned, he was committed to curbing and indeed 
eventually terminating European hegemony over the Muslim world, and Egypt in particular. The 
scholar contended that greater authority by European powers would mean a further erosion of rights 
to sovereignty, and humiliation for Egyptians. As injustices against ordinary Muslims continued,  
al-Afghani argued that, as well as a more comprehensive education reform and a willingness to 
embrace changes in the world, direct expressions of political dissent against dominating European 
countries were justified. In particular, he advocated the use of Egypt’s new printing press as a 
political tool that could be used to bring about change. It would distribute literature about reform, 
the need to end occupation, and create the conditions for the liberation of the Egyptian people.  
Al-Afghani urged intellectuals, ‘ulama and political groups to all play a part in this nationalist 
movement against European control. 
‘Abduh and al-Afghani both rehearsed their theories about the way Muslim countries such as Egypt 
were no longer progressing and tried to pinpoint particular causes in their writings. However, 
Hourani notes that ‘Abduh “was to become a more systematic thinker than his master and have a 
more lasting influence on the Muslim mind, not only in Egypt but far beyond”.147 Similarly, 
although both men travelled widely, and were to have great clout throughout the Muslim world, 
‘Abduh’s more prestigious yet entirely grounded family background suggested he had a stronger 
link with traditional Egyptians. This was perhaps also due to his role as both a writer and an 
educator. ‘Abduh was indeed very well connected to leading publications, and was affiliated to  
al-Azhar and Dar al-‘Ulum. ‘Abduh’s teaching and activities outside the academic sphere – first 
offering political and juridical advice (he had served as a judge) within the nationalist movement148 
and later as Egypt’s Grand Mufti, the country’s highest legal authority – were all initiatives to help 
him bring about change in society, and to reverse years of decline in the Muslim world, while firmly 
associating Islam with modernity in all his work.  
‘Abduh and al-Afghani shared the view that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim 
world’s subordinate position to the West was complete in every field, from the economy to the 
military and technology. As he examined the reasons for this waning, ‘Abduh was convinced 
Egyptian Muslims could embrace modernity, and achieve their own success in the world. ‘Abduh 
believed there had been a move away from “true” Islam, and that Egyptians had lapsed into a 
 
147Hourani, op. cit., p.130. 
148After the failure of ‘Urabi’s revolt in 1882, ‘Abduh was exiled by the British to Beirut for having backed the “rebels”. 
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situation not dissimilar to the pre-Islamic jahiliyya, or backwardness/ignorance.149 Writing in  
al-Ahram newspaper,150 ‘Abduh suggested that the position was even worse than jahiliyya, and that 
“hopes for our people’s development diminish”.151 Significantly, ‘Abduh defined the pre-Islamic era 
as one when “intellectual enquiry into faith or indeed into the details of the universe was vetoed [and 
when] the principle that reason and religion had nothing in common, but rather religion was the 
inveterate enemy of science was promulgated”.152 ‘Abduh considered that the late nineteenth 
century Egyptian society in which he lived had also seen Islam pulled away from rationality and was 
equally characterised by scholars displaying a distinct lack of intellectual rigour when it came to 
both religious matters and knowledge, in general.153 
‘Abduh even indicated that Muslim populations, including Muslims in Egypt, had neglected the 
reality that rationality and logic were, in fact, essential to the practice of Islam. He asserted the view 
that God had given them the ability to speak and think not only to better comprehend the divine 
order of things, but also so as to progress through history, and advance the world beyond a primitive 
state.154 God’s world was not designed to remain in a fixed state, and could indeed be modernised. 
‘Abduh believed that, in contrast to any other religion, Islam in fact freed people from confined 
views and opened them up to a wider, more dynamic perspective on the world based on critical 
enquiry and deduction, and one that would encourage development .155 The link between Islam and 
forward-thinking rationality had been undermined, leading to Muslims withdrawing from “true” 
 
149Muhammad ‘Abduh, Risalat al-Tawhid (The Theology of Unity), Cairo, Mutba’at Nahdat al Misr, 1956, p.133, is used 
by ‘Abduh to consider the pre-Islamic period of jahiliyya and assert that, while pre-Islamic religions had “laid down for 
men sacred laws of asceticism and turn[ed] them towards the higher life, men lapsed from its provisions and precepts 
with concord, cooperation and peace ousted and schism, contention and strife reign[ing] in their place”. 
150The publication was started in 1875 by two Lebanese brothers, Bashara Taqla and Salim Taqla. See also Latifa Salim, 
Sahafat al-Thawra al-‘Urabiyya (The Press of the ‘Urabi Revolt), Chapter 7 in Nabil ‘Abd al-Hamid and Sayyid Ahmed 
(eds.), Misr lil Misriyyin: Mi’at ‘Am ‘ala al-Thawra al-‘Urabiyya (Egypt for the Egyptians: Hundred Years on the Urabi 
Revolt), Cairo, Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyah wa-al-Istiratijiyah bi al-Ahram (Al-Ahram Centre for Political and 
Strategic Studies), 1981. 
151Muhammad ‘Abduh,‘Al-‘Ulum al-Kalamiya wa al-Da’wa ila al-‘Ulum al-‘Asriya (Linguistic/Literary Sciences and 
the Call to Modern Sciences)’, al-Ahram, Issue no. 36, 1877 in ‘Ammara, op. cit., al-A’mal al Kamila al-Sheikh 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, vol. 3, pp.15–23. 
152‘Abduh, op. cit., Risalat al-Tawhid, p.133. 
153‘Abduh, op. cit., al-’Ulum al-Kalamiya, pp.15-23. 
154Muhammad ‘Abduh, al-Kitaaba wa al-Qalam (The Art of Writing and the Pen), al-Ahram, Issue no. 8, 1876 in 
‘Ammara, op. cit., vol. 3, pp.9-15. 
155‘Abduh, op. cit., Risalat al-Tawhid, p.13. See the introduction by Ishaq Musa’ad and Kenneth Cragg in the English 
translation, The Theology of Unity, London, Allen & Unwin, 1966. In the chapter ‘Religions and Human Progress: Their 
Culmination in Islam’ the author discusses how human progress required rational thinking. ‘Abduh argues that God calls 
for evidence to be tested, so as to confirm universal laws. He quotes examples from the Quran where God calls for truth 
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p.134. 
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Islam, ‘Abduh argued. The first historical manifestation of this was a schism and other power 
struggles within Islamic civilisation after the era of the first four Rashidun Caliphs, ‘Abduh 
explained. In particular, ‘Abduh suggested there was disunity amongst Muslims during the Abbasid 
dynasty, which saw Caliphs “became content to possess the title of ‘Caliph’ and ceased to be 
scholars and trained in religious matters, rejecting the exercise of ijtihad (independent reason).”156 
The taqlid (imitation) method of learning gained precedence, as pupils simply committed rules and 
principles to memory. 
‘Abduh identified the Turkish Ottoman’s taking over of the Caliphate from the Arabs as a second 
pivotal historical stage that brought the period of ijtihad to an end. ‘Abduh contended that this 
transition of power also had profoundly negative repercussions. The Turks encouraged Muslims to 
give up striving towards rational truths, and instead instructed them to concentrate on Islamic 
orthodoxy and the mere imitation and memorisation of Islam’s teachings. Critical analysis was 
deterred, as the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate became less credible than the Caliphate had been when 
in Arab hands. According to ‘Abduh, this crisis of legitimacy was exemplified as the core 
relationship between Arabs and Islam faded, along with a broader understanding of the Arabic 
Quran and the Prophet’s message, despite the fact that the Prophet was an Arab.157 The Ottomans’ 
position as head of the Umma was also disputed in the process. The Turks alleged inability to grasp 
the fundamentals of Islam led to them dissuading free-thinking, because they saw it as a challenge to 
their own rule. It was through weakening, and indeed corrupting the ‘ulama, and their authority over 
education and society as a whole, that the Turks could strengthen their own power.158 
All of ‘Abduh’s work continued to stress how the ‘ulama’s vital function in Islamic communities 
had been morally compromised.159 The scholar argued that all components of Muslim society – from 
the law and politics to education – were intrinsically linked. Central to ‘Abduh’s thinking was faith, 
and particularly the belief that the Prophet Muhammad’s role had been to spread God’s message, but 
also to create a moral society centred on the teachings of the Quran and the correct interpretation of 
divine law. ‘Abduh’s emphasis was on an Islamic legal system that protected all members of 
 
156Adams, op. cit., p.59; Rida, op. cit., vol. II, p.282. 
157Hourani, op. cit., p.150. 
158Muhammad ‘Abduh, Al-Islam wa al-Nasraniyya bayna al-‘Ilm wa’l-Madaniyya (Islam and Christianity Between 
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159Muhammad ‘Abduh, Al-Islam al-Youm wa’l Ihtijaj bi’l Muslimeen ‘ala ‘l Islam (Islam Today and the Remonstrance 
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society. The rapid modernisation of the world meant religious jurisprudence had to adapt to new 
demands, rather than simply relying on legal precedents encompassing outdated work by earlier 
Muslim scholars. Instead, rational methods inspired by Enlightenment thinking needed to form the 
foundation of Islamic laws that would govern the lives of Muslims in a changing era. 
The preponderance of taqlid, which required students to rehearse and indeed memorise early Islamic 
texts, showed that Muslims had moved away from authentic interpretations of Islam, ‘Abduh 
argued, and the situation needed to be rectified. ‘Abduh considered the ‘ulama to be entirely to 
blame for this. Discussions as to whether taqlid was an appropriate manner to implement Islamic 
teachings, especially in a modern age where many legal issues and newfound problems had no 
historical antecedents to compare them to, necessitated serious thought. In this respect, ‘Abduh 
believed that the application of ijtihad would ensure that reason and deduction were used in making 
sure that the teaching of the Quran and Hadith was relevant to new laws, and the general 
adjudication of ethical problems. Until this was the case, society as a whole would continue to 
regress. 
Taqlid had not only provided a pedagogical method and Quranic exegesis in Egypt but, in ‘Abduh’s 
view, it also affected the development of Egyptian society. Europe’s power over Muslim countries, 
and particularly Egypt, was spearheaded by European willingness to reform according to 
Enlightenment principles, and to apply rationality, and new technology.160 ‘Abduh insisted that a 
retreat into a state of jahiliyya in nineteenth century Egypt was due to the rejection of science and 
progress by al-Azhar University and other educational, state-run institutions. A journalistic article 
written by ‘Abduh focused on students who wanted to study rational subjects beyond Islamic 
sciences, thus provoking the concern and wrath of more traditional family members. ‘Abduh 
commented that they were instructed by their relatives to “stop reading these misleading texts in 
order that you do not fall into sin and to follow the footsteps and beliefs of [your] fathers and 
grandfathers”.161 ‘Abduh said traditional Islamic methods of study, including memorising texts, all 
contributed to a backward society which could not hope to compete in the world, least of all with 
advancing western societies.  
 
 
160Muhammad ‘Abduh, Ma huwa al-Fiqr al-Haqiqi fi al-Balaad (What is the Real Poverty in the Country?), Al-Waqa‘i’ 
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‘Abduh’s thinking and his positions on Egypt and the wider Muslim world are essential to 
comprehend his ties with ‘Urabi and the broad nationalist movement. Before the 1882 revolution, 
his opinions about Egypt’s stagnation and the need for modernisation and reform were discussed in 
refined academic circles along with al-Afghani and his peers while he was a student at al-Azhar and 
during his early career. ‘Abduh and al-Afghani called for change in Egypt, and across the rest of the 
Islamic world so as to raise their standing internationally. ‘Abduh used the burgeoning Egyptian 
press to put his reformist views across to as vast an audience as possible, even though there was 
often fierce opposition to his ideas from more conservative ‘ulama who, at the time, constituted the 
overwhelming majority of the corps of Islamic scholars. They were the traditionalists who relied on 
taqlid style methods of education that ‘Abduh felt were at the heart of Egypt’s decline and 
poverty.162 This did not dissuade ‘Abduh from writing copiously, and in great details, as he 
expressed his opinions about the blockage in society that they represented. 
It is crucial to note, however, that ‘Abduh did not want to see new western culture imposed on 
Egyptians, but instead believed a return to true Islam was necessary – this meant an Islam that 
accepted scientific progress and rational thought as a means of improving society. Thus, according 
to ‘Abduh, Islam, and the scholars who interpret it, play a fundamental part “in revitalising Egyptian 
society”. This reversion to “true” Islam – which included the need for a modernised education 
system and the practice of the methods of ijtihad to explain the meaning of sacred texts – would 
ensure that society was well managed as a righteous community that adhered to the Prophet 
Muhammad’s teachings.163 
Nineteenth century Egypt opened up to rapid progress emanating from abroad, so welcoming fresh 
political thinking. The Age of the Enlightenment and the spread of popular nationalism after the 
1789 French Revolution saw radical new beliefs arriving in Egypt via Europe. The fall of 
monarchies, and the championing of the right of the peoples to govern themselves within nation-
states had huge appeal in Europe, as local populations strove towards the most ethical form of 
representative government. In turn, such nationalist political thought was seized upon in Egypt,164 
where these new political ideas were embraced because of the country’s constitutional change, 
combined with its greater connection to Europe. 
 
162Muhammad ‘Abduh, Ta’thir al-Ta’lim fi al-Din wa al-‘Aqida (The Impact of Education on Religion and Faith),  
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This was particularly so through the popular press under Khedive Isma’il, when commentary and 
debate about political events affecting the lives of ordinary Egyptians became increasingly prevalent 
in the proliferating newspapers and journals.165 This was a time when the vocabulary of popular 
nationalism was becoming more and more common. The definition of words such as “nation” and 
“fatherland” were to be refined by scholars including Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi. Sheikh Husayn  
al-Marsafi (d.1890)166 of al-Azhar University, published his Risalat al-Kalem al-Thaman (Treatise 
on the Eight Words) in 1882 – the very year of the ‘Urabi Revolt. This was an attempt to explain the 
terms of reference of nationalism to Egyptians.  
There are two significant elements to al-Marsafi’s book that encapsulate his thinking on its subject 
matter but which also provide a crucial context to his overall contribution to the development of 
nationalism in Egypt. Firstly, al-Marsafi’s Risalat was published at a key moment in the ‘Urabi 
Revolt – 1882 was the year when the uprising reached its culmination. It was also when the revolt 
failed: a British attack on Alexandria, and the invasion of Egypt saw Urabi’s forces defeated at the 
Battle of Tel el-Kebir, thus ending ‘Urabi’s nationalist uprising and ensuring that Khedive Tawfiq 
remained in control.167 Khedive Tawfiq became a constitutional ruler agreeing to reform based on 
the orders of the British. The Khedive was regarded as a British puppet, so any hopes of a successful 
nationalist resurgence appeared doomed. 
The book was released at the height of a number of events in Egypt that saw the country’s 
nationalist consciousness growing, and which al-Marsafi sets to cover in his work. These included 
the creation of an Egyptian constitution and a move towards parliamentary politics.168 Neither of 
these significant concessions to popular government posed much of an immediate threat to the 
Khedive’s authority, but they at least led to debate about the legitimacy of Khedival power, against 
the calls for self-rule by the Egyptian people. Thus al-Marsafi’s writing was at an essential 
crossroads in Egyptian history: it was a key period of time when Egyptian nationalism and the desire 
for political freedom combined to forge a sense of national unity which was articulated across the 
whole society.  
 
165Works that discuss the history of the popular press in Egypt, include Salim, op. cit., Sahafat al-Thawra, Chapter 7; 
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The Risalat was also important because it was the first time that an eminent ‘alim from al-Azhar had 
defined key political terms that had come into common usage in Egypt. ‘Ulama had been kept on 
the margins of political institutions, and indeed political debate, for much of the nineteenth century. 
In this sense, the Risalat was considered a landmark as a widely respected and influential Islamic 
scholar had become a huge asset to the nationalist movement at a time when the ‘ulama were being 
sidelined from the nationalist debate. Al-Marsafi’s work thus made it clear that the ‘ulama could be 
relevant in terms of real world politics, and could indeed inspire thought and action related to 
popular nationalism. Similarly, the sphere of education had been under the control of the ‘ulama but 
a large number of non-religious schools were founded in the nineteenth century, so challenging their 
authority. In this context, the Risalat proposed clarifications of what education should offer 
Egyptians, and helped to restore the credibility of the ‘ulama as far as their effect on modern society 
was concerned. 
Of great significance, is the interpretation of the two types of community with which al-Marsafi 
begins his book – al-Umma (the nation) and al-watan (the homeland). His explanations went against 
the idea that Islam cannot be reconciled with popular nationalism. On the contrary, al-Marsafi 
advanced the view that Islam can in fact embrace pride in the nation. That a senior and esteemed 
member of the al-Azhar ‘ulama was putting this opinion forward, highlights the value of  
al-Marsafi’s Risalat. Al-Marsafi actually identified eight key popular words at the time, that he 
proceeded to describe explicitly in the Risalat: al-Umma (the nation), al-watan (the homeland),  
al-hukuma (the government), al-‘adl (justice), al-zulm (injustice), al-siyasa (politics), al-hurriya 
(liberty/freedom) and al-tarbiya (upbringing/education).169 Here, we will concentrate on al-Umma 
and al-watan as a means of showing how a religious scholar conceptualised fundamental terms in 
the language of nationalism. 
To al-Marsafi, “a nation [al-Umma] is a group of people bound by a certain tie”.170 He argued that 
ties could include language, place or territory, and religion.171 For al-Marsafi, there were huge 
similarities between the notion of al-Umma and a national group. The Umma, according to classical 
 
169Husayn al-Marsafi, Risalat al-Kalem al-Thaman (Treatise on the Eight Words), Cairo, al-Nahda, 1984. Accepted 
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prompted widespread arguments about which translation is correct. The words are translated here as, we believe,  
al-Marsafi would have intended. Al-Umma is widely considered to mean the “worldwide community of Muslims” and 
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Islamic doctrine, had essential defining traits: it bonded a community of Muslims sharing religious 
ideals contained in a unique holy text, accepting the Holy Prophet and indeed his teachings. Belief 
in Islam was of course central to this view, and other tribal or ethnic links were not considered to be 
as important as a common faith and adherence to its traditions. The religious connection was thus 
essential in al-Marsafi’s theory of the nation as he defined it as a religious entity in which “people 
follow a Prophet and commit themselves to his laws”.172 In this sense, al-Marsafi’s terminology 
evokes the traditional religious interpretation of al-Umma. Al-Marsafi’s insistence on religious 
affiliations was not just aimed at asserting the great importance of the ‘ulama to Egypt’s historical 
development, but was also intended to firmly back the indigenous nationalist movement, and more 
specifically ‘Urabi’s action to protect “Muslim” Egypt against an impending “non-Muslim” invader, 
in the form of British Imperial forces.  
Yet for al-Marsafi the overriding national bond in nationhood is common language. He writes that 
the “nation that is bound by language is the most proper one because language comes from within 
the people.”173 Thus al-Marsafi’s line of reasoning is that the linguistic nation is also the authentic 
nation. Here, the scholar also produces a comparison between the language of a nation and the 
growth of a tree, saying that both have solid roots allowing healthy and powerful development. Even 
if the tree dies, other trees would grow up around it.174 Such organic analogies illustrate the idea of a 
linguistic nationalism that runs throughout al-Marsafi’s work. He insists on the importance of the 
popular written press to the formation of the nation. Al-Marsafi conjures up the proto-Andersonian 
view of the nation being “imagined” as a result of the expansion of capitalist publishing.175  
Al-Marsafi is adamant that the language in print publications should be intelligible to the public in 
order to educate and stimulate debate, so allowing people to engage because “when a group of 
people share the same language, they live in harmony”.176 Al-Marsafi’s emphasis on language as the 
foundation of the nation is in fact evocative of the traditional Islamic conception of the Umma: the 
Arabic language was considered a fundamental bond for the religious community of the Umma. This 
is exemplified by the significance of the Quran – a holy text in Arabic recited in Arabic by all 
Muslims around the world, whether they are Arabic speaking or not. Thus, while there are non-
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in the authentic language, means Arabic is an essential common factor in the lives of all Muslims 
within the Islamic Umma, regardless of their mother tongues.  
Al-Marsafi’s third factor that helped define a nation was geographical. In al-Marsafi’s opinion, “a 
nation bound by territory means a group of people possessing a piece of land that distinguishes them 
from other territorial nations like the Egyptian nation or the Hijazi nation”.177 Thus al-Marsafi’s 
championing of the “Egyptian nation” does not seem to tally with the universal characteristic of the 
Umma. Through resorting to “Egyptian” or ethnic and national delineations to categorise the 
concept of the nation, al-Marsafi’s specific interpretation seemed to be at variance with the Umma’s 
elementary principle that it not only transcends tribal, ethnic or national bonds, but wider territorial 
boundaries too. Egypt’s place within the Ottoman Empire also appeared at odds with al-Marsafi’s 
idea of a single Egyptian nation organised along the lines of territory, language and religion. The 
Ottoman Empire offered the unifying tie of religion, but by introducing the limitations of geography 
and language al-Marsafi seemingly questioned and indeed challenged the legitimacy of the Ottoman 
Islamic Umma. This implicit argument was all the more important when made at a time when the 
Ottoman Empire was declining and in the context of the growing influence of a determined 
nationalist movement in Egypt.  
Despite this apparent conflict between al-Marsafi’s insistence on the geographical boundaries of a 
nation and the universalism of the Umma, there was in fact a territorial aspect to traditional Islamic 
religious communities. The dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) was a key concept in the classical 
definition of the Umma. So too was its antithesis dar al-Harb (abode of war).178 Whether for reasons 
of defence or expansion, this divide was manifestly connected to the notion of territory as it opposed 
the realm of Muslims (living on Muslim lands) to the realm of non-Muslims. Parallels between  
al-Marsafi’s idea of the geographical nation-state and the Umma were strengthened when we 
consider that, according to al-Marsafi, “the nation must believe that their land is like one’s home 
[and] they should defend it with their lives”.179 Al-Marsafi saw holy war as being justified so as to 
defend the virtue of dar al-Islam. Defending Muslim territory was morally right, as would be the 
case when Egypt was threatened by a non-Muslim British invading force. In the words of al-Marsafi 
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“nobody should be allowed in one’s home unless for service, visiting or living but even for these 
purposes there are certain limits”.180 
Thus the three ties of nationhood advanced by al-Marsafi can be reconciled with the Umma. There 
were two other consequential aspects of al-Marsafi’s work that displayed an Umma-style moral 
dimension to the conceptualisation of the nation-state. The morality of the nation as a community 
was of utmost importance to al-Marsafi. He also put great emphasis on the moral imperative behind 
the people’s actions that were paramount to the progress and indeed success of the nation. 
Accordingly, for al-Marsafi, tolerance and justice underpinned the strength of a nation, while 
intolerance generated its decline, for example.181 Al-Marsafi also believed there should be constant 
debate between members of society, with young and old working out the best manner in which to 
resolve differences, with the nation-state more generally recognising peoples’ rights as well as their 
duties towards it.182 
It is in al-Marsafi’s chapter on al-watan that he dealt with the subject of rights and duties more 
comprehensively. He employed the term watan in a broad sense to mean “homeland,” while 
explaining that there were many different types of homeland, all created for differing circumstances. 
He clarified that a public homeland, for example, was a “piece of land that a community would 
consider as their place where they would live and work for their land”.183 He also identified a 
“private watan” and described it as an individual’s home and indeed the place where an individual’s 
soul resides.184 Thus al-watan was distinctly linked by al-Marsafi to residency: “the house, the 
district, the village, the country, the world and globe are watan because they are places of 
residency”.185 
The meaning of al-watan proposed by al-Marsafi exceeded the mere boundaries of the nation. 
However, he insisted that the rights of the watan should adhere perfectly to those he saw fit to be 
granted to the nation. He emphasised rights and duties that should be enjoyed by all members of the 
watan, in all spheres. Anyone, whether operating in private or public life, had a moral imperative to 
uphold these principles. As an example of this imperative, al-Marsafi drew a parallel between urban 
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and rural life, stating that the areas symbolised two kinds of watan. He argued that the populations 
of cities had a civic duty to maintain thoroughfares in good order, while the government has a 
similar duty to keep citizens and their livestock safe by curbing traffic to manageable limits and 
providing walkways for pedestrians.186 Thus a nation’s rights are ultimately drawn from its citizens’ 
own sense of civic duty and responsibility to the nation, where “everybody should believe that his 
country needs his time and effort and when people have this feeling, it will benefit their own 
security and they would never hesitate in helping their own country”.187 It was in this way that  
al-Marsafi brought to the fore the moral dimensions of the nation (or watan): he encouraged 
members of communities to act along ethical principles, while stressing the concept of the nation as 
a moral community, preserving the rights of these people. 
In his depiction of the nation as an ethical entity, al-Marsafi made Islam, and the religious scholars 
who uphold its laws, its focal point. The Risalat lists episodes from the life and teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad to illustrate right conduct and relate them to the characteristics and 
requirements of both the Umma and watan. These two types of community clearly had common 
features, but for al-Marsafi, the morality of the nation was centred on Islam, and the ‘ulama’s ability 
to “call people to do good deeds and dismiss them from doing the wrong ones”.188 The ‘ulama’s role 
within the nation was deemed crucial by al-Marsafi, who placed them in a historical continuity: they 
represented a direct link between the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, through to the first 
Imams and their methods of legal interpretation, and ultimately the modern ‘ulama whose primary 
duty was to explain the Quran and Hadith, and thus provide a moral guide to upright behaviour for 
the community as a whole. 
Al-Marsafi’s definition of the Umma gave prominence to the function of common faith in society. 
He emphasised that the nation’s bonds became stronger through “holding fast to the rope of God”.189 
Religion was, for al-Marsafi, not only a unifying factor, but it also ensured that the nation remained 
just and equitable. However, al-Marsafi also warned against people steering of the ethical, moral 
path as laid out in the original teachings and sacred texts of Islam, writing that “people tend to forget 
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society as a whole was made more vulnerable: it diminished its sense of common purpose, led to its 
gradual decay, and opened it up to foreign menace. ‘Ulama of all kind, reactionary and reformist, 
concurred with this view at the time, seeing correctly applied moral lessons as being vital as a 
barrier against the influence and intrusions from non-Muslim forces. Al-Marsafi was pointing to 
European penetration and the very specific threat of British invasion at the end of the nineteenth 
century. He called on “a group of people for the sake of reforming an entire nation”.191 Although al-
Marsafi did not say exactly who he was referring to, there is no doubt from his writing that the 
‘ulama would have been involved. 
However, al-Marsafi avoids viewing the entire ‘ulama corps as a single, cohesive unit. Instead, he 
concedes that, while the “orators of the pulpit [are] more skilled than the public”192 at interpreting 
the holy texts of Islam, some simply tend to “memorising words whose meanings they don’t 
understand”.193 Examining the role of the ‘ulama from a historical perspective, al-Marsafi notes how 
the early ‘ulama “established the discipline of the fundamentals of religion [and] purified the 
authentic pillars of Islam”.194 In time, the religious scholars adopted intellectual and legal methods 
to analyse the holy Islamic texts and guarantee that their implementation in everyday life remained 
appropriate and relevant to the community. But there were splits between different schools of 
interpretation, and some of these divisions descended into confrontations between these groups. It 
was in this way that the ‘ulama became politicised, as rulers got involved in their battles and, in 
turn, ‘ulama formed alliances with those power brokers. This was how the ‘ulama were corrupted, 
al-Marsafi claimed.195 
Al-Marsafi thus saw an era of intense internal dissension within the corps of religious scholars as 
being the time when these ‘ulama took to politics. As a result, Egyptians started to mistrust the 
‘ulama, who instead of acting for the benefit of the community, appeared to be more interested in 
currying favour with rulers who had an undue amount of influence over them.196 Religious 
affiliations weakened because of this politicisation, and this had a highly negative impact on the 
 
191Ibid., p.20. 
192Ibid., p.21. Al-Marsafi alludes to both the ‘ulama and the minbar, the place in a mosque from which ‘ulama deliver 
sermons. 
193Ibid., Al-Marsafi is describing the way Muslims committed the Quran to memory, believing that such a practice kept 
the holy book in the way God intended, and made sure it would not be altered in any way.  
194Ibid., p.23, Al-Marsafi here refers to the foundation of the ‘ulama as a corps following the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad and the four Rashidun Caliphs. 
195Ibid., pp.14-16. 
196Ibid. 
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unity of the nation, said al-Marsafi. In effect, the religious ties which held Egypt together were 
threatened by the ‘ulama’s politicking. The moral and intellectual vacuum diminished the strength 
of the nation, al-Marsafi argued. Such a view presents a disunited ‘ulama as harming the nation, 
while a united corps, and the religion they represent, benefit the cohesion of the nation. In this sense, 
al-Marsafi placed Islam as the moral cornerstone of the Egyptian nation, with the ‘ulama’s duty to 
protect it. Al-Marsafi’s summed the idea up, by writing that the ‘ulama were “like Prophets but 
without Revelation [and] are the guardians of the Revelation who explain its content to the people 
and educate them through this Revelation”.197 
Again, the Risalat needs to be understood in the context of the year in which it was published, 1882. 
It was the time when a forceful political movement galvanised vast popular appeal and took part in 
the revolt by Egyptian nationalists led by Ahmad ‘Urabi. Al-Marsafi’s work was by no means 
available to a majority of Egyptians, and cannot directly claim responsibility for the mass appeal of 
‘Urabi’s nationalist movement. However, the Risalat certainly did play an essential part in the 
uprising by influencing Egypt’s intellectuals, and especially religious scholars. For the ‘ulama, the 
author of the Risalat who came from a family of esteemed scholars, was an eminent ‘alim in his own 
right. Al-Marsafi was considered an accomplished writer who had wide experience teaching at 
Egypt’s greatest seats of learning – al-Azhar and Dar al-‘Ulum. His peers saw him as an elite 
scholar who could be described as one of the most respected and influential ‘ulama of the day.198 
Al-Marsafi’s standing as a high-ranking ‘alim and a pro-nationalist was made clear when he joined 
other senior ‘ulama in the signing of the fatwa that dethroned Khedive Tawfiq as Egypt’s ruler in 
July 1882. Not only was al-Marsafi’s Risalat of great interest to the ‘ulama, but so was his 
significant discourse on nationalism, as it applied to Egypt. This inspired extensive discussions on 
this issue amidst a large number of them. It did not matter whether other religious scholars agreed 
with al-Marsafi’s interpretation of the concepts of nationhood and “fatherland” (the popularity of his 
views among the ‘ulama was not accurately recorded).What is certain, however, is that al-Marsafi’s 
work shows how elite religious scholars were drawn into contributing to the domestic political 
arena, and particularly towards the nationalist movement. It was this political consciousness – one 
that was to oppose both Ottoman and British rule – that was to spread across Egypt, with the ‘ulama 
playing a key role in this anti-imperialist development.  
 
197Ibid., p.22. 
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Egyptian nationalism was often confused with Arab nationalism per se in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Nationalism across the Arab World was not an all-encompassing movement, however. In 
fact, the kind of nationalism to be found in Egypt at the time was a result of the country’s unique 
history and geographical position. The invasion by French forces under Napoleon Bonaparte in 1789 
was to start a wholly different type of nationalist movement for Egypt, as it related to others in the 
Arab world. Napoleon and his military ensured that Egypt was effectively separated from all the 
other countries in the Ottoman Empire. After the French left in 1801, Muhammad ʿAli was 
nominally an Ottoman governor when he came to power in1805, but in reality he took charge of an 
autonomous state which the Ottomans struggled to influence, let alone control.1 
By the time Muhammad ʿAli died in 1849, however, Egyptian sovereignty had been eroded by the 
growing economic might of adventurist colonial powers. The ʿUrabi Revolt, an uprising which 
started in 1879 against the Khedive and increasing European influence in Egypt, was crushed in 
1882,2 heralding a new period of Egyptian history which got underway following the invasion and 
Occupation by British forces in the same year.3 The turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century 
once again saw Egypt being used as a place for the Ottoman and British Empires to pursue their 
power games; specifically in episodes such as the Taba Crisis in which a border dispute turned into a 
battle of wills backed up by military power – one which involved a pan-Islamic front made up of 
Egyptians and Ottomans against a Britain determined to ensure the security of strategic assets like 
the Suez Canal. Britain’s unwavering reliance on the harshest form of summary justice to maintain 
its power was illustrated by the Dinshawai Incident. It cast a dark cloud over the end of colonial 
administrator Lord Cromer’s period in Egypt. 
It was against this tumultuous background that Egypt was in a singular position to foster a brand of 
feeling and behaviour which became arguably the best known (and indeed most effective) of the 
differing nationalist movements which swept across the Arab world.4 
 
 
1Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011, and George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, New York, Capricorn Books, 1965, Chapter 4. 
2Robert Tignor, op. cit., pp.239-48. 
3For a narrative on British rule in Egypt see Robert Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882-
1914, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966. 
4Hourani, op. cit., pp.273-79, 362-63. 
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What was clear was that Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century was very different to 
neighbouring countries in the Ottoman Empire. As a nation, Egypt was not only seeking 
independence from its British imperial masters, but also from the Ottomans. Egypt was the first 
overwhelmingly Muslim territory to express a desire to be politically independent from the Ottoman 
Empire. What also distinguished Egypt’s hallmark nationalism was that the country was seeking to 
break away from an Islamic ruler – the Ottoman Caliph – at a time when the Ottoman Empire had 
not collapsed. Thus Egypt developed unique nationalistic policies and strategies. These became 
viewed as a benchmark by which to measure the success of nationalist movements in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds.   
Egyptian nationalism during this period was noted for being underpinned by a strong unity in views, 
purpose and action. Throughout the 19th century, Egypt was developing into a country set aside from 
so many other surrounding Arab states. As it struggled to replace institutions embedded in the 
infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire with more modern ones, it had a state education system which 
deliberately championed an Egyptian form of “exceptionalism”. 
The distinct nature of Egyptian society and history was advanced at every opportunity, especially 
following Occupation by British forces in 1882. The arrival of troops and administrators from the 
United Kingdom highlighted, rather than diminished, this sense of a special Egyptian identity. This 
period coincided with increased intervention by Ottoman rulers in their territories around Egypt. The 
British presence not only stirred up a strong sense of Egyptian nationalism, but also succeeded in 
strengthening loyalties among some Egyptians for the Ottoman Empire. 
This chapter will analyse the manifestation of anti-Imperialist ire fostered against Britain, focusing 
on key moments and incidents which acted as the catalyst for massive social change. As discussed in 
our first chapter, the ‘Urabi Revolt, which took place in the build up to the First World War was 
arguably the first true revolution in modern Egyptian history, and rallied thousands against western 
colonisers. The irregular Egyptian army involved found support from numerous members of 
Egyptian society in what turned out to be an indisputably patriotic conflict against invading British 
forces. This first expression of Egyptian nationalism assisted greatly in a revolt which was doomed 
in the short term, but which ultimately united huge numbers of Egyptians in a manner which would 
later carry them forward towards limited independence. Crucially, the Taba Crisis, which almost 
started a regional war involving the two dominant Empires operating in Egypt, and the Dinshawai 
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Incident, which revealed the reactionary spirit of the British Empire at its harshest, also ultimately 
inspired a strong anti-colonial position in Egyptian society. This chapter will first of all concentrate 
on these two spectacular displays of British Imperial might and repression. It will then demonstrate 
how the loosening of British control caused by the departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 consolidated 
nationalist ambitions. It will eventually be argued that all these elements would lead to a pivotal 
moment in the articulation and spread of nationalist ideals, with the setting up of formal political 
parties providing mouthpieces for the population at large. As such, all the below aspects will be 
taken into account. 
Indeed, the experience of being linked to the industrial democracies of Europe, albeit through 
Empire, had a huge influence on nationalist aspirations. Ties with Britain not only reduced the 
strength of Egypt’s economic relationship with neighbours, but also produced an educated, articulate 
and aspirational class who had worked closely with a growing number of European colonists. 
Egyptian bureaucrats, land owners/managers and politicians were among the new elite who were 
able to rally the rest of the population towards political action. 
This “modern” and increasingly secular class of Egyptians gradually replaced the traditional “Arab” 
and indeed “Muslim” class who had previously generated public support through regional and local 
clubs and societies. Radical ideas articulated by the new classes were combined with nostalgia for 
Egyptian ancient history, evoking the glories of the Pharaohs, and a culture which was revered all 
over the world. That modern-ancient identity came to lessen the attraction of a traditional religious 
identity centred on Islam and what it meant to be an Arab. 
Thus, this chapter will emphasise the over-riding European cultural and political forces which 
moulded Egyptian nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. This preponderance of European 
doctrines applied as much to the “new intellectuals” as it did to Egyptian scholars influenced by 
their state-sponsored trips to countries like Britain and France, where they used the very ideas 
learned from their colonial masters to push for their own independence.  
Towards the start of the twentieth century, however, the dynamic of modernisation within Egypt 
started to come from private organisations and individuals operating within the state, rather than 
from the state itself. Private money began to fund a variety of groups, whether in the professional or 
social fields. Such innovation promoted the circulation of ideas, not least of all those associated with 
political change. In simple terms, nationalism was becoming sponsored privately, rather than by the 
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government – a crucial but often overlooked aspect. People were drawn away from the concept of a 
single leader and his administration directing society, towards private individuals spearheading 
progress. Change within the “public sphere” in Egyptian society was generated by a class of “new 
intellectuals” who were to disseminate ideas about identity and nationalism. 
A secular agenda was, in the meantime, expressed by a different group of reformers. All paid great 
attention to what was being suggested by Muslim modernisers, but their views were slanted towards 
a less religious age. As the great debates of the day concentrated on crucial subjects, such as national 
identity, Islamic reform and social issues including gender equality, a form of nationalism uniquely 
geared towards Egyptian society began to emerge. The two men who perhaps proved most 
influential in shaping this early consensus were Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. So it 
was that the thinking of Egypt’s intellectual elites came to be propagated among the population as a 
whole – a development which would have a huge impact on society in the build up to the 1919 
Revolution. 
The Taba Crisis of 1906 
British Imperial might was, once again, to be the deciding factor in the diplomatic row of early 1906 
which became known as the Taba Dispute. It saw Britain and the Ottoman Empire arguing over a 
previously undefined line of demarcation in the Sinai Peninsula, west of ʿAqaba. What appeared at 
first to be a minor incident in which two sets of military personnel met – one British, one Ottoman – 
escalated to such an extent that the Royal Navy steamed towards Istanbul, threatening war. 
While the row, and the resulting settlement, serves as a classic case study of how military-backed 
diplomacy between Empires worked in the pre-First World War period, it is what the Taba Dispute 
said about Egyptian nationalism during this period which is of particular interest. As an Ottoman 
Province, Egypt’s relationship with its British occupiers became increasingly strained after the 1882 
invasion. The Ottomans had been allies of the British for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, but as Egypt became of crucial strategic and commercial importance to the British, 
tensions mounted. Britain’s new ability to send shipping through the Suez Canal rather than around 
the Horn of Africa greatly simplified travel from Britain to India, which – as Egypt – was 
considered a Jewel in the Crown of Empire. The British viewed a secure Egypt as being essential to 
maintaining access to the Canal, and this was one of the main reasons for the Taba Dispute. 
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The Ottoman Empire claimed control of the Sinai region, which had traditionally always belonged 
to the Egyptians, but the British feared that if the Turks gained a foothold in the Sinai desert they 
would be able to push for control of the Suez Canal. To add to the complications, the Ottomans 
wanted to build a railway connecting ʿAqaba to the Suez Canal5 – a project which would put the 
Turks in a position to move from the centre of their Empire to one of the most important logistical 
assets in the British Empire in a very short amount of time.  
Lord Cromer, who was the principal British official in Egypt from 1883 until 1907 in his capacity as 
Consul-General, dominated negotiations over the Taba Dispute,6 mainly using the calculated bluster 
which had turned him into such a great Imperialist. While efforts were made to modernise Egypt 
during the Occupation, Lord Cromer’s overriding position was to view the Egyptian people with 
suspicion. British interests always remained paramount. Following a mixture of diplomacy and 
military brinkmanship, the British neutralised the threat from the Ottomans during the Taba Dispute, 
and reaffirmed their command over the region. However, the episode awakened the danger to 
Britain coming from the East, and increased British attention for Syria and Palestine as potential 
buffers between the deeper Middle East and Egypt. 
The capitulation of the Ottoman Sultan ʿAbdul Hamid II and the granting of what the British wanted 
was the end result of the Taba Dispute. The increasingly ineffective Ottoman leader, who had never 
wanted to see Britain occupy Egypt, handed over thousands of square miles of territory to Egypt, 
and so to the British, who got their formal border in the Sinai Peninsula.7 
The Taba Dispute started in January 1906 when British Camel Corps officer Wilfrid Jennings-
Bramly was ordered by British Military Intelligence, which was under the auspices of Sir Reginald 
Wingate, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, to go to the ʿAqaba area to build a guard post for the 
Egyptian border police. Bramly and four Egyptian policemen arrived at Naqb al-ʿAqaba on 
5 January to set up a fort. ʿAbdul Hamid had been warned by the Ottoman governor of Syria in 
December8 about the possibility of a fort being erected. Seeing the fort as a direct menace to 
Ottoman sovereignty over ʿAqaba itself, the Sultan constructed two guard posts of his own in the 
 
5The Times, 9 May 1906. The idea never materialised because of the conditions of the terrain. 
6John Burman, ‘British Strategic Interests versus Ottoman Sovereign Rights: New Perspectives on the ʿAqaba Crisis, 
1906’ in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 37, no. 2, June 2009, p.276. 
7Ibid., p.275 
8See Private Papers of W.E. Jennings-Bramly, Frontier Administration Officer in the Sinai Peninsula, 1902-1947, at the 
Royal Geographic Society in London.  
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area – land he believed was Ottoman territory, as set out in letters between Cevad Pas, then Grand 
Vizier, and Cairo in 1892. 
There had always been vagueness about where the line between Ottoman and Egyptian territory in 
the Sinai Peninsula lay, and Cromer was determined to clarify the border. He chose to highlight his 
preference in a statement in the Egyptian Official Gazette of 13 April 1892. It pointed to the town of 
Tor Sinai, bordered by a line from immediately east of al-Arish, on the Mediterranean, to the head 
of the Gulf of ʿAqaba.9 This border would ensure Egypt, and thus Britain, assumed control of the 
whole of the Sinai Peninsula. The Ottoman response to Cromer’s statement was to say nothing about 
it and then, on 9 January 1906, to order Bramly to withdraw to Nakhl in central Sinai.10 The 
Ottomans then set both diplomatic and military initiatives in motion aimed at showing the British 
how unhappy they were to have Cromer’s forces so close to ʿAqaba. 
Egyptian intellectuals argued that the Ottomans’ desire to build a railway towards British interests 
was the main cause of the dispute. Muhammad Rashid Ridha supported such a view in his Cairo-
based newspaper, al-Manar.11 Ridha, whose general ideas centred on establishing Egypt as a united 
Islamic state, was a hugely important scholar, influenced as he was by the Salafi movement founded 
in Cairo by Muhammad ʿAbduh. As will be discussed at length later, the use of the burgeoning 
Egyptian press to disseminate opinions was typical of how nationalist ideals were being developed 
and spread at the time. 
While the dispute was being resolved, British propaganda was regularly offered as a means of 
bolstering the country’s position. Cromer was particularly focused on foreign powers being behind 
the dispute, and Germany in particular. The theory was that the Germans wanted the Ottomans to 
oppose British expansion in the area – a belief given credibility when a large number of Arabic 
language anti-English and anti-French pamphlets were distributed around Cairo. They all pointed 
out that Germany alone was the friend of the Sultan and of all Muslims. 
The long period of diplomatic negotiations also saw the Sultan supported by Mustafa Kamil’s  
al-Liwa newspaper (The Standard). An editorial on 22 April endorsed the Ottoman claim to the 
Sinai Peninsula over Egypt, while an 8 May editorial called for all Egyptians to back the Ottomans 
in the dispute. Kamil also ordered a strike at the Cairo Law School, which Cromer had to intervene 
 
9Burman, op. cit., p.279. 
10Ibid., p.278. 
11Muhammad Rashid Rida, ‘Masʾalat al-ʿAqaba’ in al-Manar, vol. 9, April 1906, pp.231–33. 
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in personally. Local opposition encouraged Cromer to try to persuade the Foreign Office that the 
dispute had wider international implications, but the Ottomans ignored British demands to leave 
Taba.12 
It was Cromer who said that if talks failed they should “send a British fleet steaming towards 
Constantinople”.13 Cromer’s belligerence was that “the result was a stiff ultimatum to the Sultan in 
early May demanding the withdrawal of his troops from Taba within 10 days, backed up by orders 
to British warships to persuade in the general direction of the Dardanelles, seizing ‘island after 
island’ on the way”.14 This Gunboat Diplomacy worked, as so often in the past. The Ottoman force 
in Taba capitulated, leaving the Ottoman authorities to take part in a joint delimitation of the 
frontier, which was signed on 1 October. If the Turks had acted more diplomatically it would have 
been difficult to justify such bellicose action over such a small incident. 
Cromer had received warnings that the Ottomans intended to strengthen their garrison around 
ʿAqaba, including one from the future Times reporter, Philip Graves, who visited Maʿan, north-east 
of ʿAqaba, in May 1905. The Sinai Peninsula took on huge strategic importance following the 
building of the Suez Canal, as it was effectively the buffer against Ottoman expansion towards the 
waterway. Following days of wrangling between the parties involved, the Khedive sent the 
following telegram to the Porte on 15 January 1906. Written under Cromer’s instruction, it read: 
The frontier between Egypt and the Ghaza region has never been clearly 
determined so, following representations made to me by His Excellency the 
Imperial Commissioner, I invite Your Highness to nominate a special 
administrator to head to the area and make contact with an ad hoc 
commission formed by the Egyptian Government to delimit the border in 
this area. 
Meanwhile, a Royal Navy cruiser, HMS Diana, was sent to the Gulf of ʿAqaba, prompting the 
Sultan to complain about an escalation. By February, the dispute had turned into an aggressive 
stand-off. The undoubted instigator was Cromer, who pushed constantly for the border to be defined 
and for Ottoman expansion to be contained so as to preserve the security of the Suez Canal. 
Cromer’s strategic achievement was confirmed in the early months of the First World War, in 1915, 
 
12George Haddad, ‘Mustafa Kamil: A Self-Image from his Correspondence with Juliette Adam’ in The Muslim World, 
vol. 63, no. 2, 1973, p.137. 
13Dispatch of 7 April 1907, quoted in Rashid Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine 1906-1914, London, 
Ithaca Press, 1980, pp.32-3. 
14Grey to Cromer, 3 May 1906, FO 800/46, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), quoted in 
Roger Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p.334. 
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when Ottoman forces took a full 10 days to cross the Sinai Peninsula in an unsuccessful bid to seize 
the Suez Canal. 
Cromer and the British Agency in Cairo fought tirelessly against the Ottomans for British interests, 
while nominally using Egypt as their pawn – a fact which did not impress indigenous Egyptians who 
felt they were being used in an imperial power game. The sense of powerless Egyptian outrage 
intensified a few months later when, in June 1906, a summary court trial saw ordinary Egyptian 
villagers executed after being accused of murdering a British officer. 
The radical nationalist Mustafa Kamil, for example, made it clear that he was supporting the 
Ottoman Empire against the British rulers of Egypt. Indeed, the Taba Crisis was demonstrating 
sharply British control over Egyptian territory – something which provoked the ire of the 
nationalists in Egypt.15 It was to lead to Cromer acting with typical belligerence, asking for an 
increase in British garrisons in Egypt. Cromer kept requesting more troops, calling for “public 
confidence” in British security to be maintained.16 Troops were regularly marching through the 
“native quarter” of Cairo, and the Egyptian police were disarmed in Buhaira.17  
Cromer’s special talent was to continually demand British resources to be pumped into Egypt to 
bolster his country’s own Empire. He successfully argued that strategic assets including the Suez 
Canal made an essential Imperial bastion, and regional issues, such as British commerce in 
neighbouring countries in the Ottoman Empire, should be of secondary concern. Cromer’s status as 
a robust and highly respected statesman with vast experience across the jewels of Britain’s 
international domain meant Egypt remained at the forefront of British foreign policy decisions. 
The Dinshawai Incident of 1906 
A pivotal point in the historical relationship between Egyptians and their colonial British masters 
came in June 1906 with the Dinshawai Incident. In comparison to the mass worldwide violence 
which was to characterise the second decade of the 20th century, and the casualties they caused, it 
was a small event – one centred more on repressive colonial arrogance than widespread killing. But 
the British response to what George Bernard Shaw would go on to call the “The Dinshawai 
 
15G. Haddad, op. cit., p.137. 
16Cromer to Grey, 21 May 1906, PRO, FO 141/397 quoted in Owen, op. cit., p.335. 
17Ibid. 
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Horror”18 was to have far-reaching repercussions, and indeed grave ones as far as the country’s hold 
on a prestigious Imperial asset was concerned. 
It was on 13 June 1906 that five British officers (three Englishmen and two Irishmen led by Major 
John Edward Pine-Coffin, a Boer War veteran who had been used to wielding brutal colonial power 
in South Africa) went pigeon shooting in the Egyptian Delta village of Dinshawai, in the Menufiyya 
Governorate. With the soldiers were an Egyptian interpreter and a local police official. Locals in 
Dinshawai raised pigeons in conical pigeon-cotes, primarily for food. The year before, in 1905, 
other British military personnel had enquired about shooting pigeons there but, following 
protestations, the British Army banned further hunting in the area. The exact details of what 
happened during the 1906 Incident are often muddled, but the gist as outlined in the summary court 
case, which ensued the Dinshawai Incident is as follows: 
The soldiers had first of all split into two groups, and insisted that permission for the hunting had 
come from the ʿumdeh, the effective chief of Dinshawai.19 All of the officers later stated that they 
had been “guests” of the villagers, and had agreed to shoot a good 100 yards away from the 
residential centre of the village, but as they started their hunt, a threshing floor in Dinshawai caught 
fire. The Dinshawai residents were furious at losing the pigeons, and, as the fire spread, were in 
increasingly angry mood. There was no sign of the ʿumdeh who had allegedly allowed the British to 
kill the birds. Some of the villagers started to throw stones at the British, who responded with gun 
fire. An already tense situation was exacerbated when the wife of Muhammad ʿAbd al-Nebi the 
prayer leader at the local mosque, was shot dead. This led to the Egyptian mob growing in size, as 
the attack on the British continued. As the officers’ live fire intensified, five Egyptians were 
wounded. The fire in ʿAbd al-Nebi’s grain store raged, meanwhile, and he hit one of the British 
officers with a stick. Al-Nebi was then joined in his attack on the British by Hassan Mahfouz, the 
man whose pigeons had been killed. 
The fight then turned against the British soldiers. Major Pine-Coffin ordered his officers to surrender 
their weapons, along with their watches and money, but this failed to appease the enraged villagers. 
Three were held captive but then let go. Two managed to escape, with one, a Captain Bull, dying 
 
18Bernard Shaw, John Bull's Other Island and Major Barbara, New York, NY, Brentano’s, 1907. 
19Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Attack on British Officers at Denshawai, London, Printed for HMSO 
by Harrison and Sons, 1906, pp.703-5.  
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from a combination of a blow to the head and sunstroke a few miles from the village.20 The second 
British soldier who managed to escape was able to return to his garrison and raise the alarm.21 An 
Egyptian who tried to help the dying soldier was mistaken as a murderer and killed by the British. 
Some 50 to 70 Dinshawai villagers were then arrested by the British (the exact number has varied). 
Before considering details of the summary trial which followed the Dinshawai Incident, and its 
effect on British rule in Egypt, it is worth outlining how autocratic Britain’s administration of Egypt 
had been since Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer,22 was made Consul-General. The background to his 
appointment to this hugely powerful position goes back to 1876 when the British and French agreed 
on the Dual Control of Egypt to assist it in its grave financial difficulties. British rule had also been 
strengthened immeasurably by military force after the London government agreed to occupy Egypt 
following the ʿUrabi Revolt. Thus the reform of Egypt’s administration and fiscal system was used 
by the British as an excuse to remain in Egypt following the ʿUrabi Revolt. 
Imperial stability was offered to the indigenous population of Egypt as a means of sorting out their 
considerable structural problems. Although Egypt’s Khedives were nominally running the country 
under the supervision of the Ottoman Sultan, their actual ability to implement decisions was feeble. 
Khedive Tawfiq officially reigned from 1879 to 1892, and Khedive ʿAbbas II from 1892 until 1914, 
but the British were very much in charge throughout this period. The economy was in the hands of 
British advisors, who made sure their Egyptian colleagues rubber-stamped their resolutions. 
These colonialist controllers clamped down on any attempts by the Egyptians to carry out policy 
unilaterally. For example, any possibility by the Egyptians to raise money to re-invade Sudan was 
nullified because it showed fiscal irresponsibility while Egypt was trying to pay off its massive 
debts. Lord Cromer personally intervened in such matters, using his status as the ultimate power 
broker in Egypt, which was established at the beginning of the Occupation, from September 1882 
until November 1883. Cromer sought backing for this position from London, and, agreeing to assist, 
British Foreign Secretary George Granville issued the Grandville Doctrine.23 It stated: 
 
20Captain Bull was hit over the head repeatedly, and knocked out. Concussion and heatstroke were confirmed as the 
cause of death by British medics. Sessional Papers, 1906, Egypt No. 3, Vol. 87, British Parliamentary Papers, House of 
Commons, pp.10,16. 
21Ibid., p.16. 
22Baring was made a Baron in 1892 and given the title Lord Cromer. He was made a Viscount in 1898 and an Earl in 
1901. ʿAfaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations, London, John Murray, 
1968, p.82. To avoid any confusion, he will be referred to as Lord Cromer or Cromer throughout. 
23Ibid., p.57. 
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It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of 
Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges 
Her Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they 
recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors 
who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.24 
In other words, Cromer, who had next to no respect for the indigenous Egyptians as far as running 
their own affairs was concerned, would guarantee that any of them who disagreed with British 
recommendations would be removed. Cromer’s firm belief that essential Egyptian reforms needed to 
be implemented as part of Britain’s Occupation,25 but not by the allegedly poorly educated and 
inefficient Egyptians, was explained as follows: 
It is absurd to suppose that a nation which has for centuries been exposed to 
the worst form of misgovernment at the hands of a succession of rulers, from 
Pharaohs to Pashas, can suddenly, on the strength of a superficial education 
imparted to a few youths at the Government schools, acquire all the qualities 
necessary to the exercise of full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself 
or to those interested in its welfare.26 
Cromer not only had the last say in any proposed action in the Sudan, but in any other policies 
pursued by the Egyptians. In a memorandum issued on 8 September 1906, Cromer further stated that 
“the system under which the country is governed, and which has grown up under the force of 
circumstances, is opposed to every sound political and administrative principle”.27 Such reasoning 
saw Cromer offer a form of control of Egypt which always made certain that the interests of the 
British Empire take precedent over local views.28 The Consul-General and his staff were perfectly 
satisfied to make policy decisions without paying any attention whatsoever to what the Egyptians 
themselves wanted. 
As far as the Dinshawai Incident was concerned, Cromer used his immense authority to set up the 
legal machinery for emergency tribunals to deal “swiftly and summarily” with violence against his 
occupying soldiers.29 Cromer was not altogether unhappy with processes organised by the 
Egyptians, but crimes against the British Army carried out by locals were always a special case, and 
 
24Quoted in Ibid. 
25Ibid., p.57. 
26British Documents on Foreign Affairs: ‘The Near and Middle East; Britain, Egypt and the Sudan, 1885–1914’, Vol. 
15, United Kingdom Foreign Office, p.407. 
27Ibid., pp.412-13. 
28Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., Egypt and Cromer, p.62. 
29Owen, op. cit., Lord Cromer, p.336. 
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Cromer believed that special measures enshrined by Khedival Decree were an absolute necessity. A 
draft copy of the specific Khedival Decree concerning emergency courts was submitted by Cromer 
to the Egyptian government, and ratified on 25 February 1895.30 
Its aim was as much to do with deterrence as punishment,31 as Cromer looked to see any efforts at 
violent dissent by the Egyptians against the British crushed at the earliest opportunity. No appeals 
against sentences would be permitted and summary punishments would also be carried out as soon 
as possible.32 Special tribunals would be adjudicated by both British and Egyptian officials,33 and 
would follow an order by the Consul-General himself, along with the Commanding General of the 
British Army of Occupation, in line with the consent of the Foreign Secretary in London. Rather 
than abiding by the accepted penal code for Egypt, the special tribunal could hand down any 
punishment it considered appropriate, depending on the severity of the crime. 
Dinshawai was just the kind of incident which Cromer had always envisaged the Khedival Decree 
dealing with. Agreement to invoke it over Dinshawai was taken with British commander, Major-
General G. M. Bullock.34 Among the figures defending the villagers was the prominent lawyer and 
politician Lutfi al-Sayyid. The President of the court was an Egyptian, a senior Cabinet member, 
Boutros Ghali (grandfather of the later United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali), 
who sat with another Egyptian, Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul (lawyer and brother of the future nationalist 
leader Saʿad Zaghlul). But the judge who mattered most was the British Vice-President, Sir Walter 
Bond. Bond, like other British officials at the time, barely spoke a word of Arabic. Cromer’s Chargé 
d’Affaires, Mansfeld Findlay, sat at the trial in the Consul-General’s absence. This was simply for 
logistical reasons – Cromer was in England at the time.35 Findlay expressed concerns that the 
Dinshawai Incident would have widespread political implications. Accordingly he advised that a 
swift trial with a verdict that could not be appealed would enable everybody to move on as quickly 
as possible, with controversy kept to a minimum.36 Lord Cromer later claimed to have been shocked 
by the harsh sentences which were handed down, and told Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, but 
both men agreed that overruling the verdicts would be a sign of weakness. 
 





35Owen, op. cit., p.336. 
36Sessional Papers, Egypt No. 3, op. cit., pp.13–14. 
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So it was that Lord Cromer and his military and administrative colleagues decided to invoke the 
Khedival Decree of 25 February 1895, initiating a summary trial involving the villagers of 
Dinshawai who had been implicated in the attack on the British.37 The first day of the court case, in 
which both British and Egyptian judges sat, was 24 June 1906, and, three days later, on 27 June 
1906, verdicts were handed down following an extremely fast rehearsal of the often muddled 
evidence.38 The view was that Captain Bull had been murdered, and so four of Dinshawai’s 
residents – Hassan ʿAli Mahfouz, Youssef Hussein Seleem, Saʿid Issa Salin, and Mohammad 
Darweesh Zahran – were sentenced to death by hanging.39 Hassan was actually hanged in front of 
his own home in the village – something which was considered particularly inflammatory by other 
villagers. Muhammad ʿAbd-el-Nebi and another villager, Ahmed ʿAbd al- Mahfouz, were given a 
life sentence of penal servitude,40 and 26 residents of Dinshawai were given various terms of hard 
labour and ordered to be flogged.41 
The Egyptian policeman who had been with the soldiers would not confirm their claim that they 
were “guests” and had effectively been given permission to act as they did. He testified in court that 
after ʿAbd-el-Nebi’s wife had been shot, the officers he was accompanying all fired on the mob. The 
policeman was severely punished for his testimony, with two years in prison and 50 whip lashes. 
There was no authorisation of flogging, or indeed of hanging, in the penal code,42 yet Cromer 
believed it was necessary as part of his policy of deterrence. The Consul-General argued that court 
sentences should be “prompt and severe”43 as Egypt adjusted to a transitional period in which 
reforms could be implemented by his British collaborators. 
A crowd of around 100 people were permitted to watch the horrific punishments carried out in 




39Ibid., pp.16–17. It has to be noted that those public hangings took place in spite of the fact that they had been abolished 
in Egypt some years before. 
40Ibid., p.17. 
41Ibid. For a full account of the trial, the sentences and names of the victims, see Kimberly Luke: ‘Order or Justice: The 
Denshawai Incident and British Imperialism’ in History Compass, vol. 5, no. 2, March 2007, pp.278-87. 
42Ibid., p.24. Lord Cromer’s annual Egypt reports always made it clear that the British had put an end to the practice of 
the kurbāsh, or heavy whip, which had been used to punish Egyptians for all kinds of alleged crimes, including not 
paying their financial dues to the state. Thus, there was a notable contradiction between Cromer’s claims and the way 
flogging was performed at Dinshawai. The punishment was not sanctioned by the penal code and so further discredited 
the British.  
43Ibid., p.23. 
44Sessional Papers, Egypt No. 3, op. cit., pp.18-20. 
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The nationalist press in Egypt was to make much of this cruelty, describing it as a humiliation 
designed to highlight Egyptian subservience to their heavily armed British masters. Under the 
Decree which established the special tribunal, none of the sentences could be appealed – a 
manifestly unjust state of affairs which furthered the impression of reactionary British rulers 
refusing to show any leniency to the Egyptians. 
After the punishments were administered, Dinshawai itself lost its ʿumdeh and numerous local 
officials were dismissed.45 They were replaced by those approved of by the British, who said that 
the person in charge would come from a neighbouring village. While the actual Dinshawai Incident 
and the trial relating to it were soon over, its repercussions were enormous: opinion formers 
including politicians and scholars all quickly saw it as a hugely significant turning point in the 
history of Britain’s control over Egypt. 
Egyptian academics and their students spoke openly about the possibility of independence.46 All 
stressed the need of all types of Egyptian people to unite towards a common goal, whether their 
nationalistic motivations were based on religion, through the Pan-Arabic movement, or through 
secular ideas. A speech by Sheikh ʿAli-al-Gerbi in the mosque of Bishri Fakhrion on 12 August 
1906 read: “Oh Moslems! Weep over these calamities. Unite yourselves together. Cease following 
your desires. Obey not the enemies of Islam, for whom God has prepared fire.”47 After the Sheikh’s 
speech, a spy working for the British listened to people in the crowd and heard an Egyptian say: “If 
the preachers continue thus, the English will go. ‘No, they must be overthrown’.”48 
Pan-Islamism appealed to many Egyptians because of the combination of religion and politics which 
they had grown used to during the modernisation of their country during the nineteenth century. Just 
as the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph was a consolidated position working within the British Empire, so 
Muslims believed they had to fulfil their duties to both their own country, Egypt, and their God, 
through their religious devotion. 
This was a period of pan-Islamic agitation, however, and Cromer wanted to make sure that any 
disturbances were dealt with in the harshest possible way.49 The Taba Crisis revealed the growing 
 
45Ibid. 
46British Documents on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p.425. 
47Ibid., p.420. 
48Ibid. 
49Sessional Papers, Egypt No. 3, op. cit., p.23. 
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unpopularity of the British Occupation, and indeed how determined the British were to defend their 
strategic and economic interests in Egypt at all costs. The brutality associated with such a committed 
mindset was brought into sharp focus during the Dinshawai Incident.50 It was because of his 
experiences negotiating Britain’s position in the Taba Dispute, and especially the resolve of the 
Ottomans to secure a base close to the Suez Canal, that Cromer was particularly wary of pan-
Islamism. 
Cromer warned of a growing Pan-Islamic movement aimed at creating a single region, made up of 
different countries including Egypt, for all Muslims. Such a movement appealed to many Egyptian 
Muslims, including potential agitators, who rallied against Western, Christian interference. These 
increasingly politicised Muslims believed that unification around their religious belief would return 
their country to the glory days of the Islamic dynasties of the seventh to the tenth centuries. Cromer 
said that “Pan-Islamism [had] quickened into activity all those elements of discord, which close 
observers well knew to exist, but which [had] heretofore remained comparatively dormant”.51 The 
British Consul-General also argued that Pan-Islam in Egypt would make Egyptians subservient to 
the Ottoman Sultan, rather than to the British. In general, Cromer was convinced that a return to the 
earliest tenets of Islam would lead to a period of intense racial and religious hatred.52 
Cromer had seen the radical forces of Pan-Islam in both Taba and Dinshawai. The Consul-General 
considered that, as far as a threat to the British Empire was concerned, Pan-Islamic-based Egyptian 
nationalism was a great menace to Britain. Cromer was indeed confident that Pan-Islamism used the 
cover of nationalism to gain legitimacy. His means of combating it were, he hoped, ones which 
would be persuasive for the British and the Egyptians who aspired to reform gradually under British 
rule. Cromer argued that British Imperialism, whether manifested in Egypt or countries like India, 
offered an example of how difficult it was to allow democratic government for indigenous people, 
while maintaining an Empire at the same time. 
Viewing the matter in what he regarded as a paternalistic fashion, Cromer thought that Pan-Islamic 
tendencies were best fought by ensuring the Khedive’s support for the Egyptian government. 
 
50John Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp.264-5. 
51British Documents on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p.402. 
52Ibid., pp.403-4. 
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Cromer knew that ʿAbbas II was essentially hostile to the British remaining in Egypt,53 and indeed 
partially viewed Pan-Islamism as a means of getting rid of them from his country. So it was that 
Cromer looked at the Dinshawai as a chance to counter such sentiments, and show off Britain’s 
ruthless determination to crush resistance. British colonial administrators believed they had been 
fairer and more just rulers than the Ottomans, giving Egyptians a better opportunity of improving 
their society, and indeed their day-to-day lives. 
The use of the Khedival Decree to deal with the Dinshawai Incident had a devastating effect on the 
international opinion of British rule in Egypt, not least of all from Britain itself. The writer and 
social reformer George Bernard Shaw expressed his outrage in particularly strong terms in the 
“Preface to Politicians” that introduces his 1911 John Bull’s Other Island. After defending Home 
Rule for the Irish, Bernard Shaw wrote about “The Dinshawai Horror” thus: 
Denshawai is a little Egyptian village in the Nile delta. Besides the 
dilapidated huts among the reeds by the roadside, and the palm trees, there 
are towers of unbaked brick, as unaccountable to an English villager as a 
Kentish coast-house to an Egyptian. These towers are pigeon houses; for the 
villagers keep pigeons just as an English farmer keeps poultry. Try to 
imagine the feelings of an English village if a party of Chinese officers 
suddenly appeared and began shooting the ducks, the geese, the hens and the 
turkeys, and carried them off, asserting that they were wild birds, as 
everybody in China knew, and that the pretended indignation of the farmers 
was a cloak for hatred of the Chinese, and perhaps for a plot to overthrow 
the religion of Confucius and establish the Church of England in its place! 
Well, that is the British equivalent of what happened at Denshawai.54 
Shaw further pointed out: 
Ages of the four hanged men respectively, 60, 50, 22 and 20. Hanging, 
however, is the least sensational form of public execution: it lacks those 
elements of blood and torture for which the military and bureaucratic 
imagination lusts. So, as they had room for only one man on the gallows, and 
had to leave him hanging half an hour to make sure work and give his family 
plenty of time to watch him swinging (“slowly turning round and round on 
himself”, as the local paper described it), thus having two hours to kill as 
well four men, they kept the entertainment going by flogging eight men with 
 
53On his first meeting with Khedive ‘Abbas II, who succeeded Khedive Tawfiq after his death on 7 January 1892, Lord 
Cromer noted that: “I see that the young Khedive is going to be very Egyptian”. See Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid, 
Part. 1, Tarikh Misr Ibtidan min ‘Am 1891. 
54Shaw, op. cit., p.11. 
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fifty lashes each: eleven more than the utmost permitted by the law of Moses 
in times which our Army of Occupation no doubt considers barbarous.55 
Shaw was in no doubt that the British reaction to the Egyptian villagers was wholly 
disproportionate, adding: “Instead of showing understanding for the peasants self-defence against 
the officer’s tactless blundering, the colonial administrators viewed the natives’ actions as a 
dangerous popular insurgency that had to be dealt with harshly.”56 Shaw also suggested that 
Dinshawai was “more dangerous to the Empire than the loss of ten pitched battles”.57 
John Marlowe said of Dinshawai: “It was the biggest blunder and the worst crime which Great 
Britain has ever committed in Egypt.”58 The radical anti-Imperialist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, a long-
time British advocate of Egyptian nationalism, thus commented on Dinshawai on June 29, 1906: “I 
have worried myself all day about the Egyptian villagers, and I see now that they were hanged 
yesterday under circumstances of revolting barbarity. All day I have been writing, and the thing is 
weighing on me like a nightmare still.”59 It was to be Blunt who spearheaded dissent against what 
was by now widely acknowledged as a British atrocity at Dinshawai. Blunt also coordinated the 
House of Commons opposition to what happened at Dinshawai, with his associate, the Liberal MP 
John Mackinnon Robertson. The latter was also introduced to the Egyptian journalist and politician 
Mustafa Kamil by Blunt, when Kamil was visiting London to lobby for the cause of Egyptian 
nationalism.60 On December 31 1906, Blunt recorded in his diary: 
We have smitten Cromer hip and thigh from Tabah to Dinshawai, and from a 
lost force at Cairo I have become a power again; never since Tel-el-Kebir 
have the fortunes of Egyptian Nationalism seemed so smiling. Such have 
been my consolations.61 
There was every sign that a violent reaction to defiance had succeeded in the Taba Crisis, but 
scholars such as Marlowe explain how the development of Egyptian nationalism clearly benefitted 
from the murderous scandal of Dinshawai.  
 
55Ibid. 
56Glenn R. Cuomo, ‘“Saint Joan before the Cannibals”: George Bernard Shaw in the Third Reich’ in German Studies 
Review, vol. 16, no. 3, Oct. 1993, p.448. 
57Shaw, op. cit. 
58John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800–1953, New York, NY, Praeger, 1954, 
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59Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events 1888–1914, Vol. 2, 1900–1914, New York, 
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60Marlowe, op. cit., Cromer in Egypt, pp.266-7. 
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John Marlowe discussed how a revived nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kamil became ever 
more popular towards the start of the twentieth century.62 Marlowe also pointed out how Cromer’s 
view of radical nationalism, with its perceived strong links to the militant Pan-Islamic movement, 
could be traced to the nationalist paper al-Muʾayyad (lit. the supported) which, throughout the 
1890s, espoused virulent Pan-Islamic ideas.63 
Sir Ronald Storrs, a British Foreign Official who in 1906 was at the beginning of his distinguished 
career in North Africa and the Middle East, was to write later in his memoirs that the sentences 
handed down at Dinshawai were “excessive and mediaeval”64 and that “a mistake had been 
committed”.65 With such opposition to British policy mounting, not least of all from within the 
British establishment, Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, at least conceded that what 
happened at Dinshawai was “open to question”.66 However, Grey chose to defend the 
implementation of British rule in Egypt in the most severe possible terms, admitting that his 
government struggled with the problem of whether “to uphold the authority on the spot at the cost of 
making British rule open to reproach, or to override it at the risk of undermining it altogether”.67 
Thus Grey’s ultimate position was that general stability in Egypt was more important than the 
spending of too much time dwelling on the possibility that the response to the Dinshawai Incident 
may well have been wrong. The confidence with which Grey offered such an opinion shows how 
rigid British rule was in 1906: the Empire’s administrators were in fact in control of the nominal 
Egyptian government through Lord Cromer. After Dinshawai, Grey agreed that the defeat of 
resistance to the Empire should remain a priority, and that it should be destroyed at every 
opportunity. Such a view was, however, to prove a great error. The violent behaviour displayed at 
Dinshawai, and the reactionary delivery of British justice which followed, made the nationalists 
even more determined to take control of their own destiny. By clamping down on those who had 
suffered most from the horror of Dinshawai, the British had united the opponents of their rule, and 
indeed reduced their support among opinion-formers within Britain. 
Following Dinshawai, Egyptian nationalists certainly found themselves with more backing in both 
their own country, as well as in Britain itself. Within Egypt, the nationalists were very careful not to 
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65Ibid., p.71. 
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take too strong a stance politically or religiously, so as not to lose the prop of the two leading figures 
in the life of most Egyptian Muslims: the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan. The fellah, who had 
previously been Cromer’s most influential supporter, was to become a staunch nationalist after 
Dinshawai. 
The needs of ordinary Egyptian people became paramount after Dinshawai, as nationalist, rather 
than Pan-Islamic arguments, prevailed: 
Dinshawai brought the ordinary Egyptian much nearer to the opinions of 
Mustafa Kamil and ʿAli Yusuf, and also brought the nationalist leaders 
nearer to the real grievances of the people. Newspapers began to drop their 
pan-Islamic tone and dwell on the miseries of the fellah; Copts joined in the 
general abuse and criticism of the British rule, and Mustafa Kamil achieved 
the Muslim-Coptic unity which he had always worked for.68 
Khedive ‘Abbas II expressed his anger after Dinshawai with the words: 
I admit that this was for me a bitter and real agony. My nights were troubled 
by it for a long time. English haste and the weakness of the Egyptian 
Government gave me no time to intervene at the time of the trial. I will not 
go on. The English press and history have since lambasted the murderers of 
Dinshwai, not the unfortunate peasants guilty of a mere gesture of violence 
of which their ignorance excuses them, but those who sent out the 
executioners, flouting law, equity and justice.69 
Qasim Amin echoes the Khedive’s words, saying: 
Everyone I met had a broken heart and a lump in his throat. There was 
nervousness in every gesture – in their hands and their voices. Sadness was 
on every face, but it was a peculiar sort of sadness. It was confused, 
distracted and visibly subdued by superior force […] The spirits of the 
hanged men seemed to hover over every place in the city.70 
The influence of Dinshawai was to last long in time, with Anwar el-Sadat, the future President of 
Egypt, who lived close to the blighted village, in the neighbouring hamlet of Mit ‘Abu ‘Kom, 
writing: 
But the ballad which affected me most deeply was probably that of Zahran, 
the hero of Dinshawai. I recall my mother reciting it to me as I lay stretched 
out on top of our huge rustic oven, half-asleep while my younger brothers 
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(and our rabbits) had all fallen asleep. It appealed to me afresh every time I 
listened to it. Dinshawai was only three miles away and the ballad dealt with 
a real incident… Zahran was the hero of the battle against the British and the 
first to be hanged. The ballad dwells on Zahran’s courage and doggedness in 
the battle, how he walked with his head held high to the scaffold, feeling 
proud that he had stood up to the aggressors and killed one of them. 
I listened to that ballad night after night, half-awake, half-asleep, which 
perhaps made the story sink into my subconscious. My imagination roamed 
free. I often saw Zahran and lived his heroism in dream and reverie – I 
wished I were Zahran.71 
The dark, violent streak within British Imperialism had been shown up by the Dinshawai Incident, 
as everyone from militant nationalists in Egypt to enlightened reformers in Britain itself realised that 
urgent action was needed – not just to curb such reactionary excesses, but to allow nationalist 
aspirations in Egypt to flourish. There was a distinctly racist element to what had happened in the 
devastated community, with the British viewing their self-styled superiority as a pretext to wreak 
havoc among the indigenous community. 
Lord Cromer’s Departure in 1907 
Cromer unexpectedly resigned in April 1907, citing health reasons, but there is no doubt he felt it 
was time to go. The departure was variously described as “a bolt out of a clear sky” and a “national 
calamity”. As the British Controller-General and Consul-General, Cromer’s greatest achievement in 
Egypt was serving British interests – but his often ruthles treatment of native Egyptians also had the 
effect of inspiring nationalist thought and action. 
Egypt’s controllers had de facto authority over Egypt’s finances, meaning they wielded enormous 
power in both the Egyptian and British governments. When Ismaʿil refused to declare bankruptcy, it 
was Cromer who pressured the government in London to dispose of him in 1879. This was greeted 
with relief in Egypt itself, not because there was widespread approval of the British choosing 
leaders, but because Ismaʿil was considered a lackey of men like Cromer. This sense of puppet 
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Historian Roger Owen thus assessed Cromer’s legacy in Egypt: 
That Cromer really believed that one man could persuade the different 
groups in Egypt to fuse themselves together into a single cosmopolitan 
society with common interest is testimony to a system of personal rule that 
had become significantly divorced from major local developments.73  
The starting point of all Cromer’s dealings with the Egyptians was that he deemed that they could 
govern themselves. Such prejudice caused immense resentment, as did his conviction that Egypt was 
not a proper nation, and never would be one. Cromer’s day-to-day interactions with ordinary 
Egyptian people saw him misread the undercurrent of nationalist fever. One of Cromer’s biggest 
mistakes was to write off the burgeoning Egyptian nationalist movement as inconsequential. Soon 
after returning to Cairo in October 1906, Cromer wrote that “Dinshawai is forgotten”74 and all but 
discarded the popularity of Mustafa Kamil as a matter of concern for those trying to maintain 
domestic security in Egypt. 
In this sense, he was a typical Victorian Imperialist – one who believed in the superiority of the 
Anglo-Saxon race and its duty to act as a parental figure to the less advanced peoples of the world. 
Viewing the Eastern mind as weak and “slipshod”, he was never happier than as a colonial 
administrator. Known to co-workers and friends as “Over-Baring”, he could be condescending to 
both his peers and to the “subject races” he governed. Cromer constantly fought to persuade opinion 
formers in London – and particularly cabinet ministers and journalists – that there should be no 
possibility of Britain abandoning Egypt. Alfred Milner’s England in Egypt,75 defended the 
Occupation, and was of huge use to Cromer. Constant changes between Salisbury’s Conservative 
governments and Gladstone’s Liberals made Cromer’s task a difficult one, but he slowly came to 
realise that the Conservatives were a more determined Imperial party than the Liberals. Cromer 
thought that Muslim fanaticism had pushed Europeans towards supporting the British, believing that 
moderates were disturbed by pan-Islamic ideas, and that reactionary policing was the only way to 
deal with it. In fact, the heavy-handed reliance on police and military force provoked Egyptian into 
just the kind of nationalistic designs that Cromer and his fellow officials feared. Cromer always 
estimated that a long period of Egyptian administrative and political incompetence meant a long 
occupation was necessary for any type of reform. 
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When Cromer first became Consul-General, he approved the Dufferin Report, which effectively 
sanctioned a compliant parliament for Egypt with no power. It stressed that the security of the Suez 
Canal zone should be maintained at all times. More crucially, the report approved of men like 
Cromer firing any Egyptian officials who refused to accept British directives. This guiding principle, 
named after British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, was known as the Granville Doctrine. 
Cromer ensured that British officials were positioned in all key ministries during the so-called 
Veiled Protectorate. Any show of Egyptian governance was essentially a façade, with the always 
weak Tawfiq Pasha more than happy to abdicate any governmental responsibility. The Egyptian 
army, which Cromer considered untrustworthy because of a history of mutinies against the Khedive, 
was disbanded and a new army organised along British lines, as had happened in India. With 
Egyptian finances stabilised by 1887, Cromer also made sure that the Egyptians abandoned any 
aspirations towards reconquering the Sudan, which Egypt had lost control of following the Mahdist 
Rebellion. 
From 1885 to 1887 Baring ran a “race against bankruptcy”76 – struggling to find the money to keep 
up payments on Egypt’s debt, pay for the occupying army, finance the administration, and fend off 
French and British domestic objections to the Occupation. Cromer decided against evacuating Egypt 
in the foreseeable future. Perhaps without fully realising it, Cromer “had helped to place Egypt on a 
path along which the only logical destination was not self-government but annexation … the country 
would now be subject to the familiar colonial process by which the more reforms were 
implemented, the more further reform was seen as absolutely necessary”.77 
There were sometimes more consolatory measures employed by Cromer. The Dufferin Report had 
asserted the need for British supervision of reforms deemed necessary for the country. Cromer 
upgraded the Egyptian Department of Education to a ministry, and appointed the perceived 
“moderate” Saʿad Zaghlul as its new head in November 1907. Cromer wanted to work with 
Egyptians in high positions, as a way of reforming from within.  
However, Cromer misjudged the effect of his education policy on nationalist thinking. Cromer’s 
background in India always made him think that underemployed graduates from European-style 
schools and universities were likely to turn their attentions to nationalist considerations and action. 
Thus he removed vital resources from higher professional schools, as well as the secondary and 
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primary schools that provided them with students. In an article entitled “Lord Cromer Before 
History” in the newly-created al-Jarida newspaper, the nationalist Lutfi al-Sayyid commented on 
Cromer’s mixed legacy: on the one hand he virulently criticised Cromer’s failure “to establish the 
foundation of a productive and serviceable system of public education” but also lauded Cromer’s 
“magnificent results” for his successful economic policies.78 
Irrigation projects brought considerable economic prosperity to Egypt under Cromer. The projects 
were underpinned by British expertise gained in India, and were often supervised by Anglo-Indian 
engineers. The profits they made benefited every worker, from prosperous landowners to peasants 
alike. One of the main aims of the irrigation schemes was to win support for the Occupation. Under 
Cromer, the barrage north of Cairo was repaired, and – most famously – the British built the Aswan 
Low Dam across the Nile between 1898 and 1902. As Egypt exported raw cotton to industrial 
Britain, Cromer refused tariff protection to fledgling textile factories. The ability to control floods 
and provide irrigation for Egyptian crops was, according to Owen, an example of Cromer presiding: 
Over one of the world’s first modern green revolutions, in which a 
temporary surge in yields and outputs based on a combination of extra water 
and more prolific strains of cotton was bought at a longer-term cost in terms 
of waterlogging and an intensification of pest attacks beginning in the early 
1900s.79 
Despite his reputation as an uncompromising Imperialist, Cromer always believed that British 
control of Egypt would one day end, and that full independence would be restored, but only once the 
Egyptian people had learned how to govern themselves properly. 
Cromer’s policies directly led to profiteering by colonialists – something which inflamed passions 
among Egyptians, especially those living in rural areas. Cromer circumvented French and other 
European interest on the Caisse de la Dette Publique by raising loans through private interests, and 
particularly Ernest Cassel and his local banking partners in Egypt. Cassel set up the National Bank 
of Egypt, which obtained a monopoly on issuing Egyptian banknotes. Cassel also made a fortune at 
the expense of the Egyptian government when he was allowed to sell off the state lands of the Daira 
Saniya. Cromer appreciated how dangerous it was to give permission to profiteers to make so much 
money out of Egypt, but, once schemes were in motion, he had trouble reining them in. 
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ʿAfaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot suggested that under Cromer Egyptian nationalists were inert and that 
many Egyptians had trust in Britain’s policy of gradually retiring, while carrying out reforms in the 
meantime. But, Marsot argued, Cromer had no intention of seeing the British actually leaving one 
day. Marsot writes: 
Baring believed that “subject races” were totally incapable of self-
government, that they did not really need or want self-government, and that 
what they really needed was a “full belly” policy which kept it quiescent and 
allowed the elite to make money and so cooperate with the occupying 
power.80 
Cromer’s sense of bullishness was increased by the way he had to continually deal with the French, 
who had always opposed the Occupation. Attempts to sabotage British policy were frequently 
manifested through the Mixed Tribunals or the Caisse de la Dette Publique, with the French 
delaying or blocking any reforms which were necessary. It was only after the 1904 Anglo-French 
Entente that Britain could enjoy the upper-hand in Egypt, in return for the French having the upper-
hand in Morocco. 
Various factors combined to make Cromer seem even more authoritarian, as he moved towards the 
end of his time in power. Very little information about what Egyptians were really thinking was 
passed on to Cromer, who remained as assured of his ability to understand everything as ever 
before. A Liberal government in Britain was becoming more in tune with nationalist aspirations 
across the world, yet the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 convinced Cromer that he could do even 
more to impose his country’s will on a foreign power. He wanted to abolish the Capitulations and 
Mixed Tribunals and set up a European legislative council alongside the Egyptian one. With the 
British in charge, Cromer dreamed of “fusing together all the races of the Valley of the Nile”. Owen 
adds: “it is difficult to exaggerate the extraordinary, and misguided ambition behind this exercise in 
what would now be called “nation-building”. Even more striking than the unreality of the whole 
project is the megalomania involved.”81 
Severe punishments meted out to Egyptian peasants following the 1906 Dinshawai Incident were a 
huge black mark on Cromer’s period in power, even though he was out of the country at the time 
and had no direct involvement in Dinshawai. Straight afterwards, the new British Liberal 
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government under Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman adopted a more lenient policy 
towards Egypt, and this was soon followed by Cromer handing in his resignation. He was awarded 
£50,000 by the British government for his “eminent services” to Egypt. 
In 1908, Cromer published, in two volumes, Modern Egypt and a narrative of events in Egypt and 
the Sudan since 1876. In 1910, he also published Ancient and Modern Imperialism, an influential 
comparison of the British and Roman Empires. After Khedive ʿAbbas II was deposed by the British 
for supporting the Ottomans during the First World War, Cromer was free to publish his impressions 
of the Khedive, ʿAbbas II, in 1915. 
So it was that pre-First World War Egypt was characterised by key episodes of traditional British 
colonialism belligerence. Incidents such as Taba and Dinshawai, and indeed the use of 
overwhelming military firepower in the suppression of the ʿUrabi Revolt, showed single-minded, 
self-interested and often brutal British administrators acting with uncompromising ruthlessness to 
protect their interests. Sensitivity to a changing world, and the views of an increasingly politicised 
and internationally-aware indigenous population was always discarded in favour of the pursuit of 
objectives which bolstered Britain’s position. 
All of this was to have the effect of rallying Egyptian nationalists who found growing sympathy for 
their cause among a more educated and better organised population. Indeed, political parties, private 
clubs, and other groups became the platform from which people from every strata of society would 
make a concerted attempt to dislodge foreign rulers who were increasingly being viewed as colonial 
despots. 
How Private Initiative and the Emergence of a Class of “New Intellectuals” helped spread 
Radical Nationalist Ideas 
Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, it was the Egyptian state itself which was 
widely considered as the main moderniser. The view that al-Azhar, the country’s most important 
religious institution and its associated organisations, dominated society began to change. A need to 
advance, and alter people’s perceptions of the world, saw the younger generation being sent to 
European countries like France and Britain to study on government-funded scholarships. Schools 
and other educational establishments at home also moved away from the rigidity of the al-Azhar 
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system. Reforming governments introduced theatres, and opera houses, and other forms of 
entertainment aimed at a new type of culturally aware, cosmopolitan Egyptian. There were artistic 
and literary movements which challenged traditional ways of looking at the world. The workplace 
was also transformed, with people moving into factories and other communal places of work, rather 
than remaining in agricultural jobs. 
Colonial rule by the British had a great deal to do with these modernising trends in the nineteenth 
century, enabling new concepts from abroad to circulate, and inspire change. However, the idea of 
imposed development by an outside ruler which dictated how society was to evolve was not one 
which could be maintained. By the turn of the century, and throughout the period 1900 to around 
1920, the notion of the government and other state institutions playing the role of moderniser began 
to be replicated through private initiatives. This meant educated, enlightened, and wealthy private 
individuals and independent organisations investing in society to bring about progress. 
These private individuals and organisations worked with modernising architects, artists and business 
people, as well as politicians and civil servants. All had a loose societal mission to improve and 
expand, with the ultimate aim being a better, contemporary society for all. This experiment in 
changing every department of society has been compared to other countries’ “bourgeois cultural 
revolution”82, especially the kind which took place in Europe from the three centuries starting in 
1600. Similarly, Egypt, and indeed other parts of the Middle East, went through an intense period of 
“modernisation” at the beginning of the twentieth century.83 
Replacing absolute power based on religious beliefs with a more secular view of the world was the 
definite objective of the “bourgeois cultural revolution”. Modern theories such as improving the lot 
of women became paramount, and began to dominate all forms of cultural expression, including 
literature. This new era of radical thinking was credited for creating the climate for Egypt’s 
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From the outset, the intensely frustrating aspect of all this change was that it was still underpinned 
by the British Empire, and its forces of control.84 Egyptians knew they had to work out their own 
economic and political institutions, as well as sociocultural, ahlī85 autochtonous ones. This meant 
“private” institutions beyond the state. The ownership of private land by Egyptians played a big part 
in the feeling of an indigenous people taking charge of their own country, and indeed their own 
destiny. Egyptians owned 31 per cent of all privately-owned land in their country by 1900, and 
300,000 to 450,000 feddans (an Egyptian unit of land measurement) were added between 1900 and 
1906.86 Thus people could start to speak about “provincial capitalism” as it applied to people living 
in the Nile Delta in the quarter of a century starting in 1895. Notable among such landed gentry 
were grandees living in al-Gharbiyya province: their farming and trade generated substantial surplus 
of produce.87 Small and medium-sized factories such as cotton-ginning plants were also owned in 
Upper Egypt, while others worked as merchants and government contractors.88 
It is through such success that wealthy individuals were able to finance public projects. A large rise 
in the incomes associated with the agricultural sector allowed landowners to support ahlī 
institutions, and privately sponsor individuals who ran them. Many of these landowners were part of 
the newly intellectualised class. Expatriates from other countries also belonged to this new 
entrepreneurial class, promoting modernisation in every aspect of life, and bolstering it financially 
too. An organisation directly funded by this diaspora from other countries, and through local 
benefactors, was the Société Égyptienne d’Économie Politique et Législation (The Egyptian Society 
of Political Economy and Legislation), which was set up in 1907. It offered Egyptians training in a 
range of diverse fields, from banking to the cinematic arts. More generally, it provided practical 
advice on how ordinary people could found working-class clubs and societies. More privileged 
members of society also benefited from what the organisation had to propose, learning how to form 
themselves into influential groups. 
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Thus the nationalist flame was fanned by a range of modernising influences. Increased property 
ownership, and especially the development of sizeable landowner estates, contributed to enrich and 
educate people from all levels of society. Colonial rulers from Britain also unwittingly stimulated 
nationalist thought by allowing this modernisation to develop within the public sphere. Community 
life became hugely important to a new class of Egyptians, who wanted to share their wealth and 
their ideas. This all created a dynamic around the turn of the century, when the era of the new, 
assured, populist thinker was in full swing. The “modern intellectual” grew principally out of two 
elements: this novel period of idea-sharing, and the expansion of national and international 
journalism. Intellectuals and ordinary people were all able to take part in the circulation of ideas, as 
the new language of democracy began to thrive out of this exchange. At this point it is important to 
note the spread of non-Azharite thinking, which is to say the kind of belief which is not related to 
the Mosque and the Islamic university of al-Azhar. Secular schools produced a whole new 
generation of effendiya – those of high education and social standing in Arab society. These, in turn, 
were part of a new literate class which provided the bulk of readers for the burgeoning press, and the 
similarly revitalised publishing industry. 
Intellectuals and influential journalists were at the forefront of the diffusion of new ideas. Rich 
“upper-class” thinkers who offered to solve the nation’s problems were at the top of this pyramid.89 
Many spoke a foreign language, usually from one of the allegedly great civilising nations, and 
especially France. The new Egyptian philosophers were frequently wedded to the cultural 
convictions of this foreign country too. Their thinking filtered down through society, through large 
networks of new social groups. 
The exchange of opinions, and high powered debates, took place in coffee shops between effendiya, 
but such places of refreshment and discussion were also open to those without a significant 
education. The semi-literate and wholly illiterate were given the opportunity to have newspapers and 
books read out to them at these coffee shops by mutanawwirīn (enlightened people) – a term 
associating education with “light”, in contrast to “dark” ignorance. This enabled ordinary people to 
take part in arguments and talks of their own, with the mutanawwirīn – this vast new class of 
intellectuals – contributing to the unfurling of civilising ideas imported from Europe.  
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These “new intellectuals” soon stepped into roles once fulfilled by Muslim scholars trained in 
Islamic law, or ʿulama. In contrast to the ʿulama, who were easily recognisable thanks to their 
traditional Islamic garb, the new thinkers dressed in European clothes, and often made themselves 
noticeable through cosmopolitan accessories, perhaps marking their adhesion to French culture by 
wearing a beret or carrying a work of Gallic literature around with them at all times, for example. 
These determinedly worldly Egyptian thinkers saw themselves as essential members of a radical, 
challenging new society, and indeed representatives of the modern age.90 
New writings focusing on liberal ideas flourished. These included Qasim Amin’s feminist tomes on 
the liberation of women: Tahrir al-marʾa (The Liberation of Women) (1899) and Al- marʾa  
al-jadida [The New Woman] (1901). Books by scholars like Amin called for fresh, profound 
theories about how society should be organised, so improving the condition of every social group, 
especially perennially disadvantaged ones such as women. The thousands of articles and other 
literature written in similar vein all provided the prelude to nationalist arguments which were to 
dominate intellectual thought in the run up to the 1919 Revolution in Egypt. The need to move on 
from an era characterised by regression, into an enlightened one inevitably underpinned all this new 
reflections. 
The overwhelming desire to see the British retreat from Egypt was naturally a primary component of 
any Egyptian nationalist consideration, but the need to work out exactly what to replace it with was 
also very important. In short, that new class of intellectuals wanted to define the new Egypt. A 
consensus was to emerge around the belief that western modernisation could be reconcilied with 
indigenous Egyptians finally taking hold of their own lives. Much of those new thinkers’ effort was 
centred on how new technology, revived political and social institutions, and other factors could all 
be directed towards the establishment of a new nation.  
There were a number of national newspapers founded during the two decades leading up to 1919: 
al-Muʾayyad (lit. the supported one) was set up by Sheikh ʿAli Yusuf in 1889 and it was later 
adopted by Hizb al-Islahʿala al-Mabadiʾ al-Dusturiyya, the Party of Constitutional Reform, and al-
Liwaʾ, (The Standard), which was established by Mustafa Kamil in 1900. The latter became the 
organ of the Watani Party. Similarly91 al-Jarida92 (lit. the newspaper) was first published in 1907, 
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just before the creation of the Umma Party, for which it was the mouthpiece. All of these 
newspapers were examples of the dynamic success of ahlī associations, and activities which 
involved huge numbers of Egyptians in the period preceding the 1919 uprisings. Many of these 
groups concentrated on the production of newspapers and privately-funded magazines. 
Classical Arabic was the main language of these new newspapers, along with colloquial Egyptian 
dialects. Muhammad ʿUmar, the author, counted some sixteen new magazines in 1900 alone.93 Over 
the last 25 years of the nineteenth century, more than 160 Arabic-language newspapers and journals 
were founded in Egypt.94 In The Arabs, Eugene Rogan notes how one the most famous newspapers 
in the Arab world today, Al-Ahram (lit. the pyramids) came into being at this time. Al-Ahram was 
launched by the brothers Salim and Bishara Taqla, who moved from Beirut to Alexandria in the 
early 1870s. It was also during this period that the cities of Cairo and Beirut earned their 
contemporary reputation as the main publishing cities in the Arab World.95 
The Khedival Agricultural Society was initiated by the landowner Prince Husayn Kamal in 1898. 
Kamal was one of the new enlightened thinkers who saw the need to address and then find an 
answer to Egypt’s challenges through science. Specifically, Kamal wanted to create a body which 
could use new technology to improve agricultural methods in his country’s rural areas.96 In 1919 
there was another major development which saw powerful Egyptian landowners working in tandem 
towards the collective good: it was in this year that an appeal was made towards the formation of a 
club for important figures in the agricultural sector (Nadi al-Aʿyān). The main purpose of this call 
was to foster a sense of camaraderie among an agricultural elite. The solidarity of this “notables 
club” never materialised for political reasons, but it was a perfect example of how members of 
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The Watani party sponsored high-school students’ Clubs (Nadi Talabat al-Madāris al-ʿUlya), which 
were founded in 1906. The party also helped set up the Manual Labourers’ Syndicate 
(NiqābatʿUmmāl al-Sana’iʿal-Yadawiyya) and the Cairo Tramway Workers Syndicate three years 
later.97 They were typical of a score of similar groups, some of which had strong links with 
European countries, while others were more parochial in nature, concentrating more on building up 
membership within Egypt itself.98 There was a civil servants’ Club formed in 1911, and, a year later, 
a workers’ Club.99 All of these new associations were further proof of the increasing communal 
character of Egyptian society. 
All the while, public affairs were being discussed in private salons of the rich and influential. 
Princess Nazli Fadil welcomed numerous people to hers, up until her death in 1913. Other 
prominent figures who took part in talks in such forums were the religious scholar Muhammad 
ʿAbduh, the writer Muhammad al-Muwailihi, and Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, the lawyer, politician, 
translator and alienated brother of the future nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul. The esteemed 
newspaper editor Sheikh ʿAli Yusuf was also a regular visitor to Princess Nazli’s salon. Syrian 
author May Ziyada (daughter of Ilyas Ziyada, the owner of the journal al-Mahrusa [lit. the protected 
one]) also hosted writers and debaters in her salon. Those who called in up until the late 1920s 
included thinkers such as Khalil Mutran, Salama Musa, Shibli Shmayyil, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, 
Ahmad Zaki Pasha, and ʿAbbas al-ʿAqqad.  
The growth of ahlī activities reached an important point in 1907. That year saw an infamous 
financial crash, with the New York Stock Exchange falling 50 per cent on its 1906 peak. It became 
known as the “Year of Panic” in international financial circles. At that time, any frailty in the 
international system was viewed as something which could be turned to the advantage of 
nationalists. Crucially, the exit of Egypt’s British Consul-General Lord Cromer the same year 
preceded by the Taba Crisis and the Dinshawai Incident in 1906 also had a profound effect on 
Egyptians, with the creation of political parties. These included ‘Ali Yusuf’s Hizb al- Islahʿala al-
Mabadiʾ (the Party of Constitutional Reform) associated with the Khedive; Hizb al-Umma was 
backed by liberal landowners and senior civil servants; and al-Hizb al-Watani, which was founded 
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by Mustafa Kamil. Ahlī activities rapidly increased as an Egyptian School of Fine Arts, funded by 
Prince Yusuf Kamal, was opened. A movement of agricultural cooperatives was also led by ʿUmar 
Lutfi, a wealthy landowner and a teacher at the Khedival Law School.100 
Mustafa Kamil was a leading proponent of the ahlī initiatives, and was to become synonymous with 
their success. He rallied supporters through the new associations, and started a new newspaper to 
promote his political party. Kamil was also one of the first people to offer private financial help to 
education.101 In 1880, Yaʿqub Sarruf102 had translated Samuel Smile’s well-known book Self-help, 
with Illustrations of Conduct and Perseverance. The book immediately had a profound impact on 
intellectual thinking in Egypt. Kamil was among those who were to champion “self-help” as a 
political dynamic. He frequently used the expression, including at the opening of a school he 
founded in 1898, stressing the need for pupils to work towards taking control of their own lives. 
Kamil also ensured that “self-help” was turned into a motto which was inscribed prominently 
around the school, along with other inspiring phrases extracted from Smile’s book.103 This belief in 
private initiatives in education also led, in 1908, to the establishment of an ahlī Egyptian university 
following Kamil’s recommendation. 
Secular Nationalists: Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid 
Opinions about the substance and future direction of Egypt as an independent state differed 
enormously in Egypt before the First World War, with newfound political parties putting forward 
numerous policies and strategies to take the country forward into a prosperous future. Among the 
most high-profile parties were the pro-Ottoman al-Hizb al-Watani (The Nationalist Party) which, 
despite its loyalties to the Ottomans, was indisputably Egyptian in outlook and aspiration. The 
figurehead of the party was Mustafa Kamil (and later Muhammad Farid). Less disposed to the 
Ottoman Empire was the Hizb al-Umma (The Party of the Nation), whose main spokesman and 
ideological inspiration was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. There were widespread divergences between the 
Nationalist Party and the Party of the Nation in regards to the Ottoman Empire, but their views on 
the future of Egypt itself were far more uniform. 
 
100See Patrick O’Brien, The Revolution in Egypt’s Economic System: from Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1966, p.49, and Davis, op. cit., p.88. 
101Baraka, op. cit., p.70. 
102Sarruf was a Syrian émigré to Egypt and editor of the pro-British magazine al-Muqtataf. 
103Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.109. 
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Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) was to use his legal training to formulate and articulate his vision of an 
independent Egypt, setting his ideas within the context of ties with an Ottoman Empire which he and 
his followers still found attractive. Religious ties to the Sultan/Caliph were emphasised, as the 
Nationalist Party strived to impress a huge constituency of ordinary Egyptian people. As he made 
speeches around the country, Kamil highlighted a position which was only partially traditionalist, 
combining hatred and rejection of the British Empire with an appeal to those who harked back to the 
glories of Egypt’s ancient history. Kamil’s flowing rhetoric104 was enshrined in numerous 
publications including the newspaper al-Liwaʾ, which he edited from 1900 to 1907. It was in 1907 
that the paper’s editorial staff and other writers helped found al-Hizb al-Watani itself.105 In fact, 
most political parties in Egypt at the time were established around a newspaper or an editor. In 1910, 
owing to a discord between the new leader of the party, Muhammad Farid, and the heirs of Mustafa 
Kamil, the party approved al-‘Alam newspaper (The World) as it new mouthpiece, although several 
other newspapers supported the National Party too.106 
Mustafa Kamil’s priorities were to stir up a strong nationalist spirit at home, while attempting to 
make an overwhelming case internationally for Egypt’s right to be free from British rule. Kamil 
tried to divide France and Britain by inviting François Deloncle, a journalist and member of the 
French National Party, to see the political situation for himself as part of the process of 
“Internationalising” Egypt’s struggle. Deloncle arrived in Cairo on 21 March 1895,107 and was 
introduced by Kamil to Juliette Adam, the staunch pro-British publisher of La Nouvelle Revue. 
Adam connected Kamil to French literary and political circles and personalities. Kamil thus 
established the contacts to spread details of the Egyptian nationalist cause abroad, not least of all by 
writing about it in La Nouvelle Revue.108 
 
 
104Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Western Rule Versus Western Values: Suggestions for Comparative Study of Asian Intellectual 
History’ in Diogenes, vol. 7, no. 26, Summer 1959, pp.71-96. 
105Al-Jaridah, 23 October 1907. Egypt’s national movement had antecedents in a secret military group set up by Ahmad 
‘Urabi in 1876. Known simply as the Military Party it evolved into a “National Front” called al-Hizb al-Watani led by 
‘Urabi. When the ‘Urabi Revolt got underway, this party in turn achieved mass support as it rallied against foreigners 
interfering in Egyptian affairs. The failure of the ‘Urabi Revolt, however, brought about the fall of the party before it 
achieved the unity of its supporters. 
106These included al-Dustur, Wadi al-Nil, Dia al-Sharq, Misr al-Fatah, al-Balagh al-Misri, and Majallat al-Qutr  
al-Misri. 
107Haykal Muhammad Hussein, Shakhsiyyat Misriyyah wa Gharbiyyah (Egyptian and Western Personalities), Cairo, 
Dar Ruz al-Yusuf, 1954, p.51. 
108Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid, Box No. 1, Khatab min Mustafa Kamil ila Muhammad Farid, 10 August 1898. 
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Al-Liwa advocated the party’s views and there was also a supplementary magazine entitled Majallat 
al-Liwa that came out every two weeks. In the wake of the Dinshawai Incident of June 1906, Kamil 
also launched two daily newspapers called L’Étendard Égyptien and The Egyptian Standard. They 
first came out in March 1907, and specifically targeted European readers in order to explain the 
Egyptian standpoint on those events.109 Both newspapers were to last until 1909, when a lack of 
funds forced closure. The nationalist movement led by Kamil was indeed revived following the 
Dinshawai Incident, which caused Egyptians to become extremely antagonistic towards the British 
Imperialists.110 Kamil thus used all these platforms, as well as his public speaking, to advance his 
nationalist ambitions, while at the same time lobbying for greater educational opportunities for 
Egyptians. He accused Britain of having neglected this field on purpose. Kamil also promoted the 
National Party’s programme that included the independence and just governance for Egypt and the 
Sudan based on a written Constitution. Kamil also wanted rulers to be regulated by an authoritative 
representative Assembly. Education was to become a priority for Kamil’s political demands, along 
with support for international treaties and financial arrangements. Health, social policy, agriculture, 
and industry were also part of the nationalists’objectives.111 
Mustafa Kamil died in February 1908, and it was then that Muhammad Farid was elected president 
of the Party. He re-iterated the requirements of the national movement, calling for the British to 
leave Egypt so that his countrymen could get on with setting up their own Constitutional, 
parliamentary government, an effective system of primary education for all classes, as well as 
providing protection for workers through a variety of measures including trade unions.112 Just such a 
union came into being in Bulaq in 1909, leading to increased friction between the Khedive and Farid 
through the press.113  
During Muhammad Sa’id’s time as Prime Minister (1910-1914 and again in 1919) – which 
succeeded that of Boutros Ghali’s (1908-1910) – a number of laws were passed aimed at keeping 
the power of the Nationalist Party in check.114 For example, criminal charges involving print 
 
109Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid, Part. 1, Vol. 1, Malaf No. 1, p.2. 
110Tom Little, Modern Egypt, London, Ernest Denn Ltd., 1958, p.63. 
111Yunan Labib Rizq, Al-Ahzab al-Misriyya Qabil Thawrat 1952 (Egyptian Political Parties Before the 1952 
Revolution), Cairo, al-Ahram, 1977, p.23 and al-Liwa, 27 December 1907.  
112Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid, Part. 1, Vol. 1, File No. 1, pp.3-4. 
113Al-Liwa, 24, 25, 31 October 1908; and Al-Muayyad, 24, 29 October 1908; and Dar al-Watha‘iq al-Qawmiyyah, 
Mahafiz ‘Abdin, Diwan al-Khidiwi, Iltimasat Jama’iyah, Mahfazah No. 1; and Dar al-Watha‘iq al-Qawmiyyah, 
Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad Zaghlul, Kurras No. 17, pp.895, 896. 
114Qanun Nos. 27 and 28, 16 June 1910. 
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journalists were to be heard by the Criminal Court, where no appeal against conviction was possible, 
instead of the Court of Justice, where appeals were allowed. Students were not permitted to take part 
in protests. The law was changed so that any accomplice or accessory to an offence could be 
punished, even if there was no direct involvement.  
When Muhammad Farid wrote an introduction to Wataniyyati by Sheikh ‘Ali al-Ghayati, he was 
prosecuted under the new laws, and put in prison. The literary introduction had urged poets to evoke 
Egypt’s nationalistic consciousness. Undercover police harassed National Party members while the 
newspapers al-Liwa and al-‘Alam were both suspended: al-Liwa on 31 August 1912 and al-‘Alam 
on 7 November 1913.115  
The National Party became much less influential during the First World War because of martial law, 
under which numerous activities, including much journalism and political activity were put on 
hold.116 The National Party’s work was mainly reduced to propagating literature in Europe calling 
for a free Egypt.117 At the end of the war, the party resumed its protests against the British 
government and reasserted its nationalist demands.  
As far as Kamil’s views about Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire were concerned, he 
was a secular politician whose position was always profoundly pro-Ottoman.118 He wrote reams 
about the subject in his book The Eastern Question (al-Masʾala al-sharqiyya), published in 1898. It 
deconstructed claims that Egyptians were trying to set up an Arab caliphate in their country, 
blaming them as a British-backed conspiracy theory aimed at scaring people away from the 
Egyptian nationalist movement. He was convinced the British were trying to break up the Ottoman 
Empire and occupy its territories themselves, and so remained solidly pro-Ottoman right up to his 
death in 1908.119  
 
 
115Al-‘Alam, 21 August 1912 and 27 October 1912. 
116The Press Laws of 1881 had already been re-issued under the Premiership of Boutros Ghali, which allowed the 
Government to censor newspapers. See Al-Liwa, 1 February 1909, “Madha Yurid bil Sahafa”; and FO 407/174 No. 33, 
Sir G. Lowther to Sir E. Grey, Constantinople, 15 March 1909; and FO 407/174 No. 40, Ronald Graham to Sir E. Grey, 
Cairo, 4 April 1909. 
117Landau, op. cit., pp.130-131. 
118At the young age of thirty-four years-old, Kamil was honoured by the Ottoman Sultan with the title of Pasha in 1904. 
In 1899, he had been made Bey. 
119See Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-wataniyya fil-adab al-muʿasir (Nationalist Orientations in Contemporary 
Literature), 2 vols., Cairo, Dar al-Maʿarif, 1954, vol. 1, pp.8-10; Faruq Abu Zayd, Azmat al-fikr al-qawmi fil-sihafa al-
misriyya (The Crisis of Nationalist Thought in the Egyptian Press), Cairo, Dar al-Fikr wa al-Fann, 1976, pp.121-22; 
Hourani, op. cit., p.203. 
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Indeed, Kamil provided the connecting link between Egypt and Ottoman Turkey as he protested 
against the continuation of the British Occupation.120 Kamil thus showed support for the Ottoman 
Khalifa as a tool against the British, all the while trying to make Britain more unpopular with other 
powers in Europe. Kamil thus relentlessly used the press to defend the Ottoman Government and the 
concept of Pan-Islamism.121 Mustafa Kamil was made al-Mutamaiz (lit. the distinguished) and given 
the al-Majidi medal by the Sultan in 1899, and in 1904 Kamil attained the title of Pasha. 
The pro-British Syrian community in Egypt was one which caused Kamil particular anger as they 
did so many other Egyptian nationalists. The privileged Syrians were known as intruders 
(dukhalaʾ).122 Muhammad Farid himself was particularly sympathetic to Kamil’s position towards 
the Syrian Arabs in Egypt. Followers of Kamil became more determinedly pro-Ottoman Empire 
from 1907 onwards. There were repeated attempts by the Watani Party hierarchy to work with the 
Ottoman leaders who took over following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but these had little 
impact. Instead, the years after the insurrection were characterised by increasing cracks in the 
Ottoman Empire – ones which had started to open during the Young Turk revolt. It was brought 
about by an unlikely alliance of discounted groups including Turkish nationalists and secularists 
influenced mainly by western ideas and governments. The common bond was the widespread view 
that the Ottoman Sultan was failing to run the Empire properly. The nationwide organisation which 
brought disparate groups of nationalists together was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). 
Its development led to the Ottomans trying to bolster their position in North Africa and the Balkans, 
where they were continually being challenged by European Imperial powers. Measures to try to stop 
expansionist Italy moving into Libya, for example, included a ban on Italians buying or running 
factories in Tripoli and other major Libyan cities and towns. Similar restrictions were also applied in 




120‘Abd al-Rahman Al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil Ba‘ith al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya: Ta’rikh Misr al-Qawmi min Sanat 1892-
1908 (Mustafa Kamil Instigator of the Nationalist Movement: The Nationalist History of Egypt 1892-1908), Cairo, Dar 
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Watani spokesman Muhammad Farid and Sheikh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Jawish left Egypt in 1911-1912 to 
support the Ottomans from Constantinople in their conflicts in Libya and the Balkans.123 By the 
outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war in Tripoli, many Egyptians were backing the Ottomans, and 
Egyptians also sided with the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913, when the aim was to 
stop secession. Similarly, during the Taba Dispute in 1906 when British and Ottoman forces came 
close to engaging, it was to the latter that Egyptians had shown loyalty. Kamil also backed the 
Ottomans unreservedly, considering that losing territory to them was preferable to having the British 
negotiate on their behalf. 
By the time Arab discontent was brewing up against Ottoman rule during the period 1908 until 
1914, the pro-Ottoman Watani leaders expressed their prevalent allegiance to the Ottoman Empire 
and were singularly unsympathetic to Arabs seeking to break away from its domination. Instead, 
specific Egyptian problems were concentrated upon at party meetings, including the annual 
Congresses.124 Syrians like Rashid Ridha were attacked in journalistic articles for trying to diminish 
the centralised power of the Ottoman Empire. Watanists believed that breaking down the power base 
of the Ottomans would simply play into the hands of the British. The principal fear was that the 
British would use Ottoman weakness to extend their own empire throughout the Muslim world.125 
As far as ideology was concerned, there were a number of reasons why Egyptians should be drawn 
to Ottomanism. A lot of Muslims were impressed by the idea of pan-Islam which the empire 
encouraged. The anti-western nature of the Ottoman Empire had similar appeal to the masses 
(although more affluent, middle-class Egyptians were less inclined to support it). Upper-classes – 
and especially those of Turco-Circassian origin – were meanwhile very pleased about the 
association with Turkey which came with strong ties with the Ottoman Empire. 
Up until the First World War, there was, as far as their relations with Ottoman rulers were 
concerned, a notable divergence between Watani Party power-brokers and Arab nationalists. A 
revealing example was the Party’s explicit rejection of the idea suggested by Arab nationalist 
ʿAzizʿAli al-Misri that the Party support Arab aspirations for greater autonomy. The Administrative 
Council of the Party opposed such a move because it did not want to encourage conflict between 
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Arabs and Turks at a time when the Ottoman Empire was already under great threat,126 argued 
Muhammad Farid. It was just before the start of the War that Farid and Jawish took part in heated 
debates with Arab nationalists in Constantinople accusing the Arabs of treason to an Empire which 
deserved their fidelity.127 In summary, there were vast numbers of Egyptians who maintained their 
loyalty to the Ottoman Empire right up until its defeat in World War I. 
Despite widespread approval of the Ottoman Turks, there were thousands of others who believed 
that the noticeable disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would lessen the chances of it helping 
Egypt in its struggle towards independence. Instead, Hizb al-Umma, which was founded in 1907 
around the newspaper al-Jarida (1907-1915) as a direct reaction to the Dinshawai Incident, 
championed a form of secular nationalism which distanced itself from the profound Islamic nature 
of the Ottomans. Hizb al-Umma’s leader was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872- 1963), also editor of the 
Party’s newspaper. As a profoundly liberal nationalist who viewed organised religion as an 
anachronism, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid encouraged his supporters to reject continuing defence of the 
Ottoman Empire, suggesting that cooperation with the British was justified as Egypt strived towards 
reform in every aspect of public life. 
Al-Sayyid always appreciated the efficient administration and relative financial stability which came 
with Egypt’s links to the British Empire, but his overriding view was that the colonialists and the 
Khedives would always be a barrier to his people expressing themselves democratically. Al-Sayyid 
considered it wholly unrealistic that Britain’s military strength, and their often ferocious devotion to 
maintaining their Empire, could be overcome by Egyptian nationalists. Ever a pragmatist, it was  
al-Sayyid’s view that Egyptians should work within the British colonial system to lobby for a 
Constitution on the Khedive, and indeed to strengthen the Legislative Council and the Provincial 
Councils – the bodies of native rule.128 
Al-Sayyid’s overall repudiation of Arab-centred nationalism was made very clear in 1911 when two 
Syrian dignitaries visited Egypt and made the suggestion that Syria should be annexed to Egypt if 
the Ottoman Empire were, as feared, to collapse. Al-Sayyid later said his reply was: “I did not agree 
with this idea, not only because of the impossibility of the request, but because I did not see it as 
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being in the interest of Egypt.”129 The interests of Egypt and Egyptians were paramount to Hizb  
al-Umma, which appealed to an almost mythical sentiment of Egypt as a giant fusion of like-minded 
people sharing a heritage and love of nationhood. Al-Sayyid called on his countrymen to “absolutely 
reject any attachment to any other homeland but Egypt, whatever our origin – Hijazi, Nubian, 
Turkish, Circassian, Syrian, or Greek”.130 
Such a profoundly Egyptian nationalistic stance left al-Sayyid little scope to show sympathy towards 
a more generalised Arab nationalism. Discussing discontent by Arabs at their under-representation 
in the Ottoman Parliament, al-Sayyid appreciated the complaints of Arab activists, and sympathised 
with their position, but was convinced they could be resolved through negotiations between Arabs 
and Ottomans.131 As far as the fight against the Italian empire in Libya by Ottoman-Arabs between 
1911 and 1912 was concerned, al-Sayyid made his opinion clear in a number of strongly argued 
editorials in al-Jarida. Hi main argument was that Egypt had no national interest in the conflict, and 
should remain out of it.132 So it was that nationalists like Lutfi al-Sayyid and the Umma Party 
viewed Egypt as a national unit which was completely separate from its neighbours, while others – 
and notably the Watanists – considered it was one of a number of indigenous units represented by 
the all-encompassing Ottoman Empire. Like the National Party, the role of Hizb al-Umma declined 
during the First World War, however, and after the conflict the majority of its members joined al-
Wafd party, which played a central role in the 1919 Revolution and on which we shall concentrate 
fully later on. 
It was this new belief in political groups and associations which was to create a wave of popular 
support for the Revolution of 1919. People no longer regarded nationalism as an intellectual ideal, 
but as a basic right. They had learned much through communal debate, and then communal action. 
Association was deemed essential for people who wanted to fight against injustices, and rise up 
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There is no doubt that the basis of an Egyptian nationalist movement was well in place by the turn of 
the twentieth century. The conduct of British soldiers during the Dinshawai Incident of 1906, and 
the subsequent trial, was unquestionably reactionary and many showed their opposition. Dinshawai 
was followed eight years later by the outbreak of a global war which, as far as Egypt was concerned, 
brought ordinary people into contact with their colonial masters, often for the first time. 
The sense of an expansionist coloniser pillaging one of its prestige overseas assets became very real 
to the ordinary man and woman. The fact that many of these indigenous citizens actively had to help 
the British exploit Egyptian resources for their use in the war became intolerable. Mass mobilisation 
in the countryside saw nationalist resentment spread out of the cities and towns, across the whole 
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The widespread view that Egypt had been plundered by an invading, colonial power during the First 
World War inflamed passions across the country during the post-war period. People considered that 
the mobilisation of an armed, foreign force stripped the indigenous population of precious resources. 
So it was that, in the Spring of 1919, the arrest and deportation of nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul 
became the spark which turned all these grievances into a fiery explosion of outrage. There were 
strikes accompanied by riots in major cities including Cairo and Alexandria, as industrial unrest 
brought transport links and other vital infrastructure to a standstill, causing panic across the ranks of 
those upholding British rule in Egypt. 
Darwin has depicted the Egyptian countryside in 1919 as being akin to “an economic and social 
battleground where competing groups struggled to gain most and lose least from the changes of the 
preceding decade”.1 Brown in his Peasant Politics notes how rural mobilisation led to wide-scale 
resentment of the British occupiers. He points out that many Egyptian peasants were coming into 
contact with direct British rule for the first time ever. Darwin argues that the “war imperialism” of 
the 1914-18 conflict replaced the “informal imperialism” which had previously characterised 
Britain’s presence in the Middle East. This form of “war imperialism” had three principal features 
which Darwin qualifies succinctly. He describes them as “temporary additions to Imperial power” – 
which is to say the introduction and extension of British administrative control; the mass 
mobilisation of labourers and animals to form whole military units; and the organisation and 
collection of agricultural resources for the war effort.2 
Egypt’s agricultural cycle was detrimentally affected by this massive logistical undertaking, which 
involved huge amounts of food and fodder for the soldiers and animals. All of this produce had been 
originally intended for civilian use, but was instead turned over to the military. This caused major 
changes in the nature of the Egyptian economy: it meant that everyone from senior Egyptian civil 
servants and industrialists to ordinary agricultural and city workers became far more aware of the 
control the British Empire had on their lives. The main argument of this chapter is that this 
galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before. 
 
1John Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922, London, 
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Certainly, the Wafd nationalist literature has made efforts to propagate this argument too.3 Officials 
at the Foreign Office in London also admitted – albeit rather bluntly – that: “There is no doubt that 
we squeezed the country very hard.”4 A logical corollary was great sympathy for nationalistic 
messages.5 The system of reconciling civilian and military demand in the midst of a total war came 
close to destruction in 1918. Rioters in Egypt in 1919 were in many ways similar to those in India 
who attacked vital communications, including railway and telegraph lines, in order to try to break 
down the British administration of their respective countries.6 The ultimate aim was to safeguard 
local resources, and to stop them being taken away for the war effort. 
The chapter will thus successively analyse the devastating consequences of the British “war 
imperialism” on the Egyptian people. As the conflict grew in its intensity, an all but inevitable result 
was Egypt been turned from a “Veiled Protectorate” of the British into a country which was directly 
ruled from London. The main reason for this downward penetration was the need to step up the war 
effort. The chapter will then highlight how the mass mobilisation of a traditional, agrarian economy 
necessary for a modern, industrialised war had far-reaching repercussions on Egyptian society. 
Finally, the chapter will examine how the war disrupted, and eventually destroyed an Anglo-
Egyptian system which had existed in the pre-war years – something which led to a politicisation of 
the Egyptian people which was as swift and powerful as the progress of the war itself. Those 
concerned were only too ready to react equally strongly when nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul called 
for independence from Britain during the March 1919 uprising. 
From “Veiled Protectorate” to Direct British Rule 
Egypt’s pre-war economic system was based on very limited military spending, low taxes, free trade 
and what was always described as a “temporary occupation”. After Royal Navy ships were sent to 
put down the nationalist ʿUrabi Revolt in 1882, the economy evolved into a distinctive one right up 
until the years preceding the First World War.7 British bureaucrats assisted by a formal Army of 
Occupation were then given permission to modernise what Alfred Milner called the “frightful 
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misgovernment” of Khedival rule.8 After 1892, the London Foreign Office conceded that 
withdrawal from Egypt was not likely to happen, despite politicians protesting against a supposedly 
“temporary” occupation. British influence across Egypt spread in the years leading up to the turn of 
the century.9 British civil servants flooded the higher reaches of the Egyptian government by 1914, 
with Milner coining the description of Egypt as a “Veiled Protectorate”.10 These highly influential 
British civil servants became known as “advisers in name, controllers in fact”, but they operated 
behind the façade of the Egyptian Government.11 The British bureaucrats were ostensibly 
accountable to Egyptian Ministers in a separation of powers. British policy between 1882 and 1914 
was to maintain British economic and strategic interests, ensuring enough political co-operation so 
as to avoid direct British rule.12 This led to a “constant balancing act” in British foreign policy – 
work centred on improving Egypt’s political and economic status certainly led to stability within 
Egypt, and actually strengthened Britain’s position, resulting in more British officials arriving in 
Egypt to join the country’s bureaucracy.13  
Lower, peasant levels of Egyptian society were not, however, influenced by this influx of British 
administrators. The vast majority of the Egyptian population was instead unaffected by a British 
presence made up of only 300 to 400 civil servants, and 4000 to 5000 soldiers. Their direct 
involvement did not extend to rural Egypt. In the countryside, 68 per cent of Egyptians remained 
employed in agriculture.14 Rural policies continued the Khedives’ pre-1882 measures, which saw 
Egypt integrated into the international economy through the development of cotton as an export-
based cash crop.15 This course of action led to work on huge capital projects including the creation 
of the Aswan Dam, as well as a comprehensive railway network.16 
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The edicts of British officials were sent through the local village hierarchies, meaning most ordinary 
people had very little to do with the British. This form of indirect rule led to many believing that 
some kind of Egyptian government was in fact making decisions, rather than the British themselves. 
After the First World War broke out in 1914, this separation of powers broke down. Military 
demands during the war saw martial law introduced, resulting in centralised British control over 
every aspect of Egyptian life. So it was that intense resource extraction engendered a fundamental 
change in the relationship between the Egyptians and their British colonial masters. 
At the outset of the war in 1914 Egypt was nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire, something 
which was illogical considering Turkey’s position as an enemy of the British. Sir Edward Grey, the 
British Foreign Secretary, first proposed that Egypt be annexed, but Sir Milne Cheetham, acting 
Consul-General in Cairo, was against this, defending the collaborative tradition of the “temporary” 
occupation of Egypt. Cheetham said that annexation would contradict the Government’s declared 
aim of upholding the rights of small nations.17 Britain’s connection with the Caliph, the spiritual 
head of the Sunni Muslim inhabitants of Egypt and India, also needed to be considered, argued 
Cheetham. The Residency called for a careful approach in 1914, regarding Egyptians as “potential if 
latent enemies whose neutrality and quiescence it was advisable to purchase at a price”.18 In October 
1914, the Residency adjourned before suspending the Legislative Assembly. On 2 November 1914, 
the British military authorities in Cairo proclaimed that Britain would take on primary responsibility 
for the defence of Egypt. No Egyptian would be asked to engage in the fighting, it was alleged. 
Press censorship and counter-intelligence expedients were also brought in, adding an undertaking 
which defied those Egyptians who had declared an Islamic holy war on 14 November.19 
Egyptian sovereignty was settled on 19 December 1914 when Britain declared Egypt a Protectorate 
and replaced the pro-Ottoman Khedive, ʿAbbas Hilmi II, with his nephew, the pro-British Hussein, a 
man described as a collaborator “of unmistakable loyalty and sincerity”.20 Sir Henry McMahon was 
made Egypt’s High Commissioner, while martial law was put in place to bypass the system of 
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Capitulations.21 Britain became the main legislative and executive authority in Egypt, despite 
Foreign Office claims that martial law would supplement rather than supersede the Civil 
Administration.22 This development was one of the first signs of the newly aggressive British 
involvement in Egyptian sovereignty. 
This interference in the country’s most vital affairs transformed the political relationship between 
Egyptians and British, directly creating the bitterness which led to unrest in the post-war years. The 
terms of the Protectorate were ambiguous and easily manipulated. They were at first welcomed by 
the British, while the Egyptians viewed them as a transitional plan aimed at prosecuting the war 
successfully before Egypt’s status was finally settled.23 Percival Elgood, who served in the 
Ministries of War, Interior and Finance and as wartime General Staff Officer at Port Said during his 
career in Egypt, said later – in 1924 – that the Protectorate “inferred much and promised little” and 
should not have been implemented since “no human intelligence in November1914 could foretell 
the development of the War, or whether Egyptian assistance would not become necessary to the 
success of military operations”.24 There was, to begin with at least, little impact on the daily life of 
Egyptians made by the new measures. 
However, an indication of the gradual manner in which the war ended up having a dramatic 
consequence on Egyptian society is clear. As Britain extended its military commitments across 
Europe and the Middle East it increasingly relied on logistical support from its Empire, and 
especially the colossal human resources.25 The London government was fully aware that a global 
war necessarily required a strategy designed to “embrace the active mobilisation provisional of the 
nation’s entire economic resources as well”.26 Also, with Britain expanding its Imperial ambitions, 
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cities such as Cairo, as well as the larger towns, became full of uniformed soldiers from Britain and 
the Commonwealth preparing for action in nearby theatres of war, including the Dardanelles and 
Palestine. The flood of units of men with their equipment, all involved in training for war, had a 
profound effect on the psyche of Egyptians. This kind of military presence was an extensive 
physical manifestation of colonisation – one which raised tensions in local communities, convincing 
people that the vast increase in troop number corresponded with a vast decrease in independence.27 
Sir John Maxwell, the military Commander of Britain in Egypt in 1914-15, worked closely and 
effectively with the civil administration.28 Egypt was the main base for the Dardanelles campaign in 
1915 and, in January 1916, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) returned to Egypt. By 
9 January General Archibald Murray had replaced General Charles Monro as Commander-in-Chief. 
The MEF initially operated alongside the Force in Egypt, but by March 1916 the complexity of 
maintaining two military formations persuaded Maxwell to suggest that his position be abolished. 
Maxwell found the system “extravagant and wasteful”.29 Murray then assumed sole charge of the 
amalgamated troops which were renamed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). 
An advance across the Canal Zone across the Sinai Peninsula to el-Arish was ordered by Murray in 
February 1916, near the border with Ottoman Palestine. This aimed to stop the Sinai falling into 
enemy hands by securing British control over the only town capable of defeating an attacking force 
thanks to access to water supplies. Victory would also enable the EEF to take rapid offensive action 
against any Ottoman build-up in southern Palestine.30 The War Office in London approved the 
policy, and the EEF crossed the Sinai to occupy el-Arish on 22 December. The progress was 
accompanied by the construction of a desert railway from the Canal port of Qantara, and a water 
pipeline, and by 5 February 1917 both reached el-Arish.31 The campaign, which began as a 
defensive one designed to protect Egypt, then became an offensive one, with the EEF making 
headway into Palestine. The capture of Gaza and Beersheba, the two main sources of water for the 
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region, denied this water being made available for the enemy. It also ensured that the EEF had a 
healthier HQ, away from the malaria-infested coastal plain of southern Palestine. The operation also 
provided cover for the extension of the military railway into Palestine.32 
There was very little resistance from the Ottoman Turks in the Sinai so, under mounting pressure 
from the War Office in London to deliver a spectacular, morale-inspiring victory at the time of the 
Russian Revolution, Murray carried on advancing. An attack on Gaza on 26 March was planned too 
quickly, however, and without adequate logistical support. Despite a troubled campaign, the War 
Office ordered that the manoeuvre continue leading to the Second Battle of Gaza on 18 April, when 
a frontal assault on the reinforced Ottoman garrison was beaten back with heavy casualties to both 
infantry and cavalry.33 On 11 June, Murray was relieved of his command and replaced by General 
Sir Edmund Allenby.  
With increased artillery, and two new infantry divisions put at his disposal, Allenby spent the 
summer of 1917 extending the rail and pipeline networks up to and along the battle-front. This 
detailed preparation was repaid during the Third Battle of Gaza between 31 October and 
2 November – one which included the heaviest non-European artillery bombardment of the war.34 
The EEF launched an assault on Gaza and Beersheba in a combined offensive and penetrated the 
Ottoman lines.35 Allenby’s XX Corps was confronted with stiff Ottoman resistance in the Judean 
Hills but broke through to capture Jerusalem on 9 December. 
While all this was happening, British armies were involved in all-out fighting on the western front in 
Europe. Offensives in France meant few additional troops were made available to the EEF from 
Europe. Instead, battalions from British India were sent to Egypt, many of them initially badly 
trained and poorly equipped before they were transferred to the front line of the conflict.36 Faced 
with the want for extra training and fast supply lines, Allenby did not resume his offensive until 
September. A joint-infantry-cavalry attack at Megiddo vanquished the Ottoman Seventh and Eighth 
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Armies on 26 September 1918. The use of the air force and substantial mechanised transport led to 
the retreating Ottoman columns being cut off and defeated, in what became a text-book model for a 
modern, “deep” battle.37 This paved the way for the advance to Damascus on 30 September and 
Aleppo on 6 October. It was at Aleppo that the momentum was halted, because the cavalry and other 
mechanised forces had far outstripped their supply lines.38 
Such swift, dynamic, modernised warfare across a fluid frontline entailed that local resources 
continually had to be commandeered to meet military needs. A lack of roads and railway lines at the 
beginning of the war necessitated that supplies be carried by beasts of burden across countryside. 
This was made particularly difficult because of the rough and uneven state of this rural environment 
in the Sinai and Palestine, and involved basic logistical military units made up of thousands of 
labourers and animals including camels and donkeys. By the time of the capture of Aleppo in 
October 1918, lines of communication were stretched to 650 miles, with these animals and their 
human guides having to negotiate the hundreds of miles of hugely difficult terrain. By this time, the 
demands on the country of Egypt had increased inexorably.39 In November 1918 the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force comprised more than 460,000 combatants and non-combatants, with up to 
500,000 Egyptians serving in the Egyptian Labour, and a further 170,000 in the Camel Transport 
Corps.40 
Wartime Mobilisation of Egyptian Resources 
The provision of man and animal power, and food and fodder was the main strain of this massive 
wartime mobilisation.41 The agricultural cycle and the delicate balance between civil and military 
requirements were all affected in Egypt. While the enormous EEF mobilisation was met, there was 
great disruption to the political economy of rural Egypt and its fragile equilibrium between 
subsistence farming and the growth of cash crops for export. Units like the Egyptian Labour Corps 
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and Camel Transport Corps called for huge numbers of peasant workers to be recruited. This was a 
voluntary movement to begin with, but it turned into a division of forced labour. Egyptians noted 
that it started to resemble the corvée – a system of unpaid toil which had been abolished in 1892 but 
which Cromer described as one of the primary “civilising” achievements of British rule. During the 
war, the reappearance of state requests for labour caused great hardship and resentment in rural 
regions which contributed to the revolt in 1919.42 
Towards the end of the war, Britain was no longer the main supplier for the military forces in 
Palestine and Mesopotamia. Instead, bulky comestible items had to be produced locally, so as to 
economise on the use of shipping which was needed in other theatres of the war. In both Egypt and 
India the British authorities increased their downward demand on agrarian society. 
They organised the mobilisation and collection of local resources to supply the various military 
campaigns, so intensifying the trend towards greater British exploitation of rural affairs in Egypt that 
had begun during the consulships of Cromer and Kitchener. Above all, however, this development 
represented a significant departure from pre-war policy as the civil-military state intervened directly 
in economic affairs in order to requisition local produce on a far more substantial scale.43 The High 
Commission in Cairo initially had to take measures to stimulate the production of foodstuffs and 
reverse the pre-war emphasis on cotton which had restricted the amount of cereal yielded and 
created a dependence on imported food. By 1914, there were shortfalls in grain and meat and a 
reliance on imports to meet domestic consumption. Around one-third of Egyptian wheat 
requirements, amounting to 260,000 tons, were imported from Russia and India in 1913, while cattle 
came from Sudan.44 
The outbreak of war in 1914 and the immediate diversion of shipping to military use meant Egypt 
either had to decrease food consumption or increase the production of foodstuffs. Reducing 
consumption would make a mechanism of rationing and a literate population necessary. 
Accordingly, the Egyptian Government passed a decree on 20 September 1914 forbidding the 
cultivation of cotton in Upper Egypt and restricting it to one-quarter of total holdings elsewhere.45 
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This limitation was subsequently relaxed to one-third of holdings following protests from large 
landowners. Its results were mixed as the proportion of cultivated land producing cotton fell from 
44% in 1914 to 28% in 1915, before rising to 40% in 1916 when many large landowners came to 
regard the fine levied on excess cotton production as a minor tax on profits as world prices soared to 
record levels.46 Consequently the constraint had to be re-imposed with tighter regulation in 1917. 
Early attempts to change commercial agricultural patterns is what these curtailments on cotton 
cultivation represented. But they failed to significantly increase grain production, or achieve self-
sufficiency in food output. Farmers switching production to the growth of cereals were hampered by 
the absence of nitrate fertiliser, because it was needed by the military. This led to a disappointing 
wheat harvest in 1915, and many peasants switched to growing animal fodder instead.47 
The Egyptian Government’s failure to keep under control the export of foodstuffs in 1914 
exacerbated the situation. It led to a huge increase in exports in 1915, making wheat scarce, and 
leading to maize being used as a substitute in 1916. Egypt remained dependent on shipments of 
wheat, and flour from India throughout the war, despite the various measures taken to stimulate 
cereal production. The return of the MEF from Gallipoli in March 1916 overwhelmed existing 
reserves of food and fodder and caused a food crisis which had to be dealt with by emergency 
shipments of bread and hay from India.48 Prosecuting a major desert campaign with peasant labour, 
animal transport, food, fodder and railways between mid-1916 and November 1918 had a huge 
impact on Egyptian society. Established patterns of agricultural production and distribution were 
distorted, and Egyptian agriculture regressed from an export-based cash economy to a food-
producing one in which any surplus was claimed for military consumption and thus withheld from 
commercial sale. Egyptian agricultural schemes were disrupted because of three factors in 
particular: the recruitment of peasant labourers for military unit; the diversion of the Egyptian 
railways for use by the military; and the extraction of agricultural resources to feed and maintain the 
troops in the Sinai and Palestine. 
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The decision to use Egyptian manpower was part of a long history of state mobilisation of peasant 
labour in Egypt. This had been standard practice during the Ottoman period (1517-1882) and 
Mehmet ʿAli introduced conscription for the peasantry in 1823. Under the corvée system, vast 
numbers of forced labourers worked on the construction of irrigation and infrastructural state-
building projects during his reign (1805-1848).49 During the reign of Khedive Ismaʿil (1863-1879) 
railway development and the construction of the Suez Canal intensified and politicised the contacts 
between state institutions and peasants and set in motion a dialectical process of negotiation and 
occasional confrontation with the bureaucratising state.50 Government demands for labour declined 
after 1882, and by 1914 only the Nile Bank Lists, which provided labourers for essential flood-
defence works, remained.51 
The need for peasant labour during the war asked for a hierarchical bureaucratic structure that 
projected state power downward to provincial and rural levels. This was how this mobilisation was 
achieved.52 There were improvements in irrigation, however, and this ensured that British calls for 
military labour differed greatly from what was the case under the Ottoman Empire. The agricultural 
“off-season” in which labourers had temporarily offered their services under the corvée ceased to 
exist, with agriculture becoming a year-round activity. Between 1917 and 1918 the agricultural and 
military cycles clashed as wants for military labour peaked each spring and coincided with the wheat 
harvest.53 
The Egyptian Labour Corps and the Camel Transport Corps were the units in which most Egyptian 
labourers served. They made up the complex logistical system which allowed the advance into 
Palestine to take place. Before the railway had been built across the Sinai, and mechanised transport 
emerged in great numbers after 1917, all items of consumption had to be shifted into place by man 
and animal power. This included all of the water requirements of the force, which were moved 
across the Sinai by camel until the water pipeline was ready in February 1917. 
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It was in January 1915 that the Camel Transport Corps (CTC) was founded to use animals in the 
Canal Zone. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Whittingham took charge, combining his military 
experience in the Grenadier Guards with camel management skills picked up in the Anti-Slavery 
Department in Sudan.54 The Corps strength stood at 1310 camels and 864 men by February 1915, 
and was split into 24 sections and four divisions.55 The camels took rations and water along the Suez 
Canal during the early stages of construction of the Canal Zone defence works.56 An Ottoman attack 
on the Canal Zone occurred on 3 February 1915 but was largely unsuccessful. The CTC was 
therefore reduced to 500 camels – a move which signified that the immediate military threat to 
Egypt had got smaller.57 Methods of loading camels were perfected during these earlier years of the 
Corps, as well as means by which the animals could be protected against mange, colic and cold.58 
In December 1915 the London War Office authorised the Force in Egypt to be increased to 20,000 
camels.59 This was in part due to Maxwell’s decision to defend the Canal in depth, and the need for 
a defensive line 11,000 yards to the east. The sandy soil of the Sinai Desert made wheeled transport 
unsuitable, so camels were brought in to ferry water, ammunition and other essential military 
supplies.60 There was a rise in military demands on the CTC as the advance across the Sinai took 
place in 1916. This was in particular because the water pipeline always lagged behind the railway. 
Throughout 1916 the troops and labourers were dependent on the CTC on water which was 
conveyed by rail from the Sweet Water Canal to the railhead and then loaded on to special fantasses 
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The CTC peaked in size in June 1917 when it was made up of 33,594 camels and 19,886 Egyptian 
personnel. Then its ration strength was reduced to 29,000 camels in March 1918 and 25,700 in 
September. The change in ground in Palestine allowed greater use of mechanised transport.62 
Around 170,000 camel drivers and 72,500 camels served in the CTC between December 1915 and 
February 1919.63 The men and camels enduring terrible conditions, especially during the winter 
progression to Jerusalem through the Judean Hills in 1917 and the two Trans-Jordan raids in March 
and April 1918. In 1924, Elgood recorded how the “fellahin drafted into it gave themselves up as 
lost men” who could “hardly have been worse off in Turkish captivity”.64 
As well as the problems suffered by camels and drivers, there were other effects caused by the 
strengthened CTC, especially in regards to impacts on Egyptian society. Around 30,000 camels 
imported to Egypt from Arabia were all lost. The lack of camels on the open market naturally 
pushed the price of the animals up.65 The Ministry of Interior started to buy lots of camels in 
December 1915. The Heavy Delta camel proved the most suited to the work required, out of the 
eight classes of camel tested.66 
Camels were used by peasants to carry their produce to local markets for sale. They also resorted to 
railway connections to take their produce to national markets. The effective requisitioning, through 
“indirect pressure”, of their camels caused considerable hardship and unrest in the countryside, as an 
estimated 20,000 were gathered in this way in 1916 and 35,000 in 1917.67 This in turn placed 
enormous demands on agricultural Egypt to supply the fodder to feed the camels as well as the 
46,000 horses, 15,000 mules and several thousand donkeys in service with the EEF by 1917.68 As 
with the supply of camels, the open market could not provide the required quantities, which were 
obtained instead by means of requisitioning and forced purchasing at below market prices.69 
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The reality of Egypt being a country in dire straits became more apparent as people were recruited to 
the Egyptian Labour Corps (ELC). Some 500,000 Egyptians served in the unit between 1915 and 
1919. Even then, these figures were disputed by some Egyptian historians with some saying the 
actual number was more like 1million.70 Although enlistment initially represented a financially-
attractive proposition to many peasants affected by agricultural unemployment and low wage-rates 
in 1915-16, the opportunity cost of engagement went up at a great rate in 1917-18 as agricultural 
salaries readjusted to reflect the growing scarcity of rural labour. The resulting slump in recruitment 
at a time of rapidly increasing military needs for labour led to the introduction of more coercive 
methods of enrolment which caused great discontentment in rural areas. 
The first mobilisation of Egyptian labour occurred in March 1915 with the dispatch of a 650-strong 
Egyptian Works Battalion to the Dardanelles.71 The Battalion was stationed on the advanced base at 
Lemnos and was involved in the construction of piers, jetties and a light railway. It performed 
extremely valuable service in difficult conditions during the summer of 1915 and was often exposed 
to shell-fire. However, an “unfortunate incident” early in September left nine Egyptian workers dead 
and another seven injured after British officers fired on them to quell a disturbance. The unrest arose 
when the labourers claimed that they had only agreed to serve for three months and that their 
agreement stipulated that they would not be employed under fire. Their British officers disputed 
both allegations, and tensions escalated further after one officer flogged several of the men.72 
The civil and military authorities in Egypt condemned the “deplorable lack of tact and self-control” 
of the officer involved, and the Commander-in-Chief of the MEF, Sir Ian Hamilton had little option 
but to withdraw the Battalion to Egypt.73 This he did with regret, for “the abused and troubled 
Works Battalion also did magnificent work as long as it was here, and I wish very much I had 
another”.74 In Egypt, the British civil authorities fretted that the incident would awaken memories of 
the 1906 killings at Dinshawai and spark a nationalist backlash. This was averted through a policy of 
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In July 1915 the Egyptian labour force at the Dardanelles was augmented by an Egyptian Labour 
Corps. This numbered 1,152 labourers, recruited from the villages of Upper Egypt, and 10 British 
officers, described as “private gentlemen specially qualified by their occupation in Egypt to 
understand and handle Egyptian labourers”.76 Its commander, Major Hicks Paul, had long 
experience of administering agricultural estates in Egypt and earlier in 1915 had served as Inspector 
of a Section of the CTC. He thus combined practice of handling Egyptians in both a civilian and 
quasi-military context. The ELC returned to Egypt after the evacuation of the Gallipoli beachheads 
in January 1916. It then expanded rapidly as manual labourers constructed the railway and water 
pipeline which accompanied Murray’s advance through Sinai. By the end of April 1916 its strength 
had grown to 42 officers and 9000 men. A formal structure of recruitment replaced the hitherto “ad 
hoc” system that had relied on the collaboration of specialists such as Hicks and other members of 
the British commercial community.77 
Demands for labour continued to increase as the logistical network became more complex and the 
lines of communication lengthened. In July 1916, 3,800 labourers dug trenches and generally 
buttressed the fortifications at Romani against the anticipated Ottoman charge which came on 
4 August. This figure represented the maximum number who could be supplied with water, to the 
chagrin of Murray who had ordered the dispatch of 5,000 and ordered a report as to why the 
remaining 1,200 had been held back.78 Nevertheless, Murray was satisfied with their prowess, 
remarking that “I feel it would have been perfectly impossible for Territorial troops in this area to 
have accomplished one-twentieth of the work these Egyptians have done”.79 
The exact strength of the ELC has been a matter of dispute between the official British sources and 
Egyptian historians: Nathan Brown quotes a British estimate of half a million alongside an Egyptian 
estimate “two or three times that number”.80 All labourers were recruited on three-month contracts, 
except those serving overseas in France and Mesopotamia, who enlisted for six months. This meant 
that one-third of the force had to be replaced each month.81 This high turnover has made it very 
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difficult to calculate the overall statistic of men who served, as an unknown number re-enlisted, and 
the precise figure may never be known. Official Foreign Office data show that the levels of 
Egyptians working for the ELC rose steadily: these correspond roughly to the official sum of 
100,002 labourers in November 1918, which included all ELC men performing duties overseas as 
well as 6,406 skilled men assisting in the units.82 The British authorities were careful not to 
publicise the extent of Egyptian involvement in the war effort, in light of the 1914 Proclamation and 
nationalist unease at the scale of their participation. In September 1918, Cheetham informed Balfour 
that “the figures have, for obvious military reasons, never been published, and are quite unknown to 
the public”. Cheetham added that “it has recently been thought advisable to contradict exaggerated 
rumours to the effect that several hundred thousand Egyptians had been sent across the Canal”.83 
Enlistment in the ELC was nominally voluntary, and overall responsibility for raising the amount of 
men rested with a network of British District Recruiting Officers. At this level, direct British 
supervision of the system of recruitment ended as control shifted to a class of intermediate 
collaborating groups. These utilised existing methods of state penetration of rural society as 
Egyptian agents in each sub-district worked with the village headmen (ʿumdeh) to enrol the 
labourers. Initially, the rates of pay – 5 Piastres per day for service within Egypt and 8 for service 
overseas – compared favourably with the prevailing agricultural wage rate, which was lower in 
1916.84 It was in the villages of rural Egypt, far from official gaze, that the abuses and compulsion 
which engendered so much indignation occurred. British officials blamed the “natural venality” of 
Egyptian ones for practices such as the acceptance by agents of bribes for exemption from service 
from those willing and able to pay, while imposing effective conscription on all others.85 
Significantly, the village headmen succeeded in deflecting the rural backlash against these abuses of 
authority by ascribing them to “tyrannical” British demands for men. As a result, one British 
administrator in Cairo acknowledged that “while we were winning the war, we were losing the 
fellahin”, long considered the bedrock of British rule in Egypt, as in India.86 
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After mid-1917, the intensification of recruitment, increasing exposure of labourers to shell-fire and 
deployment in an offensive campaign in Ottoman Palestine multiplied the plethora of rural 
grievances. Although the measures taken in May 1917 temporarily boosted enlistment, the 
inexorable rise in military requirements for labour resulted in another crisis in May 1918. This 
happened as contracting fell from 6,000 per week in February to 4,000 per week in March and 1,800 
per week in April when the start of the wheat harvest increased the opportunity cost of servicing. 
The general reluctance to enlist was compounded by stories of sickness and hardship from returning 
labourers and an outbreak of cholera in southern Palestine in January 1918. Meanwhile, news of the 
great German offensive on the Western Front on 21 March reached Egypt alongside rumours that 
hundreds of Egyptian labourers had been killed when the German assault broke through Fifth 
Army’s front-lines at Saint-Quentin. 
These declining returns led to the final collapse of the system of voluntary work. On 1 May, Allenby 
informed Wingate that “recruiting has… now become so unsatisfactory and shows every inclination 
to remain so that it is of the utmost importance to reconsider the question of compulsion”.87 With 
Wingate and both the Sultan and Prime Minister adamantly opposed to the introduction of 
conscription, the High Commission adopted a scheme of “administrative pressure”. This involved 
the requisitioning of labour from the villages, working through the hierarchical structure of the 
provincial governors (mudīr) and village headmen (ʿumdeh).88 Within the High Commission itself it 
was rather euphemistically referred to as “compulsory volunteering”.89 
The new policies led to “various regrettable incidents” taking place, almost daily in late-May, June 
and July in rural provinces, as opposition to them mounted.90 They included attacks on village 
officials and policemen attempting to round up “volunteers” for the labour units. The British blamed 
the disturbances on the ʿumdeh, whom they suspected of resorting to corrupt methods to collect 
men. In particular, they believed that the new measures “brought to a head long standing differences 
between village factions”.91 One Political Officer reported how “Junior Officials, ʿOmdehs and 
Sheikhs used it as a weapon against their personal enemies, as well as for the purposes of extortion”. 
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In this manner, the system of “compulsory volunteering” became a haven of “favouritism and 
baksheesh” that was “allowed to drift into a means of oppression of the poor and helpless”.92 
The second action to destabilise rural Egypt was, between May 1917 and November 1918, Egyptian 
railway being expropriated for military purposes. Thus the civilian lines were used to provide 
minimum subsistence to the civilian population. This created a massive overstretching on the 
connection between agricultural production and the railway network, as it was strained to its limit. 
Before 1914, the virtual absence of wheeled traffic, added to restricted routes of inland waterways, 
meant that the Egyptian State Railway (ESR) system was employed extensively for moving cash 
crops (such as cotton) to the ports for export, and collecting sugar, cereal, forage and other 
foodstuffs from agricultural districts and distributing them to the various centres of consumption 
around the country.93 
The exploitation of Egyptian railway resources was first raised in July 1916 when the Foreign Office 
ordered the civilian authorities in Egypt to render all possible assistance to the construction of the 
desert railway across the Sinai.94 The diversion of railways to military usage accelerated sharply in 
May 1917 after Murray identified them – along with manpower – as the two areas where Egypt 
could intensify its general contribution to the war effort.95 This led to the transfer of a dangerously 
high proportion of Egyptian railway resources to satiate the voracious demands of the military 
railway track as it extended further into Palestine. 
By October 1917, 5400 wagons were in permanent military use. Only 3600 remained for supplying 
food and goods to the civil population96 and Wingate warned the military authorities that the system 
had been reduced to its minimum subsistence.97 The Director of ESR, Sir George Macauley, replied 
that the country could still be nourished, but a considerable dislocation of traffic in goods would 
occur in 1918 and continue into any post-war period.98 The Foreign Office advised Wingate that 
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military requirements justified “such sacrifices as would be entailed upon the Egyptian commercial 
population”, unaware that their policies were creating food shortages in the cities and conditions of 
severe deprivation in the countryside.99 The effects of this were made clear in March 1919, when 
railway lines became one of the targets of the rural violence as peasants sought to evade state orders 
for their meagre stocks of food and fodder. 
The third element of dislocation was the large-scale extraction of agricultural resources to provide 
for the EEF in the Sinai and Palestine. Vast quantities of food and fodder were called for to feed the 
men and animals over and above the civilian population of Egypt. Fodder was initially brought over 
from India, but it was a bulky item which took up scarce shipping space. From 1916 the shipping 
shortage made it desirable to obtain sources locally in Egypt, and in 1917-18 Egyptian fodder was 
used to meet needs in Palestine and Mesopotamia as well.100 Insufficient amounts were forthcoming 
on the open market so fodder was secured by means of appropriation and forced purchasing from 
rural producers.101  
The extraction of foodstuffs was according to a similar pattern as initial acquisitions on the open 
market were followed by the imposition of a formal commandeering apparatus. This new method of 
distributing food and other local resources between civilian and military requirements altered 
traditional farming convention. The Resources Board which formed in 1915 to equip the 
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force with provisions evolved into the Supplies Commission in 1916 
before being replaced by a Controller of Supplies late in 1917. However this only lasted until 
March1918 when a Supplies Control Board was established.102 The Supplies Control Board 
represented a comprehensive attempt to channel all agricultural activity towards the prosecution of 
the war. It fixed maximum prices for cereals, meat and other commodities, was responsible for 
maintaining stocks in the larger cities, and for collecting Army supplies direct from the cultivators. 
In practice, this amounted to requisitioning in all but name, as local officials regularly seized crops 
as “contributions” and all farmers were forced to sell their produce to the government at prices fixed 
below market rates.103 Once again, Elgood retrospectively acknowledged that “of all forms of 
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control… few were guilty of more profound or more costly mistakes than those which dealt with 
food”.104 
These agricultural policies failed to make Egypt self-sufficient in food. Shipments of grain from 
India continued to make up for shortfalls in local availability, and Cairo and Alexandria suffered 
from acute food shortages in 1917-18. Prices of foodstuffs soared as the military competed with 
civilians for sparse commodities, and wheat consumption fell dramatically from an average of 
95.9 kg/capita in 1913 to 61.7 kg/capita in 1918.105 Usage of other crops also dropped by between 3 
and 10%, and late in 1918 the food deficiencies extended to the countryside as peasants refused to 
sell to the Supplies Control Board and began to hoard grain for their own consumption.106 By 
November 1918, every facet of the agricultural system in Egypt had been penetrated by the British 
authorities. Military demands for food, fodder, man and animal power and rolling stock led to the 
disruption of pre-1914 agricultural patterns. The artificial restriction of prices denied cultivators the 
opportunity to share in the soaring wartime prices, while the constraints on the cultivation of cotton 
marked the regression of Egyptian agriculture from a highly-developed commercial economy to that 
of a planned economy. 
The Breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian Economic System 
The paucity of gearing a peasant economy to modern, industrialised warfare was continually 
exposed. India, the main supply base for the campaign in Mesopotamia, had similar problems: 
military demands for man and animal power, food and fodder made the civil authorities to question 
the very foundations of their rule by Britain. In Egypt, as in India before it, the British were initially 
reluctant to penetrate downwards to satisfy their war needs through relying on rural society.107 Bitter 
memories of previous social backlashes against the imposition of heavy taxation on the peasantry in 
India in 1857 and Egypt in 1882 reinforced this view. So it was that military demands for Egyptian 
resources were not burdensome in the early days. 
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In 1915, the main supply base for the Dardanelles was constructed at Alexandria and stocks were 
drawn from the pre-1914 Army of Occupation peacetime depots at Cairo and Alexandria.108 In 
October 1914, Egypt’s role as a centre for operations in the eastern Mediterranean expanded as it 
took on responsibility for equipping the four infantry divisions dispatched to Salonika. The supply 
base at Alexandria was re-organised into the Levant Base under direct War Office control. The 
Egyptian Government established a local Resources Board that entered into contracts for all district 
supply purchasing. This eased tensions in relations between the military and civilian communities 
which had blighted society earlier in 1915 when the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and the 
Force in Egypt had contended on the open market for the same resources.109 
It was Murray’s advance across the Sinai and his army’s offensive campaigns in Palestine which led 
to a radical and long-lasting increase in military demands on the civilian population of Egypt.110 
This was exacerbated by a growing shipping crisis as losses from German and Austro-Hungarian  
U-boats mounted during 1916. Losses were particularly critical in the Mediterranean and seriously 
interfered with the transport of provisions from the United Kingdom. In June, Sir John Cowans, the 
Quartermaster-General at the War Office, insisted that local resources be used as much as 
possible.111 By December, the position had worsened still. The General Staff in London admitted 
that in the case of Egypt “we are faced with a situation which amounts practically to a break-down 
in our shipping arrangements…We have, in fact, reached a stage where the available shipping is 
inadequate to meet requirements”.112 
A wider intensification of the Imperial war effort in 1916 had much to do with the decision to use 
local resources that year. The flagging Egyptian and Indian wartime contributions had been harshly 
criticised by officials in London, with many considering that Cairo and Delhi were not doing enough 
to help win the war. In June 1916 the very influential Middle East diplomatic adviser Sir Mark 
Sykes put forward a memorandum to the War Committee saying that “civil policy in Egypt since the 
beginning of the war has been business as usual. There has been a steady effort to carry on the 
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administration as though very little was afoot…this has produced a deadening of energy and a 
defensive or passive atmosphere…”113 The Proclamation of November 1914 is often described as 
something which limited the ability of the British to alter their foreign policy to adapt to changed 
circumstances, but this theory has been downplayed by Sykes. Sir Reginald Wingate, who took over 
from McMahon as commissioner on 1 January admitted in May 1917 that other countries had in fact 
contributed more than Egypt to the war effort. However, Wingate said the Egypt input was “by no 
means negligible…within the limits of His Majesty’s Government’s assurance…and by the 
requirements of the local political situation”. It was on 21 May 1917 that the issue of Egypt’s 
participation in the war effort came to a head. William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff in London, sent a telegraph to Murray to ask “whether in your opinion, Egypt is contributing to 
the fullest extent possible”. Robertson told Murray that: “It is essential that all parts of the Empire 
should share the strain as far as local conditions admit.” This was proof that the November 1914 
Proclamation prohibited a more dynamic involvement in the war effort, but Robertson said: “As 
regards Egypt, I am not satisfied that this is the case.”114 Murray’s repeated failures to break through 
into Gaza by May 1917 showed how important it was to devise a complex logistical network of 
advanced bases and light railway lines so as to maintain a force of three infantry divisions, initially, 
and then seven infantry and three cavalry divisions in southern Palestine. Robertson raised concerns 
which were shared by all the military authorities in Egypt at the widening gap between the 
increasing military requirements for labour and the decreasing numbers of men enlisting voluntarily 
for the various labour units and auxiliary corps and services became evident. 
A discussion of the general use of manpower and the scale of Egypt’s proper part in the war effort 
was also brought up by Robertson’s telegraph. On 22 May, Murray warned Wingate that: “There 
can be no doubt that Egypt is not feeling the strain of the war.”115 The High Commissioner 
responded to this by reaffirming the principle of the November 1914 Proclamation. Wingate 
reminded Murray that the need to maintain a compliant and stable Egypt represented a “strong 
argument against conscription and the mobilisation, in a European sense, of the country’s 
resources”.116 Talks between the civil and military authorities in Egypt were similar to those taking 
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place between the Foreign Office and War Office in London. On 18 June 1917, Sir Ronald Graham, 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and the former Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in 
Cairo, told the Army Council that the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, considered that any change 
in the November 1914 Proclamation would be a mistake as it would justify the negative effect it 
would have on public opinion in Egypt.117 But the London War Office held a very different view – 
on 2 July, Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, informed Graham that the Proclamation 
represented “the chief stumbling block to the fuller development of the resources for the purposes of 
the war”.118 
Allenby, the dynamic new Commander-in-Chief arrived with a mandate from the Prime Minister 
ordering “such reinforcements and supplies as he found necessary” to take Jerusalem by 
Christmas.119 Allenby’s successful breakthrough in November 1917 and extension of expeditions 
into Palestine placed enormous strains on Egyptian resources to furnish the EEF and build the 
networks of roads and railways which connected the troops in Palestine to their supply bases in 
Egypt. The extraction of the resources necessarily involved the British in unprecedented downward 
mobilisation. The agricultural cycle and the delicate balance between civil and military requisites 
were all drastically altered, so ensuring that the war led to the rapid politicisation of all levels and 
sectors of society in Egypt.120 
Wartime demands for logistical supplies involved a deeper infiltration by the British into Egyptian 
society and an intensification of the exploitation of local resources. Similar processes occurred in the 
territories which came under British control in Mesopotamia, and in India which remained the 
supply base for that campaign. In each region, the mobilisation of local resources led to a situation 
of acute penury that affected rural and urban socio-economic groups. These included conditions of 
near-famine121 brought about by the forced purchasing of crops in 1918, inflationary pressures that 
resulted from the scarcity of food and other commodities such as coal and cotton seed, and service 
in the military labour units. In Egypt, these measures gradually evolved into “a means of oppression 
 
117Sir Ronald Graham to the Secretary of the Army Council, 18 June 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA. 
118Lord Derby to Graham, 2 July 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA. 
119David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, London, Oldhams Press, 1938, volume 2, p.1090. 
120Yapp, op. cit., The Making of the Modern Near East, p.295.  
121Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1900-1948’ in Antony Best (ed.), An International 
History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond, 2nd ed., Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2008, p.111. 
Chapter Three: Prelude to the 1919 Revolution: How Britain’s “Informal Imperialism” was replaced by 
the “War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict 
 
155 
of the poor and helpless” which contributed greatly to the alienation of the peasantry hitherto 
considered the “keystone of the British occupation”.122 
In summary, in 1919 the peasantry identified the principal reason for their grievances as “covert” 
British rule.123 Even Chirol, a passionate imperialist, highlights the hardship felt not only by the 
peasantry but also by the urban working-classes: 
[I]n Egypt, as in every other country, all the conditions of life, and especially 
the enormous rise in prices, had produced a wave of social unrest which took 
many different forms. [...] For the rise in wages, considerable as it had been, 
had often not kept pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very 
necessities of life. This was the case amongst the landless labourers in the 
rural districts, and still more in the urban centres, where the lower classes – 
workmen, carters, cab-drivers, shopkeepers, and a host of minor employees 
– were hard put to it to make both ends meet.124 
Chirol even goes as far as showing some understanding for the use of violence by the peasantry to 
express their suffering: 
The British Occupation has taught them for the first time in their history that 
the fellah too has rights, and Nationalism has recently taught them that 
violence is at least excusable in the assertion of grievances. An agrarian 
movement, if once started under the pressure of economic distress, might 
easily assume against the landlords the same disorderly character of violence 
as the anti-British rising last year.125 
In the same vein, Safran explains how railway lines and telegraph poles were listed among 
legitimate symbols of British rule which could be attacked.126 This is also emphasised in Carman’s 
article, “England and the Egyptian Problem”: 
Before the war was two years old martial law had completely overshadowed 
civil authority; requisitioning of supplies and forced recruiting of labour 
alienated the agricultural masses which had hitherto been loyal.127 
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The radicalisation of these disparate groups was matched by a second significant development in 
1919. This was the British authorities’ attempt to legitimise their wartime powers and extend them 
into the immediate post-war period. On 7 November 1918, the Anglo-French Declaration promised 
to assist in “the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and 
Mesopotamia”.128 Although Wingate informed the Sultan that Egypt was “in an entirely different 
situation” and not covered by the Declaration, it nevertheless gave impetus to Egyptian demands 
that they be allowed to place their case for self-government before the international community at 
the post-war peace conference.129 So too did news that a delegation from the Hedjaz, led by Prince 
Faisal bin Hussein, would travel to Paris. 
These two strands came together between November 1918 and March 1919 to form the prelude to 
the outbreak of the revolt. In November 1918, the Brunyate Commission proposed to replace the 
1911 legislative machinery with a bicameral legislature which would, for the first time, bring 
Egypt’s foreign communities into the legislative process. This discontended native civil servants and 
lawyers,130 so far two of the most important collaborative props on which British rule rested and 
whose continued cooperation was essential to the daily administration of Egypt.131 
Also in November, the Foreign Office refused two requests, from Prime Minister Hussein Rushdi 
and nationalist politician Saʿad Zaghlul, to travel to London and place their case for Egyptian 
autonomy before ministers in advance of the Peace Conference. Balfour ruled that “no useful 
purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance 
immoderate demands which cannot be entertained”.132 
Beyond “Drawing Room” Nationalism 
Egyptian politicians felt that their loyal participation in the war effort entitled them to be involved in 
the negotiations on the future of the Ottoman Empire.133 Rushdi resigned on 5 December in protest 
 
128See Elizabeth Monroe, Philby of Arabia, London, Faber, 1973, p.95 for the full text of the Anglo-French Declaration. 
129Wingate to Balfour, 5 December 1917, FO 371/3204, TNA. 
130As the Wafdists made their bid for power, the reaction of the Egyptian workers was largely according to ethnic lines. 
Greeks, for example, remained extremely loyal to the British. The French were detached, if sympathetic to nationalist 
aspirations, while Italians were broadly active supporters of the Wafd. 
131Yapp, op. cit., p.295. 
132‘Summary of Events in Egypt from November 1918 to April 1919’, 17 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA. 
133Harding Papers, Vol. 4, 28 December 1918, Wingate to Harding, CUL. 
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at London’s “interpretation of the meaning of the protectorate with which he could not agree”. 
Meanwhile, Zaghlul’s delegation (the Wafd) drew up a constitution declaring their intention to seek 
the “absolute independence of Egypt” through “peaceful and lawful means”.134 
Consequently it was the Wafd’s ability to broaden its appeal beyond the educated urban elite which 
marked the real break with the past and shook British policy to its core. The politicisation of 
Egyptian society enabled them to tap into and mobilise popular support. This was a reaction to the 
more visible and penetrative nature of British interference in Egyptian affairs during the war. The 
wartime political economy served to heighten public awareness of the effects of British decisions on 
their lives. It provided disaffected elements and local elites with an external scapegoat on which they 
could rightly blame their hardships.135 Furthermore, the active participation of native lawyers and 
civil servants stripped the British of their two most important local allies and created the power 
vacuum which temporarily paralysed the working of the state after the first strike wave erupted on 
9 March. 
In rural Egypt, disgruntled civil servants and lawyers played an important role in transmitting 
Wafdist ideals to provincial towns. Labour social clubs and organisations such as the newly-
reconstituted Manual Trade Workers Union spread the activist message beyond the realms of the 
educated elite.136 A broad range of socio-economic groups mobilised in an uneasy alliance between 
the aristocratic leadership in Cairo who struggled to control and channel the inarticulate fervour of 
the urban and rural masses which followed them.137 For the peasants who targeted symbols of 
British authority such as railway lines and telegraph poles, their action was primarily motivated by 
dissatisfaction with the wartime sufferings imposed by the military demands for their resources, 
labour and animals as well as a desire to protect scarce supplies from further degradation.138 
The Wafd’s achievement was to combine the nationalism of ideals espoused by the educated urban 
elite with the social and economic effects of Egyptian implication in the war effort. This was a 
significant new development which, in the words of one contemporary British official, meant that: 
 
134‘Summary of Events in Egypt from November 1918 to April 1919’, 17 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA. 
135Yapp, op. cit., p.297. 
136Beinin & Lockman, op. cit., Workers on the Nile, p.88. 
137Vatikiotis, op. cit., The Egyptian Army in Politics, p.23. 
138Safran, op. cit., p.103. 
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“For the first time these two naturally antagonistic classes are united in having grievances.”139 
Zaghlul fused the backlash of the educated urban intelligentsia and nationalist elite at British 
attempts to extend their temporary wartime powers into the post-war world with the wide range of 
hardships that faced almost every social and economic grouping in Egypt. 
The mobilisation of Egyptian man and animal power made possible the conduct of modern warfare 
in a pre-industrial setting. It made a formidable contribution toward the creation of a logistical 
network that maintained the EEF over a line of communication which eventually linked the Suez 
Canal to Aleppo on 31 October 1918. Nevertheless, the demand for military labour involved the 
British authorities in unprecedented downward mobilisation into rural Egypt. It both built upon and 
utilised the existing Ottoman pattern, but interfered with agricultural schemes in a fundamentally 
different manner as agriculture had become a year-round activity by 1914. The impact of wartime 
agricultural policies fell variously on large landowners, who resented the restrictions on cotton 
cultivation that prevented them from sharing in record prices after 1916, and on small peasants, who 
suffered from the requisitioning of their animals and fodder. Wingate defended these policies and 
stated that the British authorities had been preoccupied with doing “all in their power to help in 
winning the war”.140 
The negative legacy of rural mobilisation was one of considerable hardships that hardened into 
resentment against the British presence as countryside Egyptians came into contact with direct 
British control for the first time.141 Their politicisation mirrored that of many other strata within 
Egyptian society as a result of the war, and ensured that they were no longer immune to the 
“drawing room” nationalism of the urban and educated intelligentsia.142 
The mass slaughter and devastation of infrastructure caused by the First World War had created an 
urge for global change. The old order of Imperial powers was in crisis, and nationalists 
acknowledged this as an opportunity to challenge it. Their masters’ claim to represent superior 
societies appeared particularly weak. European nations with expansive empires had used up masses 
of resources to prosecute the war, and the veneer of martial invincibility that once surrounded them 
 
139‘Memorandum by Mr Mallaby Firth, Department of Antiquities’, 7 April 1919, FO 407/184, TNA. 
140‘Rough Notes by Sir R. Wingate on Sir W. Willcocks’s proposals’, no date but March 1919, FO 371/3714, TNA. 
141Brown, op. cit., p.203.  
142‘Enclosure by William Willcocks – Memorandum, giving the opinion of a very friendly and reliable Egyptian on the 
situation today’, 4 March 1919, FO 371/3714, TNA. 
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had vanished. Moreover, those who had assisted the colonialists in their conflicts as subjects – 
including risking their own lives and losing fellow countrymen – felt they should be repaid with a 
greater stake in running their own affairs domestically as well as on the international stage. 
Failing economies contributed to the bleakness of the immediate post-war period, as, between 1918 
and early 1919, those in countries such as Egypt saw rays of light in Wilson’s idealistic rhetoric 
about self-determination and a new world order. This is the reason why his “Wilsonian Moment” 
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The concept of “self-determination” that had such an abiding influence on the 1919 Egyptian 
Revolution has its roots in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s political discourse during the period 1903 to 
1917. A liberal, conservative version of the Russian leader’s radical, Marxist ideas was then placed 
in the international arena by American President Woodrow Wilson, at the end of the First World 
War, and during the post-war era when attempts were made at moulding a new world order. 
Since 1917, the debate about self-determination mainly took place using the language of law and 
international diplomacy.1 In this chapter, we will also examine it as social history, demonstrating 
how it legitimised a dynamic force for hugely significant changes around the world.2 Both Lenin 
and Wilson effectively combined to promote the term “self-determination” internationally as it was 
projected into routine political discourse, especially with regard to the creation of new states, and the 
re-organisation of former empires.3 The League of Nations was to evoke “self-determination” during 
the Åland Crisis of the early 1920s, for example, when the population of the Åland Islands 
demanded an end to Finnish rule. Rather than self-determination per se, Finland allowed measures 
securing political and cultural autonomy 4 and the League of Nations ruled that these were enough to 
protect the Swedish language and culture which those living in the islands wanted. By June 1945 
delegates of 50 nations had met in San Francisco to incorporate the “equal rights and self-
determination of peoples” in the new UN Charter, the founding document of the United Nations. 
 
1See Quentin Skinner ‘The Idea of a Cultural Lexicon’, pp.158-174 in Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1, 2002. On legitimation in international affairs see also Ian Hurd, 
‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, pp.379–408, 
at p.393. For a legal approach, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch’, European Journal 
of International Law, vol. 8, 1997, pp.566-582, and especially Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Recorded oral 
pronouncements and written documents (including diplomatic, legal and political ones) all make up the “discourse” 
referred to in this chapter.  
2This chapter follows the intellectual and social history methodology of the “Cambridge School” historian Quentin 
Skinner, as outlined in his seminal article ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ in History and Theory, 
Vol. 8, no. 1, 1969, pp.3-53. We will, in particular, be applying Skinner’s framework to demonstrate how specific ideas 
and terms of expressions are used in international discussions to legitimise concepts. Skinner argues that references of 
political thinking require legitimation. In turn, they are “inhibited” by the need for this legitimisation. On all this see 
Skinner’s History and Theory as well as Skinner’s highly influential publications on theoretical principles, which are 
compiled in Visions of Politics.  
3On this precise aspect, see the analytical work of the scholar Rita Augestad Knudsen, along with her more general study 
of the concept of “self-determination” as it relates to the idea of freedom in 20th and 21st century international discourse 
in her unpublished doctoral thesis: Moments of Self-determination: The Concept of “Self- determination” and the Idea of 
Freedom in 20th and 21st Century International Discourse, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2013.  
4Marvin W. Mikesell and Alexander B. Murphy, ‘A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority-Group Aspirations’, 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 81, no. 4, 1991, p.597. 
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Wilson and Lenin had both always had very different views as to what self-determination actually 
meant, and each played a crucial role in triggering a global argument on the subject. Woodrow 
Wilson’s general idea about “self-determination” was, in summary, a liberal conservative one, while 
Lenin’s was a radical socialist one. Diplomacy in the early Twentieth Century became focused on 
“self-determination” as a concept that could be used to justify policy. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the 
Russian Bolshevik leader, spent fourteen years between 1903 and 1917 theorising it, and then it was 
American President Woodrow Wilson who globalised it as a “legitimising” ideal. There is no doubt 
that Wilson was on many occasions responding to Lenin’s work. In this chapter, we will analyse the 
pronouncements of both men, and how they both helped to create an “international self-
determination moment”– one that would have resounding repercussions for the Egyptian nationalist 
movement. 
Accordingly, this chapter will start by exploring the ideological and theoretical chasm between 
Lenin and Wilson’s respective interpretations of “self-determination”. What both leaders thought of 
freedom was central to their discourse on self-determination: each wanted to justify and legitimise 
their own definitions in relation to liberty. Lenin stressed how “self-determination” was a radical 
idea: one that projected freedom as equality. If pursued, it would lead to complete political freedom, 
and the creation of new, independent states equal in status with other states and systems. Lenin was 
arguing for “self-determination” in the context of socialist internationalism – one that included the 
possibility of violent revolution. This made for a more restricted definition of the term, based on 
factors that were not to become internationally prevalent. Wilson also wanted to legitimise “self-
determination” in the context of freedom. Although his reference to “self-determination” was 
ambiguous and potentially difficult to implement, it was markedly different to that envisaged by 
Lenin. While the Russian’s “radical” stance has given prominence to equality in international 
debate, Wilson’s “liberal-conservative” idea of freedom has instead insisted on the values of peace 
and stability. The American President seldom evoked the term “self-determination” specifically, but 
implied it as a conditional form of political freedom – a notion that guaranteed non-interference with 
existing borders and orders. The political results of framing “self-determination” in such a way have 
been advantageous to those upholding the status quo. As Lenin’s work, Wilson’s discourse set terms 
of reference that would be used repeatedly at key historical junctures in the future. But, as will be 
demonstrated, even though Wilson had used the terminology of “self-determination” far less than 
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Lenin and in a far more elusive manner, it was his liberal-conservative interpretation that was to 
have great impact and long-lasting influence on the world. 
This chapter will also, in turn, focus on Lenin’s and then Wilson’s use of the rhetoric of “self-
determination”, and place it in its historical perspective. Ideas popularly associated with “self-
determination” – such as sovereignty, freedom and legitimacy – had been debated for centuries, but 
it was Lenin and Wilson who brought the term per se to international prominence, resorting to 
precise language that took on immense significance for the future of the world. In short, “self-
determination” became a crucial reference point in global diplomacy thanks to both Lenin and 
Wilson. This was at a time of turbulence, involving cataclysmic world events including the First 
World War and Revolutions in Russia. Conflict resolution, and indeed conflict prevention, 
underpinned the idea of “self-determination”, and the most destructive war in human history (to 
date) gave the need to get the concept right added urgency. The perception was also that the pre-War 
era had been wracked by corrupt, unjust systems that did nothing to alleviate the condition of 
subjugated peoples. 
Lenin and Wilson both endeavoured to alter the overwhelming negativity of the war into a catalyst 
for change, following which a new, enlightened world would emerge. The notion of “self-
determination” was, for both men, integral to this, even though their versions of self-determination 
differed as much as their overall political ideologies. Both men were determined to use this rhetoric 
along with their own frameworks to win over international audiences. However, this chapter will 
conclude by demonstrating that it was Wilson’s “self-determination” vocabulary which had the 
more direct effect in practice. In particular, it will show how the Egyptian nationalists had studied 
Wilson’s parlance in detail and consequently saw the promises of the post-war era as an opportunity 
to break away from British colonial rule. 
The “Leninist Moment”: Lenin’s Radical Socialist Interpretation of Self-Determination 
Lenin produced numerous publications between 1903 and 1917 about the “right of nations to self-
determination”.5 Marxist thinking always informed his work, with discourse on “self-determination” 
 
5The principal reference to Lenin and other Marxists is the Marxists Internet Archive (MIA): www.marxists.org. The 
website has digitalised the version of Lenin’s collected works originally printed by Progress Publishers, Moscow. The 
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at this time mainly occurring in debates about the “National Question” that raged between Lenin and 
his fellow socialists. Soon, the First World War would have a far greater influence on Lenin’s 
stances on “self-determination”. 
At the start of the 1903-1917 period, Lenin’s party was relatively obscure and thus he and his 
comrades were not constrained by the pressure of having to formulate views for a wider audience 
(as Wilson would be). Lenin and the Bolsheviks were then not in a position to implement any 
policies either, meaning they could push theoretical arguments without worrying about any real 
world consequences. This was a time when there was no “standard” socialist view of the national 
question.6 Karl Marx and the first Socialist International (1866) had instead left the problem of 
reconciling Marxism with nationalism unresolved. A major problem for both Marx and the Socialist 
International had been dealing with socialism’s focus on class being the main dynamic of political 
behaviour and the notion of national solidarity. This made the entire subject of self-determination a 
controversial one. Marxist thinkers were not intent on defining the nation precisely – they only 
referred loosely to “nations”7 – but they saw these units as being bound up in the concept of self-
determination. 
Lenin viewed the “national question” and “self-determination” as components of the same problem. 
When Lenin first began making pronouncements about “self-determination”, the exact link between 
national liberation and socialist liberation was not established. Later, the First World War provided 
the reason for internal socialist discussions and works about “self-determination” to be elevated to 
political theories about pressing world affairs. Thus Lenin’s original writings on “self-
determination” made reference to specific issues including the position of different nationalities 
within the Russian Empire,8 and he subsequently applied his views on “self-determination” to the 
 
first publication dates of his discourses are cited below, along with where they can be found online. Russian language 
mentions follow the website’s standard referencing.  
6Marxist interpretations of nationalism are contained in John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1982, pp.21-28. See also Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist Leninist Theory and 
Strategy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984.  
7Stalin did, however, analyse the concepts that make up a “nation” in ‘Marxism and the National Question’, see below, 
Prosveshcheniye, nos. 3-5, March–May 1913.  
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm. 
8E.g. Lenin, ‘The National Question in Our Programme’, Iskra, no. 44, 15 July 1903. 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1903/jul/15.htm (this discussion is reproduced verbatim in Lenin, Collected 
Works, Vol. 6, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, pp.454-463, but we will cite hereafter MIA references when 
possible); Lenin, ‘The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905–1907’, Zhizn i 
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First World War, and related subjects such as Imperialism. So it was that terminology of “self-
determination” began to appear in the literature of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party 
(RSDLP or “the party”), including the Marxist group’s resolutions dating from 1903.9 This was the 
year that polemics on national groups within Russia became particularly focused in socialist circles. 
However, “self-determination” was still more to do with highly competitive theoretical exchanges 
about ideology within the party,10 rather than being about tangible political action. 
The necessity of establishing a new political order in Russia was naturally one that motivated the 
discussions of revolutionary socialists imbued in Marxist thinking. Their debates on “self-
determination” became more intense as the promise of power beckoned. As Lenin jostled for 
influence within his party, and indeed leadership of the RSDLP, he was intent on offering a rigorous 
definition of “self-determination” that would legitimise his arguments. Lenin was not in Russia for 
much of the early 1900s (he mainly remained in Munich, London and Geneva) but he followed his 
country’s progress intently from abroad, writing all the time about its politics, and applying his 
doctrine to the situation there. 
The Bloody Sunday massacre of protestors in St Petersburg in January 1905 triggered Revolution in 
Russia – one which the Tsar would survive.11 As Lenin encouraged the Bolsheviks to take part in 
violent attacks on those in authority,12 he adopted slogans such as “armed insurrection”, “mass 
terror”, and “the expropriation of gentry land”. This led to accusations from the Mensheviks, the 
non-Bolshevik wing of the party, that Lenin was deviating from orthodox Marxism.13 By the time of 
 
Znaniye, 1917, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1907/agrprogr and Lenin, ‘Critical Remarks on the 
National Question’, Prosveshcheniye, nos. 10–12, 1913, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/crnq/index.htm.  
For sources on political action by minorities in Russia during this period, see e.g. Rex A. Wade, The Bolshevik 
Revolution and Russian Civil War, Westwood, CT, Greenwood Press, 2001, p.87; David R. Marples, Lenin’s 
Revolution: Russia, 1917–1921, Essex, Pearson Education, 2000, p.5; Edward Acton, Rethinking the Russian 
Revolution, New York, Routledge, 1990, p.145.  
9The terminology of “self-determination” also appeared in RSDLP resolutions of 1913 and 1917. In this chapter, “the 
party” will refer to Lenin’s socialist party, regardless of its actual name at any point in time. The RSDLP was also 
known as the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party or the Russian Social Democratic Party; it was later on called 
the “Bolshevik” party, and then, following the birth of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
10James Mayall, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Twentieth Century Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.115 – also implying that efforts 
to advance “self-determination” had more to with pragmatic political calculations, rather than doctrinal beliefs. 
11Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p.44; Christopher Rice, Lenin: Portrait of a 
Professional Revolutionary, London, Cassell, 1990, pp.86–88; Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography, London, Macmillan, 
2000, p.167. 
12Fischer, op. cit., pp.44-45; Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution: 1899–1919, London, Collins Harvill, 1990, pp.362-
363; Rice, op. cit., pp.88-89. 
13Service, op. cit., pp.170-171. 
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the February 1917 Revolution, which prompted Lenin’s return to Russia, and the subsequent 
October Revolution when the Bolsheviks took complete power, Lenin’s position within the party 
was by no means certain,14 even though he had sided fully with the Bolshevik majority of the party, 
rather than the Mensheviks in 1912.15 
It was during the fourteen years after 1903 that Lenin came to view “the right of nations to self- 
determination” as being of “utmost” and “specific importance”.16 Self-determination was a key part 
of the socialists’ organised discussions, when the party’s debating programme became inextricably 
intertwined with Lenin’s ascension to power.17 Lenin’s determinedly combative approach to politics 
was initially aimed at winning over colleagues, rather than stamping his mark on the world stage. 
His long-term view was to apply his political vision in Russia, and indeed the wider world, but he 
first needed to convince his party to support his ideas. Lenin always spoke publicly about “self-
determination” when he was fighting for control of his party, his country or – later – international 
domination.18 When, in 1917, Leon Trotsky became the Bolshevik Commissioner for Foreign 
Affairs, he said that Lenin “possessed the tenseness of striving towards his goal”.19 Lenin was 
always obsessed with any issue in hand, and immersed all of his being in the struggle to achieve his 




14See e.g. Christopher Read, Lenin: A Revolutionary Life, New York, Routledge, 2005, p.78; Stanley W. Page, Lenin 
and World Revolution, New York, New York University Press, 1959, p.353; Leon Trotsky, Lenin, London, George 
G. Harrap, 1925, pp.79-80; dates references follow the Julian calendar, used then. 
15See e.g. Neil Harding, ‘The Russian Revolution: an Ideology in Power’ in The Cambridge History, op. cit., pp.239-
266, especially p.242; Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, New York, Norton, Vol. I, 1978, 
pp.26, 37; Page, op. cit., p.4; Read, op. cit., p.73; Stephen J. Lee, Lenin and Revolutionary Russia, London, Routledge, 
2003, p.8.  
16Lenin, ‘To Alexandra Kollontai’, written after 19 March 1916, in Lenin, Lenin on the United States, New York, 
International Publishers, 1970, pp.138-139. See also Lenin, ‘The Discussion On Self-Determination Summed Up’, 
written in July 1916 and published in October 1916 in Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jul/x01.htm.  
For example, the Marxist debate on self-determination is discussed in Neil Harding, Lenin’s Political Thought, Chicago, 
IL, Haymarket Books, 2009, pp.298-299. 
17Lenin’s determined course to achieve power is documented in e.g. Service, op. cit., p.330; Rex A. Wade, The Russian 
Revolution, 1917, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.210; Read, op. cit., p.67; Lee, op. cit., p.25; 
Marples, op. cit., p.10.  
18See Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924, London, Pimlico Random House, 1996, 
pp.386, 388-389. 
19Trotsky, op. cit., pp.161-162, original emphasis. 
20Ibid. See also Carr, op. cit., p.23. 
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As with all his political arguments, Lenin tried to underpin his theory of “self-determination” with 
ideological correctness.21 He produced as much legitimising literature as possible to back up his 
cause that “self-determination” was an answer to the “national question”, including Karl Marx’s 
writings on nationality and nationalism22 and a report from the 1896 London Congress of the Second 
International.23 In 1914 Lenin wrote: “No one can seriously question the London resolution”.24 
Lenin used extracts from the German version of the Political Action Commission’s report from the 
London Congress to highlight how the Second International was in favour of “the full right of all 
nations to self-determination”.25 Through citing texts from organisations such as the Second 
International, Lenin was always trying to bolster his own standing, by making his ideas more 
appealing amongst his fellow party members.26 
Lenin believed that “self-determination” legitimised the freedom to secede and become a state, so as 
to be equal with other states.27 In essence, people could not be free unless they had the opportunity 
to choose full independence from a dominant nation. Without being granted that choice, countries 
would not be able to realise self-determination, nor indeed freedom.28 In 1913, an RSDLP resolution 
defined “self-determination” as “the right to secede and form independent states”. This was a 
testament to the party’s endorsement of Lenin’s stance.29 In practice, a party resolution stated that 
 
21See e.g. Lenin, op. cit., ‘The National Question’, 1903. Such issues are only briefly touched upon in works about 
Lenin’s political thought on self-determination, e.g. in Carr, op. cit., p.68; a relative exception is the following paper by 
Uriel Abulof, ‘We the Peoples? The Birth and Death of Self-determination’, Tel Aviv University and Princeton 
University Woodrow Wilson School, 2010. 
22See Joseph A. Petrus, ‘Marx and Engels on the National Question’, Journal of Politics, vol. 33, no. 3, 1971, pp.797-
824; Bill Bowring, ‘Marx, Lenin and Pashukanison Self-determination: Response to Robert Knox’, Historical 
Materialism, vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, pp.113-127. 
23See Dick Geary, ‘The Second International: Socialism and Social Democracy’ in The Cambridge History, op. cit., 
pp.219-243. 
24Lenin, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, written February-May 1914, published April-June 1914, 
Prosveshcheniye, nos. 4-6, p.451, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm.  
25Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914.  
26Also in Lenin’s ‘The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, written January-February 
1916, published in April 1916 in the magazine Vorbote, no. 2, in Russian in October 1916 in Sbornik Sotsial-
Demokrata, no. 1, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jan/x01.htm. 
27E.g. in Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914; Lenin, ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to 
Self-Determination’, written in German not earlier than October 16, vol. 29, 1915, published in Lenin Miscellany VI, 
1927, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/oct/16.htm; Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916; 
Lenin, ‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism’, written August–October 1916, published in Zvezda 
nos. 1-2, 1924, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/carimarx/index.htm. 
28Terms such as “independence”, “freedom” and “self-determination” are used interchangeably in e.g. Lenin, op. cit., 
The National Question and Lenin, op. cit., The Socialist Revolution.  
29Lenin, ‘Resolutions of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party 
Officials’, September 1913 in Notification and Resolutions of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials, Article 4, issued by the RSDLP Central Committee, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/sep/30b.htm. 
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“self-determination” meant “the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic 
method of deciding the question of secession”.30 Due to Lenin’s work on the concept, whenever 
“self-determination” was mentioned in future international contexts, the “default” way of 
implementing it would be equated with the creation of a new state, and as the position that had to be 
either approved or disapproved of. By declaring that “all nations” had the right to “self-
determination”, Lenin was also introducing equality as a key component. 
Lenin defined self-determination as an overwhelmingly “negative” concept in 1913, saying: 
“Combat all national oppression? Yes, of course! Fight for any kind of national development, for 
‘national culture’ in general? – Of course not”.31 Here, Lenin was introducing the wider theoretical 
context in which questions about nationality and self-determination would have to be solved.32 
Lenin’s interpretation of self-determination concentrated on the economic and political role the 
“nation” played as it developed into a socialist state. ‘The Right of Nations to Self-determination’, 
Lenin’s main discussion on the subject in 1914, stressed the marked contrast between the specific 
practice of self-determination in a particular case, and the unopposed right to self-determination as 
secession.33 There would always need to be a great deal of groundwork involved in considering 
whether an area should be granted independence based on self-determination. Lenin had, as early as 
1903, made an emphatic distinction between promoting a right to self-determination, and actual 
situations when peoples were demanding for the principle to be applied.34 So it was that Lenin 
decided that sometimes secessionist claims could be ignored, even if there was theoretical support 
for secession itself. 
Definite geopolitical, economic and historical conditions for a conceptual right to self-determination 
were laid out by Lenin between 1913 and 1916 in the context of a Marxist view of freedom – the 
same Marxist ideology around which he had expressed his general self-determination discourse. The 
requirements for self-determination and the “nation” were also rehearsed by Lenin as he suggested 
historical determinism played an important part in these contingencies. Sticking to the Marxist view,  
 
 
30Ibid., Article 5. 
31Lenin, op. cit., ‘Critical Remarks’, 1913. 
32See Michael V. Kryukov, ‘Self-determination from Marx to Mao’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 1996, 
pp.357; Gleb B. Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-determination in Soviet Foreign Policy, Moscow, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1964, pp.13-19.  
33Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914; Lenin, op. cit., ‘The National Question’, 1903. 
34Lenin, op. cit., ‘The National Question’, 1903. 
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Lenin argued that both nationalism and national identity were the results of a fixed phase of 
bourgeois capitalism.35 
Self-determination was part of capitalism’s historical dynamic and part of the national question, 
Lenin contended in ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ in 1914. This would concentrate 
on how self-determination needed to be examined as part of a capitalist period of history.36 More 
specifically, the point of history in which self-determination was being considered was crucial in 
deciding whether it would assist progress towards socialism. This 1914 work pinpointed two stages 
of capitalist development: the first was the collapse of feudalism and absolutism; the second was the 
creation of bourgeois-democratic societies, and the mass movements focused on nationalist concerns 
which followed. 
As it set out to “capture the home market”, capitalism needed the bourgeois class, while it organised 
itself into “politically united territories whose population speak a single language”. It was through 
these units that capitalism won over feudalism.37 It was this period of capitalism that saw all classes 
joining together to fight for “the rights of the nation”,38 Lenin argued. As this all inevitably 
progressed towards the socialist society, self-determination should be supported during this period. 
His 1914 writings also stipulate that the second stage of development of society towards socialism – 
the “eve of capitalism’s downfall” – would not have any room for self-determination, however. 
This, as mature capitalist states would be characterised by clear rivalries between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie.39 The confrontation between the working-class movement and the capitalist one 
would become a global one. Lenin’s view was that Socialist revolution and, ultimately, the defeat of 
capitalism, would ensure that internationalism was triumphant over national self-determination.40  
 
 
35Lenin, op. cit., ‘Critical Remarks’, 1913. On the requirements of nationalism and self-determination, also Lenin, ‘Draft 
Theses on National and Colonial Questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International’, 5 June, 1920. 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm; S. Gilov, The Nationalities Question: Lenin’s Approach 
(Theory and Practice in the USSR), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1983, p.28; Carr, op. cit., pp.234-241. 




40Ibid. See also Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, p.287.  
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Economics began to play a part in Lenin’s explanations of self-determination in 1915 as he wrote 
that the “division of nations into oppressor and oppressed”41 was one which needed to be analysed 
in line with Marxist ideology on the national question. This meant the proletariat in oppressor 
nations assisting those in oppressed states towards self-determination. Meanwhile, the workers of 
oppressed nations should push for “unity and the merging of the workers of the oppressed nations 
with those of the oppressor nations”.42 If not, they would “involuntarily become the allies of their 
own national bourgeoisie, which always betrays the interests of the people and of democracy, and is 
always ready, in its turn, to annex territory and oppress other nations”.43 Secession could be 
sanctioned only when liberation movements were combating capitalist oppressors in a progressive 
fashion, Lenin had asserted in 1913. If a nation supported its “own bourgeois nationalism” then 
Lenin could not endorse it.44 As Lenin stated again, in 1914: “We fight against the privileges and 
violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part 
of the oppressed nation.”45 
A geopolitically determined categorisation was also part of Lenin’s criteria for the right to self-
determination. In 1916, Lenin pinpointed three different classes of nations, all of which had varied 
obligations as far as self-determination was concerned.46 The first involved the advanced capitalist 
countries, such as America, Britain, and other major western powers. By 1916, such nations had 
seen bourgeois national movements disappear, and they were now subjugating colonised nations, as 
well as people within their own borders. The proletariat in oppressor countries needed to lend their 
support to the self-determination of people living in the areas they were oppressing, so hastening the 
establishment of socialism there, and by consequence benefitting their own interests.47 Lenin quoted 
Marx saying: “no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations”.48 
 
 
41Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’, 1915. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
44Lenin, op. cit., ‘Critical Remarks’, 1913. 
45Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914. 
46Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916. 
47Ibid.; also Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914. Such argument is also advanced in Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolutions 
of the Summer’, 1913. 
48Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916. 
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Austria, the Balkans and Russia made up the second geopolitical area that interested Lenin, because 
they contained recently formed bourgeois-democratic nationalist movements. The proletariat should 
view self-determination as a way of uniting workers living in both oppressed and oppressing 
nations, as part of the class struggle.49 The “semi-colonial” classification of China, Persia and 
Turkey was Lenin’s third category, along with the colonies. Lenin’s views were based on his 
particular interest in various developments in such areas.50 Self-determination – that is to say 
immediate freedom – should be an unconditional demand of revolutionaries in bourgeois 
democracies.51 
Lenin believed, in line with Marxist theory, that larger states had intrinsic advantages for everyone 
living in them, so long as full equality was granted.52 But the incentive to formally withdraw from a 
union might recede if they had the right to self-determination.53 Lenin contended that if nations were 
granted the right to self-determination as independent entities, then it would “attract” them “to union 
with great socialist states”.54 Lenin expanded on his support for this idea in 1915 thus: 
[N]ot because we [the social democrats] have dreamt of splitting up the 
country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, 
because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, 
only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is 
inconceivable without the freedom to secede.55 
There would be no desire to secede if people had equal rights that included the full right to self-
determination within a larger political unit. The reality would be that the equality made available by 
the right to self-determination would have rendered the application of the concept irrelevant. It is 
also likely that even if states did choose secession when given the right of self-determination, there 
 
49Ibid. 
50See e.g. Lenin, ‘Lenin’s remark on the arrest of B. G. Tilak in 1908’ (1911) in Ravindra Kumar (ed.), Selected 
Documents of Lokamaya Bal Gangadhar Tilak 1880– 1929, Volume II, New Delhi, Anmol, 1992, pp.134-135; and 
‘Lenin’s comments on Indian political system and the conviction of B. G. Tilak’ (1913) in Kumar (ed.), op. cit., p.166; 
and his proposed additions to the 1896 International’s resolution in Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916. 
51Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916.  
52Ibid.; Lenin, op. cit., ‘Critical Remarks’, 1913. Also his ‘Note to the Theses “Socialist Revolution and the Right of 
Nations to Self-Determination”’, 1916, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/feb/00.htm.  
53Lenin, ‘Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?’ in Proletarskaya Pravda, vol. 32, no. 14, 18 January 1914, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/jan/18.htm; Lenin, op. cit., ‘Critical Remarks’, 1913. See also Harding, 
op. cit., Lenin’s Political Thought, p.300. 
54Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion on Self-Determination’, 1916. 
55Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’, 1915. 
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” 
and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists 
 
172 
would be extremely close unifying ties between the states involved.56 Accordingly, self-
determination would not be a divide between working-class communities. On the contrary, the 
concept of self-determination would reinforce links between equal entities across national 
boundaries.57 
Thus, Lenin’s views on “self-determination” encompassed an ideal of equality as a legitimising 
standard. In 1914, Lenin laid out his vision as to how this legitimising mechanism could be 
achieved: “By political equality [we] Social-Democrats mean equal rights, and by economic 
equality [...] the abolition of classes.”58 This stance was later compared by Lenin to the deceptive, 
bourgeois “abstract or formal posing of the problem”,59 and explained how: “Freedom and equality”, 
would “in practice [only signify] wage-slavery for the workers”.60 Lenin believed that his own 
approach to the notion of equality deemed necessary to ensure “self-determination”, was the right 
one however. His emphasis on such a standard of equality showed that his arguments were based on 
his broader thinking, and not just on debates with fellow Socialists about specific issues, such as 
nationalism.  
Lenin was therefore in favour of self-determination if it led to liberty as equality without division 
into nationalities, and within a classless society progressing towards becoming a socialist one.61 
Once socialism was established, the national question, including questions of “self-determination”, 
would be replaced by internationalist equality.62 Internationalism, rather than nationalism, was a 
perennial theme in Lenin’s work.63 As Leon Trotsky put it: for Lenin, internationalism was “a guide 
to revolutionary action embracing all nations”, with the world “considered as one single 
battlefield”.64 
 
56Lenin, ‘A Letter to S.G. Shahumyan’ in Bakinsky Rabochy, no. 48, March 1918 (written 1913), 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/nov/23.htm. 
57See e.g. Lenin, ‘The Working Class and the National Question’ in Pravda, no. 106, 10 May 1913, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/may/10.htm; Lenin, op. cit., ‘Draft Theses’, 1920. 
58Lenin, ‘A Liberal Professor on Equality’ in Put Pravdy, no. 33, 11 March, 1914 (emphasis in original), 
marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/mar/11.htm. 
59Lenin, op. cit., ‘Draft Theses’, 1920. 
60Lenin, ‘Deceptions of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality’ in N. Lenin, Two Speeches at the First All-
Russia Congress on Adult Education, Moscow, 1919, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/jun/23.htm. 
61Lenin, ‘The Fight for Freedom and the Fight for Power’ in Volna, no. 9, May 5, 1906, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/05.htm; Lenin, op. cit., ‘Note to the Theses’, 1916; Lenin, op. cit., 
‘The Right of Nations’, 1914. 
62Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. 
63See e.g. Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914. 
64Trotsky, op. cit., p.143. 
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The notion of “self-determination” as a concept encompassing freedom as equality was 
consequently a “negative” legitimising principle, according to Lenin. That is to say that Lenin 
believed self-determination was a right because it offered people freedom against and from 
negatives such as, tyranny, absolutism, monarchy, annexations, and capitalist oppression. Self-
determination could be used to guard against all such factors.65 All of these restrictions on freedom 
created circumstances of inequality, dependence, and interference. As such, they legitimised “self-
determination”.66 Thus it was self-determination as protection against threats to freedom that Lenin 
praised, even if he believed that, as a right, self-determination would seldom be implemented. The 
idea of “self-determination” as freedom from domination and dependence had been put forward by 
republican theories for centuries, and Lenin’s thoughts were partially in line with theirs.67 Where 
Lenin’s vision differed, however, was that he was a radical socialist with a global view, rather than a 
republican focusing on a single state. Liberty for Lenin was an international ideal, one that would 
allow oppressed peoples worldwide to take charge of independent states. In this context, violence 
and instability were permitted, if they contributed to the advancement of freedom as equality within 
the framework of socialist beliefs across the planet. In this sense, Lenin would support a 





65E.g. in Lenin, ‘The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories’ in Pravda, no. 162, 7 November 1912, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1912/nov/07.htm; Lenin, op. cit., ‘The National Question’, 1903; and Lenin, 
op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. Another similar approach is in Karl Kautsky, Der Weg zur Macht (The Road to Power), 
chapter 9, ‘A New Period of Revolutions’, Berlin, 1910, www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/kautsky/1909/macht; Patrick 
Goode (ed. and trans.), Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings, London, Macmillan, 1983, p.75.  
66See also Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Socialist Revolution’, 1916; and Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914, in which 
he outlines the freedom from oppression narrative in relation to the 1896 Resolution, highlighting its “sympathy for the 
workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism”. The English language 
report employs the word “despotisms” and not “absolutisms”, see Will Thorne, ‘Full Report of the Proceedings of the 
International Workers’ Congress, London, July and August, 1896 (the Fourth Congress of the Second International)’ in 
The Labour Leader, Glasgow and London, 1896, p.32.  
67See, for example, Skinner’s work Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; 
Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Quentin Skinner, ‘A Genealogy of 
the Modern State’, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 162, 2009; and ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, The 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Harvard University, 1984.  
68See e.g. Chapter 1 in Lenin’s The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the 
Proletariat in the Revolution, written 1917, published 1918. 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev. 
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Lenin’s view of self-determination helped resolve the tension between Marxism and nationalism. He 
effectively won the in-party socialist arguments centred on the national question, as his theory was 
included into key party resolutions in 1913 and 1917. 69 Nations in Russia, the resolutions stipulated, 
should be allowed “self-determination” as the right “to secede and form independent states”.70 They 
also advocated “complete equality for all nations”, promoting self-determination as a means to get 
rid of “national oppression” by “ensur[ing] complete solidarity among the workers of the various 
nations”.71 Thus, the resolutions highlighted – as Lenin did – the difference between being in favour 
of self-determination, and “the expediency of a given nation’s secession”.72 The latter expediency 
needed to be worked out in “the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism” at all times, 
and rule out joining up with the bourgeoisie, Lenin argued.73 
The Bolsheviks triumphed in Russia with the October 1917 Revolution, just after Lenin’s views of 
“self-determination” had also triumphed with the official formulation of these resolutions. Lenin 
was then encouraged to transfer this ideology to real life by pressing for independence for such 
groups such as the Ukrainians, Finns and those living in the Baltic.74 It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to analyse the demands made of Lenin. Such matters are covered by others.75 However, 
while there were often stark differences between Lenin’s arguments in favour of self-determination 
and his ability to reject certain claims to independence,76 his political ideology always informed his 
policy decisions. Socialist development was paramount to Lenin, and underpinned his support for 
 
69See Wade, op. cit., The Russian Revolution, p.151 and Carr, op. cit., pp.261–263, on how Lenin inserted the rhetoric of 
“self-determination” in the party programme, despite being initially unsuccessful. See Carr, Ibid., p.269, who writes on 
how this also occurred in 1919. See also Read, op. cit., p.226.  
70The same expression is used in Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolutions of the Summer’, 1913, and in Lenin, ‘Resolution on the 
National Question’ of ‘The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) 24–29 April 1917’, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/7thconf/29e.htm. 
71Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolution on the National Question’, 1917. 
72Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolutions of the Summer’, 1913. 
73Ibid. 
74See e.g. Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923. The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self- 
Determination, Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980; Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik 
Revolution 1917–1923, Vol. III, London, Macmillan, 1953, pp.258-270. 
75E.g. Harold Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. VI, London, Henry Frowde and Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1924, pp.311-333; Richard K. Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1918–
1921, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992; Carr, op. cit., 1978, p.265 on Ukraine; pp.270-273 on the 
Baltic States and Georgia, pp.286-289 on Poland and Finland; as well as Figes, op. cit., pp.375-377, 703-713. 
76For allegations of double standards and “opportunism” of the Bolshevik policy on “self-determination and 
nationalities”, see e.g. Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘Soviet Nationality Policy’, Russian Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 1956, pp.3-13 
especially p.4; Winston Churchill, The World Crisis. The Aftermath, London, Thornton Butterworth, 1929, p.85. 
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self-determination at all times.77 Some may have questioned whether it was fair to consider “self-
determination” between such a rigid doctrinal framework, but Lenin did not waiver from his clearly 
stated rationale.  
Lenin’s Discourse on “self-determination”: From Intra-Socialist Party Debate to Wartime 
International Revolutionary Rhetoric 
Lenin’s ideas about self-determination were considerably affected, and indeed changed, by the First 
World War,78 and these adaptations in turn influenced how President Wilson responded, as he ended 
up internationalising the concept. Like most politicians of his era, Lenin spent a great deal of time 
considering what had led to the war starting, what kind of war it was, and what possibilities it 
created for the future once the fighting was over. These reflections shaped Lenin’s political thoughts 
on self-determination. Lenin’s views, contained in speeches and writings, saw the First World War 
as primarily being the result of capitalism, and “imperialism” at its highest stage,79 and specifically 
the fight for control by dominating countries, as outlined in his famous 1917 pamphlet Imperialism. 
He demonstrated how traditional capitalist competition had been replaced by monopolies,80 with 
leading powers vying for economic and political hegemony.81 The First World War was 
“imperialistic – both annexationist and plunderous”82 and, given Lenin’s theories about Imperialism, 
unavoidable. Control was the ultimate aim of imperialism so its corollary would be violence.83 This 
violence came from the intense antagonism between respective capitalist powers, and also from the 
imperialistic repressive nature of colonisation.84 Thus the capitalist dynamic was the main reason for 
the war, Lenin believed. 
 
 
77See e.g. Lenin, ‘The Question of Nationalities or “Autonomisation”’, written 30 December 1922, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testamnt/autonomy.htm. 
78For the war’s impact on Lenin’s political thought, see also Harding, op. cit., Lenin’s Political Thought, pp.20-26; 
Read, op. cit., pp.116-126; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale, 
New York, Praeger, 1989, pp.4-13. 
79Lenin’s opinions on the subject are contained in his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, London, Pluto 
Press, 1996 (first written in 1916, and published in 1917), and also his Collected Works: Notebooks on Imperialism, 
Vol. 39, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1968. 
80Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.101. 
81Ibid., pp.89, 77. 
82Ibid., (1920 preface to the French and German editions), pp.3-4. 
83Ibid., p.83. 
84Ibid., pp.97 and 125. See also Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolution on the National Question’, 1917. 
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Aggressive imperialistic rivalry manifested itself in many ways, including the scramble to gain and 
then govern colonies. This resulted in a globe “completely divided up”,85 with colonialist power 
primarily growing out of the determination of avaricious nations to interfere with the populations of 
new areas, and the natural resources that came with them.86 Lenin was “obviously not” opposed to 
using force in broad terms,87 but he was against colonial annexations because they contradicted the 
right of self-determination for all nations.88 Lenin wrote in 1916 that annexations “establish[ed] state 
frontiers contrary to the will of the population”.89 Lenin explained: 
National self-determination means political independence. Imperialism seeks 
to violate such independence because political annexation often makes 
economic annexation easier, cheaper (easier to bribe officials, secure 
concessions, put through advantageous legislation. etc.), more convenient, 
less troublesome.90 
Being against imperialist annexations and standing up for the right of nations to self-determination 
went together, Lenin argued.91 
There was considerable liberating potential in the unrest, dissent and subsequent violence that 
colonial expansionism and the denial of self-determination would inevitably cause, Lenin contented. 
Imperialist oppression would stir the consciousness of those being exploited and provoke them to 
unite socially towards the cause of expelling those who were dominating them. In short, maintaining 
an economic grip through reactionary Imperialism and the forces of law and order which upheld it 
would trigger social awareness and effective armed opposition.92 Lenin’s 1917 pamphlet 
Imperialism explained how this united action was a reaction to capitalist provocation, leading to 
violent revolution and liberation.93 So it was that there was no emphasis on peace in Lenin’s 
wartime interpretation of self-determination. Lenin’s belief in the possibility of violence in the 
context of self-determination and freedom was thus very different to Woodrow Wilson’s, who 
championed peace and stability at all times. 
 
85Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.90.  
86Ibid., p.83. 
87Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. 
88Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.125. 
89Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. 
90Lenin, op. cit., ‘A Caricature’, 1916. 
91See also Harding, op. cit., Lenin’s Political Thought, p.66; Young, op. cit., pp.107-134. 
92Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.125. 
93Ibid., pp.125, 97. 
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In 1916, Lenin wrote that “Liberation of the colonies means self-determination of nations. 
Europeans often forget that colonial peoples too are nations, but to tolerate this ‘forgetfulness’ is to 
tolerate chauvinism.”94 Other socialists had put forward the same kind of thinking about Imperialism 
and their view that colonised countries should be allowed to stand alone.95 For example, Karl 
Kautsky in 1910 stated that imperialism “deceived and disposed of foreign peoples as if they were 
cattle”. Kautsky then elaborated: 
[Imperialism] rest[ed] on the assumption that only the peoples of European 
civilization are capable of independent development. The men of other races 
are regarded as children, idiots or beasts of burden, to be treated with more 
or less mercy – at any rate they are beings of a lower kind, which can be 
controlled according to our whim. 96 
Lenin did not believe in unconditional self-determination, that is to say principled self-determination 
without any exceptions at all. Instead he pushed for all colonised peoples to be given the right to 
oppose those dominating them within the struggle to establish socialism within their areas of the 
world. Lenin aimed to assess individual cases with this long-term objective prevalent in all 
discussions.97 Thus this case assessment model contradicted the widespread belief among historians 
that Lenin “first and foremost” viewed self-determination as “a postulate of anti-colonialism”.98 This 
traditional presumption was not only misguided99 but Lenin proposed “self-determination” as a 
much more generalised answer to the “national question” which had been debated among socialists. 
Lenin was not in favour of any independence from colonialist oppression where liberation stopped 
development towards socialism.  
Lenin’s early calls to oppose the nationalistic “defend the fatherland” rallying cries prevalent in 
Russia and Europe during the First World War seemed to be at odds with his support for an anti-
 
94Lenin, op. cit., ‘A Caricature’, 1916. 
95See e.g. Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, London, Routledge, 2003 (first published in 1913);  
Karl Kautsky, ‘Imperialism and the War’ in International Socialist Review, November 1914, 
www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/war.htm; Karl Kautsky, ‘Ultra-Imperialism’, Die Neue Zeit, September 
1914, www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htm. 
96Kautsky, op. cit., Der Weg zur Macht, pp.75–76.  
97See Lenin, op. cit., ‘A Caricature’, 1916. 
98Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
p.44. 
99See also Bowring, op. cit., p.125. 
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colonial version of self-determination.100 Flag and country patriotism was a unifying and galvanising 
force among all belligerents during the war, with people across the political and class spectrums 
gathering around their national symbols,101 but Lenin had objected to this “fatherland” war effort. 
He considered such emotional nationalism to be a “despicable betrayal of socialism”.102 In contrast 
to the stances of the Marxist theorist and revolutionary socialist Rosa Luxemburg who was against 
“defence of the fatherland” and “self-determination” whatever happened,103 Lenin had no problems 
with it as long as it was aimed at imperialistic oppressors. In fact, Lenin argued, people were 
perfectly entitled to consider their violent struggle a “defence of the fatherland” if it resulted in the 
demise of an Imperial power.104 Thus Lenin’s backing of independence from a colonial power and 
more general opposition to “defending the fatherland” could be reconciled. Both were legitimised in 
the context of Marxist ideology and the global war against capitalist imperialism. 
Lenin used the language of “self-determination” to undermine imperialism. In this sense he was 
applying “self-determination” as a “negative idea of freedom” – defining it against a set of negative 
concepts. The colonial drive for “domination” subdued “liberty”, Lenin outlined in his 
Imperialism,105 and he advocated “self-determination” as the best liberating tool to get rid of it. Land 
theft, oppression, exploitation, and other forms of interference were to be opposed at all times, but 
Lenin had not condemned all forms of interference before the war. It was only once the First World 
War had started that Lenin suggested that interference per se was generally a crucial way by which 
freedom as equality was taken away, and proposed self-determination as a means of winning it back. 
Thus the war altered Lenin’s theoretical opinion on “self-determination” and Imperialism, as he 
addressed his revised position to a different kind of public. It was in this manner that Lenin was able 
to increase the scope of his ambitions. 
 
 
100Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916; also Figes, op. cit., p.293; Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New 
Diplomacy 1917–1918, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1959, pp.60-63, 380-381. 
101See Geary, op. cit., p.237, on the influence of the Second International on certain groups. 
102Lenin, op. cit., ‘Draft Resolution’, 1920. See also Carr, op. cit., p.66. 
103Rosa Luxemburg, ‘Speech to the Hanover Congress (October 1899)’, German: Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften, II, 
Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1951; Dick Howard (ed.), Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1971, pp.347–351. 
104Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. 
105Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.83.  
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Before the outbreak of the war, Lenin was largely directing his comments about “self-
determination” at fellow socialists, as he asserted himself within his party, but his comments were 
aimed at a far wider audience as the global conflict progressed. During the war, Lenin’s use of the 
rhetoric of “self-determination” was primarily motivated by the Marxist imperative to push peoples 
all over the world to unite as an international working-class and so bring about revolution in the 
colonies. Lenin’s ultimate objective was to halt the control of capitalist powers and to trigger an 
international revolutionary wave.106 Furthermore, this dynamic applied in Europe would, Lenin 
contended, “sharpen the revolutionary crisis” within major capitalist countries – the imperialists’ 
home arena.107 If the working-class united in these countries, they would not only spark revolution 
at home, but bring the war to an end, as well as advance socialism.108 Thus, Lenin’s soundings on 
self-determination were now focused on the international struggle to not only stop the war, but to 
bring about the demise of capitalism. This contrasted with Lenin’s far more limited debates on “self-
determination” which took place among Socialist rivals before the war.109 
 
Through attempting to influence the world with his increasingly radical wartime ideas on self-
determination, Lenin showed how ideological propaganda was crucial to the First World War effort. 
A burgeoning mass media made sure that the standpoints of international politicians engaged in the 
war reached as wide an audience as possible.110 People everywhere began to become aware of 
messages about everything from generalised political thought to specific information about the 
 
106See also Trotsky, op. cit., p.93; B. I. Zhuchkov, Lenin on the Nationality Problem, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1968, p.43; Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist 
Internationalism, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1989, p.232; Carr, op. cit., 1978, pp.245–246, 428; A.J. Mayer, 
op. cit., pp.24, 264, 301; Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1917–18, 
Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1979, p.48; Figes, op. cit., pp.294, 537–538.  
107Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. See also Carr, op. cit., 1978, pp.55, 62; Carr, op. cit., The Bolshevik 
Revolution, p.9. 
108See in particular Lenin, ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution (Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party)’, 
Priboi Publishers, 1917, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/tasks/index.htm. See also Carr, op. cit., 1978, pp. 
65–67; Carr, op. cit., The Bolshevik Revolution, p.7; A.J. Mayer, op. cit., pp.97, 245. 
109See e.g. Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’, 1915, and Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916. 
110See Gerard J. De Groot, The First World War, Hampshire, Palgrave, 2001, pp.146-148. A.J. Mayer, op. cit., pp.7-8; 
Figes, op. cit., p.541 for the spread of Bolshevik propaganda; on US propaganda, see George Creel, How we Advertised 
America. The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee of Public Information that Carried the Gospel of 
Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe, New York, Harper, 1920, and George Creel, The War, the World, and 
Wilson, New York, Harper, 1920. See also Herbert E. Brekle, ‘War with Words’ in Ruth Wodak (ed.), Language, Power 
and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse, Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989, pp.83–87. 
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progress of the war, and indeed leaders’ plans for the peace that would come next.111 Both Lenin and 
Wilson were at the heart of this propaganda war as they pushed forward their beliefs about “self-
determination”. However, it would be wrong to say that the two men’s public statements were solely 
strategic – both had broad ideological convictions and these were certainly reflected in the ideas 
they articulated about “self-determination”.112 
Two revolutions in Russia and America’s entry into the war ensured that the ideological battle 
became more protracted in 1917.113 President Wilson was interested in projecting America’s war 
effort as being one about morality and virtue, and indeed about legitimising his country’s 
contribution to the world conflict in glowing terms, with regular references to liberty and, crucially, 
peace. Wilson’s approach to “self-determination” in this context will be examined in the next 
section of this chapter.114 The February 1917 Revolution in Russia led to the end of the Tsar and the 
establishing of the Provisional Government, which ostensibly shared power with the Soviet of 
Workers’ Deputies in Petrogad.115 Later in 1917, the Bolsheviks prevailed during the October 1917 
Revolution, seizing power. Against this background, Lenin had pushed self-determination as a 
weapon of global revolution to oppose all forces resisting socialism, and particularly capitalist 
imperialism. Russia and America were united in the war effort until March 1918,116 but, following 
the Russian revolutions, they naturally had great ideological rivalry. The post-war destruction of 
empires, and the need to replace them with new territorial lines, was still unclear then, but it was 
already certain that traditional diplomacy and the accepted standards of an Imperialist world were 
 
111As far as the Press was concerned, Winston Churchill (op. cit., p.137) pointed out that the Paris Peace Conference had 
500 “special correspondents” covering it. See also Laurence W. Martin, Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and 
the British Liberals, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1958; A.J. Mayer, op. cit., pp.54, 372. 
112In spite of allegations to the contrary, e.g. Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, Decolonization, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, 
p.10. 
113America formally joined the First World War as an “Entente” or “Associated” force, and not as an “Allied” one, but 
for ease the USA will hereafter be referred to as a member of the “Allies”. 
114Former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1914 idea of a ‘World League for the Peace of Righteousness’, Outlook, 
23 September 1914, pp.169–178, at p.178 also shows how morally charged some American discourse could be. 
115See e.g. Harding, op. cit., ‘The Russian Revolution’, p.240. The “Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Deputies” is what the name became. Until September 1917, the Mensheviks were very much in charge of this particular 
Soviet: Wade, op. cit., The Russian Revolution, pp.64, 70. In contrast, Bolsheviks controlled the Petrograd and Moscow 
Soviets by October 1917: Marples, op cit., p.87; also Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp.43, 49; Carr, op. cit., 1978, pp.70–71; Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: 
Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002, p.50; Peter Gatrell, 
Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2005, p.197; 
A.J. Mayer, op. cit., p.72. 
116At the time that Russia and Germany agreed to the Brest–Litovsk treaty, as below. 
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under threat.117 These changing circumstances and values saw the possibility of a new world being 
acknowledged by both the Americans and the Bolsheviks. There was a distinct gulf between their 
respective, competing principles, but they were personified by Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow 
Wilson. The pair became locked in debate aimed at persuading global audiences that their own 
causes were the right ones.118  
For the Americans and their allies, the newfound influence and doctrinal fever of Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, and especially their calls for international revolution, were deeply troubling.119 As a 
small, relatively unknown wing of an obscure party, the Bolsheviks had little appeal before the war, 
and certainly not outside Russia. The war gave them a chance to propagate their ideals to Europeans, 
and indeed to others living in other parts of the world and their push for radical change, and 
especially freedom from oppression, resounded worldwide in areas exhausted by conflict.120 The 
Bolsheviks developed a particular interest in altering western public opinion, with the European Left 
becoming the key target for these theories about the war.121 The U.S.A and those who had fought 
alongside them were, in the short term, most concerned that the Bolsheviks would actually withdraw 
 
117To see how this manifested itself after 1919, Lassa Oppenheim, The League of Nations and Its Problems: Three 
Lectures, London, Longmans, Green, 1919. 
118On Wilson, see e.g. William Carleton, ‘A New Look at Woodrow Wilson’, Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 38, no. 4, 
1962, p.566. 
119Wilson’s writing between 1917 and 1918 sees this coming up a lot, as in PWW 1984, vol. 45, e.g. ‘A Memorandum 
by William Boyce Thompson’, 3 January 1918, at p.442; ‘From George Jan Sosnowski’, 11 January 1918, at p.574; ‘A 
Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann’ – i.e. ‘The Memorandum of the 
Inquiry’ – ‘The Present Situation: The War Aims and Peace Terms its Suggests. Our Objectives’, at pp.459–464; also 
‘Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, 12 February 1918’, pp.333–334 in PWW 1984, vol. 46; Memorandum from 
William Bullitt received by Wilson on 18 November 1918, pp.121–123 in PWW 1986, vol. 53; Robert Lansing, The 
Peace Negotiations. A Personal Narrative, London, Constable, 1921, p.171; Edward Mandell House, The Intimate 
Papers of Colonel House, Volume III: Into the War April 1917-June 1918, arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour, 
Ernest Benn Ltd, 1928, pp.297-298. There was frequent discourse about Russia in Paris during the Peace Conference: 
see e.g. ‘Hankey’s notes of a meeting of the Council of Four’, 20 May 1919, pp.301-302 in PWW 1988, vol. 59. 
120Wilson’s propaganda chief George Creel responded by advocating for an American Bureau of Public Information in 
Europe; see ‘A Memorandum by George Creel’, 31 January 1918, pp.200–203 in PWW 1984, vol. 46. The U.S.A.’s 
worries about the popularity of the Bolsheviks were discussed in the New York Times: ‘Prey of Agitators’, 23 August 
1919. This article reported that “a campaign for self-determination for the negroes of all corners of the earth” lauded 
Lenin and Trotsky. To learn about the then Bolsheviks’ increasing appeal in Russia, see Gatrell, op. cit., p.221. 
121See e.g. E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. III, 1928, p.329; and Lenin quoted in Carr, op. cit., The Bolshevik Revolution, p.9. 
Martin, op. cit., recounts how British radicals who organised themselves into groups were able to have an influence on 
government action, despite their relatively small size, p.58. See also Memorandum of Lloyd George, ‘Some 
Considerations for the Peace Conference’, 25 March 1919 in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World 
Settlement, Vol. III, New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922, p.449, as well as pp.451-452; Carr, op. cit., The 
Bolshevik Revolution, p.12; A.J. Mayer, op. cit., pp.31, 34-35, 265, 333-334, 387-391. See also Lenin, op. cit., ‘The 
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from the war effort, so potentially damaging their own contributions considerably.122 Their fears 
proved grounded when, in March 1918, the Bolsheviks now running Russia, signed the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers, who no longer had to combat on the Eastern front.123 
America and affiliated nations had in fact suspected that Germany had been undermining Russia all 
along, supporting the Bolshevik rise to power as a means of improving its own chances of winning 
the war.124 
Wilson’s prestigious, “liberal” image and the substantial propaganda machinery he had at his 
disposal made him a formidable enemy to Lenin as the two leaders competed to promote their 
respective thinking.125 Despite the challenge from the American, Lenin was determined to champion 
his radical Marxist ideas as much as possible.126 Yes, the men’s ultimate goals were very different, 
but both employed the same kind of Old World Versus New World rhetoric – one that opposed 
imperial annexations. The difference was Wilson wanted change according to liberal-conservative 
principles, while Lenin was a revolutionary who used self-determination to strongly advocate for 
socialism. When the war ended, Lenin attacked the allegedly hypocritical liberals in Europe who 
had supported Wilson, saying they “call[ed] themselves pacifists and socialists, who sang praises to 
‘Wilsonianism’, and who insisted that peace and reform were possible under imperialism”.127 
Wilson’s increasing popularity as the war progressed – and the widespread support that his ideas 
received – is likely to have prompted Lenin to emphasise his own version of self-determination.128 
While the phrase “self-determination” was barely employed by Wilson, the broader thinking 
connected with it, and the expression itself as used by Wilson in 1918, were viewed as being an 
 
122A.J. Mayer, op. cit., pp.170, 77–78, 83, 88; Trygve Throntveit, ‘What was Wilson Thinking?, A Review of Recent 
Literature on Wilsonian Foreign Policy’, White House Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 2011, pp.457-458.  
123For a discussion of the Russian treaties from that time, see e.g. Charles G. Fenwick, ‘The Russian Peace Treaties’, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 1918a, pp.706-711. 
124See e.g. the secret ‘Memorandum on the Formula of “the Self-Determination of Peoples” and the Moslem World’, 
British Intelligence Bureau, TNA: FO 608/203, Department of Information, Section E, 30 January 1918, no. 6289/1, 
pp.2–3; and memoranda received by Wilson on 20 and 22 November 1918, in PWW 1986, vol. 53, pp.136–137,  
169–180. 
125See New York Tribune editorial reproduced in E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. III, 1928, p.354. See also Klaus Schwabe, 
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also Carr, op. cit., The Bolshevik Revolution, p.13. For details on the US information infrastructure, see Creel, op. cit., 
How we Advertised America, and Creel, op. cit., The War, the World, and Wilson. 
127Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.5, from his preface written in 1920. 
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integral part of what the U.S. president represented. Despite this, Lenin set out to undermine 
Wilson’s message.129 Lenin wanted to try to take control of the “self-determination” narrative by 
highlighting the hypocrisy of the USA and its colonialist, capitalist Allies as they interfered in the 
affairs of foreign countries while allegedly championing self-determination.130 
After the “self-determination” debate levitated from one between rival socialists to a global issue, 
party members placed it at the centre of their international ideological war with the USA and its 
western Allies. This aspect tends to be underplayed in scholarly literature on the subject.131 Lenin’s 
opinions and similar pressure from the Soviet in Petrograd132 originally led to the Provisional 
Government which came to power early in 1917 introducing its “Declaration of War Aims” in 
March 1917. They read: “[T]he objective of free Russia is not the domination of other nations, nor 
the expropriation of their… property, nor the forcible seizure of foreign territories, but the 
ratification of a stable peace on the basis of national self-determination”.133 Following the October 
Revolution later in 1917, self-determination was backed by the Bolsheviks as being a desirable 
concept for all Russian people. The Bolsheviks advocated peace and democracy based on “no 
annexations or indemnities and the self-determination of nations”.134 They wanted to stake their 
claim to being more moral than their ideological enemies in America and in line with this they 
disclosed previously confidential treaties from the Tsar’s regime into the public domain.135  
It was Leon Trotsky, the Bolsheviks’ Foreign Commissioner, who, on December 31 1917, released 
the most important international address as regards Lenin’s and the Bolsheviks’ pronouncements on 
 
129See e.g. Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
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declaration: ‘Appeal to all the peoples of the world’, that came out against colonisation: Izvestiya, 15 March 1917 in 
Martin McCauley, (ed.), The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State 1917–1921: Documents, London, Macmillan, 
1975, pp.78-79. 
134Bolshevik decree of 2 November 1917, ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia’, signed by Lenin and 
Stalin. www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm. 
135See Leon Trotsky, ‘Note of Foreign Minister Trotsky to the Allied Embassies in Petrograd Offering an Armistice’, 
21 November 1917, pp.188–189 in James Brown Scott, Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, 
December 1916 to November 1918, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Law, 1921.  
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” 
and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists 
 
184 
self-determination: “To Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries”. It highlighted the posturing 
of the Allies and called on them to be open with their war aims. It asked if the Allies were “willing 
on their part to give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, 
Madagascar, Indochina, et cetera”, just as the Revolution in Russia had presented this right to those 
living in Finland and Ukraine:136  
[I]t is clear that to demand self-determination for the peoples that are 
comprised within the borders of enemy states and refuse self-determination 
to the peoples of their own state and their own colonies would mean the 
defence of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism.137 
The literature emphatically stated Lenin’s attitude towards “self-determination”, all the while 
forcefully opposing the Imperialistic status of the colonial, western nations. Such public wartime 
statements confronting the western Allies made sure that Lenin’s interpretation of “self-
determination” became part and parcel of the global moral debate about the world’s future. Lenin’s 
rhetoric had led to the language of “self-determination” becoming more important to the extent that, 
by December 1917, Wilson was apparently using it in his State of the Union Speech. The President 
said “the principle” should be “brought under the patronage of its real friends”.138 It was also in 
December 1917 that the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin made a very clear 
mention of “self-determination” in his Christmas address, arguing that the Central Powers provided 
“validity to this principle everywhere in so far as it is practically realisable” and only if other war 
participants followed suit.139  
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated on 5 January 1918 that “we are fighting for a just 
and lasting peace”, and “a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-
determination or the consent of the governed”.140 It has been said that Lloyd George thus “coined 
 
136English version in ‘David Roland Francis to Robert Lansing’, Petrograd 31 December 1917, recorded on 1 January 
1918, PWW 1984, vol. 45, pp.411–412. 
137Ibid., pp.412–413. 
138Wilson, ‘Fifth Annual Message’, 4 December 1917, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. 
millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3799. 
139‘Statement of Count Czernin at Brest–Litovsk of the Terms on which the Central Powers were willing to Conclude a 
General Peace’, 25 December 1917, pp.221-222 in Scott, op. cit. 
140David Lloyd George, ‘British War Aims’, 5 January 1918, WWI Document Archive. 
wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Prime_Minister_Lloyd_George_on_the_British_War_Aims. The speech was so similar to 
what Wilson then planned that he reportedly considered cancelling his Fourteen Points Speech: Victor S. Mamatey, The 
United States and East Central Europe 1914–1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1957, pp.175-176. See also Trygve Throntveit, ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow 
Wilson and National Self-determination’, Diplomatic History, 35(3), 2011b, pp.445-481, especially pp.459–460. 
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the phrase self-determination”,141 but this was in fact after Lenin had spent at least fourteen years 
discussing the subject in numerous speeches and written works, and also in the wake of First World 
War international declarations by the Bolsheviks. Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech was 
made just three days after Lloyd George’s reference to self-determination. Wilson would firmly 
propagate the language of self-determination worldwide the following month.  
The fourteen years during which Lenin theorised “self-determination” between 1903 and 1917 were 
hugely significant to getting the concept on to the global agenda and to comprehending its future 
international references. While international mentions on the subject would not generally be framed 
around Lenin’s radical socialist ideology,142 the Russian’s work was still vital as regards equating 
the implementation of self-determination with independent nationhood. Self-determination thus 
became the legitimising concept for the creation of these new states. Lenin’s “negative” 
interpretation of liberty was also crucial. His definition of self-determination meant freedom from a 
variety of negatives, ranging from colonial domination and inequality to exploitation. The need to 
break free from oppression was, for example, part of a legitimising standard that permitted violence 
to be used. Thus negatives had positive moral associations. This radical idea of self-determination – 
one tied up in Lenin’s Marxist theory of freedom – was to go head-to-head with Wilson’s more 
liberal-conservative approach to the concept. 
Universal references about “self-determination” became increasingly dominated by Wilson’s liberal-
conservative convictions. But it was the Russian’s more revolutionary discourse on “self-
determination” that had prompted Wilson to globalise the term in the first place. By 1917, Lenin had 
been grappling with it for fourteen years, and its conceptual and political insertion into wartime 
rivalries on the world stage was down to him. If it had not been for Lenin’s work in this respect, 
Wilson may not have reacted to it altogether. Lenin’s radical language thus provided the trigger to 
Wilson internationalising the phrase in 1918, as the world considered the First World War and its 
aftermath.  
 
141John Milton Cooper (ed.), Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace, 
Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p.421; also p.426.  
142For a few later suggestions on how to condition statehood on the basis of “self- determination”, see e.g. Wayne 
Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.208–212, and Nicolaus Tideman, ‘Secession as a Human Right’, Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, vol. 1, no.1, 2004. 
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The “Wilsonian Moment”: Wilson’s Internationalist and Liberal-Conservative Interpretation of  
Self-Determination 
As the First World War raced to a close, President Woodrow Wilson committed America to “self-
determination” in a manner that was high profile and internationalist, while liable to 
misinterpretation. Russia supported the right of all nations, especially colonised ones, to self-
determination, but Wilson’s intentions were far more limited in scope. So it was that the year before 
the 1919 Egyptian revolution saw the U.S. President introduce “self-determination” on to the global 
stage. The President imbued it with a sense of moral worth for an extensive audience, so as to try to 
legitimise his vision of a secure, peaceful world order over and beyond the nationalist aspirations of 
subjugated peoples. This was a time when Wilson was enjoying a great deal of prestige 
internationally, and he was accordingly intent on pushing forward his liberal-conservative agenda 
around the world. The result was that self-determination as a dynamic for change became hugely 
influential – it gained traction across numerous countries, and would eventually be codified as 
international law in the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter.  
Wilson was to personify this movement towards self-determination as a justification for political 
action. He was so firmly linked with the concept143 that, remarkably, even his work that did not 
specifically quoted “self-determination” was associated with the notion in the global imagination. A 
prime example was that Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points speech did not mention the term, but 
became nonetheless a key international reference for the idea.144 In this sense, Wilson’s principle of 
self-determination also represented his wider political beliefs, and especially his conservative-liberal 
ones about how the world should be organised.145 
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Wilson’s rhetoric of “self-determination” needs to be considered, like Lenin’s, in the historical 
period it was articulated. The First World War was raging when Wilson made his most significant 
points about self-determination. Lenin’s contribution to the subject was also an influence on the 
American at the time. This section will therefore examine Wilson’s language of “self-determination” 
and its standards of legitimation, in the context in which they were formulated. It will then present 
Wilson’s more pragmatic “self-determination” discourse set within a worldwide movement 
upholding the notion as a means of solving territorial disputes in the wake of the Great War. While 
Wilson’s overall thought processes dictated his reasoning on self-determination, our focus will be on 
the internationalisation of the concept, rather than the specifics of Wilson’s broader political 
philosophy.146 
Wartime doctrinal antagonism was culminating when, in 1918, Wilson first spoke formally about 
“self-determination”.147 There were numerous official opposing views as to what the ideals of peace 
should actually entail after the war148, so the conflicting nations enhanced their own contributions to 
the war effort, all the while criticising their adversaries’ positions on the subject. Their objective at 
all time was to appeal to a worldwide public, in order to convince them that they were best placed to 
win the war, and indeed win the peace. All the warring parties were aware that Lenin had dominated 
the “self-determination” debate before 1917. This ideological rivalry thus continued alongside the 
actual combat. It was in this highly strifeful global environment that America tried to exploit 
 
using the expression “self-determination” to any great extent, Mazzini’s ideas on democratic mandates and nationalism 
appear to have had an impact on Wilson’s thinking, see e.g. pp.194, 233. 
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sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization 1914–1920’, Diplomatic 
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Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937, pp.29, 68; 
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meeting with Wilson on 10 December 1918 and Wilson’s ‘Remarks to Foreign Correspondents’ in PWW 1984, vol. 47, 
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the Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library (WWPL): woodrowwilson.org; and Scripps Library and Multimedia Archive 
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Wilson’s discourse as propaganda, projecting American values as universal ones. The significance 
of self-determination arguments as a propaganda tool was illustrated after the war in 1920 when the 
head of the American Committee on Public Information said Wilson’s wartime pronouncements had 
been the USA’s “most effective weapons” in conveying to the world “the motives, purposes, and 
ideals of America so that friend, foe and neutral alike might come to see us as a people without 
selfishness and in love with justice”.149 The USA’s image on the international stage, as well as his 
own reputation, were uppermost in Wilson’s mind as he put forward his ideals on “self-
determination”.150 It ensured “unprecedented enthusiasm” – as regards competition with other world 
leaders, Wilson was certainly in the strongest position when he attended the Peace Conference at the 
end of the war.151 In 1919, when he arrived in Paris, Wilson became the first president to leave the 
U.S. territory while in office. 
There were marked differences between the direct environment in which Wilson and Lenin 
formulated their ideas concerning “self-determination”. Wilson’s were focused on self-
determination petitions during a particularly tumultuous period of world history, and they were 
made when Wilson was President of the USA. Thus his pronouncements were expressed in the 
context of international diplomacy and realpolitik when he was at the height of his power. America 
itself was enjoying increased international standing, yet Wilson was not constrained by the need to 
win elections, or ensure the approval of his colleagues. In contrast, Lenin articulated his thoughts far 
more theoretically, setting them within the wider subject of Marxist revolution. He concentrated on 
the doctrinal “correctness” of self-determination as it might apply to reality. At the time, Lenin was 
fighting for power within his party, and all of his arguments were advanced within the framework of 
Marxist ideology, and the passionate in-house debates that characterised socialist party politics. 
Both Lenin and Wilson wanted to succeed in the propaganda battle during the war, and in the post-
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Personality was key to the two men’s presentation skills, and the way their respective opinions on 
self-determination were greeted. While Lenin engaged with his opponents, Wilson was more single 
minded, and there is no evidence of Wilson having to persuade critics that his stance on self-
determination was the right one.152 Instead, Wilson was overwhelmingly dismissive and even 
“intolerant of the views of others”, and as “intensely prejudiced in his likes and dislikes”.153 Wilson 
did not take kindly to guidance,154 and “shunned the sight or study of unpleasant truths that diverted 
him from his foregone conclusions”.155 He had a “one-track mind”,156 and was “dogmatic and yet 
[without] a very clear idea of what was really needed”.157 
Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, was naturally keen to offer as much advice 
as possible to the President but – as so many other advisors – was routinely bypassed. The 
Bolsheviks called on the U.S., and the country’s allies to explain their war aims in the context of 
self-determination in December 1917.158 When Wilson used his January 1918 Fourteen Points 
speech to reply, Lansing said the Bolsheviks represented “the proletariat [,] the ignorant and 
mentally deficient”,159 and not the Russian people as a whole. Lansing argued that the Bolshevik 
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idea of “self-determination” would cause “international anarchy”160 and so, Lansing suggested, it 
should not be addressed. It is also likely that Wilson was not as antipathetic towards the Bolsheviks 
and, accordingly, ignored Lansing’s recommendation. 
The changes brought about through revolutions in Russia were not something which Wilson felt 
able to easily cope with, however, and, in 1918, he admitted: “I have been sweating blood over the 
question that is right and feasible to do in Russia. It goes to pieces like quicksilver under my 
touch”.161 President Wilson was not averse to the way Russia developed after the February 1917 
Revolution, but this was not the case during and after the Bolshevik Revolution in October, when 
Wilson was a lot more engaged with how matters were unfolding.162 Wilson objected to the 
Bolsheviks’ covert diplomacy in the pre-war years and calls for radical change, even though he 
welcomed some of their opposition to colonial annexations.163 This was entirely in line with 
Wilson’s strong disapproval of disorder. 
Wilson’s reply to the Bolsheviks in his Fourteen Points appeared to be to try to get them remain in 
the war fighting with the Allies.164 At that time, Wilson was concerned that the Bolsheviks were 
actively negotiating with the Central Powers from December 1917. More generally, he wanted to 
persuade a Europe exhausted by the war – and left-wingers in the West, in particular – that his own 
political ideology on the future of the post-war world order was far more attractive than the 
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It was a month after the Fourteen Points speech that Wilson internationalised the concept of “self-
determination”, despite the opposition of political colleagues including his Secretary of State, 
Lansing. The latter was a qualified lawyer and consistently argued that the absence of any specific 
recipient of the concept of “self-determination” meant it did not have validity, to the extent that it 
might be devoid of any significance at all.166 Lansing also claimed that pursuing self-determination 
could be perilous and was “utterly destructive of the political fabric of society and resulted in 
constant turmoil and change”.167 Lansing put across his opinion in 1918, emphasising arguments he 
had also made to Wilson: 
The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-
determination’, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas 
into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible 
demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in many lands. What 
effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the 
nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and 
rebellion? […] The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise 
hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In 
the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist 
who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to 
put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! 
What misery it will cause!168 
Lansing was much chagrined when Wilson rejected his assessment.169 Despite such difficulties with 
Wilson, Lansing’s work still provides important scholarly reference points170 and is consulted at key 
moments in history. 
During the First World War, “self-determination” underpinned discussion by all parties, including 
Lenin, about likely territorial settlements at the end of the conflict. While Wilson appeared to ignore 
advice on other matters, he accepted the knowledge of “experts” on that subject during that 
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period,171 seeking “general principles of justice”, “not by diplomats and politicians each eager to 
serve his own interests, but by dispassionate scientists – geographers, ethnologists, economists – 
who had made studies of the problems involved”,172 said one of Wilson’s aids. On his way to Paris 
for the Peace Conference at the end of 1918, Wilson said to the experts with him: “Tell me what is 
right and I will fight for it. Give me a guaranteed position.”173 In September 1917, Wilson had 
already set up a U.S. “Commission of the Inquiry”174 made up of specialist counsels and other 
presidential advisors tasked with recommending territorial arrangements aimed at ensuring future 
peace and stability. The Commission sent the President a memorandum just before Wilson delivered 
his Fourteen Points speech.175 Findings outlined in the Memorandum were included.176 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech made no direct reference to “self-determination” yet it became 
eternally associated with the President’s view of the notion.177 Beyond that, the speech came to 
illustrate Wilson’s close personal link with “self-determination”, especially in the context of the 
peace that would follow World War I. In many ways, Wilson was the personification of “self-
determination” at the time. Thus the speech was not just a chance for him to outline his vision on the 
war’s territorial divisions in detail, but it was the most well-known pronouncement anyone made 
during the entire conflict. The meaning of “self-determination” and its use to the international 
community all came to be inextricably connected to Wilson’s wider political thoughts and 
utterances. 
Numerous diplomatic historians have analysed President Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in great 
detail, and it is by no means our intention to do so here, but rather to focus on its significance.178 It is 
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particularly noteworthy that Wilson spoke a week after being given an English language edition of a 
document in which the Bolsheviks asked the Allies to explain their ambitions for the First World 
War, in the context of “self-determination”. The Fourteen Points suggested specific cases of land 
arrangement agreements for Europe that would be linked to his considerations on self-determination.  
They included: 
Independence for Poland so as to create a country “inhabited by indisputably Polish populations” 
(XIII). Italy’s frontiers were to be changed “along clearly recognisable lines of nationality” (IX). 
Those living in Austria-Hungary (X) would be permitted the “opportunity of autonomous 
development”. Similarly, it was pledged that Arabs, like all the other subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire, would be granted “an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity 
of autonomous development” (XII).179 Balkan alliances would be organised “along historically 
established lines of allegiance and nationality”. It was also stated that the “political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states” should be officially fixed (XI).180 
Wilson also called for colonial arrangements to be “based upon a strict observance of the principle 
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must 
have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined” (V). 
Wilson wanted “evacuation of all Russian territory” (VI), the re-establishment of the state of 
Belgium (VII), and the righting of the “wrong done to France by Prussia” in Alsace-Lorraine (VIII). 
Wilson was opposed to further secret treaties (I). He forcefully asked for guarantees of freedom of 
the seas and free trade (II and III), and significant arms reduction (IV); as well as a “general 
association of nations” to ensure “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike”. 
Bearing in mind his own link with “self-determination”, Wilson took advantage of the speech to 
inspire international debate on the subject, without resorting to the phrase directly. An example of 
this was the way Wilson highlighted nationally defined characteristics for working out state 
boundaries: his contribution in this field provided reference points for politicians and academics to 
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discuss self-determination in nationalistic terms in future years. More specifically, Wilson’s 
discourse on the restoration of Belgium and France independence would later be seen as case studies 
in self-determination being used to re-establish sovereignty after occupation and annexation, as in 
the 1990s instances of Baltic independence. Wilson’s talk of “colonial claims” in relation to Russia 
seemed to be prompted by the Bolsheviks’ anti-imperialist rhetoric of “self-determination”. Wilson 
primarily intended the Fourteen Points to be legitimised through creating peace, stability, liberty and 
protection from the kind of disorderly involvement that Lenin had advocated. The main targets of 
Lenin’s version of “self-determination” were domination, dependence and inequality. But Lenin also 
aimed to prevent the sort of interference manifested in colonial oppression and exploitation by 
capitalist forces. 
In turn, Wilson linked the liberty of “free nations” – or “states” as they are referred to today181 – 
with their stability and ability to trade freely.182 Thus Wilson outlined disruptive influence and 
sudden change as the main threats to freedom. The U.S. President did not mention “self-
determination” or even “freedom” directly in his wartime speeches.183 Instead, peace and states 
being able to act unimpeded were the main themes in Wilson’s communications.184 Freedom as 
peace is what Wilson emphasised – he saw it as the legitimising norm. This was to be expected 
considering his stance was being delivered in the context of the First World War. It was an idea of 
“freedom” not shared by the far more radical Lenin, who continued to see violence as an acceptable 
tool to be used towards political change in the context of “self-determination”. 
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Economics was crucial to Wilson’s argument during the war. As regards interference, free trade was 
particularly important to him.185 The American President cautioned that curbing trade between states 
would be a “non-interference” peril to their freedom.186 The ideology of economic liberalism, 
expressed as free trade, was essential to peace, stability and overall freedom. Wilson warned in 
April 1918 that a German victory in the war would end up with “trade […] follow(ing) the flag”, 
with no maritime liberty.187 Protectionism blighted free trade, so jeopardising a nation’s freedom 
and a peaceful world order, Wilson argued.188 To limit this danger, Wilson used post-war 
settlements to press for free trade for some countries by emphasising their open passage to 
international waters.189  
Prior to America entering the First World War, Wilson mentioned “self-determination” in 1915 
when he asked Congress to improve the country’s military measures so as to make independent 
seaborne trade safer,190 but at this stage the term was not yet a global one. President Wilson’s first 
significant statement on “self-determination” came with his “Four Principles” address to Congress 
on 11 February 1918.191 He expanded on his Fourteen Points speech. The Four Principles aimed to 
address international reaction to the Fourteen Points, and to clarify America’s peace settlement 
proposals. By this time, the USA had been fighting in the war for close to an entire year, and still 
viewed Russia as an ally. This was despite the latter being actively engaged in talks with the Central 
Powers – the Quadruple Alliance that was at war with the Allied Powers. As difficulties mounted, 
and the world searched for a new way forward, Wilson’s usage of “self-determination” in his Four 
Principles pronouncement was the most valuable international expression of the notion of the 
unfolding century.  
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Wilson’s Four Principles immersed the language of “self-determination” into an enquiry into the 
causes of the war, and indeed the entire nature of the war. This was at a time when Lenin was also 
still exploring the concept of self-determination in his works as it related to the conflict. Wilson 
wrote: “This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities 
which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own 
allegiances and their own forms of political life.”192 Wilson scorned the “forever 
discredited…balance of power” game, saying that, to guarantee peace, “every territorial settlement 
involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned”. 
A peaceful world, and an end to instability, was the ultimate object of Wilson’s form of “self-
determination”: 
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and 
governed only by their own consent. ‘Self- determination’ is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will 
henceforth ignore at their peril.193 
So it was that Wilson legitimised “self-determination” as a way of ending domination and 
interference. Wilson had no truck with revolutionary violence. Peace and freedom were the result of 
stability, and entirely the right state of affairs.194 This contrasted sharply with Lenin’s ideological 
definition of “self-determination” that relied on self-determination as being a step on the road to 
equality within the framework of internationalist socialism. Lenin’s ultimate objective was violent 
revolution to end capitalism, and he advocated the unlawful use of force, if necessary, to attain this. 
There is no doubt that, like Lenin, Wilson saw “self-determination” as a means to an end, but of 
course the end Wilson aspired to was distinct from Lenin’s. 
Wilson always differentiated between “peoples” and “statesmen” in his Four Principles address. He 
suggested it was politicians, and not their constituents, who were responsible for the First World 
War.195 Wilson insisted that his country was at war with Germany per se but “had no quarrel with 




194See, for example, Notter, op. cit., pp.20, 80, 228; Manela, op. cit., The Wilsonian Moment, p.43.  
195For instance, in the Washington Post interview, 5 November 1916, cited in Notter, op. cit., p.568, see also p.480. 
196In Wilson, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War against Germany’, 2 April, 1917, 
APP: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65366. 
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and condemned such autocracy in Germany as an illegitimate bar to freedom.197 Yet rather than 
supporting the “bottom-up” idea that ordinary people should decide on policy, Wilson concentrated 
on the ideal of rulers understanding what those they were in charge of desired, and delivering their 
wishes through the established political system.198 Wilson thus viewed a flaw in the general will, in 
that people en masse could make the wrong decisions and put society in peril.199 Wilson was said to 
be a self-styled “democrat like Jefferson, with aristocratic tastes” in 1917.200 He was not altogether 
content to be considered as a democrat because “his mind led him where his taste rebelled”.201 
Wilson was prone to think of his backing for democracy as being in “bad taste”. 
The Four Principles speech was, therefore, in many ways a warning to politicians that bypassing 
“self-determination” would put their own futures in jeopardy. Allowing self-determination to 
flourish would defuse popular dissent and prevent it from threatening political power.202 Wilson thus 
considered that self-determination should be an “imperative principle of action”: ignoring it would 
endanger peace and stability, and put the position of rulers at risk. Wilson’s crucial point was that, in 
contrast to Lenin’s thinking, self-determination should not manifest itself in demands for equality or 
separate statehood.203 
Wilson’s Pragmatic Approach to Self-Determination: “An Imperative Principle of Action”? 
The way Wilson considered “self-determination” as a means of empowering heads of state over 
ordinary people has been underplayed by historians. Wilson’s view of the phrase as integral part of 
democracy was noticeably dissimilar to many modern interpretations of the principle.204 
 
197Wilson 1918, ‘Four Principles’, see also his message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 11 March 1918, Baker 
1922, Vol. I, p.45; and E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. III, 1928, p.433.  
For reference to Lenin’s response on behalf of the Bolsheviks see ‘Draft Resolution on Lenin’s Message’, 15 March 
1918: www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/13.htm#bk2. See also William Langer, ‘Peace and the New 
World Order’ in Arthur Dudden (ed.), Woodrow Wilson and the World Today, Philadelphia, PA, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1957, p.67-68. 
198See, for example, Stephen Wertheim, ‘The Wilsonian Chimera: Why Debating Wilson’s Vision hasn’t saved 
American Foreign Relations’, White House Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 2011, pp.343-359, pp.349, 351. 
199See, for example, E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. IV, 1928, p.28, note 1. 
200E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. III, 1928, pp.181–182, diary entry from 10 September 1917. 
201Ibid. 
202Cf. Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917; also Edward M. House, ‘The Versailles Peace in Retrospect’ in 
Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (eds.), What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace 
Conference 1918–1919 by American Delegates, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1921, pp.425–444, p.429. 
203Cf. also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, p.446; and the Bowman Memorandum, DHM 1928, 
Vol. I, p.43.  
204In particular, see Wilson, op. cit., The State; also Wertheim, op. cit., ‘The Wilsonian Chimera’, p.349. 
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The U.S. President’s ideas about democracy were thus very different to the kind that are popular 
today, when voters in liberal democracies technically govern through elections, institutions, and 
relations with their representatives. Simply describing Wilson’s “self-determination” as 
encompassing values such as “popular sovereignty”205 and “self-government”206 can be wide off the 
mark and certainly needs to be challenged. Wilson was prone to engage with particular grassroots 
groups, for instance left-wingers who had to be persuaded away from Bolshevism, or Germans 
whom he wanted to convince to rebel against the Central Powers’ unjust war.207 However, this 
limited approach to “self-determination” clashed with Wilson’s universal discourse on the matter, 
and seemed more like pragmatic manoeuvring prompted by the progress of the First World War. 
The following ideas about Wilson’s concept of “self-determination” in fact appeared in his rhetoric 
using a different form: that is to say the “consent of the governed”.208 Although Wilson often 
employed the expressions “self-determination” and “consent of the governed” interchangeably,209 
“consent of the governed” was given precedence. In particular, Wilson had articulated the 
proposition in 1917 that peace and stability were reliant on “the principle that governments derive 
all their just powers from the consent of the governed”.210 The way Wilson resorted to the two 
notions as implying much the same thing created difficulties as to their exact meaning, and indeed 
made it possible for peoples to apply differing definitions to the concept of “self-determination”.211 
Repeated references to “self-determination” and “consent of the governed” did, however, point to 
clear agreement on the legitimising requirements of stability, peace and freedom from interference. 
Wilson’s “consent of the governed” was accordingly a diluted type of “self-determination”,212 as the 
term “determination” indicates a far stronger link between the ruled and their rulers. The phrase 
 
205Manela, op. cit., p.42.  
206Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, p.451. 
207See, for example, Carleton, op. cit., p.563. 
208See, for instance, Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917; and on 26 May 1917 when Wilson addressed the 
new Russian Government, E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. III, 1928, p.135. Thus the allegation of 
Manela, op. cit., p.22, that President Wilson only swapped “self-determination” with “consent of the governed” in the 
days after February 1918, is erroneous. 
209See, for example, Wilson, ‘The Pueblo Speech’, 25 September 1919, Voices of Democracy, The US Oratory Project: 
voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/wilson-the-pueblo-speech-speech-text. The term “consent” is also mentioned in the above 
Four Principles citation. 
210Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917 and op. cit., ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918. 
211See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, p.478.  
212Ray Stannard Baker, ‘The Versailles Treaty and After’, Current History, vol. 88, no. 534, 1989 (originally published 
1924), pp.20–23, p.21; DHM 1928, Vol. II, Document 7: ‘Wilson’s Second Draft or First Paris Draft’, 10 January 1919, 
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“consent of the governed” suggests peoples meekly accepting the whims of a political 
establishment, while not assisting in the formation of the political framework which affects their 
lives or opting out to set up a new political system. In the absence of any definition of equality, 
“consent of the governed” could merely signify that people were governed rather than playing any 
active part in the process of government. Thus this phrasing points to a form of representation, rather 
than political ownership: it does not imbue people with a sense of political legitimacy, involving 
them directly in governance and indeed law-making. 
Lenin had presented “self-determination” as freedom, as it related to equality and the creation of 
new states. Wilson thus reacted to what he perceived as Lenin’s radical creeds by questioning the 
distinction between “self-determination” and “consent of the governed”. In short: Wilson moved 
“self-determination” down a far less extreme route. This happened during the propaganda war which 
was taking place between Russia and the USA, as both countries tried to champion their visions 
about how to create a new post-war world order. More specifically, Wilson wanted to turn “self-
determination” into his own conception in order to use the socialists’ international discourse on 
“self-determination”, while discarding its Bolshevik radical idea of freedom, and transforming it 
into a globally influential notion impregnated with his own liberal-conservative outlook. 
Wilson’s internationalisation of the language of “self-determination” led to millions calling for 
political liberty, in numerous different countries.213 As we shall see, Wilson’s rhetoric had a great 
appeal to Egyptian nationalists as they struggled against colonial rule. In this sense, Wilson’s 
statements had a profound influence on the progress of the war, and the way in which democracy 
would develop, and in particular on how the peoples’ political demands would be met. Wilson’s 
global pronouncements during the war were thus made with great sensitivity to the kind of impact 
they would have. Fear about the popularity of the Bolsheviks, and indeed the preoccupation that 
Russia could actually pull out of the war, and the need to establish a new world order on American 
terms, all bolstered the concept of self-determination. 
Against this background, using the term “consent of the governed” was also a sign of Wilson 
wanting to keep Allies such as Britain and France content during the war. Both had colonies and 
were intend on strengthening their respective empires, instead of liberating their “subject peoples”. 
 
213See, for example, the Provisional Government of Lithuania: ‘Lithuanian Delegation to Woodrow Wilson, 23 Jan. 
1919’, WWPL: wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30992; Manela, op. cit., p.196. 
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In the context of these colonial possessions, Wilson’s principles and proposals were examined with 
a lot of scepticism,214 so the U.S. President toned down his arguments. This pragmatic approach saw 
self-determination fitting into a definition that could encompass imperialism. In 1918, while Wilson 
was publicly articulating on the subject, Lenin had already purposefully conflated “self-
determination” with freedom from colonialism on the world stage. Worried that US-style “self-
determination” was not being promoted adequately, a Wilson-sanctioned official215 offered a 
perspective of the Fourteen Points in the Autumn of 1918 – one that encouraged Britain and France 
not to be concerned about self-determination threatening their colonies.216 While there was a 
consensus on a peace centred on Wilson’s Fourteen Points “and the principles of settlement 
enunciated in [Wilson’s] subsequent address”,217 with concepts such as self-determination,218 there 
was by no means a green light for a self-determination that included de-colonisation.219 
So it was that Wilson’s own usage of “self-determination” had, by the opening of the Paris Peace 
Conference, become acceptable to colonialist nations such as Britain.220 Woodrow Wilson had 
reconciled the desirables of peace, stability and non-interference with states which retained colonial 
empires. So long as these standards were respected, then colonialism was sanctioned, Wilson 
argued. Negotiators in Paris had also, in fact, sealed colonial arrangements, as they were in accord 
on boundary agreements that adhered to the wishes of major powers. Only a handful of new states 
 
214In 1929, Churchill stated that the Allies were largely unsupportive of Wilson’s plan “except in general sympathy”, 
p.105; an irritated Georges Clemenceau (in Grandeur and Misery of Victory, London, Harrap, 1930) went further and 
diminished the Fourteen Points to a “purely American idea”, p.156. The same view is expressed in Franz Ansprenger, 
The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires, New York, Routledge, 1989, p.31.  
215House’s analysis was prepared in time for the Peace Conference, and used during negotiations. Drafted in the main by 
Walter Lippman, who had been Secretary of the Inquiry, it was completed on 29th October 1918, E.M. House, op. cit., 
Vol. IV, pp.156–158 and Churchill, op. cit., p.106. Cf. also Riga & Kennedy, op. cit. 
216E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. III, 1928; ‘Official American Commentary on the Fourteen Points’, 
October 1918, pp.198, 201. See also Churchill, op. cit., p.106; Seymour, op. cit., pp.567-558, 571. 
217However, there were qualifications in relation to the “freedom of the seas”, and refraining from requesting German 
compensation clauses, André Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty, Indianapolis, IN, Bobbs-Merrill, 1921, p.71. The 
Allies’ declaration was in response to ‘President Wilson’s consent to propose an armistice to the Allies’, Department of 
State, Washington, DC, 23 October 1918, in Scott, op. cit., pp.434-436. 
218Indeed, France did mention “self-determination” in its “plan of procedure” ahead of the Paris Peace Conference, 
Tardieu, op. cit., p.88. 
219Clemenceau would later refute that the Allies ever wished to implement any “liberation program”: A.J. Mayer, 
op. cit., p.184; also De Groot, op. cit., pp.197, 193. For a sceptical British approach to Wilson’s principles, see TNA: FO 
608/41/503, Peace Conference (British Delegation) Files 97/1/22 to 98/1/2 (to P.P.18113), 1919, from Herron on 30 
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220See the exchanges compiled in DHM 1928, Vol. I-II. 
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were brought into being by the Paris Peace Conference.221 Instead, subjugated minority groups were 
left outside their “mother” countries.222 Concessions such as minority rights were awarded to some 
of those living in existing states, but they were not granted their own state.223 
By the time he actually got to Paris, Wilson was not as supportive of “self-determination” as peoples 
around the world had imagined. He was mistrustful of altering frontiers,224 and did not act like the 
self-styled champion of self-determination,225 or the “icon of their aspirations”.226 Oppressed people 
had presented letters and petitions to Wilson, and organised visits to see him.227 Despite this, Wilson 
did not offer much help.228 Wilson had presented the theory of self-determination as the key to 
peace, international order and non- interference in the affairs of states but he had no interest in new 
cases.229 Wilson by no means saw the concept as a dynamic for action. In Paris, the American 
President showed far more enthusiasm towards creating a League of Nations to ensure peace and 
stability. 
It is likely that Wilson was by then disgruntled that the language of “self-determination” he had 
employed during the war was being used to justify the need for absolute freedom for millions of 
disaffected people around the world. Just before the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson is said to have 
told the aid who spread his speeches globally: 
 
221See, for example, Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp.28, 30.  
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Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921, pp.112–132, along with Vol. I–VI, 1920-1921; and ‘The Application of 
Self-determination in the Peace Treaties of 1919’, pp.57–84 in Alfred Cobban, The Nation State & National Self-
Determination, London, Collins, 1969; and Seymour, op. cit. 
223Liliana Riga and James Kennedy, ‘Tolerant Majorities, Loyal Minorities, and “Ethnic Reversals”: Constructing 
Minority Rights at Versailles 1919’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 15, no. 3, 2009, pp.461-482, in particular pp.463-
464. For an insight into international power relations as they relate to the war’s end, see Paul M. Kennedy, ‘The First 
World War and the International Power System’, International Security, vol. 9, no. 1, 1984, pp.7-40. 
224Cf. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations, New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.131. 
225See, for example, Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontier making, New Haven, 
CT, Yale University Press, 1963, p.25. 
226Manela, op. cit., p.4. 
227William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson: The Man, His Times and His Task, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 3rd edition, 
1925, p.388. 
228See also Manela, op. cit., in relation to the plight of the Egyptian nationalists, p.153; the Koreans, pp.123-127; the 
Indians, p.166. 
229For instance, events described by the Indian and Turkish representatives in Grayson’s diary entry at the Peace 
Conference, 17 May 1919, WWPL: wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30940. Note to records from February 
6, 1919 described in E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. IV, 1928, p.322, and DHM 1928, Vol. I, pp.158, 
165, on India and self-rule. House was also later frustrated with smaller entities’ demands to self-determination, see 
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I am wondering if you have not unconsciously spun a net for me from which 
there is no escape. It is to America that the whole world turns to-day, not 
only with its wrongs, but with its hopes and grievances. The hungry expects 
us to feed them, the roofless look to us for shelter, the sick of heart and body 
depend upon us for cure. […] What I seem to see – with all my heart I hope 
that I am wrong – is a tragedy of disappointment.230  
The most telling example of Wilson’s unease at raising the concept of “self-determination” is often 
incorrectly linked to a speech at the US Senate on 19 August 1919,231 or a “written statement” he is 
meant to have sent to Congress “in late 1919”.232 In fact, the actual statement referred to was made 
while Wilson was with an Irish delegation in Paris on 11 June 1919, and it was sent to the US Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on 30 August 1919.233 According to the proceedings of the 
gathering, the group from Ireland said President Wilson had summed up the views of thousands 
around the world when he “uttered those words declaring that all nations had a right to self-
determination”. President Wilson was in turn perturbed by the unpredictable impact of what he said, 
explaining: “When I gave utterance to those words, I said them without the knowledge that 
nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day.”234 
In light of Wilson’s more practical, and indeed sceptical behaviour in Paris, it is worth reconsidering 
his reputation as a bone fide champion of “self-determination”. If he really had been the 
personification of the concept, then he would have wanted to propagate it around the world, using it 
to help liberate oppressed peoples. In fact, Wilson often made vague references to the idea, and his 
muted commitment to “real life” self-determination (in contrast to the academic principle) has 
tentatively been explained by his misgivings about actually coming up with the concept in the first 
place. That said, Wilson never publicly declared that his discourse on “self-determination” had been 
misinterpreted, or that he should not have uttered it in the first place.235 
 
230See Creel, op. cit., The War, p.163; also Baker, op. cit., Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I, p.7. 
231Cassese, op. cit., p.22; Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal, 
The Hague, Lower Law International, 2001, p.23. 
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There was in fact a great deal of pragmatism in relation to Wilson’s language of self-determination, 
especially in comparison to Lenin’s views on the subject. In this respect, it is likely that Wilson felt 
his own ideas on self-determination were misunderstood by the international audience he spent so 
much time cultivating. Lenin’s radical version of freedom as equality for everyone – including 
colonised peoples – was what Wilson had responded to. Wilson’s main aim had been to see fellow 
statesmen applying the principles of self-determination to create order, stability, and peace. He had 
by no means envisaged using the notion to justify or indeed spur popular revolutions. It is possible 
that it was not the rhetoric of “self-determination” that disappointed Wilson, but instead the fact that 
ordinary people were acting in accordance with what they thought it meant, rather than allowing 
world leaders to put it into practice. The irony was that subjugated peoples in many different 
countries interpreted Wilson’s self-determination in the radical manner that Lenin had advocated. 
So, nationalist movements around the world were in effect looking to put into practice Lenin’s 
revolutionary principles through the proxy of Wilson’s words. Rather than strengthening the values 
he believed in, Wilson’s globalisation of the term “self-determination” inspired numerous drives 
towards liberation that the President had not foretold, or indeed desired. 
There were other statements, private ones, used by Wilson to highlight his intricate evaluation of 
“self-determination”. It was the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau who defined Wilson’s 
ambition to create a League of Nations as the U.S. President’s “motor”.236 Wilson’s initial draft of a 
League Covenant, of 7 September 1918, referred to “self-determination”, but it was dependent on 
international peace and stability, illustrating how idealised Wilson’s vision could be.  
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political 
independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that 
such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary 
by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present 
social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-
determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the 
judgement of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and 
manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to 
those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material 
compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the 
 
236Clemenceau, op. cit., p.161. See also Ambrosius, op. cit., ‘Democracy’, p.229, and Stevenson, op. cit., p.245. 
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principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every 
question of political jurisdiction or boundary. 237 
It was Edward M. House, one of Wilson’s closest advisors, who placed the reference to “self-
determination” in the Covenant draft.238 Earlier, President Wilson had managed to keep the term 
away from public documents.239 Other senior colleagues, including Secretary of State Lansing and 
David Hunter Miller were categorically opposed to the use of the word: “self-determination” would 
solely lead to unrest and destabilisation was their argument.240 Hunter Miller would dispel mentions 
to “self-determination” as nationhood and instead stress the need for “internal” rights, or indeed 
human rights. Hunter Miller accordingly recommended substituting “self-determination” in the 
Covenant with a pledge to support minority rights.241 
Faced with such opposition, Wilson agreed to temper the Covenant’s reference to “self-
determination”. He put forward the idea of letting countries to veto territorial changes.242 There is 
nothing to suggest that Wilson’s scepticism towards “self- determination” was being erased from 
later versions of the Covenant243 – a document which he knew was crucial as a means for striving 
for order in the post-war world.244 “Self-determination” was originally changed to “consent of the 
 
237DHM 1928, Vol. II, Document 3: ‘Wilson’s First Draft: Covenant’, pp.12–13, emphasis mine. Three months on, 
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governed” in the drafting process,245 but this too was eventually taken out.246 Article (X) of the final 
Covenant ended up reading as follows:  
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression 
or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall 
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.247 
Wilson could have incorporated “self-determination” into the League Covenant, but did not.248 It 
thus remained a principle without any legal underpinning and indeed without any official means of 
applying it. Wilson had succeeded in bolstering the rhetoric of “self-determination”, and its power to 
make a difference in the world, but it did not become a part of international law. 
Wilson’s language of “self-determination” in the Four Principles speech was by no means as 
emphatic as it might have appeared at the time. Wilson had used the speech to attack Germany, and 
specifically Chancellor Georg von Hertling, asking: 
Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, 
that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every 
public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which 
has spread to every region of the world? 
Wilson described a “court” that was opposed to annexations and other threats and lauded “self-
determination” as being “an imperative principle of action”, rather than a vague rhetorical device, 
which statesmen would from now on “ignore at their peril”.249 Accordingly the notion of “self-
determination” was put forward as something approved of by an external actor, the “court of 
mankind”, while Wilson himself actually appeared less engaged with the concept of “self-
determination” in what was yet his most powerful argument for it. Wilson wanted to illustrate that 
men like von Hertling were dismissive of “self-determination”. What Wilson was not doing, 
however, was offering the proposition positively as a desirable that should be supported at all costs. 
Wilson’s speech was delivered just over a week after American diplomat William Bullit suggested 
 
245This was recommended by Hunter Miller, DHM 1928, Vol. II, p.87. See also Document 11, p.119, with Lord Eustace 
Percy making the same proposal. 
246DHM 1928, Vol. I, p.71. 
247See League of Nations: Covenant (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924), Avalon Project: 
avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. 
248See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, pp.445-446. 
249Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four Principles’, 1918.  
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to the President that he should use “self-determination” against the Central Powers. The speech was 
also four days after striking workers in Germany had sent Wilson a petition asking for “self-
determination”.250 Thus, Wilson’s Four Principles version of “self-determination” was reacting to 
specific situations, and not imbued with the idea that it should be employed come what may.  
Another reference to “self-determination” appeared in Wilson’s “Force to the Utmost” speech. This 
second key public mention came two months after the “Four Principles” one.251 It was made in 
Baltimore to a military audience, and was very much like the one in his Four Principles. This was a 
time when Wilson’s “self-determination” rhetoric was growing in popularity amongst peoples 
worldwide. The “Force to the Utmost” saw Wilson opposing Germany’s so-called “programme”: a 
programme that “our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free 
self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part”.252 As with 
the Four Principles speech, however, President Wilson did not actively champion the language of 
“self-determination” as playing an important role in his own agenda for world change. Instead, the 
term was used to undermine a wartime enemy. Thus, it is clear with hindsight that there were 
restrictions to Wilson’s support for “self-determination”, even when he spoke about it with such 
apparent passion in the Four Principles and “Force to the Utmost” speeches. 
An element of Wilson’s interpretation of “self-determination” which illustrates particular 
divergences with Lenin was the manner in which he tied it to equality. Wilson invariably mentioned 
equality in the context of discussions about self-determination, just as Lenin did.253 Where Wilson 
differed from Lenin, however, was in the way he valued equality only as part of an orderly world, in 
which peace was guaranteed. An example of this was how Wilson used his Fourteen Points to call 
for a peace centred on the “right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety”.254 Wilson resorted to 
the same speech to advocate “equality of trade conditions” for peaceful countries, and he re-iterated 
 
250Quoted in correspondence from Gordon Auchincloss, PWW 1984, Vol. 46, pp.227, 266. 
251Wilson did mention “self-determination” on subsequent occasions, including in the 1919 ‘Pueblo Speech’, but it was a 
reference in passing only, and while supporting his argument for the League – not “self- determination”. Other citations 
were even less significant: see his September 1919 session with the San Francisco Labour Council and his exchange 
with Grayson on 8 December 1918; Grayson’s ‘Peace Conference Diary Entry’, WWPL: 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=27740.  
252Wilson, op. cit., ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918. 
253Ibid.; Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four principles’, 1918; Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. 
254Wilson, op. cit., ‘Fourteen Points’, 1918. 
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this proposition in the Four Principles.255 Wilson’s “Force to the Utmost” speech also laid out the 
terms for a “peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike”.256 
Wilson’s definition of “self-determination” took into account a version of “equality” that was far 
more limited in scope than Lenin’s.257 Wilson outlined the equality of nations – or states as they 
would be referred to today – while Lenin applied equality to nations and their populations, including 
those who had no political power. More specifically, Wilson viewed equality as a concept aimed at 
ensuring peace.258 He considered equality as the right of any country to be free from interference in 
their political and business affairs.259 
Thanks to his generalised references to “peoples” and “nations”, Wilson was able to exclude 
particular groups from his definitions of equal self-determination. He was said to have “a passionate 
faith […] in the higher nature of the people!”,260 but this confidence was qualified to favour those 
who provided stability and peace. Thus Wilsonian self-determination supported peoples that 
guaranteed order.261 There was no question of simply granting self-determination as an ideal – it was 
instead a tool towards the establishment of international stability. 
It was also clear that there was an American bias in all Wilson’s views on self-determination, with 
the President convinced that his own country led the field in “serving humanity”.262 Wilson also 
 
255Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four principles’, 1918. 
256Wilson, op. cit., ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918. 
257Also, Wilson appeared to be uncommitted to equality in his domestic politics: see e.g. Wilson ‘An Address at New 
Rochelle, New York’, 27 February 1905, when he disapproved of the push from labour unions for equality, stating that 
“they drag the highest man to the level of the lowest”, in PWW 1974, Vol. 16, p.15. Wilson also objected to equal rights 
for non-whites, Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, pp.26-29. Scholars have shown some interest in the influence of racial 
thinking on Wilson’s policy and overall political thought, with one study published recently unequivocally calling him 
“racist”, Gary Gerstle, ‘Race and Nation in the Thought and Politics of Woodrow Wilson’ in Cooper (ed.), op. cit., 
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson, pp.93-124, at p.115. See also Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi sovereigns, 
and Africans: Race and Self-determination in International Law, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 
1996, pp.120-121. Distrust towards certain “races” as well as towards democracy (as representative of the masses) was 
commonplace at the time; for an overview see Richard Bellamy, ‘The advent of the Masses and the Making of the 
Modern Theory of Democracy’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit., pp.70-103.  
258Wilson, op. cit., ‘Address’, 1916, and: ‘Fourteen Points’, 1918. See also House’s diary entry of 15 August 1918, 
E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. III, 1928, p.49; Killen, op. cit., p.67. 
259See e.g. Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. 
260Baker, op. cit., Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I, p.103. See also Link, op. cit., Wilson: The Diplomatist, p.14 and Edith 
Benham’s diary notes, 10 January 1919, in PWW 1986, Vol. 53, p.707-709. See also Wilson, op. cit., The State e.g. 
p.27. 
261Wilson laid out these points of his political thought in his 1919 (originally 1889) The State, as well as in ‘The Modern 
Democratic State’, an 1885 piece of writing, reproduced in PWW 1968, Vol. 5, see pp.90 and 92 specifically. 
262Baker, op. cit., Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I, pp.17, 22. 
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believed that he had a special role in this duty.263 He stated that the USA “spr[ang] out of freedom 
and [was] for the service of freedom”,264 and that only America could “redeem the world”.265 
Wilson argued that America was the only “disinterested” combatant in the war,266 and integral in 
asserting the war aim he enunciated in his 1917 “Peace without Victory”.267 In this sense, America’s 
unique morality informed the country’s war efforts to clamp down on the secret treaties and 
diplomacy, and the annexing of territory associated with the old order.268 Thus, in theory, Wilson 
articulated the formal ideal of equality between states, but there was always ambiguity in his words. 
In fact, Wilson’s new world order promoted American exceptionalism, rather than genuine equality 
between nations.  
American values were fundamental to Wilson’s statements made during the war: he wanted to 
spread them across the world, rather than let other populations define their own standards. In the 
Four Principles, Wilson declared that he did “not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the 
acceptance of any particular set of suggestions”,269 but a year earlier, a set of ideals was put forward. 
President Wilson had stated the necessity for a re-shaped world centred on “consent of the 
governed”, a reduction in armaments and freedom of the seas. Wilson wrote: 
These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no 
others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men 
and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened 
community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.270 
Beyond his grand missionary rhetoric, Wilson knew that his domestic audience required him to 
concentrate on U.S. national interest as it related to the war effort.271 Wilson insisted throughout the 
war that non-interference, especially as regards the flourishing of free trade, was essential to the 
long term advantage of the country.272 If the war did not end in Victory, Wilson said in 1918, his 
“own great Nation’s place and mission in the world would be lost with it”.273 The wishes of the 
 
263For psychological analysis, see Freud & Bullit, op. cit., pp.197, 226. 
264Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four Principles’, 1918. 
265Wilson, op. cit., ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918. 
266See Bowman’s notes, cited in DHM 1928, Vol. I, p.41. 
267Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. 
268Baker, op. cit., Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I, pp.27–29, 100. See also Notter, op. cit., pp.114-119. 
269Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four Principles’, 1918.  
270Wilson, op. cit., ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. 
271See Ambrosius, op. cit., Wilsonianism, p.122. 
272Prior to America entering the war, in Wilson’s 1915: ‘State of the Union’; after, in 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. 
273Wilson, op. cit., ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918. 
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Republicans who controlled the American Congress were a huge influence on Wilson as he 
formulated a place for the U.S. in the world. The Republicans were opposed to becoming too 
wrapped up in world affairs, and Wilson had to make sure this did not happen.274  
Beyond offering a confusing and at times muddled definition of “equality” in relation to “self-
determination”, Wilson’s actual implementation of the concept was also far from convincing. Due to 
the term’s close association with its perceived originator, these ambiguous policies, too, would 
become part of the international image of “self-determination”.275 The Wilsonian approach could 
thus be as much about proposing universal values of equality to the peoples of the world as about 
exclusion. Wilson dismissed Africans living within Germany’s Empire as “barbarians” unqualified 
for self-determination, for example.276 Similar prejudice was aimed at the Irish and Albanians too. 
When an Irish group petitioned Wilson at the White House in 1918, he was uninterested.277 
Wilson was later to admit that the Irish made him “very angry”, and “that he had wanted to tell them 
to go to hell”.278 Britain was an important ally of the USA, and Wilson saw no reason to grant Irish 
nationalists support against Britain.279 
The terminology used by Wilson as he discussed equality was therefore restrained by his 
paradoxical belief that only progressive, liberal thinkers could have a say in politics.280 Wilson 
deemed equality to be a basic standard necessary within “free states” which demonstrated their 
advancement by abiding by the law.281 Those who broke the law, on the other hand, were a threat to 
 
274See e.g. Republican criticism in Creel, op. cit., The War; Manela, op. cit., p.56. 
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Conference delegates.  
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277‘An Address and a Reply’, 10 January 1918, in PWW 1984, Vol. 45, pp.559-561. See also Wilson’s replies to the San 
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2006, p.264. 
279See also Ambrosius, op. cit., Wilsonianism, p.119-122. 
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281See Wilson’s first draft Covenant in E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. IV, 1928, p.27-28. See also 
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Vol. IV, 1928, p.18. 
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” 
and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists 
 
210 
peace and stability, and were thus not entitled to equality.282 Wilson said in 1917 that true equality 
had to be “gained” in an incremental, non-violent way.283 This conditional attitude towards equality 
was the basis for peace, Wilson argued. This position was prevalent following the end of the First 
World War when newly liberated countries could only be recognised diplomatically if they adopted 
treaties guaranteeing the rights of minorities.284  
Moral and orderly governance worked within the mandate system, Woodrow Wilson suggested at 
the end of 1918.285 He saw this as a pragmatic means of ensuring peaceful and stable societies while 
avoiding the need to offer policies of equality without any pre-requisites and an independent 
homeland for those who were “unqualified”. The mandate system would therefore become the most 
decisive way to practically implement his concept of self-determination. The mandate system 
would, when incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant, guarantee sovereignty for the League. 
More specifically, it would be responsible for the “right of ultimate disposal” over populations 
formerly under the rule of Russia, or the Hapsburg or Ottoman empires. A designated member of the 
League would be mandated to each set area.286 According to the Covenant, mandate rule was 
necessary for those “not (being) able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world”.287 
It was South Africa’s Prime Minister Jan Smuts who helped to develop Wilson’s faith in the 
mandate system in “Practical Suggestion” for a League of Nations.288 Smuts organised people into 
 
282See Link, op. cit., The Higher Realism, especially ‘Woodrow Wilson and his Presbyterian Inheritance’, pp.3-20. 
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especially p.339. For the same motives, Shipway 2008 suggests that Germany was discredited as a colonial power. 
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196–197. 
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287The same expression had been used in Wilson’s various drafts of the Covenant; See e.g. DHM 1928, Vol. II, 
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their ability to govern themselves (or not), insisting some needed, “much nursing” to attain self-
rule.289 Smuts believed that the “genius of Western civilization” had a crucial role to play in the 
post-war world,290 and such views meant that Wilson was “[d]eeply impressed with the idea that it 
was the moral duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and especially to 
guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until they were capable of self-government and 
self-protection”.291 It was after reading the work of Smuts – a supporter of the apartheid system that 
ensured separate territories for blacks and whites – that Wilson included the mandate system into his 
own drafts of the League of Nations Covenant.292 Wilson’s confidence in Smuts suggests the U.S. 
President was by no means the open-minded liberal that some have made out. 
The mandate system and the Covenant were meant to guarantee guardianship by “advanced 
nations”293 so that the world as a whole would be kept safe from the potential chaos brought about 
by “uncivilised” peoples.294 The President’s advisors agreed to the mandate system being part of the 
Covenant. The major criticism of the mandate system was that it effectively legitimised inequality, 
rather than its stated aim of peace for all states. The completed, agreed Covenant left very little 
power to those who were mandated,295 while League members could take advantage of the assets of 
those oppressed peoples through the “open door” system.296 Lansing would then suggest that the 
approval of the mandate system by the Allied powers was primarily motivated by their desire to 
carve up Germany’s colonies.297  
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291Lansing, op. cit., The Peace Negotiations, pp.142–143. 
292A principle that concerned the former German colonies in the first place, DHM 1928, Vol. II, p.40. Churchill, op. cit., 
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The mandate system became linked across the globe with President Wilson’s notion of “self-
determination”. Subjugated peoples who were set to be part of the mandate system asked the U.S. 
President about its effects at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference,298 and they particularly wanted to 
know how it differed from “self-determination”.299 Wilson replied, rather mysteriously: “In every 
instance the mandate should fit the case as the glove fits the hand”.300 At a later date Wilson 
suggested to peoples living under a mandate that, over time, the system would assist them in gaining 
“full membership in the family of nations”, as this was essential for the sake of peace.301 All the 
while, Wilson focused the system’s prerogatives on how he saw his and the USA’s role in the world. 
That is to say, he wanted a prime example of universal rights and stability to administer people, 
regardless of the views they particularly formulated.302 Peace would be guaranteed by the mandate 
system, and this would in turn ensure proper freedom, was Wilson’s belief. 
Wilson’s overriding argument that mandated populations were not developed enough to establish 
themselves as political players meant that many would remain excluded from their own political, 
economic and legal affairs. The League of Nations and the mandatory powers in authority would 
make the final decision on self-rule once mandates had matured during a period of oppression. 
Mandated peoples could agree to a system passively, but this system did not involve them directly in 
the political process. The kind of plebiscites employed in select post-war settlements was not 
applied for mandates.303 The ultimate aim of the system was to guarantee a peaceful international 
system, within which mandatories’ freedoms to operate appear to have been the leading tenets. This 
state of affairs was influenced by Wilson’s more reactionary views about “self-determination”. It 
was thus formalised, even though Wilson’s explicit phrasing was not used. 
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The differences between the Wilsonian and Leninist interpretations of self-determination are far 
clearer now than they were when the two men were both articulating them at the beginning of the 
20th century. Colonial subjects in particular perceived that the two leaders had very similar ideas 
about the concept. They both questioned the validity of Empires, they were both in favour of a new 
style of transparent diplomacy, and they were both seeking a peaceful world that allowed self-
determination to flourish.  
What was certain, however, was that by 1918 Wilson had far more power to influence world opinion 
than Lenin. Wilson could inform and direct the imminent peace negotiations, and indeed adopt 
Bolshevik language to do so. Such radical discourse reflected an appetite for a complete overhaul of 
society. Subjugated peoples around the world were desperate for a transformation of the 
international order, and Wilson used the Bolshevik rhetoric of self-determination to promote his 
own programme to significantly reshape the world. In turn, anti-colonial nationalists operating 
within established Empires would appropriate Wilson’s language as they took on the foreign 
oppressors governing their lives. 
Wilson’s Self-Determination in Practice: “A Tragedy of Disappointment” for Egyptian 
Nationalists? 
Woodrow Wilson’s determined work towards creating a new world order was reported extensively 
by newspapers and journals across Egypt. The leading Arabic language newspaper, Al-Ahram, carried 
minute coverage and analysis of the American President’s April 1917 Speech to the U.S. Congress 
declaring war. Wilson pledged to support small countries in their calls and rights for freedom and – 
more generally –solemnly promised to make the world a place where democracy could flourish. 
There were numerous similar articles in the press concentrating on what America had to offer the 
Allies. Al-Ahram editorials stressed the country’s “immense” potential in the conflict, saying it 
could raise a conscript army of three million men. The overall conclusion was that the USA’s entry 
to the war could be decisive towards a successful outcome for the Allies.304  
 
304‘Al-duktur Wilsun yatlubu min al-majlis iʿlan al-harb ʿala Almania’ (Dr. Wilson asks Congress to Declare War on 
Germany), Al-Ahram, 4 April 1917; ‘Amrika wa-Almania fi harb’ (The U.S. and Germany at War), and ‘Khitab al-raʾis 
Wilsun’ (President Wilson’s Address), Al-Ahram, 5 April 1917; ‘Majlis al-Shuyukh al-Amriki yuqarriru iʿlan al-harb’ 
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Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech of January 8th 1918 received as much media attention as the 
Congress Address: the entire Speech was translated into Arabic by the Reuters news agency, and the 
joint commentary highlighted the enthusiastic responses to the Speech from around the world.305 
Egyptians across the country were thus fully informed not only about Wilson’s set of actions on how 
to win the war, but also on his vision for a post-war settlement. This had far more to do with the role 
of the press than any propaganda efforts deployed by the Commission on Public Information, which 
did not have a base in Egypt.306  
Censors operating in Egypt during the war directed their efforts towards stamping down on dissent 
shown against the domestic government, but there was little opposition to reports and analysis on 
what was happening in America and the rest of the world. Well-educated Egyptians could also read 
European newspapers from countries such as Britain and France that were imported and distributed 
widely in major cities, as well as those printed in the country for the vast communities of 
expatriates.307 News about other international events, including the demands for Home Rule by the 
Indian National Congress was also carried by the newspapers. Egyptians could certainly get a very 
good idea about the number of people who believed that the war could change their position in the 
world, and ideally for the better.308  
Journalism promoting the Allied cause became even more prevalent in 1918, as the Allied powers 
looked increasingly likely to win. By the summer, as American troops contributed to more 
battlefield triumphs, the Egyptian press reported on the Fourth of July Independence Day 
celebrations in the U.S. for the first time. The fact that the USA chose the peaceful signing of the 
Declaration of Independence – and not a military victory or violent upheaval – as a specific day to 
mark its freedom from Britain was considered novel. Thus, high ideals were seen as being crucial to 
the American victory, rather than simply armed conflict.  
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Less than 150 years since achieving liberty from Britain, America was leading the world in 
numerous fields of human activity, from teaching and the arts, while also becoming a beacon of 
freedom and economic success. A substantial citation from the Declaration of Independence stirred 
Egyptian imaginations following its Arabic translation in Al-Ahram. Other events covered at length 
included President Wilson’s Fourth of July Address at Mount Vernon, when he again outlined his 
country’s war motivations, and there were also reports on the Independence Day festivities in capital 
cities in Europe.309 The notion of American exceptionalism was being celebrated in print 
newspapers in countries such as India and China, and Egypt followed suit. High moral stances, 
rather than selfish self-interest, were seen as the guiding light of world leaders such as Wilson, 
especially as America was evidently less reliant on Imperialism than the British or the French and 
thus more favourable to the principle of self-determination. 
Like nationalists in other parts of the world, those who longed for an independent Egypt were 
increasingly impressed by Wilson, and everything that his country represented in the new world 
order. Many of the Egyptian nationalists felt that America and its leader would therefore have to 
conform to the values promoted in their Declaration of Independence, the American war effort 
rhetoric, and indeed the country’s plans for a post-war peace, if they were to achieve their own 
ambitions.310 Such ideas were reinforced when other Allied powers supported Wilson’s statements, 
as the Egyptians were pleased to see. Just before the Armistice in 1918, there was an Anglo-French 
declaration about the Middle East: it pledged to “ensure the complete and final emancipation of all 
those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and 
administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people 
themselves”. Only Syria and Mesopotamia were specifically referred to, but Egyptian nationalists 
were emboldened by the idea, and were convinced the same measures could apply to them.311 
Nationalists in Egypt who had originally been demanding a greater say in the running of the 
Egyptian government, were so impressed by Wilson’s and the Allied views that they saw no reason 
why they should not strive for complete self-determination for themselves. Saʿad Zaghlul, the vice 
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president of the Legislative Assembly, was among the nationalists who rallied around such ideas. He 
was to become the leader of the 1919 Revolution, while colleagues who supported him included 
Muhammad Mahmud, who was from Egypt’s landowning elite. Other prominent figures involved in 
the movement were the liberal politician ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Fahmi, and the lawyer and author Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid. All of these men considered that the First World War was part of a period of history 
that was theirs to exploit. The “fight for Egyptian independence”, as Lutfi al-Sayyid would describe 
it, was a challenge which numerous Egyptians wanted to take part in. Prince ʿUmar Tusun, of the 
Egyptian Royal Family, spent the weeks leading up to the Armistice meeting Zaghlul to discuss 
sending an Egyptian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.312 Prince ʿUmar Tusun said that the 
idea of Egypt dispatching a delegation had “occurred to him after the publication of President 
Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points”.313 Even Egypt’s Sultan Fuʾad himself told the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, Britain’s principal authority figure in Egypt, that he aspired to 
“Home Rule for Egypt along the lines of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points”.314 This affirmation in 
October 1918 showed that Egypt was utterly committed to exerting what power it could muster in 
the new world order. 
President Wilson’s pronouncements continued to drive this move towards Egypt’s independence. 
Egyptian leaders were convinced that Wilson would offer his backing to them, because their 
ambitions were so closely based on the president’s own beliefs in post-war peace negotiations. 
Hampson Gary, America’s Consul General in Cairo, sent a report back to Washington on the day of 
the 1918 Armistice saying: “I have been made aware of a tendency in all classes of Egyptians to 
believe that President Wilson favours self-government throughout all the world and that he will 
champion the right of the people of this country to govern themselves.” Mr. Gary said “prominent 
officials” in Egypt had already asked him if Wilson’s vision for the world intended to extend his 
ideals to countries outside of Europe, and specifically to Egypt itself. Mr. Gary said he had heard a 
“persistent rumour” that members of the Egyptian National Assembly were circulating a petition 
calling for their own “self-determination”. Gary wrote that “All signs seem to me to point to a 
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definite movement to elicit the support of the American Government on behalf of their claims in the 
great international clearing house that is now in process of formation either by a general public 
appeal or before the peace Congress soon to meet”,315 thus confirming the Egyptian politicians’ faith 
that President Wilson would be on their side. Publications produced and distributed widely by the 
nationalists stated that independence had been recognised by Wilson as “a natural right of nations” 
and the subjugation of people completely contradicted Wilson’s principle of self-determination. In 
such circumstances, Britain’s belief that it could govern Egypt against the will of Egyptians was no 
longer acceptable.316 
When Wilson became the first U.S. President to leave America while in office, the Egyptian press in 
Arabic ran many reports about his arrival in France. The President personified the newfound 
economic and military strength of the USA, and he appeared to be the first international statesman to 
be working for everyone in the world, and not just the major powers. He wanted to back humanity 
“without distinction between white, black, yellow, etc”. There were references to the Prime Minister 
of Italy and how he saw Wilson as producing a new bible for humanity, but there was no sign of the 
American president being arrogant. It was reported that Wilson made much of displaying his 
passport to European border officials when he travelled between countries, for example. Speculation 
about Wilson’s thought processes were rife, but commentators had nonetheless full trust that his past 
“great addresses” would influence the future of the world in Paris positively.317 
It was also noted in news reports that, beyond Paris, Wilson’s whirlwind tour of Europe included 
trips to London, and Rome. There was a visit to the village in the north of England where his 
mother’s family came from, and receptions with French President Raymond Poincaré; King George 
V of England; and Pope Benedict XV, for instance. It was thanks to these published news reports 
that literate Egyptians – and those who spoke to them – knew exactly where Wilson was, and what 
he was saying.318 As he built up his international profile and influence, Egyptian nationalists 
increasingly viewed Wilson as an ally, and cultivated his representatives at every opportunity. There 
were a great number of petitions received at the American legation office in Cairo demanding that a 
 
315Gary to Lansing, 11 November 1918, U.S. NARA RG 256, SD 883.00/2. Gary’s report to DOS, 29 January 1919, RG 
256, SD 883.00/12. 
316Terry, op. cit., The Wafd, pp.19-20, 84-100; Gershoni & Jankowski, op. cit., p.44; Kedourie, op. cit., ‘Saʿad Zaghlul 
and the British’, pp.97-98. 
317‘Dr. Wilson in Europe’, Al-Ahram, 15 December 1918. 
318Reported in Al-Ahram, 16, 17, 23, 24, and 30 December 1918. 
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” 
and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists 
 
218 
ban on the Egyptian delegation (Wafd, in Arabic) travelling to Paris should be reversed. The British 
did not want Zaghlul to travel, and the Americans were asked to oppose this, by adhering to the 
ideas of the “illustrious president, who stands today in the eyes of the world for full justice for all 
nations, large or small”.319  
All kinds of influential Egyptians signed the petition calling for the delegation to be able to go to 
Paris, including civil servants and legislators, those working in local government, tradesmen, 
members of the judiciary, doctors and those in the armed services.320 Hampson Gary wrote in his 
account that all were “basing their claims to independence on the president’s self-determination 
clause”, and that they would “endeavour to obtain an expression of opinion from him during his visit 
in Europe”.321 Egyptian Christians were, said Gary, the only group who opposed the proposed trip to 
Paris by the delegation, the Wafd. These Christians did not recognise Zaghlul as their leader, and 
wanted Britain to remain in charge in Egypt. They feared Muslim majority government, thinking 
that their own safety could be compromised. The petition received by the Americans from the 
Christians was not signed, however, and Gary admitted that it might be a forgery.322 
Zaghlul meanwhile sent a note to Gary saying that the Americans had entered the war with the aim 
“of safeguarding the rights of the small nations”. Zaghlul said the Egyptian people had to take 
control of their own future, and would be prepared to make a deal with America, to have their self-
determination supervised by a League of Nations envisioned by President Wilson.323 Zaghlul 
dispatched a telegram to Wilson himself in December 1918, stressing that Egyptians endorsed his 
view of the world. Zaghlul wrote: “No people more than the Egyptian people has felt strongly the 
joyous emotion of the birth of a new era which, thanks to your virile action, is soon going to impose 
itself upon the universe.” Wilson’s leadership would “spread everywhere all the benefits of a peace” 
no longer “troubled by the ambitions of hypocrisy or the old-fashioned policy of hegemony and 
furthering selfish national interests”, Zaghlul added.324 Egyptians were entitled to be in Paris, 
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Zaghlul argued, because it was their “natural and sacred right”— the overwhelming desire was for 
Wilson to get the British to accept all of this.325 
Nationalists in the Egyptian legislature expressed similarly ardent feelings in a letter welcoming 
President Wilson to Europe. It read: 
To the great and venerated President who led the people of the United States 
in their disinterested participation in the European conflict to save humanity 
and to preserve the world in the future from the horrors of war, we send our 
affectionate greetings. 
To the eminent philosopher and statesman who occupies today a 
preponderant place among the leaders of peoples, and whose high ideals are 
imposing themselves upon statesmen of all nations, we offer our homage and 
admiration. 
To the chief of the great American democracy, who left his country in order 
to bring about a durable peace based upon equal justice for all and 
guaranteed by the Society of Nations, we submit the cause of Egypt, which 
is subjugated to a foreign domination that Egypt unanimously rejects. 
Long live the United States! Long live President Wilson! 326 
While the note was clearly aimed at appealing to Wilson’s vanity, it reflected the American 
President’s portrayal in the Egyptian press at that time, and there is every likelihood that those views 
were completely sincere. 
Zaghlul continued to write to President Wilson, calling on him to apply his ideals to Egypt. Zaghlul 
also wrote to Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister who was president of the Paris Peace 
Conference, to complain about the British bar on Egyptians attending.327 Zaghlul produced a 
detailed memorandum about ‘The Egyptian National Claims’ on January 25, 1919, making the case 
for his 15-men delegation to travel from Cairo. This thirty-three page document was disseminated to 
all foreign diplomats in the city.328 All aspects of its culture and economic and historical 
developments, including its rich ancient history, meant Egypt was a perfect candidate to govern 
itself, the memo argued. Egypt’s “racial homogeneity, the high culture of her ‘elite,’ her sense of 
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order, love of liberty and generous tolerance” should all be considered, the memo emphasised. 
Meanwhile, it said that violent British rule was “at utter variance with justice, not to mention 
civilisation”. If, as Wilson had pledged, the world needed to be reorganised according to democratic 
principles of justice and equality, then Egypt would have to become a self-governing state.329 
Thus it was in the context of a rapidly changing world that the prospect of a democratic and free 
Egypt was promoted. The nationalists were no longer pushing for limited liberalising reforms, as 
they had been before the war. Instead they wanted full-blown self-determination. Those taking up 
the Wilsonian clamour for self-government included the National Party, whose priority had been a 
German and Ottoman victory in the war, so as to topple the British Empire administration in 
Egypt.330 In exile in Geneva, the National Party president, Muhammad Farid, wrote to Wilson about 
British oppression, and suggested that the American president’s “noble principles” would see him 
pushing for Egypt’s presence at the Paris Peace Conference. Egyptians sought “the dawn of a new 
era”, one that would see Egypt stand alone as a free nation, under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, Farid wrote, and countries without “imperialistic designs” were best placed to deliver it.331 
Farid went on to portray Wilson as “that great man whose name is venerated by all Egypt as that of 
the champion of the liberation of nations”.332 
Members of the U.S. peace commission were staying at the Hotel Crillon in central Paris, and they 
received a stream of correspondence there from Egyptian groups from around the world, all of it 
calling for independence for Egypt. The interest groups said they met Wilson’s visit to Europe “with 
emotional joy” at “one of the most solemn hours of the world’s history” in order to serve “the cause 
of justice, right and liberty”. 
Commentators in the Egyptian press kept emphasising that Wilson’s words about freedom from 
subjugation had inspired hope that the American president would deliver on his powerful 
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pronouncements and help Egyptians achieve their goal.333 One of the pamphlets prepared by 
activists and sent to the U.S. commission was called Egypt and the Peace Congress. It set Egypt’s 
new demands in the context of its history, opening with a section “Egypt and the Wilsonian 
Principle”. It said: “The principle of the rights of nations which, only yesterday, was in the eyes of 
many a chimera, has to-day become a reality”, thus making it clear that Wilson had galvanised 
nationalist thought and action, ensuring that it would play a hugely important part in world 
affairs. Those who wrote the pamphlet noted that Egypt was effectively free prior to the British 
occupation. It disputed the claim that Britain had brought economic prosperity to their country. The 
hefty document used numerous quotes from Wilson’s statements throughout the War as evidence of 
his apparent support for Egyptian independence. As so many other documents prepared at the time, 
the pamphlet contained sweeteners aimed at encouraging the support of the western powers for their 
cause: it suggested, for example, that Suez Canal control would be decided by the League of 
Nations.334 
Despite the lobbying of Wilson and his representatives in the French capital, Britain’s officials in 
Paris did everything possible to counter the Egyptians’ calls for self-determination. The French-run 
conference secretariat was easily manipulated by the British who made sure that petitions from 
Egyptians were stored, rather than distributed to delegates.335 Even petitions sent directly to the 
Americans did not do much better. Joseph C. Grew, Secretary of the American delegation said they 
should be forwarded to the “persons in the Commission”, who were unsympathetic to Egyptian 
demands for self-determination.336 Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, was a 
particularly strong supporter of the British, and their powerful position in Egypt. Many American 
diplomats were equally pro-British.337 Allen Dulles, who at the time was working in the State 
Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs said that correspondence from the Egyptians “should 
not even be acknowledged”. The request for Egyptian representation at the Paris Conference was of 
primary interest to George Louis Beer, the designated expert on African affairs, who said: “Such a 
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step would serve no good purpose”, as it would lead to “similar appeals from factions in all parts of 
the world”. Despite all their hard work, short and very formal acknowledgment of receipt slips from 
Gilbert Close, Wilson’s private secretary, were all that the Egyptian nationalists ever got back after 
delivering their extensive literature.338 
Back in Cairo, Hampson Gary would not meet Zaghlul or other representatives of the Egyptian 
nationalist lobby, and his advice to colleagues in both Washington and Paris was for them to dismiss 
Zaghlul’s appeals to the Americans to help him against the British.339 Gary made out that those 
seeking to influence western powers in Europe were by no means representative of the majority of 
Egyptian people. They were instead a “native autocracy as foreign to the autonomous peasantry as 
the British”, and not in any way “conversant with American and European ideals”. Furthermore they 
were “incapable as yet of efficient government”, said Gary.  
In turn, ordinary Egyptians were described as “politically undeveloped”, uneducated, and sceptical 
about Egyptian authority figures. They “really prefer British protection to native autocracy”, was the 
line of argument. Accordingly, self-determination was “manifestly impracticable” in Egypt because 
its people were “as yet not fitted for self-government”. Gary suggested his country should back “the 
continued political education of the Egyptian people under British protection”, so safeguarding the 
majority of Egyptian citizens, and indeed foreigners. Rather than supporting nationalism, the USA 
should recognise and support the British Protectorate over Egypt, Gary argued.340 Despite all this, 
Wilson had by no means written off the demands of the Egyptian nationalists as the Peace 
Conference progressed, and the Americans had not yet recognised the British Protectorate. As 
Egyptians continued to insist that they should be able to run their own lives, one nationalist 
pamphlet concluded: “Are we to believe, that such a plain and natural aspiration can be deliberately 
put aside?”341 
Towards the end of the war, those following Wilson’s announcements in colonies around the world 
became increasingly optimistic that they could benefit from the new global order he contemplated. 
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They initially trusted that change could be fast and far-reaching. However, details of the envisaged 
peace treaty were to cause profound disappointment: they suggested beyond any doubt that 
traditional imperialistic ideas were still dominating international diplomacy. Those living outside 
Europe would continue to be denied anything approaching sovereignty – a fact that contributed to 
the evaporation of the “Wilsonian Moment”. In Egypt, anger and bitterness led to demonstrations 
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On 8 March 1919, a heavily armed platoon of British soldiers carried out a dawn raid on the Cairo 
homes of the prominent Egyptian nationalists Saʿad Zaghlul, Ismaʿil Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud 
and Hamad al-Basil. The four were bundled into military vehicles and – still under the cover of 
darkness – briefly taken to the city’s Qasr-al-Nil barracks before being placed on a warship heading 
for Malta.1 The brutally unexpected deportations ultimately caused the Egyptian Revolution. 
At the time of their arrests the men had been preparing to travel to France as their country’s 
representatives at the post-World War One Paris Peace Conference.2 They were the most well-
known members of the Wafd (lit. “delegation”) who had effectively been designated to thrash out 
their nation’s very future in the reorganised world. Egyptians were smarting at not having been 
granted independence from Britain after the conflict, and these four men were meant to carry their 
grievances to the major powers. The political, economic and social conditions under which 
Egyptians had been living since the start of the British Occupation were crucial factors in the social 
turmoil. The dramatic arrests exacerbated these factors to breaking point. 
The myth of charismatic leadership is often applied to Saʿad Zaghlul, the fierce Egyptian nationalist 
who did so much to forge his country’s recent history. His hero status has never been in dispute, but 
just how much of it derived from his place within a mass movement is less easy to define. While 
some view Zaghlul as a classic “man-of-the-people” who ultimately led his country to 
independence, others position him within an authoritarian, highly-organised elite who were able to 
impose their will on their country’s development. Indeed, in spite of his impressive legacy, Egyptian 
historiography is still divided on Zaghlul’s actual contribution to the Revolution. His standing as a 
compelling chief is discussed by some historians and social commentators who, instead of focusing 
exclusively upon the individual leader, are primarily concerned with the hugely important role of the 
masses at grass-root level. 
It is therefore legitimate to consider to what extent the nationalist struggle in Egypt was a popular 
movement from below, or indeed an elitist protest from above. Did Saʿad Zaghlul – an eloquent, 
erudite and extremely intelligent politician, despite his humble origins – play a unique part in the 
first truly modern revolution in Egypt; a revolution which involved all regions, age groups, classes, 
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and religious communities? Or was he merely a vehicle for the expression of nationalist hopes and 
expectations? 
A major argument in this chapter is that the events of 1919, as they are related by Western writers, 
often overlook the Egyptian dimension of the story. An emphasis will therefore be put on Egyptian 
sources to describe the circumstances surrounding the Revolution in an attempt to add a valuable 
indigenous perspective which is largely absent from Western literature that tends to downplay the 
scale of the protest as well as the brutality of its repression. Particular and extensive usage will be 
made of a previously only carefully and selectively quoted Report drawn up by the Egyptian 
Delegation which offers a detailed narrative of the Revolution. Furthermore, the document also 
contains verbatim transcriptions of official Egyptian reports, correspondence, depositions of victims 
and eye-witnesses, and photographs of atrocities committed by British troops in Egypt. This will be 
treated as very useful information as we are focusing our attention on the Egyptian records of the 
events, while being fully aware of their potential slant. 
The recently-founded Wafd had been determined to receive authorisation – up to and including 
passports from the British authorities – to allow them to travel to Paris so as to take up their places 
at the negotiating table in Versailles.3 Their intention was to seek the “absolute independence of 
Egypt” through “peaceful and lawful means”.4 In a letter addressed by the Wafd Delegation to High 
Commissioner Wingate on 3 December 1918, Zaghlul wrote: 
Forbidding our departure makes illusory and inoperative the mission that we 
have accepted by the will of the country. It is difficult to conciliate this 
situation with the principles of liberty and justice which the victory of Great 
Britain and her Allies is supposed to have caused to triumph.5 
The Wafd’s growing and more vociferous activism prompted Cheetham (acting as High 
Commissioner in Egypt during Wingate’s absence in London) to address a note to the British 
Government to request authority to arrest Saʿad Zaghlul and his principal confederates and to banish 
them immediately.6 
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Did Cheetham’s decision unintentionally spark the unrest? The repercussions of what he did 
certainly placed question marks against the British authorities’ anticipation of the ill-feeling which 
inevitably led to Revolution.7 Cheetham’s resolution similarly cast some doubt about the extent to 
which the British were prepared to tackle the uprising. The chapter will contend that the British were 
indeed taken by surprise by what happened.  
As the Revolution escalated, the British government appointed General Allenby as Special High 
Commissioner for Egypt as evidence of a change of approach towards the nationalist movement. 
What was Britain’s strategy behind the alteration of its policy in Egypt? And what was its outcome? 
It will be demonstrated that, despite Allenby’s claims of controlling the situation, British power had 
diminished under the increasing force of nationalist spirit. 
This chapter will conclude that Zaghlul’s charismatic leadership was an important element in the 
process of both individual and collective resistance against British rule. It will also highlight the fact 
that there was no clear-cut dichotomy between “above and below” as far as the Revolution was 
concerned. Instead, what emerges is a much more complex picture of interdependence between the 
elitist and progressive direction of the nationalist Wafd Party and the popular and revolutionary 
nature of the movement at the grassroots. This complementary relationship helped define “a new age 
in Egyptian history – the age of Egyptian nationalism”8 – and, more specifically, a brand of 
“revolutionary nationalism”.9 This period of upheaval created panic among those upholding British 
rule, and showed how ill-prepared they were to deal with this state of affairs.  
“Nationalism of the Elite” or Legitimacy Gained at Grass-Root Level? 
Zaghlul’s popular myth was reinforced by the title Za‘im al-Umma, the Arabic for “Leader of the 
Nation”, and he is also often referred to as “Father of the Egyptians”. Obituaries published in the 
year of his death, 1927, evoked – variously – the “Death of an uncrowned King” and the demise of 
the “Colossus of the Nile Valley”. The legendary singer Oum Kalthoum dedicated a song to him, 
while Zaghlul’s home in Cairo was turned into the “House of the Nation” – Beit al-Umma. These 
early tributes were followed up by Zaghlul’s name becoming imprinted in Egyptian national history, 
 
7Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 2, p.111. 
8Ramadan, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya, p.5. 
9Zaheer Masood Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt: Rise and Fall of the Wafd Party, Delhi, The Jamal Printing 
Press, 1967, p.3. 
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and indeed the collective consciousness. New schools, city and town squares, and streets were 
named after him, while monuments and statues were erected to him. 
Movies portraying Zaghlul leading the country to glory are still shown across Egypt to this day, 
while radio programmes and plays also perpetuate the legend. Saʿad Zaghlul’s character was also 
explored in Bayna al-Qasrayn, the first volume of Naguib Mahfouz’s trilogy of historical novels, 
along with details of the anti-British uprising of 1919. There is an emphasis on Zaghlul’s life in 
school history curricula. In general terms, all manifestations of Egyptian culture are pervaded by a 
glorious episode of Egyptian history in which Zaghlul headed and ultimately won the struggle 
against the country’s colonial masters. What is certain is that Zaghlul, who proudly called himself 
the “son of the rabble”, because of his fellah (peasant) background, developed the ideas behind the 
Egyptian Revolution of 1919, championing the anti-British nationalism which resulted in nominal 
independence in1922. 
On 13 November 1918, just two days after the Armistice brought the First World War to an end, 
members of Egypt’s burgeoning nationalist movement began to assert their presence forcefully. This 
was one of the reasons why Saʿad Zaghlul, already self-styled representative of the people of Egypt, 
presented himself at the official Cairo Residency of Reginald Wingate, the British High 
Commissioner for Egypt. The general subject of discussion was the Egyptian question, but Saʿad 
Zaghlul, ʿAbd al-Aziz Fahmi and ʿAli Shaʿarawi – all members of the Legislative Assembly – were 
specifically asking for the abolition of martial law and censorship, two oppressive measures which 
had both been implemented at the outbreak of the War, and on the establishment of the British 
Protectorate over Egypt on 18 December 1914.10 
The Egyptians also demanded “complete independence”11 for Egypt although Saʿad Zaghlul assured 
Wingate that there would be sufficient guarantees aimed at guaranteeing British interests. This 
would mean that the routes down to India, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire, would be 
protected, and British forces would be allowed to occupy Egyptian soil in times of emergency. 
Shaʿarawi further explained that their claim meant “friendly relations between freemen rather than 
between a slave and his owner”.12 Zaghlul said that their requests were being put to Wingate 
 
10FO 371/3204 No. 1710 Sir R. Wingate to FO (It was dispatched to the King and War Cabinet), Cairo, 17 November 
1918.  
11Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No .1, pp.12-17. 
12Al-Rafiʿi, op. cit., Tarikh al-Haraka al-Qawmiyyawa, pp.70-2. 
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because he was acting for the British Government, but made it clear that his Delegation was more 
than ready to travel to London to negotiate with the government directly if necessary.13 
Wingate, for his part, wanted an off-the-record conversation – stating that he could make no official 
promises because he did not know what his government’s views about the demands actually were.14 
Instead he offered assurances that, following the Peace Conference due after the War, Britain would 
give full attention to the Egyptian question, which was presented as “an imperial and not an 
international question”. Wingate is even believed to have quoted a line from the Qur’an to make his 
point: “Allah maʿa al-sābīrīn, idha sabirū” (God is with the patient, if they are patient).15 Most 
importantly, Wingate urged caution, insisting that the Delegation did not represent Egyptian public 
opinion, saying they had come to his Residency to discuss the affairs of a whole nation without 
having a mandate to do so. 
It was, in fact, this crucial question of legitimacy which had galvanised the Delegation. A few hours 
after the meeting with Wingate, Saʿad Zaghlul and his colleagues met to consider the methods 
which would empower them to speak on behalf of the nation. They decided to form a board which 
was called al-Wafd al-Misri (the Egyptian delegation),16 and which would obtain the mandatory 
authorisation that would give the board the right to demand complete independence for the Egyptian 
people.17 
Al-Wafd al-Misri, Egypt’s first official Delegation, came into being on 13 November 1918. It was 
made up of: Saʿad Zaghlul as its president,18 along with seven initial members, ʿAli Shaʿarawi, ʿAbd 
al-Aziz Fahmi, Muhammad Mahmud, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, ʿAbd al-Latif al-Makabbati, and 
Muhammad ʿAli ʿAlluba. An additional seven members later joined the Wafd – including members 
of the pre-war party, al-Hizb al-Watani (the Nationalist Party).19 They included: Ismaʿil Sidqi, 
 
13Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., Thawrat Sanat 1919, Vol. 1, pp.138-139. 
14Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, op. cit.; ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Fahmi, Hadhihi Hayati (This is my Life), Cairo, Dar  
al-Hilal, 1963, pp.76-89. 
15Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of Sir Reginald Wingate, Maker of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, London, John Murray, 1955, p.229. 
16Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad Zaghlul, Kurras No. 32, pp.1844-1846. 
17Ibid., pp.1845-1846. 
18Ibid., pp.1851-1853. 
19Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 1, p.11; Mudhakkirat Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Aluba, 
pp.107-108; and Amine Youssef Bey, Independent Egypt, London, John Murray, 1940, pp.62-64. 
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Sinyut Hanna,20 Hamad al-Basil, George Khayyat, Mahmud Abu al-Nasr, Mustafa al-Nahhas, and 
Dr. Hafiz ʿAfifi.21 
They immediately set about drafting a declaration that would allow the Delegation to officially 
become the representative of the nation and press for its rights. On 23 November 1918, the fourteen 
members laid down the regulations of the Wafd, which were made up of twenty-six Articles in all.22 
The attainment of complete independence by legitimate and peaceful means was the intended 
objective of the Delegation (Article 2). The will of the Egyptian people was announced to be the 
source of the authority of the Delegation (Article 3).23 The final Article stipulated the formation of a 
central committee for the Egyptian Delegation, whose members were to be chosen from prominent 
personalities in the country. Its main purpose was to collect donations and ensure correspondence 
within the Delegation.24  
The new national organisation was meant to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, but there is little 
doubt that its membership was initially biased towards the professional classes. Financiers, 
administrators, lawyers, civil servants and other urban professionals were selected, along with a 
small religious class (the Copts), but the grand land and property owning class dominated. 
Cumulatively they provided the nucleus of a landed and commercial bourgeoisie which had an 
obvious economic interest in political independence.25 
Saʿad Zaghlul emerged as the Delegation’s leader because of his dynamic personality but also, it 
was noted, because of his cultured outlook, and religious belief tempered with an enlightened 
approach to new ideas.26 The highly experienced reformer soon established himself as the favourite 
leader of the Wafd Party and the Egyptian people. Zaghlul was certainly different from other 
politicians of his generation. Rather than coming from a metropolitan household, he was born in 
Abyana, a country town, in 1856. He was brought up in this rural environment as the son of a fellah 
(peasant), studying at his village school before going on to al-Azhar University, in the days of  
 
20This led Zaghlul to comment: “he was the first Copt to think of joining the Wafd” in his Memoirs, Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad 
Zaghlul, op. cit., Kurras No. 32, pp.1853. 
21Ibid., p.1853. 
22Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, op. cit., Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 1, p.11. 
23Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad Zaghlul, op. cit., Kurras No. 32, p.1849. 
24Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 3, p.272. 
25Muhammad Anis, ‘Thawrat 1919 Wa Hizb al-‘Ummal al-Britani’, al-Hilal, 1 October 1964, p.23, and ‘Atiyya Shuhdi 
Al-Shafi’i, Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya, 1882-1956 (The Evolution of the Egyptian Nationalist 
Movement, 1882-1956), Cairo, Dar Shuhdi, 1983, p.45; Ramadan, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya, p.101. 
26ʿAbbas Mahmud al-ʿAqqad, Saʿad Zaghlul, Cairo, Matbaʿat Hijazi, 1932, pp.123-88. 
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Al-Afghani and then Mohammed ʿAbduh. Zaghlul made his political debut as a follower of ʿUrabi. 
He later learnt French, the foremost diplomatic language of the time, at the Sorbonne University in 
Paris, as well as taking a law degree. He married the daughter of Premier Mustafa Fahmi – 
something which increased his social standing enormously. 
A cosmopolitan, aspirational background combined with a grounding in Egypt’s rural heartland 
made Zaghlul admired by all classes. Zaghlul was the one and only Egyptian whom Cromer was 
particularly impressed by. In his farewell speech on leaving Egypt, Cromer in fact singled out 
Zaghlul as “one of its future rulers. He possesses all the qualities necessary to save this country. He 
is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions... he should go far.”27 A distinguished 
legal career saw him appointed a Judge at the High Court in 1892. He was then designated as 
Minister of Education and, later on, Minister of Law. He was moderate in his views, something 
which again was appealing to observers, from whichever side of the political spectrum they came 
from. Zaghlul had a ruthless, uncompromising side too. He was an important figure behind the 
establishment of the pre-war Hizb al-Umma (People’s Party) in 1907 before being elected to the 
Legislative Assembly, and then selected for the post of Secretary of the Assembly.28 Zaghlul was 
thus a reformer with a commanding, traditional education behind him, and someone with experience 
in a variety of political roles. His modest origins endeared him to the masses but he could evidently 
mix with people from all classes. It was the former aspect of his character which was to prove most 
useful as he moulded the Wafd into a political force which could represent the Egyptian population 
at large. 
So it was that the grassroots base for a popular revolution was laid down by the pressure caused by 
martial law, censorship, and the First World War. When combined with President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points, this pressure became unassailable, as the American president’s heady principles infused 
unprecedented hope into downtrodden Egyptian political circles. It was now all a matter of 
coordination between those political circles and the masses. That is precisely where the relation of 
interdependence between these two spheres comes into play. 
 
 
27George Young, Egypt, 3rd ed., London, Ernest Benn, 1930, p.233. 
28Lashin, op. cit., Saʿad Zaghlul wa-Dawruhu fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya (Saʿad Zaghlul and His Role in the Politics of 
Egypt), pp.82-102. 
Chapter Five: The Egyptian Nationalist Revolution of 1919 and the British Response to the “Egyptian Problem” 
 
232 
Interdependence between the Elite and the Masses 
The Delegation was, at the start, little more than a small group of idealistic, high-minded individuals 
who viewed themselves as nothing less than the leaders of a newly emerging, independent nation. In 
terms of democratic organisation, the group had few institutional ties with the majority of Egypt’s 
population. 
Soon, however, the group developed into the Wafd Party, which took its place at the head of a mass, 
broad-based movement including almost every section of Egyptian society. The traditional dynamic 
of youth – so important to such movements wherever they are formed – was provided by students 
from the Nadi al-Madaris al-ʿUlya, a strong coalition of Higher Schools’ Club. These bright, hugely 
energetic youngsters were tasked with the collection of signatures, or Tawkīlat (also mandates), 
which were to provide written legitimacy to the political grouping.29 The Tawkīl had only been a 
hurriedly prepared document drawn up after the delegation’s meeting with Wingate at his Cairo 
residency, but its subsequent impact was profound. It had provided permission to the Delegation to 
work towards Egyptian independence through peaceful means, thus ensuring that the organisation 
was lawful in the eyes of all those involved in the process, and to the watching world. 
Beyond this limited aim of the Tawkīl, it had the effect of inspiring political awareness in the mass 
of people.30 The Delegation had not envisaged the influence it would have on the people they sought 
to represent and neither had the British authorities who initially tried to suppress the signatures 
campaign31 – such was its immense power on the consciousness of the Egyptian people. As students 
travelled the length and breadth of the country amassing signatures, they instilled great hope, 
bringing thousands of Egyptians into their party.32 Certainly, there is little doubt that the Delegation 




29Al-Ahram, 2-3 August 1920. 
30Ramadan, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya, p.156.  
31Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad Zaghlul, op. cit., Kurras No. 32, pp.1855-1856.  
32Elie Kedourie, ‘Saʿad Zaghlul and the British’ in Albert Hourani (ed.), Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 2, St Antony’s 
Papers, No. 11, London, Chatto and Windus, 1961, pp.148-149. 
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The Delegation had, of course, made representations to the British Government, asking if they could 
travel to London to negotiate directly, but such requests were constantly turned down.33 British 
politicians said they were too busy, but it remains unclear as to whether the British anticipated 
spokespersons of the Wafd Party travelling to Paris. The Egyptians viewed this as a sleight as – for 
obvious reasons – they saw their peremptory claims as being of paramount importance. 
Things moved rapidly and, on 4 March 1919, the Wafd sent letters to the agents of foreign countries 
in Egypt protesting against British policy as it contradicted the wishes of the Egyptian people.34 On 
6 March, General Watson – the Commander of the British forces – threatened “to take strong 
action” against the Delegation if it carried on with “the discussion of the existence of the 
Protectorate”.35 The Delegation’s reply was short and to the point – they published a letter of protest 
addressed to Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, reiterating their call for complete independence.36 
This had a serious consequence on the British government, whose wholly negative reaction was to 
arrest Saʿad Zaghlul, Muhammad Mahmud, Ismaʿil Sidqi and Hamad al-Basil and to deport them to 
Malta on 9 March. ʿAli Shaʿarawi took over the leadership of the Wafd in the meantime.37 
This section had sought to address the following question: did the Revolution of 1919 start from 
above – under the auspices of the intensely charismatic leader Saʿad Zaghlul – or was it a genuinely 
popular movement which emanated from the grassroots? The dynamic of the Egyptian Revolution 
came from a combination of two compelling forces: the first was Zaghlul, and the second was his 
vast power base among the masses. So it was that the Wafd succeeded in becoming a recognised 
mouthpiece for the millions who had undergone unprecedented social turmoil and bitter hardship 
during the First World War. This experience of the chaos caused by worldwide conflict, when 
merged with Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination, ensured they were determined to get rid of 
their colonialists from Britain. But while the Wafd leaders and those operating at the grass roots had 
the same overall purpose, they diverged on the means of achieving that result. In 1918 Egypt’s first 
truly modern revolution began with peaceful negotiations aimed at terminating the newly declared 
British Protectorate on the country. By 1919, it had escalated into widespread protest and physical 
 
33A. Fahmi, op. cit., p.88. 
34Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., Thawrat Sanat 1919, pp.163-164. 
35George Ambrose Lloyd, Egypt since Cromer, Vol. 1, London, Macmillan, 1933, pp.296-297. 
36Ahmed Shafiq, Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasiyyah (The Egyptian Political Annals), al-Tamhid, Vol. 1, Cairo, Matba’at 
Shafiq Pasha, 1926, p.244. 
37Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., pp.167-169.  
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attacks firmly directed against the British administrative and military presence on its soil. As far as 
political action was concerned, violence was replacing the gradual, piecemeal approach of the Wafd, 
as a new brand of radical, “revolutionary nationalism” started to emerge. 
“Revolutionary Nationalism” Crushed by the “Barbarism” of Empire Troops 
The sudden deportation of Saʿad Zaghlul and his three colleagues was, as far as the stability of the 
British Empire was concerned, a fatal move. As previously mentioned, it sparked a popular uprising 
and strikes right across Egypt, precipitating a period of violent confrontations between the Egyptian 
people and British troops known in Egyptian historiography as the 1919 Revolution. Over several 
months, Egyptians of all classes and religions participated in the upheaval. The novel nature of the 
clashes was highlighted by the fact that, for the first time in history, upper-class Egyptian women 
openly took to the streets for a political cause and thus showed their solidarity with the nationalist 
movement. The chronology of what happened was minutely recorded by the Egyptian Delegation in 
a Report which was later addressed to the newly-appointed British High Commissioner, Allenby, on 
30 March 1919. The Report recounts that the protests began with peaceful student demonstrations 
on 9 March – the very day that the Wafd leaders were deported to Malta. In order to paint a 
comprehensive picture of the dramatic events, we will also be relying on the records of other 
observers, whether local historians and participants or British officials whose despatches were 
mainly based on eye-witness accounts.  
In Cairo, agitation first flared among students of law, engineering, agriculture, medicine and 
commerce. All were joined by students from Dar al-‘Ulum (an institution which combined modern 
secondary teaching with Islamic studies) and the School of Jurisprudence. “Nearly three hundred 
were arrested.”38 On 10 March, students of al-Azhar and secondary school pupils also got involved. 
The marches were deliberately organised to pass the houses of political agents, with those taking 
part chanting their concern for the very future of Egypt, for their own freedom to be reinstated, and 
for the end of the Protectorate.39 Later in the 10 March rally, there were numerous heavy-handed 
 
38Report presented by the Egyptian Delegation in Arabic, with a French translation, to the British High Commissioner 
on 30 March 1919. The members of the Delegation were invited to the Residency on 31 March to discuss its contents 
with the High Commissioner. See Egyptian Delegation Report, op. cit., p.30 & p.37. 
39Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 22 March 1919, FO 371/3715, TNA; Chirol, op. cit., The Egyptian Problem, pp.177-178; 
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attacks on everything from trams to shops, especially those owned by foreign nationals.40 The 
Report points out that, on 11 March, “another peaceful manifestation of students was received by a 
volley of shots which killed a certain number of them”.41 And, on 12 March, “similar peaceful 
manifestations were suppressed by machine-gun fire which caused the death of more young 
people”.42 Also on 12 March, dissent reached Tanta. British troops responded with more definitive 
expressions of violence, killing and wounding Egyptian demonstrators with their firepower.43 There 
were similar scenes of repression on the 13 and 14 March in Cairo, with the British Army 
intervening against public displays of opposition all over the city in an attempt to disrupt further 
peaceful processions organised by students “without arms”.44 Such action inevitably exacerbated the 
problems.  
The revolutionary spirit spread, as anti-British activity fanned out across the whole country.45 The 
next day, 15 March, transport workers succeeded in severely disrupting communications all over 
Egypt. On that day alone there were more than 4,000 railway workers on strike. Strategically crucial 
areas which experienced sabotage included Imbaba, the gateway to Upper Egypt, where railway 
lines were destroyed, thus preventing engines from moving.46 On 16 March, the craftsmen also 
engaged in the dissent.47 Two days later, on 18 March, protests moved from Bulaq to al-Azhar. It 
was in al-Azhar that there was even more resistance from British troops, and serious fighting broke 
out. Again, demonstrators were killed and wounded by Empire troops.48 The violence prompted the 
inhabitants of districts including al-Azhar, al-Sayyida Zaynab, al-Husseiniyya and Bab  
al-Sha‘ariyya to erect barricades. They also dug long, deep ditches to prevent the easy movement of 
military vehicles. By this time, shops and financial institutions had all been closed since 11 March.49 
It had been on the same day that the legal profession had also organised meetings and agreed to go 
 
40Shafiq, op. cit., p. 252; and Letitia W. Ufford, Milner Mission to Egypt, 1919-1921, PhD thesis, Columbia University, 
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on strike as an objection against the deportation of the four nationalist leaders.50 By 12 March, the 
agitation extended to major cities including Alexandria, Tanta and al-Mansura. In the latter city 
students had attacked police stations, also setting fire to railway stations and damaging telegraph and 
telephone lines. Again, a number of demonstrators were shot dead or seriously wounded by British 
troops. A key example was the slaughter in Tanta, where a British unit fired at them near a railway 
station, killing 16 and wounding 49.51 
Following these cataclysmic events, disturbances propagated to Mudiriyyat al-Buhaiyra,  
al-Gharbiyya, al-Minufiyya, al-Daqahliyya, Assiut and al-Fayyum.52 Rioters in these regions 
followed the revolutionary example, once again destroying railway lines, and cutting telegraph and 
telephone poles. The first railway line was cut on 13 March, between Tanta and Tala. Damage was 
done to numerous other parts of the rail network, to the extent that Cairo was separated from other 
regions. The British military authorities had to put out a declaration on 17 March instructing people 
living in communities near demolished or impaired railway lines and stations to pay for the cost of 
repairs themselves.53 This did not prevent agitators at Dayrut and Dir-Muwas to assail the train from 
Luxor to Cairo on 18 March, mortally wounding three British officers and five soldiers.54 As a 
result, on 20 March, British army officials ordered that the settlement closest to the attacks be raised 
to the ground.55 
Bedouins also took part in the Revolution, with numerous engagements between them and the 
British, especially at al-Fayyum, where there was solid support for the nationalist Hamad al-Basil. 
On 19 March, a group of Bedouins from West Fayyum were involved in a conflict with British 
Guardsmen. Around 400 demonstrators were killed or wounded. Bedouins also besieged the Diwan 
of Itsa, demanding that the police gave up their weapons and horses. The isolated forces of authority 
refused and heavy fighting ensued, with the Bedouins eventually defeated.56 Bedouins in Mudiriyat 
al-Buhaiyra made an assault on the Kum Hamada district and British troops were sent by the 
military administration to subjugate them.57 
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To illustrate the unity and tolerance of the whole of Egyptian society in revolt, many authors have 
emphasised the participation of women and religious minorities in the nationalist movement. There 
is no doubt that the appearance of women on the barricades was a fascinating development. Many of 
these women indeed went so far as to assist with the demolition of railways lines and telegraph 
poles. In correspondence with General Sir Edmund Allenby, the newly-appointed High 
Commissioner of Egypt, Saʿad Zaghlul commented upon the extraordinary social change, noting 
how “the most distinguished women in Egyptian society were not able [...] to see their fellow 
countrymen treated in this way and keep silent about it”.58 
On 16 March, nearly three hundred upper-class women had demonstrated under the leadership of his 
wife, Safiyya Saʿad Zaghlul, Huda Shaʿarawi, wife of one of the original members of the Wafd and 
organiser of the Egyptian Feminist Union, and Muna Fahmi Wissa. Zaghlul also testified that: 
“[T]he British soldiers surrounded them on all sides, with fixed bayonets pointed towards them, and 
compelled them to remain two hours under a broiling sun.”59 
The involvement of women in the movement was certainly unprecedented. Middle-class women 
played important roles in the struggle, taking part in the political process along with upper-class 
women and fellahat (female peasants). These women organised all kinds of strikes, protests, and 
boycotts of British goods and wrote petitions, circulating them to foreign embassies. Zaghlul himself 
commented that, “[T]he curtain that ordinarily separates our women [...] from the outside world did 
not prevent them from expressing their sentiments.”60 Historians have often remarked how the 1919 
Revolution effected a huge transformation in relation to women’s place in Egyptian society. It took 
women – as the historian Ramadan put it – from the harem to the public arena and the labour 
market.61 
Another significant moment as far as potentially disparate groups were concerned saw the Wafd 
choose both the cross and the crescent as an emblem, signifying national as well as religious 
concord. Leading Egyptian Copts sent correspondence expressing their empathy with the 
nationalists, with the Egyptian Association, a group formed soon after Wilson’s arrival in Paris to 
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advocate independence, adopting a flag showing the symbols of Egypt’s three principal religious 
communities – a crescent, a cross, and a star of David. This badge was displayed on a scarlet 
background to signify the union of Egyptians of all faiths in the national struggle.62 
In a letter to Georges Clemenceau, the President of the Paris Peace Conference, dated 28 June 1919, 
Saʿad Zaghlul presented a brief statement about the different kinds of atrocities which had been 
committed in Egypt. All stressed the increasing “barbarism” of Empire troops. Hoping that 
Clemenceau would raise Egypt’s grievances at the Conference, he wrote forcefully: 
The British authorities in Egypt were as much disturbed as provoked by the 
extent of the movement, and astonished at their powerlessness to stop it. It 
was then that the spirit of vengeance got the better of them, and that they 
allowed themselves to indulge in the most disgraceful excesses. No longer 
content to stop the demonstrations by means of rifles and machine guns, they 
were guilty in several places of rape, of the assassination of peaceful 
villagers, of pillage, of arson – all with the most trifling pretext or even 
without pretext. No longer was it a question of individual crimes committed 
by stray soldiers. [...] No longer was it a question of blows and thefts in the 
streets of Cairo and Alexandria. Attacks began to be made by strong military 
detachments, under the command of their officers, in villages as well as 
cities.63  
Thus Zaghlul underlined the paradox between discourse at the Paris Conference and British actions 
in the real world. There was a deep irony in the sight of a reactionary British Army subduing 
nationalist hopes in Egypt, while these same hopes were being put forward in Paris as the very basis 
of a new world order.64  
Elements of those involved in the Egyptian uprising had, of course, been violent, but their actions 
were nothing as aggressive as the British. “Peace keeping” measures included the beheading of 
revolutionaries. There were numerous incidents of serial rape, arson, pillage and flogging, all carried 
out by ordinary “Tommies”, many already battle-hardened during First World War campaigns. The 
detailed description of British atrocities provided by Zaghlul to Clemenceau was based on literal 
translation of complaints and sworn testimony. He had gleaned facts from the memorials of the 
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complainants, police registers, the correspondence of the Ministry of the Interior and telegrams the 
Wafd was able to get copies of.65 
For example, a police record was established in the district of Bulaq, in the Egyptian capital, on 
14 March 1919, reporting a rape case as follows: 
The victim [...] was a girl named Zeinab Mohammed Aly. [...] She was only 
ten years old. She had been violated and death had ensued. The medical 
report qualifies this crime as one of “abominable barbarism”.66 
Other instances of rapes are abundant. Mohammed Ahmed Goma, a 35-year-old teacher at the girls’ 
school at Manial al-Rodia, thus described what happened in his village at Giza on 30 March 1919: 
The whole night, the soldiers mixed with the women [...]. They shamefully 
attacked their chastity, and violated many of them. The reason why I do not 
mention particular cases is that our peasant women would never confess 
such shame that would leave ineffaceable marks of disgrace upon 
themselves and their husbands.67 
A merchant called Hussein Sayyid al-Mohr, aged 46, who lived in Nazlet al-Shobak, reported what 
his wife as well as other women underwent: 
I, with my very eyes, had to see my own wife, Aisha, being raped. I think no 
woman escaped that disgrace, as the soldiers remained in the village from 
the afternoon until the next morning.68 
In the same village, Mahmud Ibrahim ‘Abdel Hadi, aged 32, stated that two soldiers caught his sister 
‘Aziza, aged 30, and “took her to a room where both of them committed rape on her”. He added: 
I myself saw the raping with my very eyes while I was unable to do 
anything. One of the soldiers shot her, and one of them looted all the money 
and jewellery which they found. Then they set fire to the house by pouring 
some fluid from bottles which they had with them. They also poured some of 
that liquid over my murdered sister and burnt her. I went up to the roof and 
jumped to an unburnt house and continued jumping from one roof to another 
until the morning.69 
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The situation worsened, with the number of punitive campaigns increasing. Examples of the rising 
intensity of British repression included a statement by Mahmud Mansour al-Dali, ʿOmdeh (Mayor) 
of Badrashin, in the Province of Giza, which related to events that occurred on 25 March 1919: 
[A]t 4.30 a.m. my house was attacked by 40 British soldiers. [They] entered 
my bedroom, where they found my wife, my daughters and daughters-in-
law. From the room in which I was held, I could hear their cries and sounds 
of struggling. Their distress was heart-breaking. I wanted to fly to succour 
them, but was immobilized by a stroke from the butt of a rifle. […] Having 
obtained permission to dress, I entered my room where I found the women, 
trembling with fear and indignation at the ignominious treatment which they 
had received from the soldiers. […] Other troops pillaged the village [and] 
soldiers divided the spoil between them.70 
He added that he “saw the flames mount from homesteads and heard the cries of distress, interrupted 
by the noise of a fusillade”.71 He later found out that, “Ibrahim ʿAtwa al-Dali, my cousin, was killed 
by a bullet in his home, after having been divested of his money”. Among other casualties was also 
ʿAbd al-Gawad Sayyid Marsouf who “was shot in his house, his head cut off, and the soldiers 
amused themselves with it as if with a ball”.72 
Similarly, on 30 March 1919, hundreds of soldiers arrived in the village of Shobak near Cairo, 
raping local women and killing their men folk if they resisted. More than 140 houses were destroyed 
by fire, leaving only 56. The Mayor and four members of his family “underwent a refined 
martyrdom” as they were buried up to their waists before being cut to pieces by bayonets. 
There were further examples of gratuitous acts of retaliation. For instance, Ibrahim Rashdan, Mayor 
of Aziziyya, wrote on 25 March: 
The British were going to burn the village, and ordered the inhabitants to 
leave their homes as soon as possible. Men, women and children hurried 
away, carrying what they could. […] They subjected the women to the most 
shameful treatment, but the fellaheen hide these details for the sake of their 
women’s reputation. […] A sacred banner embroidered with the Moslem 
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A particularly fierce punitive campaign was recounted by Ragheb Effendi Biachi who reported, on 
behalf of the inhabitants of al-Chabannatt, the following episode: 
On 25 March 1919, at half-past ten a.m. a group of British soldiers 
surrounded the house of the Mayor of our village. […] On my arrival there I 
was immediately surrounded by armed soldiers. The Colonel then informed 
me that at 2 o’clock on 24 March, one of the Indian soldiers (Gourkas), who 
was guarding the railway line, had been killed. He informed me that our 
village would be burnt if the criminal was not denounced and handed over at 
once.74 
Continuing his narrative Ragheb wrote: 
In the meantime the village had been encircled and the inhabitants, old and 
young, ordered out of their homes. They were pushed along at the point of 
the bayonet without pity for woman or child.75 
Ragheb then cited one significantly cruel spectacle: 
A poor woman, bearing child, was expelled violently. She was in terrible 
pain, but every time she tried to sit down […], the soldiers prodded her on 
with the points of their bayonets. […] [S]he died a few hours later.76 
The officer then executed fifty of the inhabitants and the whole village was burnt and abandoned. 
“This is a true story of what British soldiers did to our village and to our people. Even this did not 
satisfy them, for they declared their intention to burn three more villages to avenge the death of one 
Indian soldier.”77 
A similar carnage occurred in the village of al-Shobak on 30 March 1919. One vivid scene of 
atrocities describes how the “Sheikhs and other notabilities of the village [...] were strangled and 
buried upright and their heads covered over by grass”.78 The massacre was followed by burning 
which “continued from Sunday at 3 o’clock p.m. until Monday morning at 10 a.m.”.79 During these 
events, twenty-one people were killed and twelve wounded. On top of that, one hundred and forty-
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On 9 April 1919, two days after the atrocities committed in the villages of Imbaba, Aziziyya, 
Badrashin and Nazlet al-Shobak: 
[T]the inhabitants were still able to point to the bodies of the victims in the 
cornfields and canals. No estimation can be made of all the animals 
destroyed. The maize which was on the roofs of the houses has been 
sprinkled with benzene and burned. Thus, the entire harvest of the peasantry 
had been destroyed.81 
The brutality of British rule was also illustrated by the way troops resorted to flogging as a means of 
retaliation. Zaghlul noted in his correspondence to Clemenceau, that: 
Under pretext that a shot had been fired at a British patrol which was passing 
at a certain distance from the village of Kafr Moussaed, the soldiers entered 
the said village, and also in the villages of Choubra-al-Charkieh and Kafr-al-
Hagga, as well as in the hamlets that depend upon them. They compelled the 
whole masculine population to appear and condemned them to be flogged on 
the stomach and on the back. [...] In the district of Kafr-al-Charkieh, the 
British authorities made use of the whip a regular thing, and forced the 
mayors to furnish men to be flogged.82 
Egyptian men were depicted in graphic photographs with their bare torsos covered in whip marks. 
The nationalists who took the images placed the name and social position of each man under each 
photograph: pictures of peasants, students and religious scholars were all included so as to provide 
evidence of the broad social support for the revolutionary nationalist movement. British soldiers also 
forced the Mayors and businessmen of the villages to sign their names to a document 
acknowledging the British Protectorate over Egypt.83 
There were detailed reports of violent incidents at Saft-al-Melouk on 12-13 April 1919. Egyptian 
men were severely tortured in an attempt to get them to admit the name of one alleged criminal, or 
to show the British authorities where arms were concealed. Each man 
… was seized by soldiers who undressed him, took all his money away, and, 
as soon as he was naked, placed him with his head through a hole. Four 
soldiers held him outside this hole while four groups of soldiers, each 
composed of three soldiers held his feet and hands in lifting up his body. 
Two other soldiers then flogged him mercilessly without taking any care as 
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kiosk and beaten and kicked by other soldiers outside the kiosk. Some of 
these men fainted from the pain inflicted. Others vomited blood. There was 
no doctor there to take care of those wounded or to prevent those who were 
ill or feeble already from being thus tortured.84 
The Delegation’s report notes that no exceptions were made by the British according to the social 
status or age of the victims.85 Approximately five hundred men were brutalised in this fashion and 
lodged a complaint in Cairo. However, the report states that those who could not come to Cairo were 
“more numerous”.86 
In view of the deaths and abuse perpetrated by British soldiers, Zaghlul felt entitled to put the 
following questions to Georges Clemenceau: 
Can we Egyptians remain with folded arms and keep absolute silence in the 
presence of the different forms of martyrdom the British military authorities 
are inflicting upon us, especially when our conscience is free from having 
committed the slightest crime? [...] Can we hold our peace and not complain 
when it is decided that every Egyptian, of whatever rank, must stand up and 
salute passing British officers? Can we preserve our serenity when our 
women are violated, our villages burned, the innocent assassinated en 
masse?87 
Thus, Saʿad Zaghlul summed up his own country’s tragedy with typical eloquence. 
Despite the barbarity with which the British went about quelling the revolt, more railway lines were 
cut at Meit al-Qirsh, Tafahna al-Ashraf and Dandit. Again, the British authorities responded with 
more repressive violence.88 When the inhabitants of al-ʿAziziyya and al-Badrashin villages burnt the 
railway stations at al-Hawamdiyya and al-Badrashin, troops responded by, on 25 March, burning 
these villages in addition to the village of al-Shabanat near al- Zaqaziq.89 On 30 March, villagers 
from Nazlet al-Shobak in al-ʿAyyat district, attacked a train, and the British burnt this village as 
well.90 
In Assiut, demonstrators seized local ammunition dumps as well as police arms. They also set 
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British forces in the city, but following the arrival of military supplies, the insurrection was 
suppressed and law and order restored.91 At al-Minya, a nationalist committee was formed which 
took responsibility for protecting foreigners and their property and tried to maintain peace generally. 
The committee also upheld a basic form of local government, to the extent that consuls and 
foreigners observed that conditions for foreigners remained remarkably safe.92  
On 30 March, a British force commanded by Brigadier General Huddleston settled at the Diwan al-
Mudiriyya and sent for the thirty or so committee members. Six of them – namely Muhammad 
Tawfiq Ismaʿil, Dr Mahmud Bey ʿAbd al-Razaq, Muhammad Effendi Rahmi, Hassan Effendi ‘Ali 
Tarraf, Riyadh al-Jammal and Sheikh Ahmad Hatata – were arrested and accused of usurping the 
authority of the Government.93 
It was at Zifta that a revolutionary committee formally declared independence as they raised a 
national flag and distributed literature announcing that they were now the main authority in the 
town. Wafd Party member Yusuf al-Jundi gave clear instructions for the committee to be convened 
at Cafe Mustawkli. The committee was made up of some Aʿyan (wealthy landlords), the educated, 
and minor merchants, such as ʿAwad al-Kafrawi, Sheikh Mustafa ʿAmayim, Ibrahim Khayr al-Din, 
Admun Burda, Muhammad al-Sayyid and Mahmud Hassas. Yusuf al-Jundi also led a large 
demonstration, with many of those carrying guns and clubs. But Ismaʿil Hamad, the Maʾmūr (local 
chief) of the area, was hugely proud of his country. In order to avoid fighting and further bloodshed 
he capitulated, surrendering the town, and weapons to the British. However, insurgents were still in 
control of the railway and telegraph stations. 
The principal committee established smaller groups to preserve order and to collect dues, and also 
set up groups of students and other learned people in the towns. These conducted patrols in the 
streets, while others made sure that provisions were not stolen, and indeed worked to prevent British 
spies from entering. It was one such faction which published and distributed a newspaper called  
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Following the release of Saʿad Zaghlul and the granting of permission to the Wafd to travel to Paris 
on 7 April 1919, a revolutionary committee continued to exist in Zifta. This situation was sustained 
until the British Military Authority finally sent a unit of Australian troops to put down the revolt. 
The approach of the soldiers led to the inhabitants digging trenches in main roads, but the invaders 
began shelling before seizing Mahlaj Rinhart and Kishk School on the outskirts of the town. It was 
left to Ismaʿil Bey Hamad to intervene, and he acted as mediator between the soldiers and the 
committee. It was only at this point that the soldiers went into the town and finally restored 
government authority.95 
The 1919 Revolution was a major watershed in the progress of the Egyptian national struggle. It 
formed, according to the prominent Egyptian historian ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Rafiʿi, “the basis for all 
the developments that followed”.96 It was the first truly popular revolution in Egypt, which included 
all regions, age groups, classes, and religious communities. In the words of Saʿad Zaghlul, it brought 
“all the Egyptians, from highest to lowest” together.97 Another Egyptian historian has written that 
the 1919 Revolution augured, “a new age in Egyptian history the age of Egyptian nationalism – 
which replaced the idea of the Islamic community that made Egypt part of the Ottoman state”.98 It is 
apparent that Western history books make little mention of the brutality which characterised British 
rule in Egypt. Some 800 Egyptians and 60 British soldiers and civilians died in the clashes that 
Spring, and thousands more were wounded.99 In March 2009, however, an article published in the 
Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) on the occasion of the 90th 
anniversary of the Revolution, stated that the ruthless subduing had made “1,000 Martyrs” in 
total.100 The violent disturbances of the period naturally worsened connections between the British 
and the Egyptians. This deterioration in relations was to hamper all future attempts at negotiation. 
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A New Brand of Egyptian Nationalism which took the British by Surprise 
The Wafd’s novel brand of nationalism, which so surprised the British, was very different to pre-war 
versions. It was based upon the legacy of Egypt’s extensive participation in World War One – a 
conflict which exposed the country to a range of previously unheard of sufferings, thus altering its 
social face. In particular it transformed the nationalist movement from one mainly involving an 
educated urban elite into one supported by an extremely broad cross-section of socio-economic 
groups.101 This new kind of nationalism discarded the pan-Islamic and pro-Ottoman beliefs of pre-
1914 nationalism, instead putting forward positivist ideas rooted in the framework of a liberal 
political philosophy.102 
The realisation that economic power played an important role in political advancement was another 
post-war development. Landowners, financiers, administrators, lawyers, civil servants and other 
urban professionals dominated the Wafd membership. Together they made up a concentrated group 
of aspirational citizens in both metropolitan centres and the countryside who were invested in 
Egyptian independence. The Wafd thus ensured that the influence of the collaborative groups which 
had propped up the British administration was now eroded.103  
The Wafd also distinguished itself by its efforts to build a solid political and economic alternative to 
British rule. This differentiated the party from the older Turco-Albanian aristocracy, of which Prime 
Minister Rushdi was a prominent member.104 The British civil and military authorities failed to 
foresee this turn of events. During the few crucial months between Rushdi’s resignation in 
December 1918 and the outbreak of the revolt on 9 March 1919, Egyptians affairs were run by 
British advisers. They had nonetheless been unable to comprehend the extent to which the Wafd 
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The Residency turned to the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that they were able to 
follow public opinion around the country, but during that period Haines had made little effort to do 
so.105 Moreover, the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff was under strain because many officers 
had been demobilised after the war, or else were on long leave.106 Accordingly, the Residency 
received “totally insufficient and misleading information as to the true nature and character of the 
Nationalist political movement”.107 It was these observations which led Cheetham to report to the 
Foreign Office on 24 February 1919 that Zaghlul was widely distrusted and that the trouble which 
he had been creating was dying out.108 The British government thus seemed to view the nationalist 
movement as a minority group made up of a few disgruntled politicians, and with little real power, 
let alone influence on the mass of the population. 
Consequently, when the Wafdist agitation became more of a concern in March 1919, the British 
authorities’ reaction was a traditionally brutal one. It was entirely conditioned on British experiences 
pre-1914 when outbreaks of nationalist activity were violently crushed. Then, the arrest and 
deportation of nationalist leaders had always succeeded in quelling putative uprisings.109 By 1919, 
however, the decision to deport Zaghlul and his three fellow nationalists to Malta could only have 
been described as a disastrous miscalculation. It severely underestimated the amount of popular 
support enjoyed by Zaghlul’s group.110 The British government thus realised in March 1919 that 
their initial obstinacy first shown towards Zaghlul’s demands had been ill-advised in the extreme, 
and was more than partly to blame for the subsequent rebellion.111 It was only when wide-scale 
upheavals erupted that officials in London finally began to appreciate the seriousness of the 
situation. 
Thus, the “temporary reaction in our favour” which had been anticipated by Wingate in London did 
not materialise. Instead the incarceration and then deportation of the Wafd leaders was met by 
student demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria on 9 March. These were followed by a wave of 
strikes involving transport workers, judges and lawyers. In a highly significant display of inter-
communal unity against the British enemy, the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo was opened up to Coptic 
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preachers. Upper- and middle-class women took to the streets for the first time in Egyptian history. 
By 15 March, the unrest had spread to large parts of the countryside, ensuring a temporary loss of 
British control in numerous districts as logistical networks were targeted and destroyed, or at least 
momentarily put out of action.112 
British rulers, finally acknowledging that the disturbances were not solely isolated incidents which 
could be put down by intimidation and deportation, but a far-reaching national revolt, rushed 
General Allenby, “the strong man of the East”, to Egypt on 22 March.113 Allenby reached Cairo on 
25 March and, as Special High Commissioner, was ordered “to exercise supreme authority in all 
matters military and civil, to take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to 
restore law and order, and to administrate in all matters as required by the necessity of maintaining 
the King’s Protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis”.114 In order to carry out these 
instructions, Allenby resorted to an apparently contradictory combination of military repression in 
the provinces and limited but effective concessions to nationalist opinion. These compromises 
included the release of Zaghlul and his associates and permission for them to travel to London and 
on to Paris.115 By 29 April, Allenby reported that the situation was “much improved”.116 Yet as will 
be shown, Allenby’s cruel legacy has not been particularly successful. In effect, the broadening of 
the Wafd’s attractiveness beyond the educated urban elite constituted the real rupture with the past 
and altered British policy dramatically.  
The much-vaunted, rhetorical utopianism of mainly western statesmen at the post-war Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 certainly stirred a nationalist consciousness in Egypt. However, Egyptians were 
only too well aware that lofty ideas about self-determination had done nothing to stop the British 
using maximum force to stamp out a popular uprising in their own country. The pragmatic, and far 
from idealistic, reality was that the Egyptian Revolution grew directly out of the Peace Conference 
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Allenby’s modus vivendi: Britain’s New Policy towards Egypt 
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the events of the Egyptian Revolution had an 
effect across the country. Cheetham, the British Chargé d'affaires in Egypt, had this in mind when 
he wrote to the British government: 
Latest reports are that preaching in favour of cessation of work has taken 
place in some mosques in Cairo. Were it not for this feature it would 
probably be our best policy to deport or intern here the rest of Saad’s 
deputation, and to treat similarly others who might openly replace them. 
Alternative is to discover some ground for reconciliation, and I may wish to 
recommend a concession to native feeling.117 
It was Cheetham who put forward the idea that Egyptian nationalists should not be prevented from 
travelling to Europe to air their grievances. He also believed that an investigatory commission 
should travel to the country to provide recommendations about how the situation could be 
ameliorated. All of this would happen once the Paris Peace Conference had formally recognised the 
British Protectorate over Egypt, and indeed accepted the mandate.118 
Cheetham sought the help of the United States in convincing the British Government to adopt a 
more conciliatory policy. So it was that on 18 March he summoned the American Consul General, 
telling him that “at no time since the Araby rebellion in 1882 has the state of affairs been so 
critical”. Cheetham made it clear that he had not received orders from London. As the American 
Consul General reported in a telegram: 
[H]e desired me to report the serious conditions to my government in the 
hope that it would exert promptly some influence over his own government 
and thus make them appreciate the gravity of the situation.119 
The Consul General also recounted that Cheetham had called him to his official Residency “to tell 
me that the situation is getting beyond control and to ask if I will be prepared to help in the matter if 
the worst comes”.120 Yet despite such a seemingly pacifying turn of events, the Foreign Office 
instructed Cheetham to take further repressive measures so as to ensure that order was 
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maintained.121 Consequently, the General Commander-in-Chief sent for a number of selected Wafd 
members on 16 March. At a meeting, he held them personally responsible for outbreaks of trouble. 
The next day, the Wafd produced a letter protesting against what the British Commander had said, 
sending a copy to the consuls of all foreign countries represented in Cairo.122 
With the Revolution escalating, the Government ministers forming the British delegation in Paris 
soon became aware of the immense power of the nationalist movement that they were up against. 
Attempts to control it by deporting its leaders would be doomed to failure, they realised. Egypt was 
faced with a bona fide nationalist uprising throughout the country.123 Accordingly, these British 
ministers sent a telegram to London on 18 March reversing Curzon's policy: 
[O]rder must be restored immediately and without bargaining, and then a 
competent government carrying the requisite authority formed. When this 
had been done, HMG were prepared to discuss in London any grievances 
with Egyptian Ministers, and these Ministers could be accompanied by 
persons qualified to represent the Nationalist cause, even if they were 
extremists.124 
It was at this point that General Allenby was appointed by the British Government as High 
Commissioner for Egypt. He set about implementing a policy which had been broadly delineated by 
the British delegation in Paris in its message to the Foreign Secretary on 18 March. Allenby arrived 
in Cairo on 25 March. As quickly as the next day he summoned a group of Notables and Aʿyan, 
including members of the Wafd, and firmly told them that his mission in Egypt involved: the 
restoration of law and order in the country; a thorough investigation of the root causes of the 
Revolution; and the use of the law to try and eliminate these grievances.125 
Allenby called on all of them to work with him closely towards a fair and equitable settlement of the 
issues which had led to the Revolution.126 It appeared that, within days of arriving in Cairo, Allenby 
had already made his mind up about a solution to the Egyptian problem. It might even have been 
that he had worked out a solution before arriving.127 His policies were to be as follows: a just, 
transparent training policy ultimately designed towards getting Egyptians administrating their own 
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country; a firm ban on bargaining in political affairs; some reduction in the strength of British 
Forces in Egypt.128 
Yet despite these measures which were clearly aimed at expunging the deeper origins of the 
Revolution, Allenby did not call a halt to the military action undertaken by General Bulfin, 
Brigadier General Huddleston and Major John Shea. On 29 March, it was reported that the punitive 
campaign led by Brigadier General Huddleston in Assiut was ongoing, as the military commander 
attempted to restore order in neighbouring districts. It was also the case that Major John Shea was 
moving south to the Middle Egypt region, leading a full-strength army unit for the same purpose. 
The 1 April official account included intelligence about 16 mobile platoons working in Upper 
Egypt. It was recorded on 4 April that their repressive activities were intensifying.129 Lord Lloyd 
criticised General Allenby, saying it was imperative to complete the work initiated by General 
Bulfin as he tried to re-establish British authority in the country, and put an end to the unrest. It was 
only after he had eradicated the trouble that he would discuss the removal of the sources of Egyptian 
grievances.130 
Despite the violence taking place across the country, Lord Allenby’s policies were certainly 
tempered with a more benevolent spirit. He allowed military force to be used in quelling the March 
Revolution, but at the same time he negotiated with Wafd members and Egyptian leaders to try and 
deal with the causes of the Revolution. General Allenby understood clearly that “force could never 
solve the problem of Anglo-Egyptian Relations”.131 As will be explained, however, this policy – 
directed as it was towards the immediate suppression of the Egyptian Revolution and the 
continuation of the British Protectorate – did not achieve its desired objectives.132  
On 30 March, the members of the Egyptian delegation submitted a report on Egypt’s complaints, 
and what they considered as the genesis of the Revolution. The Wafd argued that Egyptians viewed 
the British protectorate over Egypt as something which had been made necessary by the war. They 
said all had been forced to endure a military regime during the war, while maintaining the hope that 
the Egyptian question would be settled in favour of the aspirations of the Egyptian people. This hope 
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had all but disappeared after the end of the war, with the British refusing to authorise the Egyptian 
delegation to travel to England and indeed France in order to test Egyptian claims for independence 
before world public opinion. The Wafdists were concerned that representatives of British Wilāyāt 
(dependent provinces) had been allowed participation at the Peace Conference in Paris, while Egypt 
– generally regarded as a more civilised nation which had actually helped to conquer these countries 
– was banned from the Conference.133 
Not only had Britain put down Egyptian nationalist ambitions, but it had also arrested the head of 
the Egyptian delegation and his three colleagues. As discussed, this had directly led to bloodshed, 
with students and then other groups taking part in peaceful demonstrations against the British. 
Violence was met with violence, as the Egyptian people fought back against British troops who had 
been firing at them. The Delegation’s report thus repeated the advice which it had first offered the 
military in a letter dated 24 March. In order to put an end to the agitation and general confusion, it 
suggested the formation of a new popular ministry – an advice which had been promoted by the 
notables, scientists, ministers, representatives and Aʿyan of Egypt. This view had indeed been 
expressed in the aforementioned letter which they had sent to the General Commander-in-Chief.134 
On the following day (31 March), General Allenby summoned the members of the delegation and 
the members of Rushdi’s ministry who had resigned135 so as to review the report presented by the 
Wafd. Allenby made it clear that he saw the report as an extremely positive development, and 
suggested that the two parties had come closer to one another, so ensuring that an agreement was 
possible.136 On the same day, Allenby wrote to the British Government recommending that the 
Egyptian nationalists should be allowed to travel to Europe regardless of the nature of their 
demands. Allenby stated that he had been influenced not only by the Wafd members, but also the ex-
ministers. These senior politicians had stated that “this concession would restore tranquillity and 
guarantee the formation of a ministry”.137 The British Foreign Office, which viewed this proposal 
“with grave misgiving”, passed it on to the British delegation in Paris.138 In turn, the delegation 
concluded that Allenby’s advice “cannot be disregarded”, and accepted his considerations. They 
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also requested Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary in London, to “avoid any appearance of 
mistrusting” Allenby’s present policy.139 
Before the reply from the British Government had arrived, Allenby had written, on 4 April, to  
re-emphasise his proposition, and to issue a warning to his own Government about the seriousness 
of the situation, indicating that “there is evidence that movement is influencing Palestine and Syria, 
besides Egypt, and danger is a very real one”. Simultaneously, Allenby reiterated to his government 
“the importance of obtaining an early announcement that our protectorate is recognised by 
powers”.140 On 5 April, Allenby was told that his policy had been agreed to. He was guaranteed all 
support in implementing it. An alternative plan was, however, also put to him. This was that a 
commission of the highest importance, headed by Lord Milner, should immediately be sent to Egypt 
to conduct a probe into the current situation and produce an account about the future make-up of the 
Protectorate. Adopting this substitute measure would have changed the centre of the political 
dynamic concerning Egypt’s future from Europe back to Cairo, and it might also have made it 
simpler to fulfil Egyptian requests without making out that violence had led to previously 
unsatisfied demands being met. The decision as to which action to pursue was left to General 
Allenby.141 On 6 April, Allenby telegraphed his government, outlining the steps to be followed to 
carry out his strategy. In terms of the scheme of sending out Milner’s Commission to Egypt, Allenby 
stated that “the proposed commission might be desirable later, but would be useless now”. There 
was always the possibility that it might be sent when the ministerial deputation left Egypt for 
London.142 
Allenby’s priority was to implement his guidelines as soon as possible. On 7 April, he gave 
permission to the Egyptians to travel to Europe following their release from prison in Malta. On 
9 April, Hussein Rushdi formed the Ministry. Even so, Allenby’s decision was severely criticised. 
As one British national in Egypt wrote: 
The proclamation of April 7th came as a bombshell to us. As affecting British 
Prestige and security in Egypt, General Allenby’s action is regarded as 
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nothing short of calamitous. Men who were previously prepared to stand by 
us simply had to go over to the other side for protection.143 
Lord Lloyd made it clear that he considered this “reversal” of policy would make it appear that 
violence as a tool of political action had succeeded. He accordingly described Allenby’s action as 
unjustifiable.144 What alarmed Sir R. Graham, he said, was that two weeks of violence might lead to 
Britain surrendering what it had failed to yield during four months of negotiations.145 What was 
immediately apparent, however, was that the news had a sudden effect right across Egypt and the 
Sudan. It was hailed as great national triumph, with political agitation giving way to popular 
celebrations. 
It certainly seemed that the change in British policy in Egypt took place after Britain had reached 
guarantees about the recognition of the Protectorate by the major powers which had convened at the 
Peace Conference, and by the United States in particular. The U.S. President informally recognised 
the Protectorate on 19 April, just as Zaghlul and his delegation, which had left Malta a few days 
earlier, landed in Marseilles on their way to the Paris Peace Conference. The official recognition 
which came on 21 April delighted British officials. Curzon was among those who were convinced 
that a “severe rebuff” in Paris – and most definitely one which had come from the U.S. President – 
had to be seen as a vital step in diminishing the danger from Zaghlul’s damaging extremism. He 
believed that Wilson’s formal acknowledgement was “a very important step in the right 
direction”.146 George Lloyd, who in the 1920s would serve as the British High Commissioner in 
Egypt, said later (without trying to disguise his happiness) that the U.S. validation of the 
Protectorate assured that “Zaghlul’s last hope of effective action in Paris disappeared”. The 
statement showed how concerned the British had been about the possibility of President Wilson 
giving Zaghlul a hearing in Paris.147 The Wafd delegation was, in turn, “shocked” at news of the 
recognition, and “despair began to steep into their hearts” about the prospects of what they had set 
out to achieve. The nationalists had seen Wilson as the personification of their hopes. Accordingly, 
the final U.S. decision left them with a sense of betrayal. In his memoirs, Muhammad Haykal said 
that this resolution by the Americans fell upon the nationalists “like a bolt of lightning”: 
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Here was the man of the Fourteen Points, among them the right to self- 
determination, denying the Egyptian people its right to self-determination 
and recognising the British protectorate over Egypt. And doing all that 
before the delegation on behalf of the Egyptian people had arrived in Paris to 
defend its claim, and before President Wilson had heard one word from 
them! Is this not the ugliest of treacheries?! Is it not the most profound 
repudiation of principles?!148 
Notwithstanding this harsh reverse, the Wafd representatives got to the French capital in April and 
began pressing for Egypt’s independence from Britain. While there were Wafd members who 
viewed the American stance as a mortal wound as far as Egyptian aspirations were concerned, 
others, including Zaghlul himself, decided to keep reiterating their stated aims. The entire 
population of Egypt, Zaghlul was to record in his diary, had become a “revolutionary people 
determined to achieve independence and willing to pay a price for it”, and they would not accept 
failure.149 
Through the execution of its new policy in Egypt, Britain was seeking to guarantee the containment 
of the Egyptian Revolution as well as the alleviation of its current impact on the British position in 
the country. Was Allenby’s modus vivendi a success? What was the direct outcome of his via media 
which combined the restoration of law and order with negotiations with the nationalists? Allenby’s 
balance sheet turned out to be quite unimpressive. 
The celebrations which followed the release of the Wafd delegation from Malta were only 
temporary. Within a couple of days strikes and riots once more blighted the whole country, and 
especially Cairo. There is no doubt that the government had been fully reshuffled, but as soon as the 
Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, returned to office on April 9, he was warned with an ultimatum by 
government officials who had been on strike. They called for the Cabinet to officially recognise the 
Egyptian delegation as the principal legal power in the country, but also demanded that it should 
refuse to recognise the British Protectorate. They also requested the withdrawal of British troops 
from Egypt, stating that they should be replaced by Egyptian troops. After numerous and vain 
negotiations, Rushdi Pasha resigned on 21 April.150 The next day, General Allenby issued a 
proclamation151 ordering that the striking officials, under threat of being fired, should go back to 
their posts. They grudgingly obeyed. Other strikes were outwardly crushed by the repressive 
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measures of martial law, but nationalist spirit remained at the grassroots level. Ordinary Egyptians 
were, perhaps more than ever before, resolved to abolish the Protectorate and liberate Egypt from 
foreign “usurpers”. 
By forcefully ensuring the resignation of the Rushdi Pasha ministry, the Wafd had dismissed the 
theory that British control was crucial to Egypt’s future. Over a period of more than 30 years, the 
Egyptians had only nominally governed Egypt with the assistance of English advisers, but the 
country had actually been administered by a British bureaucracy headed by a Consul-General or a 
High Commissioner. As far back as Lord Cromer’s time, this administration had worsened to such 
an extent that it was almost entirely alienated from the population it was designed to be serving. 
Under such a system, where there was little if no mechanism for public opinion to be heard, 
Egyptians were naturally disinclined to accept that British plans to train an Egyptian governmental 
class had worked. They considered that the number of Egyptians in the public service was in fact 
decreasing and they “were treated more and more as inferiors and not as collaborators”. They also 
complained that “the British official world had steadily cut itself off from any intimate contact with 
Egyptians save with those who were prepared to have no opinions of their own”.152 
It was clear to all that an out-of-touch, largely irresponsible civil service had to go. After the 
stepping down of the Rushdi Pasha Cabinet, it took General Allenby a month to convince 
Mohammed Saʿid Pasha to form a new government.153 This government went on to survive for eight 
months, but it was inevitably unable to prevent the swelling tide of nationalism which was sweeping 
the country. British control was close to breaking point. 
The British authorities in London conceded this when on 15 May 1919, it informed the Westminster 
Parliament that “a strong mission”, led by Lord Milner, would soon arrive in Cairo to investigate the 
causes of the revolution and to make recommendations about what it saw as the necessary measures 
to protect foreign interests in the country and in “shaping for the protectorate a system of prudent 
and ever-enlarging enfranchisement” as well as addressing the “claims of the Egyptian people to a 
due and increasing share in the management of the affairs of Egypt”.154 
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What was particularly noticeable about these developments was how many women took part in the 
Egyptian social movement calling for change. For the first time in history, upper- and middle-class 
female members of the population were rallying on the streets, and indeed providing the intellectual 
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The formation of a feminist consciousness in Egypt ran in parallel with the country’s rapid 
development as a modern state at the start of the 19th century. Technological advancements within 
Muhammad ʿAli’s increasingly capitalistic, secular country were accompanied by burgeoning 
intellectual thought among all sections of society, including women. The whole nation was united in 
criticising the way the occupying British had used their country for their own ends, demeaning the 
interests of the indigenous population, from the peasant masses up to the educated elites. This gave 
rise to numerous variations of Egyptian nationalism, all of which were eventually to play a part in 
seeing at least nominal native rule introduced. 
The feminist element to this movement was both vocal and powerful, as women rallied under the 
“Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. Nationalism was certainly an obvious vehicle for feminist 
demands. So it was that two dynamic and overlapping groups – nationalists and feminists – merged 
to create a formidable campaigning force which would have a compelling effect on the progress of 
Egyptian society. Radical calls for change being made by a pioneering women’s movement 
strengthened the nationalist cause. In turn, feminists gained from their close association with the 
nationalists, using their connections to build up their own power base. 
Before 1919, there was a widespread perception that women were not involved in Egypt’s 
nationalist struggle. Middle East historian Thomas Philipp noted the “total lack of political 
involvement and the almost complete absence of patriotic nationalist expression” before 1919.1 In 
fact, historians have largely drawn attention to the role women played in the revolution of 1919 
per se. That year was actually viewed as a turning point as far as Egyptian feminism was 
concerned.2 The overlap between an emboldened nationalist consciousness and a new feminist one 
has meant feminist progress often being blurred by nationalistic promotion. It manifestly appears 
that feminist endeavours in the decades leading up to the war may well have been overlooked by 
academics. The need to put this historical inaccuracy right is the main objective of this chapter, and 
it will also examine the roles played by male intellectuals in the movement for change, including 
their own contribution to a feminist awakening in Egypt. 
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However, it will be argued that after Egypt won nominal independence in 1922, many of the male 
nationalists who had assisted those striving for female equality became less enthusiastic about the 
women’s crusade. Feminists learned a crucial lesson from this disappointment – they could only 
really succeed if they established their own independent political movement. 
The following chapter will examine how such an organisation took shape in Egypt at the end of the 
19th century, with the appearance of women’s journals expressing the feminist cause. It will trace its 
evolution up until the early 1920s when the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) was formed. The focus 
will be on the female, middle-class literary culture which was indelibly associated with a nationwide 
feminist awakening. The activities of women’s groups in Egypt in the decades leading up to the 
Revolution will be analysed. The convergence of feminist and nationalistic aspirations is hugely 
significant, as both were major contributing factors in moves towards revolution. An irony in the 
study of the development of a feminist consciousness in Egypt is that it has almost always been 
considered by men, with historians likely to underplay the significance of women’s action. The role 
of middle and upper-class women in recording their feminist battle will therefore be underlined in 
this chapter, particularly the split between Muslim middle-class reformist women writers and upper-
class women activists with a western influence. Finally, the chapter will explore the way in which 
women of all classes became vital political actors in the country’s fight for independence from the 
British as they participated in nationalist demonstrations for the first time in March 1919. It will, 
however, observe that the activism of the elite women, which started out playing such an important 
part in the nationalist cause, was gradually separated from it so that it could plough its own furrow 
through history. What is apparent is that the early modern feminist thinkers in Egypt did not 
necessarily come to the same conclusions about the main issues at stake or, indeed, the means to 
achieve their goals.3  
“The Women’s Awakening in Egypt” 
Feminist consciousness and the chiefly male-dominated nationalist movement were developing at a 
different pace in late 19th century and early 20th century Egypt. Men were beginning to study abroad, 
for example, while women were only just emerging from upper-class harems into the state sector. 
Women in such close-knit traditional domestic situations were becoming increasingly disillusioned 
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with their plight, and they found new outlets to display their frustration namely a burgeoning 
publishing industry. This period is referred to as “the women’s awakening” by Egypt scholars such 
as Beth Baron who point to the manner in which women were able to make their demands aired. 
While the better educated found their voice through the written word, others took part in public 
political action. Among the early female activists who inspired these developments were ʿAisha al-
Taymuriyya and Huda Shaʿarawi. 
Those researching early Egyptian feminism have conventionally regarded it as an upper-class 
phenomenon. The trajectory of the aristocratic Huda Shaʿarawi (1879-1947), who became the first 
president of the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923, helps perpetuate this view as she was the 
woman who led the actual struggle for independence. Yet more recent inquiries have challenged this 
belief, in particular works by Baron, and by Margot Badran, the women’s studies and Middle East 
historian. They show that it was middle-class women who were at the forefront of the feminist 
cause, using articles in magazines and newspapers, as well as more classical literature like poems 
and novels, to convey the need for improved rights for women.4 Arabic was the language of the 
middle-class at the time, and the women’s press – its founders, its editors, its contributors, and its 
readers – mostly came from that class. 
The new women’s literary culture gave rise to a powerful female Arabic printing business – one 
which articulated the consciousness of a previously home-bound section of society. As an increase 
in female literacy became a reality,5 middle-class women were able to put across their feminist 
agenda through their writings. This feeling that everybody could not only have a say, but make a 
positive contribution to change, was encapsulated in a phrase which came up time and time again in 
Egyptian literature of the period: al-nahḍa al-nisaʾiyya (the women’s awakening). This expression 
was regularly used by female intellectuals to describe their growing literary movement. It also took 
on a more general meaning – referring to greater social mobility for women, a vast expansion in 
popular education, and an explosion in the number of clubs and associations being formed by 
newly-empowered women. The words al-nahḍa al-nisaʾiyya became more a rallying cry than a 
straightforward description of a literary genre. They were certainly ones which captured the 
Zeitgeist of a nascent women’s movement in Egypt. 
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There were also technical reasons for Egypt’s popular publishing trade flourishing from the late 
1870s onwards. By the time of the British Occupation in 1882, the Cairo governments had 
relinquished their control of the press across the country, which meant that censorship had become 
far less rigorous. The number of presses increased because members of the middle and upper-classes 
had the financial means to invest in literature. Far more expenditure on the production of such 
material saw profits for the sector rise, with the number of books, magazines, and newspapers 
multiplying.6 As people grew more interested in political ideas, and the possibility of united action, 
the press evolved into the key medium of communicating and indeed mobilising. 
The specific development of the women’s press can be dated to the early 1890s. It corresponded 
with the emergence of private publications which allowed publishers to respond to an expanding 
female readership, and its heed of women’s affairs. Opposition to women reading and writing had 
been prevalent among the middle and upper-classes, but this was no longer the case. Female literacy 
shed its subversive image and filled those women who were able to read and write with pride, if not 
a degree of conceit, as they opened up an entirely new literary culture.7 Principally female problems, 
including ones about veiling and seclusion, were vented, along with popular ones about 
relationships, marriage and divorce. Women’s journals also tackled matters such as education and 
work, which were debated at length. The journals contained numerous articles about the world of 
entertainment, and domestic life, ensuring balanced, readable issues. Baron summarises the three 
elements of the early feminist popular press in Egypt: secularist, modernist, and Islamic.8  
Publications which were more secular in content appeared to last the longest.9 The tradition of the 
women’s press in Egypt began in 1892, when Hind Nawfal (c.1860 - 1920), a Syrian Christian 
author, started the monthly journal al-Fatah (The Young Woman), which is deemed the first wholly 
feminist outlet in a sizeable list of Arabic periodicals which were written for, by and about women 
and their concerns. They came to be known as al-majallāt al-nisaʾiyya (women’s journals).10 
Despite the wide variety of literary and scientific journals available at the time, Nawfal said she had 
set up al-Fatah because none of those platforms dealt expressly with the rights of women, nor 
articulated their predicaments in a satisfactory manner. It was for this reason that Nawfal invited 
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women to send her their contributions for print.11 Almost thirty of these women-centred periodicals 
had been produced for distribution around Egypt, and indeed in the outside world, before the start of 
the 1919 revolution.12 
However, as early as the 1870s and 1880s, women’s achievements had been featured in the then 
male-dominated press, offering hope of moving beyond customary gender roles. The first 
biographical dictionaries of women were published by Maryam al-Nahhas (1856-1888), Nawfal’s 
mother, and Zaynab Fawwaz (1860-1914) – two women who had emigrated from Lebanon to Egypt 
and then settled in Alexandria. The pair were part of a dynamic generation of female writers who 
described the condition of women in Egypt through their dictionaries. Al-Nahhas was very much at 
the vanguard of the history of the Egyptian feminist awakening. Her biographical dictionaries, based 
on a genre stretching back hundreds of years to the medieval period, became channels to document 
women’s lives. Some of the earlier biographical dictionaries included references to women, and 
there were even one or two volumes solely dedicated to women, but generally they were largely 
ignored in favour of men. Redressing the balance, al-Nahhas completed Maʿrid al-Hasnaʾ fi Tarajim 
Mashahir al-Nisaʾ (The beautiful woman’s exhibition for the biographies of female celebrities). The 
latter was a biographical dictionary which concentrated on Eastern and Western women,13 and 
which al-Nahhas researched and wrote while living in Alexandria. 
Zaynab Fawwaz, the Shiite Lebanese writer, followed in al-Nahhas’s legacy fifteen years later 
when, in 1894, she published a weighty biographical tome called al-Durr al-Manthur fi Tabaqat 
Rabbat al-Khudur14 (The Scattered pearls amongst the classes of secluded women). This highly 
detailed work chronicled the lives of historical female icons, especially from Greek mythology. 
These included Atlanta the Huntress, while biblical characters such as Abraham’s wife, Sarah, were 
also written about. The life stories of Isabella II, the Queen of Spain, were among those of more 
contemporary women accounted for, together with the 19th century American astronomer, Maria 
Mitchell. As far as Islamic role models were concerned, Fawwaz recounted the tales of Khadeeja, 
the Prophet Mohammed’s first wife; the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima; the Prophet’s youngest wife 
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Arab feminist – not because there was anything overtly radical, let alone militant, about her 
writings, but because she was a pioneer in her field. The very fact that she gave women an identity 
by highlighting their social contributions made her biographical work adventurous.15 
Women’s historical domestic seclusion in Egypt was well covered by the 19th century poet ʿAisha 
al-Taymuriyya (1840-1902), whose volumes were to influence numerous generations.  
Al-Taymuriyya mainly composed long passionate diwans about the equality of the sexes in Turkish, 
Arabic, and Persian (her lineage included a Circassian mother and a Kurdish father). ʿAisha  
al-Taymuriyya’s determination to one day be treated equally to her male counterparts derived 
directly from her lack of formal education due to what she believed to be the constraining practices 
of men. Al-Taymuriyya’s oeuvre was seen as a powerful argument for equality by thousands of 
Egyptian women. Just before al-Taymuriyya’s death in 1902, her prose was circulated widely across 
the country, while most of her poetry was published posthumously. Al-Taymuriyya was a leading 
light of the early Egyptian feminist movement. Her production concentrated on what was logically 
viewed as the biggest single impediment to women being treated equally in society – the denial of 
access to education. Hind Nawfal and Zaynab Fawwaz followed al-Taymuriyya’s example in calling 
for enhancement in the place of women in society. Both were, in particular, committed to bettering 
educational standards for women, arguing that this was entirely in keeping with religious teaching, 
including that of Islam and Christianity. 
So it was that the number of journals available in Egypt grew rapidly from the 1900s onwards. 
There was also a considerable increase in the number of Egyptian editors and writers (Syrians and 
Lebanese had once dominated the industry).16 As previously discussed, Egypt scholar Beth Baron 
provides a great deal of evidence that these early women authors – who were mainly drawn from the 
middle-classes of society – were an extremely dedicated and dominant force as far as the initiation 
of the women’s movement in Egypt was concerned. 
There is little doubt that the output of female writers changed markedly as the feminist movement 
evolved, with women finding the nationalist campaign a perfect agency for their endeavours. The 
reasoning of people like al-Taymuriyah’s was not just a call for education for women for its own 
sake, but a case to make Egyptian society a greater, more efficient one in the face of foreign 
invaders. Women insisted that education and a feminist awareness would make them better citizens. 
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As a nationalistic consciousness developed alongside a feminist one, women’s journalism began to 
play a role in affecting people’s perceptions. Malaka Sa’ad, founded al-Jins al-latif (The Fair Sex) 
in 1908, and her editing aimed “to raise the status of Egyptian women in particular and Eastern 
women in general”.17 Fluently asserted nationalist and patriotic opinions were advanced by women 
writers, so making the entry of women into the literary arena an extremely significant one.18 Despite 
this, women writers would regularly dispute suggestions that they had political aspirations, or were 
in any way trying to transform society by becoming political players.19 They regularly dissociated 
themselves from the suffragette movement in Europe, for example, making clear that their purpose 
was not to win the vote, as many women were doing in countries like Britain in the early 1900s. 
Sarah al-Mihiyya, editor of Fatat al-Nil (Young Woman of the Nile, 1913-1915) wrote that 
European women “are in a worse situation now… having striven to attain political rights alone”.20 
Women undoubtedly wanted a revitalised, new relationship with society, but greater clout in the 
home was their priority. They sought more leverage among their own families and others in their 
immediate circles, so swaying society in general. This was more important to them than outright 
political power. 
Fatima Rashid, the wife of Muhammad Farid Wajdi, owner of the nationalist newspaper al-Dustur 
(The Constitution), expressed her ideas about a woman’s devotion for her country in an article 
called “Nationalism and Woman”, in which she supported the view that those living in an occupied 
land like Egypt had a moral duty to develop a nationalist consciousness. Rashid contended that there 
were plenty of enlightened women who shared this belief with men, and that they had an obligation 
to spread it around all levels of society. It was therefore imperative that “every educated woman 
who senses the critical situation of her country […] to inspire all she meets with the essence of this 
honourable sentiment”.21 She was confident that better mothers could pass on their cultural and 
moral instruction to their children. Baron describes this process thus: 
 
17Malaka Saʿad, ‘Fatihat al-ʿaam al-sadis’ (An Introduction for the Sixth Year) in Al-Jins al-latif (The Fair Sex), vol. 6, 
no. 1, May 1913, p.2. 
18Munira ʿAtiyya Suriyal, ‘Al-Marʾah al-misriyya’ (The Egyptian Woman) in Al-Jins al-latif (The Fair Sex), vol. 3, no. 
10, April 1911, p.279. 
19Layla Al-Shamakhiyya, ‘Al-Marʾah wa safsatat al-kitab’ (Women and Sophistry) in Tarqiyat al-marʾah (Woman’s 
Progress), vol. 1, no. 12, 1908, pp.179-182. 
20Sarah Al-Mihiyya, ‘Tahrir al-marʾah fi Urubba’ (Women’s Liberation in Europe) in Fatat al-nil (Young Woman of the 
Nile), vol. 1, no. 6, April 1914, p.239. 
21Fatima Rashid, ‘Al-Wataniyya wa al-marʾah’ (Women and Nationalism) in Tarqiyat al-marʾah (Woman’s Progress), 
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In their unique capacity as “mothers of the world and child-raisers”, women 
were given the imperative of imbuing their children with love for the nation, 
teaching them national songs and stories. “It is upon you, tender hearted 
mother, to impart to your son respect for his beloved nation, which has no 
dignity without him. The glory of this nation and its misery are in your 
hands.” Mothers were seen as particularly well-suited to be inculcators of 
moral values and patriotic values.22  
Those advocating the aspirations of women in society tended to emphasise their wishes for more 
authority within the home, rather than for enhanced political rights per se. In this sense, women’s 
status as highly moral wives and mothers, was always stressed. Taking up the cause of nationalism 
was also used to legitimise calls for improved women’s rights. Yet limits were also set by the focus 
on domestic roles – by highlighting their dependence on bread-winning men they lessened their own 
functions as autonomous human beings who were capable of acting politically. Similarly, women 
made it clear that they were relying on men to bring about change through the political system, 
rather than seeing beliefs of their own implemented. There was frequent criticism aimed at 
unwanted western influences introduced by colonialists, but not against men who routinely 
subordinated women and kept them in often highly restricted positions within society. Men 
legitimised their control of women with ideals of morality, many of them based on religion. Despite 
this, there were a number of concessions which women were able to gain, and these increased 
knowledge of women’s rights in general. 
The purpose of women demonstrating their nationalistic stances was not solely an academic one – 
they wanted their work to have practical consequences. Thus nationalism became the obvious means 
by which Egyptian women could make their voices heard in society. It effectively allowed them to 
deal with numerous vexed questions including education, seclusion, veiling, and not least of all 
political action. The “mother of the nation” role which women held for themselves meant venturing 
out of their homes and into key institutions such as schools and hospitals. They also held meetings, 
developing nationalistic ideas and rhetoric which they shared with their male counterparts. These 
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The Cultural and Social Dimensions of Nationalist Feminism 
Hizb al-Umma (the Umma Party), al-Hizb al-Watani (the Nationalist Party), and Hizb al-Islah  
al- Dusturi (the Party of Constitutional Reform) were the three main nationalist parties which 
developed around newspapers in Egypt in 1907. Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-Marʾah (the Society for 
Woman’s Progress) was founded by a group of Muslim women a year later, along with a journal of 
the same name. In common with all other women’s groups at the time, Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-
Marʾah was not described as a party (ḥizb), and there were no public meetings in civic halls. Instead 
the group was called a Society (jamʿiyya) and assemblies were always held in private homes.   
Some members of Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-Marʾah had Turkish backgrounds and they, along with 
other associates, remained allegiant to the Ottoman Empire. These loyalists called for a constitution 
similar to the Ottoman Constitution. “We do not have a remedy for our present situation except 
through work and reform, and this will never be accomplished as long as the nation is not granted a 
constitution like that of the Ottoman Empire”, wrote Munira ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, an affiliate of the 
Jamʿiyyat. “What does that constitution mean? That our men will formulate their own policy, and 
foreigners will not prevent reform.”23 The obligation for male relatives to fight for a new Egyptian 
constitution was stressed by ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, along with the need for economic sanctions against 
foreigners who challenged the autonomy of Egyptians. ʿAbd al-Ghaffar encouraged Egyptians to 
ignore overseas-made, imported products, saying they should manufacture and buy indigenous ones 
instead.24 
As women tried to persuade, rather than force people to come round their way of thinking, the 
middle and upper-classes established their own network of charities. This often meant that activities 
usually carried out in the home and for the family – like cooking and sewing and caring for the sick 
– were performed in society at large. There were also other types of compassionate institutions set 
up. One, founded in 1908, looked after orphans, and one of its mission statements was to contribute 
to the “vitality of the nation”.25 This kind of altruism added a voluntary, well-intentioned dimension 
to their undertaking, which won them far more supporters than would have been the case if they 
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24Ibid., pp.126-128. 
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were simply working for proceeds. The rallying cry for these disinterested deeds was the need for 
national renewal, and not the selfish welfare of individuals. Part of this bringing the nation together 
entailed removing benevolent national agencies away from foreign control. A medicine dispensary 
initiated by Lady Cromer, wife of the British Consul General Lord Cromer, and largely run by 
British women was boycotted by Egyptian women including Huda Shaʿarawi. A royal Egyptian 
project, the Mabarrat Muhammad ʿAli, was later launched by Shaʿarawi and a number of Egyptian 
women. Middle and upper-class women invested a huge amount of time, energy and money into 
new charitable structures such as clinics and orphanages. Many became limited power bases for 
women, allowing them to influence society from outside their homes, while providing important 
social services for an increasingly unified nation.26 
Egyptian women were, by the turn of the 19th century, also using private talks as a forum for their 
new feminist awareness. The lectures, which were coordinated by upper-class women and chiefly 
delivered to women-only audiences by middle-class women, were held on Friday – the national day 
off. The new Egyptian University, which was opened in 1908 thanks to a number of generous 
endowments, including an exceptionally large one from Princess Fatma, was where many of these 
educational addresses were given. The offices of the liberal, pro-feminist newspaper al-Jarida (lit. 
The newspaper) were inaugurated in 1907, and were also used as a place for instruction. Among the 
influential speakers was Malak Hifni Nasif (1886-1918), a former teacher, who used her skills as a 
poet and writer to encourage women to lift themselves academically, and to involve themselves in 
professions from which they had previously been excluded. Using the pseudonym Bahithat  
al-Badiyya (Seeker in the Desert), Nasif always ensured packed gatherings as she became the first 
woman in Egyptian history to publicly call for the liberation of women. The first time she did this 
was at a meeting of male nationalists held at the Egyptian Congress in Heliopolis in 1911, with 
Bahithat al-Badiyya advocating a gradual breakdown of segregation, so as not to compromise 
women. Other cultural lessons were later arranged by the Intellectual Association of Egyptian 
Women, which was set up in 1914. 
The matter of a woman’s place in Egypt’s society in the early 20th century has often been considered 
in the context of the nationalist debate. In turn, female activity towards change has mainly been 
studied by male writers. There was also no doubt that the country’s growing feminist press kept up 
with the budding Egyptian nationalist movement. The parallel emergence of the two has been 
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underplayed by history books, with many of the female intellectuals of the period – whose writings 
triggered the women’s awakening – often ignored at the expense of more high-profile men. 
The Contribution of Male Intellectuals to the Feminist Debate 
One of the great ironies of the early feminist debate which took place in Egypt’s books, newspapers, 
and magazines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that it was predominantly 
conducted by authoritative men. The Muslim lawyer Judge Qasim Amin (1863- 1908) and Talaʿat 
Harb27 (1867-1941), the Cairo-based economist who founded Banque Misr, were two fiercely 
competitive male intellectuals who carried out a very overt contest on the vexed issue of women’s 
emancipation. The Amin/Harb rivalry has led to a misconception that women were not actively 
engaged in the discussion on women’s role in society, or, that women only joined in some time later 
when the Egyptian Muslim Malak Hifni Nasif began to write. Because of this erroneous view, many 
scholars attribute the foundation and early leadership of the women’s movement in Egypt – and 
indeed in the rest of the Arab world – to men.28 Yvonne Haddad, for instance, states that the Arab 
feminist campaign’s “most prominent advocates have been men who took up the cause of 
women”.29  
No male individual is more inextricably linked to the awakening of the feminist struggle in Egypt 
than Judge Qasim Amin. Feminist scholar Kader even dubs Amin “the first Egyptian and Arab 
feminist”, arguing that Amin’s books transformed the widespread national polemic about women 
into a full-fledged feminist crusade.30 But this claim seems to underplay earlier Egyptian and Arab 
feminist history, and major societal developments during and after the strive for independence. A 
French volume published in 1894 by Qasim Amin and entitled Les Égyptiens: Réponse à M. Le Duc 
d’Harcourt (The Egyptians: Response to The Duke of Harcourt) was said to have laid the basis for 
an argumentation about the situation of women in society. This work was a response to a French 
intellectual’s criticism of the treatment of women in Egypt and in Islam. In his own book, Amin 
denies that women are overwhelmingly secluded in Egypt and goes so far as to say that there is no 
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fundamental difference between the conditions of European and Muslim women.31 However, Amin 
reverted from his original defence of Islam to arrive at a more secular position in Tahrir al-Marʾah 
(The Liberation of Women, 1899) and al-Marʾah al-Jadida (The New Woman, 1900). The latter 
publication lambasted Islam, mainly using quotes from French authors who were sceptical, to say 
the least, of classical Islamic culture. Both of Amin’s latter works critiqued the place of women in 
society far more forcefully than earlier literature. Both also created a huge stir, drawing numerous 
plaudits, as well as many detractors who found his opinions repellent.32 Amin went to great efforts 
to highlight the positive contribution of Western women towards their societies’ civilisation.33 Amin 
thus summed up his view of Egyptian feminism as a tension between “modern” Western values and 
“ancient” Islamic ones. 
Amin’s key premise was that the liberation of Egyptian society from foreign control required female 
emancipation. Amin also used arguments based on the teachings of Islam to call for a sovereign 
Egypt free from external domination. In his two pro-enfranchisement tomes, Amin concentrates on 
the contentious topics of women’s education, the seclusion of women because of the way many 
covered their faces in public, reforms of marriage and divorce, and the subject of polygamy. Many 
of these issues involved laws and customs that are directly relevant to Islam or the Arab world. 
Others, such as the female veil, preceded the emergence of Islam as a religion. It has to be pointed 
out, however, that not all of these subjects were particularly pertinent to all classes of women in 
Egypt at the time. Veiling and seclusion, for example, were not practiced by working-class and 
peasant women. While arranged marriages (often followed by divorces) were relatively common, 
polygamy was in fact fairly rare in Egypt. Regardless of class, numerous women found themselves 
denied all property rights. 
Education remained the fundamental dilemma of women’s subjugation. Amin contended, for 
example, that men were to be blamed for women’s state of ignorance.34 But while Amin was in 
favour of women being educated, he did not advocate for women to be tutored on equal terms with 
men.35 The questions of polygamy and veiling were, of course, closely linked to that of education. In 
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order to defend his stances on both matters, Amin used references from Islam and Shariʿa law. 
These opposed polygamy, asserting that the Islamic legal system itself had “stipulated the equality 
of women and men before any other legal system”.36 Amin equally maintained that the covering of 
the face using a veil was not even mentioned in Islamic law.37 He said that the veil itself was in fact 
more likely to increase interest in potential suitors, and that it was a barrier to women taking part in 
any dealings.38 Shariʿa law did not require the seclusion of women in society, insisted Amin, even 
affirming that exclusions were in fact harmful to society. Despite this, Amin did not push for a 
complete and immediate ban on seclusion. Instead, Amin explained that: “…such a sudden 
revolution could lead to an increase in the behaviour that we consider corrupt”.39 
Amin’s contentions for the emancipation of women – albeit limited in scope – certainly had roots in 
the Egyptian society in which he was writing. The values of the English ruling class in Egypt also 
had a strong influence on his claims. For instance, Amin suggested in his works that the burgeoning 
feminist movement in Britain had a considerable impact on Egyptian women. As the Europeans 
tightened their control over Egypt, the principles of the old Turco-Circassian elite – the power 
structure which dominated the main administrative and military posts in society – became less 
relevant to Egypt’s upper middle-classes. There is little doubt that Amin presented a very positive 
picture of women from Europe and America during the period, declaring that many were leading 
fulfilled lives. Amin pointed to the fact that many were working alongside male counterparts in all 
kinds of fields, from the arts through to trade. He said he was saddened that Egypt was depriving 
women of the opportunities so readily enjoyed in Europe and America.40 Amin also described 
European women as being well-socialised, in the sense that they were modest and restrained in their 
behaviour. A surprising statement made by Amin was that European and American women 
continued to lower their eyes when they came into contact with an unfamiliar man publicly. He 
reckoned that not even the chastest Egyptian women would have been expected to do this.41 
Leila Ahmed, a prominent scholar specialising in women’s studies and religion, is among the 
authors who have examined Amin’s writings at length and come to the conclusion that he was not, 
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Cromer” – the Victorian British Consul General in Egypt - and “colonialism”. These figurative 
criticisms are certainly worthy of being taken seriously. Many of Amin’s theories about women 
were in fact being shared by men of the period in colonial societies like British Egypt. Ahmed 
makes the accusations that Amin’s book Tahrir al-marʾah “merely called for the substitution of 
Islamic-style male dominance by Western-style male dominance”.42 
Muhammad Talaʿat Harb was, however, the fiercest opponent of Amin’s views on women’s 
emancipation. Harb, a nationalist historian and economist who came from a lower middle-class 
Cairo family, wrote two books in 1899 and 1901,43 with the second of these, Fasl al-khitab fi  
al-marʾah wa al-hijab (The Decisive Decree on Women and the Veil), containing long excerpts 
from Amin’s reply to the Duc d'Harcourt. In it, Harb takes up a particularly authoritarian, 
conservative position on the theme of women. He collaborated on this subject with Mustafa Kamil, 
the lawyer and journalist who was a founder of the Nationalist Party, who also used his writing to 
campaign against women’s freedoms at the turn of the century. The common factor between Harb, 
Kamil and many other male intellectuals of the period was that they all had a French legal 
education.  
Harb did not oppose increased education for women, as Amin did. However, he vigorously objected 
to removing restrictions on the social mobility of women. Harb’s book starts with a quote from 
Amin’s Les Égyptiens, asserting that Muslims will never subject women to the same treatment as 
Europeans. Harb launches a vitriolic attack on him for changing his position.44 Harb is in fact in 
general agreement with the necessity for improved educational standards for Muslim women, but he 
prescribes two conditions: the first is that education does not preclude the type of modesty involved 
in seclusion and veiling; the second is that women’s education should have a significant Islamic 
dimension, and indeed be limited to the study of keeping a household in order and bringing up 
children properly. The veil and seclusion do not need to be abolished as part of a policy of educating 
women, states Harb. In practical terms, he recommends that a girl’s tutor could be a relative or a 
close family friend. The most important thing argues Harb, is that al-hijab (the veil) can be observed 
– that is to say that the head and body of a woman should be covered when she is with anybody with 
whom she is not on intimate terms. Harb supports the view that a woman should remain at home, 
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except in extreme circumstances when she is forced to go out.45 Harb also suggests that women 
teachers and administrators should staff Islamic girls’ schools. Harb is hostile to the importing of 
instructors from non-Muslim countries, even though – at the time – there were not enough trained 
Egyptian women to take up schooling and bureaucratic posts in all the educational institutions. 
Accordingly, Harb recommends that learned Muslim women should arrive from India and other 
Islamic countries to educate Muslim girls.46  
Harb is sceptical of the high regard in which Amin holds European civilisation, and he also 
castigates Amin’s dismissal of the glories of ancient Islamic legacy. Harb points out that the reforms 
in society which Amin has endorsed might have earned him praise as a reformer, but that the 
reforms have been far from effective. Harb considers that too many societal dangers were creeping 
in from the West: manners were not what they were; incidents of prostitution were on the increase; 
people were drinking wine and other alcohol; a lot of people were in debt and wasting money; and 
educational standards were declining. Harb even blamed Europeans for a deterioration in the moral 
codes of Islam. European colonialism and commerce had – alongside European “civilisation” – 
succeeded in corrupting Muslim society, and, indeed, threatening its very existence. Salvation, Harb 
insisted, did not lie in living up to European lifestyles.47 
Amin and Harb’s ideas should also be placed in the context of a conflict between the classes of 
Egyptian society. The Europeans, who were undeniably the governing class in Egypt, were seen 
differently by the upper middle-class reformers like Amin and lower middle-class intellectuals like 
Harb. In his younger days, Amin rejected European culture, but then began to admire the continent’s 
achievements as he grew older. This change of mind coincided with a widespread belief that British 
rule would, in the long run, be more beneficial to his class than the Khedives had been. But, as far as 
Harb was concerned, the colonialism and industry of Europe was a genuine threat to Egyptian 
institutions and ethics. This consideration almost certainly summed up the insecurities of his class.  
Internal tensions between men and women combined with these fundamental disparities in attitude 
towards European mores at the turn of the century were to produce a protracted divergence in the 
convictions of those from the new upper middle-classes, and the petite bourgeoisie as they related to 
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Middle East speculates that Egyptian men from a petite bourgeoisie background felt threatened by 
women. In summary, the men feared that their traditional roles as guardians of the family honour 
were being endangered by European supremacy and by the standards of the British occupiers, in 
particular. They also thought they were being undermined by women who were increasingly 
questioning their own standing within society. In contrast, men belonging to the new upper-middle 
class were more inspired by Western customs and advocated women’s moves towards 
emancipation.48 
The advancement of women in society was of course a shared goal of women of all classes, but 
there was a distinct split about how to achieve it: mainly between middle-class Islamic reformist 
women and upper-class women activists who were more galvanised by ideas from the West. This 
cleavage became one between traditional, conservative women and more liberal ones. It was made 
clear in the differences of opinion between Malak Hifni Nasif and Huda Shaʿarawi – both of whom 
were high profile adversaries in the debate on women’s issues at the end of the 19th century and 
early 20th century. 
The Islamic/Western Split among Egyptian Feminists 
The early 20th century not only saw the activation and participation of upper-class women such as 
Shaʿarawi but also an intensification of feminist arguments within the press and amongst middle-
class women writers. While the pioneering works on feminism were produced by men or by non-
Muslim women, middle-class Muslim women soon joined the conversation on the side of reform. 
The most prominent of these was Malak Hifni Nasif who, as mentioned earlier, wrote under the pen 
name of Bahithat al-Badiyah. An example of this is seen in her various journal articles and letters. 
She also spoke publicly about the situation and advancement of women, and was tirelessly involved 
with other women such as the prolific Christian Lebanese-Palestinian writer Mayy Ziyadah (1886-
1941) in various literary groups exchanging on feminism,49 nationalism and giving lectures to 
female audiences comprised of both upper and middle-class women.50 Her work inspired more 
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Ziyadah, the poet, essayist and translator, was an essential figure in the Nahda – or “renaissance” – 
of Arab literature in the early 20th century. Ziyadah and her family emigrated to Egypt in 1908, with 
her father founding al-Mahrusah (lit. the protected one) newspaper. Ziyadah became a regular 
contributor to the paper, and went on to run a literary salon in Cairo during the 1920s and 1930s 
which turned one of the most famous in the world. Her letters to Nasif provide a very clear 
illustration of their ideas with respect to women’s rights. In one letter to Nasif, written in 1902, 
Ziyadah asks for direction and leadership in the woman’s struggle: 
We have hearts that are burning, but we do not know what fire is burning 
them… so teach us how and where to direct it… Help in the emancipation of 
the woman by teaching her responsibilities and duties…We do not mind if 
you hide your delicate hands behind walls or if you hide your eastern 
features behind your veil, as long as we continue to hear the sound of your 
pen at work, so that we may know from you what the higher self is.51 
Nasif’s response to this letter was equally charged and thought-provoking. In 1912, she wrote: “My 
heart is breaking because of the corruption in our society”,52 and argued that men had for too long 
determined the fate of women: “If the man commanded us to veil, we veiled, and if he asked us to 
unveil, we unveiled, and if he asked us to learn, we learned, but were there always good intentions 
behind his demands for us?”53 Ziyadah replied to this letter, making her feelings about men’s 
historical domination over women unambiguous: “Man wants the woman to feel his tyranny, 
because tyranny is control… the more she rebelled, the more his authoritarianism increased”.54  
Malak Hifni Nasif had already rehearsed her own views about the status of women in her feminist 
tract which was published in 1910, prior to her correspondence with Ziyadah. The book,  
Al-Nisaʾiyat (Women’s Affairs) was, and still is considered an extremely important ground-breaking 
feminist publication, which looked at several issues from marriage, to polygamy, to education and 
work. Nasif objected to arranged marriages saying: “if love is not the foundation for two people 
coming together, then there is no meaning to their union”,55 and wrote that the marriage age for girls 
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that: “Polygamy corrupts men… and corrupts the hearts of women.”57 Her stance on veiling was 
more equivocal – on the one hand she argued that “our religion does not restrict us in this matter”,58 
and on the other hand stated: “My opinion is that it is not yet time for the removal of the veil, for 
women must first be given a true education, and taught proper behaviour… then leave her to choose 
what is most beneficial to her and her nation.”59 
What is very evident in Nasif’s work is a genuine attempt to advance any changes within an Islamic 
modernist context. There were other conservative women in society who, as Nasif, had a traditional 
attitude towards their role in the community – one which had been cultivated during their restricted 
experiences under Ottoman rule. These women were concerned about what they perceived as the 
spread of liberal immorality. Fatima Rashid, editor of Tarqiyat al-marʾah (Woman’s Progress; 
1908- 1909), for example, was critical of the way Egyptian women mimicked their European 
counterparts in everything from progressive point-of-views to fashion. Rashid contended that a 
return to Islamic law would be the only way of moving back from this blind copying of a foreign 
social group. Rashid wrote that Egyptian women “did not understand the full scope of religious law 
which has given them all the rights that they need”.60 Ideas about how women should behave within 
Egypt under the Ottomans also found support in the journals al-ʿAfaf (The Virtue; 1910- 1922) and 
Fatat al-Nil (Young Woman of the Nile). 
The vision of conservative women nurtured under Ottoman sovereignty was based on a harking 
back to an ancient Islamic past. It centred on the manner in which the wives of the Prophet were said 
to have conducted their lives, along with other prominent religious women. So it was that customs 
which gave women a subordinate place in society were highlighted. These included, for example, 
wearing a veil, and generally keeping a subdued profile, or secluding themselves away completely 
from society. Conflicting cultural and sexual identities put forward by women on different sides of 
the feminist polemic created a conundrum. Leila Ahmed suggested that Middle Eastern feminists 
were “caught between those two opposing loyalties, forced almost to choose between betrayal and 
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and political outlook – conservative women were particularly prone to solely calling for improved 
women’s rights within strictly prescribed parameters. In this sense, they had no interest in 
challenging the boundaries which had already been set for them by their backgrounds, and were thus 
content with accepting male views of nationalism, and what it meant for their society.  
This Islamic approach to feminism contrasted noticeably with the statements made by the more 
upper-class feminists like Huda Shaʿarawi, which appear to show a greater western orientation. 
Accounts of harems in the latter part of the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century testify 
to how upper-class women’s perceptions of themselves were evolving within the harem walls, and 
how the shifts taking place outside these walls and the writings of middle-class women were seeping 
in and influencing them. One of Shaʿarawi’s childhood memories is of a travelling poet coming to 
her house – she writes how this woman of lower status impressed her with her level of knowledge: 
“Observing Sayyida Khadija convinced me that, with learning, women could be the equals of men if 
not surpass them.”62 Moreover, upper-class women’s philanthropic activities were also pushing 
them into the public sphere, making them more aware of the political forces around them. One of the 
most successful charitable organisations, the Mabarrat Muhammad ʿAli, founded in 1909 by Huda 
Shaʿarawi and other Egyptian women, is mentioned in the Egyptian Gazette in 1910 in an article 
about high infant mortality in Egypt: 
In order to remedy this deplorable state of affairs a society has been started 
called “L’Œuvre Mohamed Aly”, which by means of pamphlets, tracts and 
the distribution of medical necessities is trying to spread some elementary 
notions of health among the native populace. The Khedive, the Khedivah 
and the Khedival mother have given their patronage to this work.63 
One conspicuous distinction between middle and upper-class Egyptian women was the level and 
type of contact they had with Western women which can endeavour to explain this Islamic/Western 
split amongst Egyptian feminists. Many upper-class families during this period employed Western 
governesses and teachers to educate their children. The memoirs of Shaʿarawi and Mary “Ellen” 
Chennells, the English governess, (c. 1814-1896) demonstrate that often very genuine friendships 
developed between these women. Chennells was, following a long career as a governess, appointed 
governor to Princess Zeynab Khanum Effendi, daughter of Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt and his 
second wife, Princess Jananyar Berinici Khanum Effendimiz. Chennells wrote Recollections of an 
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Egyptian Princess by her English Governess, a book which has become a classic source about day-
to-day life in the Khedival court, setting in the context of Anglo-Egyptian history. Shaʿarawi thus 
commented on her close association with Eugenie Le Brun, the French wife of Hussain Rushdi 
Pasha (Prime Minister of Egypt between 1914-1919): “Mme Rushdi not only guarded my 
reputation, but also nourished my mind and spirit… Soon, at her request, I began to attend her 
Saturday salon.”64 Whilst women of the middle-classes such as Ziyadah were holding meetings for 
intellectual reflections, women of the upper-classes were also engaging in socio-political 
considerations within the harems and at the high society gatherings of women such as Eugenie le 
Brun: “Mme Rushdi adroitly guided the discourse from issue to issue. There were debates about 
social practices, especially veiling.”65 Upper-class women such as Shaʿarawi also began organising 
lectures for women, initially inviting European female speakers, and later welcoming well-known 
Egyptian writers. It was through these talks that a more direct link was made between feminists of 
the middle-class and those from upper-class harems: 
Marguerite Clement arrived from France … she asked if Egyptian women 
were in the habit of giving and attending lectures. We were not, I had to 
admit, but I invited her to give one…The lecture drew a good audience… 
Soon Egyptian women began to speak. The best known was Malak Hifni 
Nasif.66 
On the other hand, under British colonial rule, middle-class women in Egypt would have come into 
contact with western women working as teachers or for ministries, positions that were limited if not 
closed to them. A level of estrangement was always maintained, and often a strong resentment grew 
out of the situation. This is seen in the case of the educator, Nabawiyya Musa (1886-1951). She 
grew up in a modest Muslim family and entered herself into the girls section of the ʿAbbas Primary 
School.67 She was subsequently admitted at the Saniyah Teacher’s Training School68 and later 
appealed to the Ministry of Education to sit the state baccalaureate exam and receive equal pay to 
male teachers. She describes this experience in her memoirs: 
Mr. Dunlope surprised me when he came in holding my application in his 
hand... He said: you are a dreamer so listen to my advice and remove this 
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request… unless you promise me you will be successful. I said: And have 
any of the other candidates promised you success before sitting the exam? 
[...] he said: then know that if you fail, my opinion of you will fall. I said: I 
am, thank God, above the serving classes, and neither you nor anyone else 
can make me a servant… for my work carries no deficiency.69 
As Badran explains, the British authorities made Musa the exception to the rule by making her the 
first female teacher to receive an equal salary to male teachers.70 Musa herself writes of her success: 
The results came out and I passed coming out forty-third among two-
hundred candidates. This was in the year 1907… no other Egyptian woman 
would pass the baccalaureate exam until 1928. For this reason my success 
was big news, and newspapers carried titles such as “the first female 
Egyptian to pass the baccalaureate”.71 
Musa was strongly opposed to marriage arguing: “I hate marriage and see it as dirt, and I decided 
never to soil myself with this dirt”72 and justifies her decision to remove her veil as being partly 
motivated by a desire to set an example in order to alter established practices: “I wanted to unveil, 
although I did not write about it but read Qasim Amin’s book and liked it, though I believe traditions 
cannot be changed with words.”73 Musa was a highly controversial character, who clashed with the 
colonial powers and also with the men of her time. She records: “They called me the wrecker of 
men’s homes and the severer of their livelihoods”,74 and describes an incident which exemplifies the 
resentment the other male teachers and the British principal had for her: 
At that time I used to write for a daily journal called “the young woman’s 
Egypt”… The other Arabic teachers went to the principal and brought her 
various clips from the journal and said I was criticizing English politics in 
these articles… and by doing that they managed to turn her against me.75 
Musa went on to become the first Egyptian woman principal at a girls’ school in Fayyum, in Middle 
Egypt.76 She was made principal of the Mansurah teaching school and in 1924 became inspector of 
girls’ schools.77 As Badran argues, the achievements in her career as an educator threatened both the 
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social patriarchy as well as the British administration.78 The relatively positive interaction of upper-
class Egyptian women with Europeans compared to the more negative one of middle-class Egyptian 
women can help clarify the spilt in Egypt’s feminist awakening from the very start between a 
western-oriented feminism promoted more amongst women of the upper-classes such as Shaʿarawi, 
and a more Islamic feminism bolstered by middle-class women like Nasif and Musa.79 Nationalist 
arguments were exploited by both liberal and conservative feminists, agreeing on the need for girls 
to be educated, to attain domestic competence, and to maintain a patriotic posture within their 
nation. 
It was through the increased intellectual contentions between female and male thinkers and writers, 
and the interplay between middle and upper-class feminists, that Egyptian feminism moved into its 
second phase during the fight for independence in 1919-1922, which tied it directly to Egyptian 
nationalism and provided the background needed to turn ideas into actions. Thus, the nationalist and 
feminist voices of the early part of the 20th century had collided. In some arenas women were 
involved by the nationalists, while in others they were marginalised and had their claims turned 
against them. However, the events of the 1919 revolution would give women a reason to hope that 
their work had not been in vain. Women’s militant participation in the protests against the British 
was greeted with open arms by many nationalists, and for a brief period the men and women of 
Egyptian society were united in their quest for independence. A joint struggle towards freedom from 
Britain suited both men, and women who had been driven to political action. 
Nationalist Feminist Political Activism 
During the 1919 revolution, Huda Shaʿarawi led veiled women demonstrators in the strife against 
the British. Female solidarity with the Egyptian nationalists was embodied by Shaʿarawi’s strong 
partnership with Saʿad Zaghlul (1859-1927), leader of the Wafd (“delegation”) – the Egyptian 
nationalist movement which was formed in 1918 at the end of the First World War. It was at the 
forefront of the push for independence from Britain, with both men and women lending their 
support to the “party of the nation”. What women also stressed, however, was that they were equally 
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campaigning for equality of the sexes – so engaging in a “dual struggle”.80 Egyptian women first 
took part in nationalist public actions in 1919, but they were to become central to the limited 
withdrawal of the British from Egypt in 1922. 
It is at this point that the chapter focuses on the role of Huda Shaʿarawi and Safiyya Zaghlul, two 
women from the aristocratic class who were integral to the nationalist feminist movement – helping 
to organise the rallies of March 1919 against the British, but also mobilising the Egyptian feminist 
movement as the revolution gathered steam. Both women were the wives of Wafd activists: Huda 
Shaʿarawi was married to ʿAli Shaʿarawi Pasha, a senior member of the Wafd party and of the 
adjourned legislative assembly. Safiyya Zaghlul (1878- 1946), in turn, was the wife of Saʿad 
Zaghlul, the Wafd leader himself. Following the favourable outcome of the 1919 revolution, Safiyya 
Zaghlul was to become known as the “Mother of the Egyptians”. There had been numerous manners 
in which upper-class Egyptian women resisted British rule, including through economic boycotts, 
pickets, and the distribution of anti-colonial literature. This chapter, however, intends to concentrate 
on the particularly symbolic marches in March 1919 and the way they created a seminal moment in 
the relationship between the nationalists and the feminists. It was the first public interaction between 
the two groups, and one which was in many respects an immediate accomplishment. So it was that 
women were able to resort to popular political activity to voice their concerns to as large an 
audience as possible, utilising their solidarity with men to advance their cause.  
Egypt scholars such as ʿAfaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, and especially feminist ones, highlight the fact 
that women from all kinds of backgrounds were involved in the battle for change. This cooperation 
across different social and economic classes has been discussed at length. However, while the effort 
of upper-class, aristocratic women to the revolution was often described in great detail, and indeed 
celebrated, the help of poorer, unentitled women has frequently been forgotten. Masses of 
economically disadvantaged women actually lost their lives in the process, while the sacrifice of 
more privileged women was nothing like as extreme. 
The arrests and deportations of Saʿad Zaghlul and three colleagues was the spark which ignited 
major protests all over Egypt in March 1919. It was also at this time that women took to the streets 
to dissent for the first time in the country’s history. This hugely significant development has been 
examined by historians writing in various languages, including English, Arabic and French. Thus a 
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mythology has emerged around the women’s very public gatherings, with recollections of the 
“Revolutionary Gentlewomen”81 written about, along with references to the “ladies’ demonstration” 
of March 1919.82 
Middle-class and upper-class women in Egypt were, before the First World War, associated with a 
number of professional sectors, including educational and journalistic. Women also gained some 
type of political action by forming social groups, but the outbreak of the war in 1914 brought a lot of 
these activities to an abrupt halt. Schools, for example, were effectively shut down as learning 
institutions as they were used to house refugees. Journalists lost their jobs as journals had to close 
because of high production costs in wartime. Many associations, including those founded by 
women, were dissolved. Rising prices, shortages of basic foodstuffs and other necessities were 
inconveniences which all hampered women’s pursuits in public life. 
The war also led to increased interest in colonial politics, drawing attention to oppressive British 
rulers and their methods. As women joined men in their hostility to the British authorities, they 
became more familiar with the language of national determination.83 Wartime hardships amplified a 
sense of injustice, and made women more inclined to protest. The basic narrative of the 1919 
revolution is allegedly well established, having been pieced together considering diverse sources 
(both indigenous and foreign) – from eye-witness accounts, and newspapers articles through to 
contemporaneous historical chronicles.84 Yet there were a number of contradictions in these records 
impeding the construction of a definitive minute-by-minute version of exactly what happened.85 
Indeed, descriptions of the March rallies are often blurred. Demonstrations first broke out on 
Sunday, 16 March, with the daily newspaper Al-Ahram reporting a “ladies’ demonstration” starting. 
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This was followed by a similar march on Wednesday, 19 March, and/or Thursday, 20 March.86 
These distinct protests have frequently been erroneously joined together as one. 
Although the processions of March 1919 by elite Egyptian women were planned in advance, and 
meticulously coordinated by Huda Shaʿarawi, they have often been characterised as being 
spontaneous ones. Shaʿarawi’s entourage sent a delegation to the British authorities to ensure there 
was official permission for the first mass meeting. No approval was offered to begin with, but it was 
later reported in al-Muqattam87 (lit. the name of a hill range in Southeast Cairo) that sanction had 
been granted by the colonial administration. Pre-demonstration work was then carried out, mainly 
involving upper-class women telephoning each other to arrange assembly points. These women also 
employed their literary skills to produce slogans on banners, and to circulate petitions promoting 
their aims. Even though her husband was a prominent personage in the progress towards 
independence from Britain, there was no question of Safiyya Zaghlul remaining in his shadow. On 
the contrary, she became a formidable political actor in her own right, showing immense support for 
the March 1919 revolution. Safiyya Zaghlul’s very home in Cairo was known as Bayt al-Umma (the 
House of the Nation), with nationalists from far and wide rallying within it. Safiyya Zaghlul invited 
activists while her husband was away – first in exile following his arrest and later travelling to 
London and Paris to press for independence for Egypt. Through this period, Safiyya Zaghlul took a 
pride in playing a pivotal role in their struggle. By organising meetings at their house, and styling 
herself as a national “mother” figure, she achieved results which have often been overlooked by 
those studying nationalist movements. During the house assemblies, Safiyya Zaghlul would sign 
petitions, deliver speeches, and generally make the men and women who visited this focal point of 
revolution feel welcome. Safiyya Zaghlul had until then lived a largely secluded life in her own 
upper-class enclave, so especially took pleasure in becoming a public individual.88 Sultan (later 
King) Fuʾad summed up the power which Safiyya Zaghlul yielded within the Wafdist nationalist 
movement when he noted the “extraordinary influence of the women and particularly of Madame 
Saʿad Zaghlul in exciting native hostility to the British”.89 
 
86Al-Ahram, op. cit. 
87Al-Muqattam, Cairo, March 1919. 
88For more on Safiyya Zaghlul, see her biography written in French by her close friend, Fina Gued Vidal, shortly after 
Safiyya’s death. Fina Gued Vidal, Safia Zaghloul, Cairo, R. Schindler, 1946. 
89Allenby to Curzon, 20 April 1919, enclosure: ‘Colonel Symes’ Note on Interview with the Sultan, April 17, 1919’, 
FO 407/184/286, TNA. 
Chapter Six: Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution: From Political Awakening to Nationalist Feminism 
 
284 
The home of the distinguished protestor ʿAtiyya Abu Isbaa was used as a convergence location for 
demonstrators on the first day of their march. The house was in Garden City, near the central square 
of Maydan Ismaʿiliyya (later renamed Midan al-Tahrir or Liberation Square), and also close to 
government offices, as well as the headquarters of foreign diplomatic missions. Petitions were 
signed by all women who came together, and then an itinerary was explained to all marchers, with 
all those taking part encouraged to walk in an orderly manner, to maintain the image of a well-
organised and peaceful demonstration. Those participating mainly wore dress favoured by women 
from the highest strands of Cairo society, namely black abayas, and white face veils.90 Most of them 
arrived by car, keeping them parked nearby as they set out on the protest route. Estimates of the 
number of women who turned up ranged from 150 to 530.91 
Banners at the front of the demonstration projected slogans such as: “We protest the shedding of the 
blood of the innocent and the unarmed” and “We demand complete independence”.92 Those shouted 
out verbally included: “Long live freedom and independence!” and “Down with the protectorate!” 
The march progressed along Qasr al-ʿAini Street, now one of the oldest streets in central Cairo, 
towards the foreign missions and other administrative offices, where organisers aimed to distribute 
tracts stating their claims. However, it was then diverted to the home of Saʿad Zaghlul which was a 
prime place for the undertaking of the Wafdist movement – a symbol of the idea that all those 
involved in the protest were part of a “national family”. 
As the dissenting crowds approached the house of Saʿad Zaghlul, it soon became evident that the 
occupying forces were uneasy about what was going on. “When we had arrived at the end of Saʿad 
Zaghlul Pasha Street we were surrounded by British troops who levelled their weapons at us”, 
women wrote in a later petition.93 Huda Shaʿarawi then challenged the soldiers with the words: “Let 
me die so Egypt shall have an Edith Cavell.”94 Cavell was the English nurse who became a female 
martyr when she was killed by German soldiers in Belgium in 1915 after helping Allied prisoners of 
war to escape. The allusion to Cavell showed that Huda Shaʿarawi knew how to cite emotional 
British references to her own advantage. Other marchers had to physically restrain Shaʿarawi from 
overly intimidating the British. They feared that violence might ensue if this were to happen. The 
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officers then “kept us standing thus for two hours under a burning sun”.95 Sir Thomas Russell Pasha, 
British commander of the Cairo City Police, later admitted that it was his decision to keep the 
women standing around under a hot sun as a way of sapping their energy and morale. The tense 
situation came to an end when Russell called for the women’s cars to be summoned so that all the 
demonstrators could depart in a restrained, easily monitored fashion.96 
The American Consul-General was among foreign missions which received petitions from the 
women, which were to become central prescribed acts of notable women’s disobedience. Many 
included complaints about the way they had been treated by the British. Records confirm that the 
women engaged in the resistance came from the highest echelons of Cairo society. Those joining in 
the dissidence movement included Safiyya Zaghlul, Sharifa Riyad, Labiba Ahmad, Esther Fahmi 
Wissa, and the wife of the late revolutionary feminist activist Qasim Amin.97 Many were the wives 
and daughters of pashas and beys, and they signed their names accordingly. The register also reveals 
that many of the women who protested together came from the same august families.  
Opposition to the methods of the British military to suppress public demonstrations was expressed 
in the appeals to the authorities, as well as the principal call for Egyptian independence from Britain. 
Signatories specifically resented the practice of force against people, “who have done nothing more 
than claim the liberty and independence of their country, in conformity with the principles 
proclaimed by Dr. [President Woodrow] Wilson and accepted by all belligerent and neutral 
nations”.98 At the time Egyptians were hugely influenced by Wilson’s principles of self-
determination, as outlined in his Fourteen Points speech delivered to Congress at a joint session on 
January 1, 1918. Pleas presented by the select group of women condemned the British for using 
machine gun fire against unarmed women and children, especially as many of the women protestors 
marched peacefully. A petition signed by 118 women urged the international community: “We beg 
you to send our message to America and to President Wilson personally. Let them hear our call. We 
believe they will not suffer Liberty to be crushed in Egypt, that human Liberty for which you[r] 
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brave and noble sons have died.”99 The hint at the U.S. War of Independence from Britain was seen 
as a particularly poignant one by those who endorsed the solicitation. 
Analysing the early March 1919 events, Middle East specialist Beth Baron is categorical that gentry 
women spent next to no time demonstrating with women from other classes. In this sense the revolt 
was not a consolidated social one, Baron argues. Instead, the main aim of the non-violent rallies 
was, at first, to convince the British that the upper Egyptian classes objected to their presence in 
their country. Coptic and Muslim women thus joined forces. The women’s choice of black clothing 
with white veils was that of entitled women who lived in relative seclusion, albeit a highly 
privileged one. They set themselves apart from women working in menial jobs in the countryside, or 
in factories, or solely in their husband’s homes. The women used the telephone to plan their 
marches, and turned up in chauffeur driven cars. The evidence of this elitism, Baron contends, 
contradicts the idea that the “lady demonstrators” displayed collective solidarity and unity across 
class boundaries. On the contrary, their attitude contributed to maintain a very stiff hierarchical view 
of society based on class distinctions.100 
The primary outcome of the aristocratic women’s activity was to create a female Egyptian voice 
which would impress a wider, international audience. Petitions written by the high society women 
used expressions such as: “In the name of the women of Egypt” and many were signed as “The 
Ladies of Egypt” and “The Egyptian Women”.101 The Egyptian family unit also became a rallying 
cry for the women demonstrating in 1919. They dubbed themselves “the mothers, sisters and wives 
of the victims massacred for the satisfaction of British ambitions”.102 Through presenting themselves 
as “Mothers of the Nation”, women played on their moral high ground as such, so dramatising their 
campaign for freedom. Some commentators, such as the wealthy Socialist and prolific Coptic writer 
and journalist Salama Musa (1887-1958), have described the March 1919 popular gatherings as a 
feminist act. A staunch defender of women’s rights, Musa writes in his Memoirs published only a 
year after al-Rafiʿi’s authoritative Thawrat 1919: “That even women went out to stage 
demonstrations was not only a revolt against the English, but even more so against a thousand years 
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of veiled obscurity.”103 Baron, however, denies that feminist demands were rehearsed during the 
protests. Establishment women stayed away from working-class ones, and insisted on remaining cut 
off from other social groups, and indeed from men, so reinforcing gender barriers.104 
The historian Ijlal Khalifa wrote: 
It is said that the daughter of the wealthy or aristocratic class is the one who 
participated in the revolution and the adept political work after it, and that 
the daughter of the middle and lower classes is the one who died as a martyr 
by the hand of colonialism, who felt its humiliation and oppression.105 
Peasant women from the countryside also supported revolutionary action. Among their exertion 
were acts of sabotage, including the destruction of railway lines. Khalifa honours the “female 
martyrs” who died carrying out this kind of operation, and lists their names, the places they came 
from, and the dates of their deaths. The Egyptian feminist Nawal al-Saʿadawi (1931- ), suggests that 
“little has been said about the masses of poor women who rushed into the national struggle without 
counting the cost, and who lost their lives, whereas the lesser contributions of aristocratic women 
leaders have been noisily acclaimed and brought to the forefront”.106 
Demonstrations against the British became increasingly populist throughout 1919, with working-
class women who had marched in different sections to the bourgeois women gradually merging with 
them. So it was that class separations were crossed. Female historians, in particular, have 
underplayed the gender segregation that has been associated with elite women’s activity. There are 
also indications that women “agitated side by side with their men”.107 Husbands and wives were 
thus brought together in protest. Shaʿarawi’s memoirs make this manifest. 
Following the achievements of the revolution, upper-class women tried to establish a political role 
for themselves through the foundation on 12 January 1920 of the Wafdist Women’s Central 
Committee (WWCC), a subsidiary branch of the main Wafd. These female activists wanted to share 
the nationalist stage with their male counterparts so as to advance women’s political culture in new 
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directions. However, once nominal independence from the British had been granted in 1922, 
nationalist men who had worked with women in the liberation struggle disowned them. Women 
were thus prompted to create formal institutions to follow their own path towards female 
emancipation. Foremost among these was the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), which was set up 
and presided over by Huda Shaʿarawi in 1923. The EFU was to become the first in a number of 
influential women’s political organisations which would work towards equality and reform.  
 
The Aftermath of the 1919 Revolution: How Male Nationalists Disowned Feminist Nationalists 
Strains between men and women campaigning for Egyptian independence came to a head towards 
the close of 1920, when male Wafdists returned from London following talks with the British 
authorities. Emboldened by their negotiations with imperial leaders, the men presented new terms 
for self-government to their own countrymen. But they ignored women’s groups,108 and specifically 
the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee which had been working so hard towards self-
determination. Angered by the Committee’s snub, the women sent a stiff letter to Saʿad Zaghlul, in 
charge of the Wafd. The correspondence of 12 December 1920 was signed by Huda Shaʿarawi and 
read: 
We are surprised and shocked by the way we have been treated recently, in 
contrast to previous treatment and certainly contrary to what we expect from 
you. You supported us when we created our Committee. Your 
congratulatory telegrams expressed the finest hopes and most noble 
sentiments. What makes us all the more indignant is that by disregarding us 
the Wafd has caused foreigners to disparage the renaissance of women. They 
claim that our participation in the nationalist movement was merely a ploy to 
dupe our civilized nations into believing in the advancement of Egypt and its 
ability to govern itself. Our women’s renaissance is above that as you know. 
At this moment when the future of Egypt is about to be decided, it is unjust 
that the Wafd, which stands for the rights of Egypt and struggles for its 
liberation, should deny half the nation its role in that liberation.109 
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The relative success of the Egyptian Revolution which saw Britain grant the country nominal 
independence in 1922 was not the accomplishment envisaged by feminists. Instead, male liberal 
nationalists effectively abandoned their women supporters. Badran summarises what happened: 
Following independence, women’s liberation slipped in order of priority for 
male liberals, who became engaged in their own political power struggles. It 
was then that feminists proclaimed the start of the public, political 
movement for their own liberation and national liberation within the 
framework of their feminist movement and began the move to desegregate 
society by the removal of the veil.110 
These developments laid the foundations for the establishment of a genuinely feminist movement – 
one which could act beyond the original calls for independence. Free of its nationalist ideology, the 
grouping brought about what was, arguably, the most momentous period in the history of the 
Egyptian women’s movement. Faced with increasing marginalisation as they campaigned alongside 
male nationalists, women were determined not to be disregarded, as they were in 1924 when they 
were left out of the inaugural ceremonies of the new Egyptian Parliament. A year later, in 1925, 
women were also prevented from contributing to the third convocation of Parliament. Saiza 
Nabarawi, the young editor of L’Égyptienne (The Egyptian Woman), the journal of the Feminist 
Union, made much of what was clearly a “double standard” in one of her articles for the publication: 
In stating my complaint I by no means resent the presence of my 
distinguished colleagues but simply wish to raise a voice against unequal 
treatment. I should point out that representatives of the local press are often 
less favoured than certain foreign women… A double standard! This will 
always exist as long as men rule…Is it just that in this Egyptian land… our 
women should be the last to enjoy rights and prerogatives accorded 
others..?111 
The distinct biased principles of male nationalist advocates very much set the tone for the years to 
come. Women were quick to grasp the change in approach by the men, and set up groups aimed at 
combating it. The pioneering EFU was the original all-women faction that led the way in 
championing female rights.112 
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Women’s chronic setbacks at not attaining equal citizenship with men following the formulation of 
the 1924 Constitution were soon transformed into renewed demands for universal suffrage. 
Members of the EFU, as well as women working within other structures, concentrated once more on 
the goal of political equality. While this was happening, however, they were met with fierce 
religious criticism. Male Muslim conservatives were not wholly opposed to women fighting for their 
prerogatives when they were united with liberal nationalists in the common, formal request for self-
rule, but this enlightened view did not extend to allowing enfranchisement. The idea of having 
women voting and acting in the political sphere for any other reason beyond lobbying for 
independence was considered beyond the pale: 
Now focusing mainly on suffrage, the feminist movement evoked a hostile 
reaction, mainly from popular religious quarters, of the sort that the EFU had 
not attracted earlier. The problem was not simply that women’s intensified 
drive for political rights was threatening but that a segment of the patriarchal 
culture, anchoring its ideology and politics in a conservative reading of 
Islam, had been gaining momentum in the 1930s and 1940s… Feminist 
activism in its most symbolically threatening form, a suffrage movement, 
and patriarchy at its most conservative, were on a collision course.113 
Despite the inevitable reproval from the conservative elements of a profoundly religious society, 
however, women did make some gains during the period. These included a rise in the number of 
jobs made available to women. In 1923, the government granted equal secondary education for girls 
too, and in 1924 the minimum marriage age for both sexes was raised (it was set at 16 for girls and 
18 for boys). 1929 was also the first year that women were allowed to go to university. By the time 
World War II started, there was a marked curtailment in all political activity, and this had a 
profound effect on the fortunes of women in society. Saiza Nabarawi’s journal L’Égyptienne was 
forced out of business, for example. By the end of the war, however, women had established the 
Arab Feminist Union in Cairo, with Huda Shaʿarawi as the federation’s president.114 
The growth and dissemination of a literary culture among middle-class Egyptian women at the turn 
of the 19th century and early 20th century was tied up in a feminist awakening in the country. 
Nationalist aspirations were part and parcel of this movement, with women using pride in country 
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feminist advancement was largely overlooked by Egypt scholars while the writings of male 
intellectuals on feminism at the time were given more historical prominence.  
Charities and other associations combined with women’s literature and other forms of 
argumentation to promote a nationalist strife linked to feminist action. The participation of middle 
and upper-class women in a wide range of activities in the years leading up to 1919 suggests that 
women’s involvement in the 1919 revolution was more the result of a historical trend, rather than a 
radical new phenomenon. As they increased their undertaking, many felt as they were an integral 
part of a national endeavour against British control. What is less clear is exactly how much impact 
these women’s groups had on the nationalist entreprise. There is little doubt, however, that 
influential nationalist literature was propagated by fronts managed by women, along with ideas by 
word of mouth. So it was that women created a place for themselves in the fight for independence, 
albeit more of a guiding, moral role than an overtly political one. 
Privileged women also saw taking up a public duty as a means of voicing their concerns while 
displaying loyalty towards men engaged in the strive towards independence. The 1919 revolution, 
led by the Wafdist Saʿad Zaghlul, was a flagship opportunity for women to show that their 
aspirations lay beyond their own societal rights as women. Instead they wanted to demonstrate that 
they were just as capable of working towards Egyptian sovereignty as their fellow male patriots. 
Veiled female agitators led by Huda Shaʿarawi confronted the British, exhibiting their solidarity 
with all Egyptian nationalists, and particularly the Wafd party. These early female mobilisations – 
the first of their kind – certainly helped precipitate the qualified withdrawal of the British from 
Egypt in 1922. 
However, following nominal independence the same year, many male Egyptian nationalists 
effectively discarded women activists who had offered them so much allegiance. Feminists were in 
turn forced to face up to an unavoidable reality – to succeed they needed to form their own 





A struggle motivated by an “Egypt for Egyptians” spirit finally achieved nominal independence for 
the country in the first half of the 20th century. Through focusing on this sense of “oneness” this 
thesis has shown how the rise of nationalism on both mass and elite opinion before, during and after 
the First World War, was channeled towards success. 
This study has demonstrated that the Egyptian nationalist movement developed through and beyond 
the quelling of the ‘Urabi Revolt by the British army in 1882. The mutiny had begun as an effort to 
restore the rights of native Egyptian military officers, but turned into a full-blown protest against far 
broader injustices. Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi, who led the revolt, highlighted his country’s unique 
cultural identity. Beyond this, elite Muslim scholars took part in the uprising. These ‘ulama 
provided the religious and intellectual rationales for the growing Egyptian nationalism. 
Despite the short term failure of the ‘Urabi Revolt, this thesis discussed the immediate pre- and post-
First World War contexts that bolstered calls for self-government in Egypt so significantly. The 
British Occupation, and the particularly violent behavior of British soldiers during the Taba Crisis 
and the Dinshawai Incident in 1906, had caused widespread anger and the increased politicization of 
Egyptians. The country’s educated classes propagated radical thoughts, creating a vigorous 
militantism that would eventually spur society towards the 1919 Revolution. 
The activists were also to become preoccupied by the impact the Great War had on the political 
awareness of a colonized people. As so often throughout human history, war was a huge catalyst of 
change. The Wafd Party’s novel brand of nationalism – one which caught the British by surprise – 
was based on the legacy of Egypt’s extensive contribution to the global war. The hostilities exposed 
the country to a range of previously unheard of hardships, and indeed altered its entire social make-
up. Anti-British sentiment escalated under the Protectorate because of the widely held belief that the 
land had been pillaged by a colonising power. This stirred the nationalist consciousness as the 





The effendiya – in essence the aspirational middle-classes – continuously participated in politics 
during the war. The ground was prepared for them by the fastest growth of mass education since 
Muhammad ‘Ali’s reign. Oppression under the British Occupation also gave them ideas about how 
to win over and organise people. Both men and women reacted to changes in Egypt’s social, 
economic and political landscape, uniting around a common language, and a shared culture as they 
expressed dissent. 
The thesis argues, in particular, that conflict transformed the nationalist movement from one mainly 
involving a small elite based in Cairo into one supported by an extremely broad cross-section of 
socio-economic groups, including many from the countryside. An overwhelming feeling of 
dissatisfaction built up, with radicals constantly looking for a time and place to act. Crucially, those 
advocating a powerful Egyptian identity received backing from the country’s non-Muslim 
communities. This new sense of nationalism was an explicitly secular one, bringing together all 
indigenous Egyptians including the Coptic Christian minority.  
Meanwhile, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had internationalised the rhetoric of self-determination 
in pursuit of a new world order – a factor that was a huge boost to the Egyptian nationalists. The 
words of the American head of state were an inspiration to them as they perceived the idealism of 
the post-war era as a chance to advance their opposition to rule by British Empire forces. It was in 
fact Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Russian Bolshevik chief, who had theorised the concept of “self-
determination”, before Wilson globalised it as a “legitimising” ambition. The two men certainly 
generated an “international self-determination moment” that would benefit the anti-colonial 
movement in Egypt. 
Beyond the principles contained in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Egyptian nationalist leader Saʿad 
Zaghlul had emphasised the deep contradiction between discourse in Paris at the 1919 Peace 
Conference and British oppression on the ground. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Office had sent 
the Special High Commissioner General Sir Edmund Allenby to Egypt. Allenby was tasked with 
maintaining security across the country. He set about this by combining military brutality to 
safeguard peace in the countryside, while displaying apparent tolerance towards urban 
demonstrations of nationalism. Specifically, he allowed Saʿad Zaghlul and other senior Wafd Party 
members to be released after they were detained and then deported to Malta, so that they could 




The thesis has illustrated how civic nationalism resulted in people championing the common good 
of all Egyptians. However, those who led the 1919 Revolution perceived no direct connection 
between what they were striving to do at home and what nationalists in other Arab countries were 
trying to achieve. This lack of parallel nationalism was evident in both the ideology and the action 
of the revolutionaries. The revolt did, nonetheless, include a forceful feminist element. It did not 
bring about emancipation, but women’s anger at this need of progress helped to drive the 
establishment of a formal women’s movement.1 Rebellion culminated in the transformation of 
Anglo-Egyptian colonial relations, as Egypt was granted nominal independence in 1922. 
The reaction of the British to the wide-scale turmoil of March and April 1919 was to send Alfred 
Milner, the Colonies Secretary, to conduct an enquiry. His commission focused on the future of 
Egypt, but was met with overwhelming antagonism by nationalists. With cooperation refused, and 
the prevailing order rejected, Milner had concluded by February 1921 that the Protectorate could no 
longer operate effectively. He instead advised Lord Curzon, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, that 
nominal independence should be regarded as a viable option for Egypt. 
Despite Milner’s recommendation, there was still a strong desire in London to retain control of the 
Suez Canal, and other key assets – a position that conflicted with what the Egyptian people wanted. 
This huge discrepancy between the two views was reflected in the manner in which Britain was 
prepared to concede nominal independence. Securing strategic interests remained the priority of the 
British, who guaranteed they were still responsible for defence and foreign policy, especially as they 
continued to occupy the crucial Suez Canal Zone. Saʿad Zaghlul meanwhile kept on coordinating 
resistance across Egypt. 
It was on February 28th 1922 that Field Marshal Edmund Allenby ensured that the London 
government issued a unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence. The subsequent Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty deemed Egypt ‘a sovereign independent state’ with four notable exceptions: ‘the 
security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt’, ‘the defence of Egypt against all 
foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect’, ‘the protection of foreign interests in Egypt 
and the protection of minorities’ and ‘the Sudan’.2 
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Research in this thesis deliberately analysed events mainly from the point of view of indigenous 
Egyptians, rather than solely through outsiders who have written original histories of this period. In 
equally contemporary fashion, it has contended that the revolution exemplified the strength of both 
elitist and populist circles working together. This was manifested in the grievances of the highbrow 
Egyptians who eventually made their way to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, as well as in the 
columns of the journalists who fuelled Egypt’s burgeoning popular press. All played a crucial part in 
obtaining Egypt’s nominal independence, attempting a largely peaceful approach to political change 
in a campaign of civil disobedience that was to influence, among others, Mahatma Gandhi in India. 
This work forms a pertinent case study of all types of nationalism throughout the 20th century and 
beyond, and particularly Arab nationalism. It concludes that a nationalist movement cannot operate 
in a vacuum so, naturally, must be investigated within the social, political and economic 
developments of the country in which it took shape and thrived. Egyptian nationalism gained an 
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